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Abstract
This thesis develops an analysis of the binding theory within the Minimalist approach
to the architecture of the language faculty. As an expression of the principles governing
the distribution and referential dependencies of reflexives, pronouns, and referential-
expressions, the binding theory has proved a highly successful and influential outcome
of the generative programme. However, given the centralMinimalist conjecture that the
computational system is strictly derivational (non-representational), the binding theory
has become one of the most problematic modules of the grammar, relying crucially on
syntactically active constraints defined over representations of sentences.
I aim to capture a range of crosslinguistic empirical facts previously attributed to
Conditions A and B of the binding theory, armed only with purely derivational con-
cepts and a generalised derivational domain: the ‘phase’. It is argued that binding rela-
tions are essentially determined in the computational component of the grammar, and
substantial evidence is provided against viewing the binding conditions as interpre-
tive instructions applying at LF. I argue that the binding conditions’ effects can instead
be determined by the core operations Agree and Merge, with previously stipulated
constraints on binding, including c-command and locality, falling out naturally from
this analysis. Moreover, the strategy of reducing the local binding conditions to more
general mechanisms leads to an elimination of the binding theory as a component of
Universal Grammar.
Independently motivated modifications to the canonical implementation of the
Minimalist model are shown to furnish the approach with sufficient flexibility to ac-
count for some long-problematic empirical phenomena. This includes a complete treat-
ment of ‘picture-noun’ reflexivisation in English and an account of the syntactic envi-
ronments giving rise to non-complementarity between anaphors and pronouns. Finally,
proposals are made for extending the approach to accommodate structured crosslin-
guistic variation in binding domains and orientation phenomena, with particular focus
on Dutch, Norwegian, and Icelandic pronominal systems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Syntactic theory, in its broadest sense, is concerned primarily with the ways in which
individual lexical items combine to compose hierarchical structures, and with the rela-
tionships that hold between elements in different parts of the hierarchy. These intrasen-
tential relationships between different lexical items and/or phrases are often thought
to be morphosyntactic. For example, in many languages the subject and verb agree, re-
sulting in a different morphological form of the verb depending on whether the subject
is 1st, 2nd, or 3rd person, singular or plural. Similarly, DPs may bear different Case
morphology according to the grammatical function they fulfil: in English, a pronoun
in the subject position of a finite clause is marked with nominative Case morphology,
a pronoun in an object position is marked with accusative Case, and a pronoun in a
possessive position is marked with genitive Case. Some syntactic relations, however,
are not so obviously marked. This thesis aims to clarify the nature of one such type
of relation that holds intrasententially between DPs, namely binding. In formulating
a binding theory, we aim to determine the syntactic factors that govern the distribu-
tion and referential dependencies of different types of DP, analysing the mechanisms
which are responsible for them within the Minimalist approach to the architecture of
the human language faculty.1
1This thesis assumes that the reader is well versed in syntactic theory, although the bare bones of the
classical binding theory are outlined in this chapter and should be widely accessible. Readers familiar with
some version of the binding theory will want to skip the preliminaries as far as §1.2, where I lay out the
theoretical landscape in which the thesis is situated. Readers with a specialist knowledge of the various
revisions of the binding theory within the Extended Standard Theory (EST), Government and Binding
(GB), and Minimalist models may then wish to continue straight to §2.2.
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1.1 The classical binding theory
1.1.1 Referential properties of DPs
From the perspective of semantics, one of the most crucial properties of DPs is that they
(can) refer. That is, a linguistic expression (at some level, simply a string of sounds)
is able to relate to our mental representation of objects or individuals in the world.
Different types of DP exhibit quite different referential properties from one another.
Expressions which are not pronominal, known as R(eferential)-expressions, have fixed
reference in a given context, including proper names (Lee Trundle, Swansea), and defi-
nite descriptions (the new stadium). While names are ‘rigid designators’, having fixed
reference across contexts, the reference of definite descriptions may vary across (but
not within) contexts. For example, although the definite DP the new stadium could be
used to refer to Swansea’s stadium or Arsenal’s stadium, it is likely to be pragmatically
infelicitous to use it in one utterance to refer to Swansea’s, and in the next to refer to
Arsenal’s. Pronouns, on the other hand, differ from R-expressions in having variable
reference in any given context. In a sentence like (1), without knowing anything about
the context in which it may be uttered, the first pronoun he is likely to refer back to John,
while the second instance of he can plausibly either refer back to John or to Bill. Both
pronouns are used anaphorically, with their antecedent in the same sentence.
(1) John thought he had won but Bill thought he had lost.
Pronouns do not need an antecedent in the same sentence, though. They simply need
their referent to be sufficiently prominent in the discourse for the speaker and hearer
to be able to identify it. Given this deictic function of pronouns, either instance of he
in (1) could refer not to John or Bill but rather to some third party, given appropriate
pragmatic conditions.
The exception to this is the class of reflexive pronouns (e.g. myself, themselves)
and the reciprocal pronoun each other, which fail to refer at all unless they pick up an
intrasentential antecedent: (2a) is impossible,2 even though pragmatic factors strongly
point to John as the intended referent for himself. This contrasts with the non-reflexive
pronoun in (2b), which is grammatical in the same environment.
(2) a. * John won the lottery. Himself was delighted.
b. John won the lottery. He was delighted.
2(2a) is impossible at least in most varieties of English. In Southern Hiberno-English such sentences
may be grammatical; see §4.4.1 and §4.4.3.
1.1. The classical binding theory 17
The same effect arises with the reciprocal in (3a):
(3) a. * John and Mary told jokes. Each other laughed.
b. John and Mary told jokes. They laughed.
Clearly, the problem is that the antecedent for the reflexive and reciprocal cannot be
found sentence-internally. Compare (2a) and (3a) with (4a) and (4b) respectively.
(4) a. John considered himself to be delighted.
b. John and Mary laughed at each other’s jokes.
Since reflexives and reciprocals obligatorily have anaphoric (and not deictic) reference,
they are collectively termed ‘anaphors’. Other personal pronouns are collectively sim-
ply termed ‘pronouns’.3 In the terminology of formal logic, pronouns, as variables, can
be ‘bound’ by an antecedent within the same sentence, and indeed, anaphors must be.
1.1.2 The distribution of anaphors and pronouns
The difference between the referential dependencies intowhich anaphors and pronouns
(may) enter is reflected in their syntactic distribution. Broadly speaking, anaphors must
be bound by an antecedent which is sufficiently close by some syntactic measure, while
pronouns cannot be bound by an antecedent which is too close:
(5) a. John loves himself
b. * John said that Mary loved himself
(6) a. John and Mary love each other
b. * John and Mary said that Peter loved each other
In (5b), the addition of the extra syntactic material compared to (5a) between the reflex-
ive and its antecedent John appears to result in the ungrammaticality of the reflexive.
The same effect arises with the reciprocal and its antecedent John and Mary in (6b). A
pronoun, however, cannot be bound by an antecedent which is local to it: there must
be sufficient syntactic material between a pronoun and any other DP that binds it. For
example, in (7a), the pronoun him may refer to any (contextually appropriate) male
3The terminology is less than ideal: as we have seen, these pronouns may have anaphoric reference and
reflexives and reciprocals are themselves pronominal, though we will henceforth follow the convention
overwhelmingly adopted in the literature.
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individual, apart from John.4
(7) a. * Johni loves himi
b. Johni said that Mary loved himi
The shared subscript index on the pronoun and John indicates that the two DPs are in-
tended to enter into referential dependency: (7a) is only ungrammatical on the reading
whereby him and John refer to the same individual, so the index is clearly crucial.5 The
explanation for all of the empirical facts examined so far is generally attributed to a
binding theory, a statement of the mechanisms governing the syntactic distribution of
different classes of DP and its interaction with their referential dependencies.
1.1.3 The binding conditions
Now let us introduce some technical assumptions required to formalise the casual ob-
servations we have made concerning the conditions governing the binding behaviour
of anaphors and pronouns. First, we might define binding as follows:
(8) Binding
An anaphor or pronoun is bound if it is c-commanded by a category bearing an
identical referential index.
This immediately requires further technical definitions, of course. As above, a referen-
tial index is usually represented (by convention) as a subscript such as i, j, k (or equally
by integers) and while further details remain to be clarified, we assume that coindexa-
tion between DPs indicates a referential dependency. The second theoretical concept to
be defined is c-command, an interpositional relation. We may assume a fairly standard
definition, for example:
(9) C-command
α c-commands β if α does not dominate β and every γ that dominates α domi-
nates β.
(Chomsky and Lasnik 1993: 518)
4This fact might be considered somewhat surprising, since unless further context is provided John is
indeed the only contextually salient individual. Nevertheless the binding relation between John and him is
impossible until further syntactic material is placed between the pronoun and John, as in (7b).
5To the same end, we could provide indices on the anaphor and its antecedent in (5a) and (6a) above,
yet because that is in fact the only reading on which the sentence is grammatical, it is not crucial that we
do. Throughout the thesis I tend to omit indices on anaphors unless a distinction from some alternative
reading is crucial to the point being made.
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Wewill not see examples bearing on the relevance of c-command in this chapter, though
it will be shown to be crucial in the following chapters.
Having characterised binding more formally, we can now impose binding con-
ditions (often also termed ‘binding principles’) on anaphors and pronouns in order to
explain the data we have examined thus far.
(10) Binding Condition A
An anaphor must be bound within a local domain
Condition A, along the lines of the condition first proposed by Chomsky (1981), thus
predicts the grammaticality of (5a) and (6a), where the anaphor is locally bound. In (5b)
and (6b), however, although the anaphor again appears to be bound, the antecedent (in
each case, the matrix subject) is assumed not to occupy a position within the relevant
local domain. This violation of Condition A explains the ungrammaticality of each
sentence. For pronouns, we require a binding condition such as the following:
(11) Binding Condition B
A pronoun must not be bound within a local domain
In (7a), him is bound, and crucially, bound within the local domain. Condition B is
violated, again resulting in ungrammaticality. In (7b), him is bound, but we assume
that John is not in the pronouns’s local domain, so Condition B is satisfied.
Even for what appears to be a strictly semantic notion such as reference, these ini-
tial observations indicate that syntax plays a crucial role in this respect. By examining
in the following chapters which antecedents anaphors and pronouns can be bound by,
we will identify the syntactic factors that play a role in determining and constraining
binding relations, quite precisely characterising their mechanisms. Specifically, this will
allow us to articulate a particular version of the binding theory within a current syn-
tactic framework. At this point, we outline in further depth and technical detail certain
facts concerning the development of the binding theory and the theoretical assumptions
which will frame the analysis provided in this thesis.
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1.2 Theoretical context of the research
1.2.1 A brief history of the binding theory
Binding theory has long been an important component of generative syntactic frame-
works. At the outset of the thesis, it is important to stress that the binding theory has
in fact been the subject of perhaps unrivalled scrutiny in generative syntactic theory.6
Chomsky (1973) first proposed that constraints on binding could be reduced to those on
syntactic movement, an approach which was crystalised in the seminal Lectures on Gov-
ernment and Binding (Chomsky 1981). This intuitively appealing binding theory (out-
lined in detail in §2.1.3 below) based on binding conditions akin to those stated above
may still be considered the canonical approach, and one of the major success stories
of generative syntax. With the binding theory pushing the development of the syntac-
tic framework, a great deal of research into binding was undertaken in what might be
considered a classical period for the binding theory. However, a marked shift in think-
ing is observed in Knowledge and Language (Chomsky 1986b), where binding is once
again largely dissociated from movement. By this time, the classical binding theory
had already become largely untenable due to difficulties in accommodating evidence
resulting from crosslinguistic research into binding. While the Chomsky (1986b) up-
date to the binding theory proved influential, containing some ingenious theoretical
workarounds to capture problematic empirical facts from English, the general approach
was perhaps already doomed.
It may have already been clear at the time that a quite different sort of theory
was required to explain the distribution of anaphors and pronouns. Indeed, while re-
search into binding within the GB framework was losing momentum, alternatives in
the early 1990s gleaned some success. Notably, Pollard and Sag (1992, 1994) developed
an approach within HPSG arguing that a thematic hierarchy governed binding rela-
tions; within the GB model Reinhart and Reuland (1993); Reuland and Reinhart (1995)
proposed a conceptually similar approach whereby the binding theory constrains re-
flexivity of predicates, rather than the structural relations between an anaphor or pro-
noun and its antecedent. One of the most influential contributions of these approaches
was to scrutinise—and ultimately redefine—the empirical scope of the classical binding
theory. As a result, it became clear that certain empirical facts that Chomsky’s binding
theories had been set up to explain (particularly concerning anaphors bound at rather
long distance) were essentially governed largely by factors independent of the bind-
ing theory. Chomsky never addressed these new concerns in print, to the best of my
6Equally, I must concede that I can in no way hope to do justice to the rich theoretical literature that
already exists on the topic. For reasons of scope, space, and time, many issues related to the binding theory
must remain unresolved, uncovered, and even unmentioned.
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knowledge. By the time of the next major theoretical shift, the advent of the Minimalist
programme (Chomsky 1993, 1995b, where the binding conditions received only a mi-
nor makeover), the binding theory had rather lost its place as the jewel in the crown of
Principles and Parameters frameworks.
1.2.2 Current theoretical challenges
Given the volume and depth of successful research into binding (particularly within the
GB framework in the 1980s) it is natural to ask exactly what this thesis can bring to the
table. It is undeniable that the now well established and highly influential Minimalist
programme of Chomsky (1993 et seq.) has failed to adequately bring the binding theory
into the fold. The apparent shift away from the central importance of the binding theory
is particularly conspicuous given that “[i]t has been clear since the early days of Mini-
malism that the binding theory would be a problem” (Tsoulas 2004: 229). Critics of the
Minimalist programme might justifiably object that in striving for the admirable aim
of theoretical elegance Minimalism has glossed over an extremely significant empiri-
cal challenge. The success of the Minimalist programme must, however, be ultimately
measured by how well it can respond to such a challenge.
1.2.2.1 Technical problems
This thesis aims to put forward an explanation for the empirical facts covered by the
binding theory compatible with the aims and methodology of Minimalism, currently
the most widely adopted implementation of the Principles and Parameters model. We
must therefore identify what a Minimalist binding theory should look like, and eval-
uate how theoretically desirable such an approach would be. An important aim of
Minimalism is to eradicate as many theoretical devices as is necessary to achieve em-
pirical coverage. At the top of the hit-list are those devices which we would not expect
if language were in a sense optimally designed.7 Many of these, as it happens, have
been assumed to be critical concepts for the binding theory in previous syntactic frame-
works. Most importantly, Chomsky (1993) eliminates D-structure and S-structure, lev-
els (along with Logical Form) at which the binding conditions like those stated in (10)
and (11) were often thought to apply.8 Thus the binding conditions can be stated as
above, but only if they apply at one of the interfaces with the external systems of the
mind, Logical Form (LF) or Phonetic Form (PF). Whether this is empirically tenable
remains to be seen (and is the focus of chapter 3). Another fundamental issue for the
7Some possible characteristics of optimal design and other related matters are clarified in §2.2.1 below.
8For example, Belletti and Rizzi (1988) argue convincingly that Condition A can be met at any one of
these three levels, so reference to a single one is insufficient.
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binding theory in Minimalism is whether the binding conditions should indeed hold
as filters on the well-formedness of interface representations. Minimalism largely seeks
to reinterpret the representational filters of the GB framework as constraints on syntac-
tic operations during the derivation, ideally reducing to economy of computation. For
the binding theory, this strategy has clearly not been implemented in the framework
Chomsky (1993) outlines.
In addition to fundamental technical problems for the binding conditions, smaller
problems arise concerning their definitions. Chomsky (1995b) proposes an Inclusiveness
Condition, banning the insertion of syntactic objects in the derivation which were not
present in the initial selection of lexical items (the numeration). Indices are not present
in numerations and therefore no principles can be stated in terms of them. The imme-
diate question is how to define binding itself, since in (8) binding is defined as coin-
dexation with a c-commanding category. Finally, the local binding domain (which we
have not yet discussed for the binding conditions in (10) and (11)) requires a definition.
As we see in §2.1, the definition proposed in GB relies on the concepts of government
and accessible SUBJECTs, yet Minimalism dispenses with these as non-primitive ad hoc
concepts.
1.2.2.2 Broader theoretical problems
The problems facing the binding theory under Minimalist assumptions concern not just
the technicalities of its definitions, but also the motivation for the binding conditions
themselves. The aim of this thesis, then, is not simply to update the binding theory
using more palatable technical devices to rephrase the binding conditions. Although
achieving the former is itself by no means a trivial matter, I seek instead a more rad-
ical reinterpretation of the binding theory. The indications that this sort of alternative
must be examined stem from another consequence of Minimalism, namely that there
can be no module of the grammar governing binding. In the modular GB framework,
binding-theoretic principles were not necessarily required to relate to principles of the
other modules (like θ-theory, Case theory etc.). Yet Minimalism not only requires gram-
matical principles not to be simply stated ad hoc, but also aims to justify them from
the perspective of optimal design of language. The ideal binding theory on Minimalist
assumptions should therefore incorporate three related facts. First, that the represen-
tational binding conditions receive a natural derivational reinterpretation; second, that
constraints on binding receive an explanation in terms of economy and follow from
independent properties of the grammar; third, that the binding theory can be elimi-
nated. Thus, the sense in which we seek a deeper motivation for binding facts than
many previous approaches have should be quite clear. The extent to which these goals
can be achieved determines the success of the framework within which the analysis is
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couched.
1.3 Organisation of the thesis
The thesis is organised as follows. The following chapter charts the development of the
binding theory since its earliest origins in generative syntax, as seen through the eyes
of Chomsky. This admittedly blinkered view allows us to focus our attention on the
key questions for the research field and examine the progress of the binding theory in
tandem with the progress of generative syntax, providing a theoretical context for the
thesis. Our attention then turns to key characteristics of theMinimalist programme, and
in particular its more recent implementations, adopted here. Theoretical problems fac-
ing this framework are identified, and modifications to certain theoretical assumptions
made accordingly. Difficulties for the binding theory under Minimalist assumptions
are outlined, clarifying the aims of the thesis.
Chapter 3 addresses one of the greatest controversies surrounding the binding
theory, namely the level of representation or stage of the derivation at which the con-
straints on binding apply. The foundation is laid for a derivational approach under
which binding relations between DPs are established in the computational component
of grammar, rather than at the LF interface. Much of the chapter is devoted to refuting a
substantial body of evidence suggesting that the binding theory must apply at LF, and
hence take the form of a set of representational filters or interpretive procedures. I show
that the reported interactions between Condition A and other interpretive phenomena
assumed to hold at LF are misleading or incorrect.
Chapter 4 proposes a new account of Condition A facts, reducing the behaviour
of reflexives and reciprocals to their lexical feature specification. It is argued that Con-
dition A may be entirely subsumed by the core operation Agree, explaining why both
locality constraints and a c-command requirement must hold between an antecedent
and anaphor. Moreover, this eliminates the need for a binding-specific local domain
(such as ‘Governing Category’), correctly predicting that a phasemate requirement be-
tween antecedents and anaphors typically holds.
Chapter 5 continues in a similarly reductionist vein, with Condition B the target.
In order to explain why the local binding domain for Condition B effects does not coin-
cide exactly with that for Condition A effects, it is argued that the two conditions make
use of two different types of phase (independently motivated in chapter 2): phases at
LF are crucial for Condition A, and phases at PF are crucial for Condition B. With these
two domains, non-complementarity between anaphors and pronouns in various en-
vironments can be comfortably explained. With certain modifications to assumptions
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concerning Merge and Agree, Condition B is subsumed by a principle governing struc-
tural economy, ensuring (roughly) that interpositional dependencies are established by
syntactic operations. I propose that the economy principle can be incorporated into
the Merge algorithm, which I suggest can also explain the relevance of the PF-phase to
Condition B effects.
Chapter 6 broadens the empirical focus of the analysis to capture variation in
binding systems in other languages. I provide three case studies of binding systems,
restricting immediate attention to the Germanic languages Dutch, Norwegian, and Ice-
landic. Some widely reported problems for the classical binding theory are examined,
and we see how these may be accommodated within the approach to binding devel-
oped in chapters 4 and 5. Certain problems will necessarily remain, and only a slice of
the binding patterns for each language can, of course, be studied in any detail. How-
ever, I show that the broad narrow-syntactic approach to binding adopted in this thesis
can demonstrate sufficient flexibility to accommodate the observed crosslinguistic dif-
ferences among these three languages.
Chapter 2
Binding Theory and the Minimalist
programme
This chapter places the thesis in its theoretical context, providing an overview of Princi-
ples and Parameters perspectives on binding, and explaining the difficulties facing this
approach under Minimalist assumptions. In the first part of the chapter, various revi-
sions of the binding theory are evaluated with respect to empirical data; many loose
ends, it seems, remain. The second part introduces key modifications to the Princi-
ples and Parameters model imposed by the Minimalist programme and outlines the
version of this framework which I term the Derivation By Phase model (Chomsky 2000,
2001). Shortcomings of this approach are raised, and modifications proposed accord-
ingly. Finally, we examine the impact of the advent of Minimalism on the binding
theory (Chomsky 1993, 1995b), which requires all mechanisms involved in accounting
for binding facts to stand up to rigorous theoretical scrutiny.
2.1 Binding theory in Principles and Parameters
It is widely acknowledged that the distribution of anaphors and bound pronouns is
governed to some extent by syntactic factors. Accordingly, a theory of anaphoric re-
lations, or ‘binding theory’, has long been an important component of most syntactic
frameworks. Viewed from the perspective of Generative Grammar, the crucial initial
observation, first made by Jackendoff (1972), is that when an anaphor or pronoun is
bound by a particular antecedent, a complementary distribution between the two ob-
tains in English. Some basic cases revealing the non-complementarity are by now very
familiar:
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(1) a. Johni likes himselfi
b. * Johni likes himi
(2) a. Johni believes himselfi to love Mary
b. * Johni believes himi to love Mary
(3) a. * Johni said that Mary likes himselfi
b. Johni said that Mary likes himi
(4) a. * Johni said that himselfi likes Mary
b. Johni said that hei likes Mary
As Lasnik (1989b: 13) states, “essentially all versions of Binding Theory from Chom-
sky (1973) through Chomsky (1981) are designed to capture the complementarity of
anaphors and bound pronouns.” It is probably no surprise, then, that these versions
of the binding theory are chiefly centred on defining the relevant binding domains,
i.e. the size of the constituent in which an anaphor must be bound and a pronoun
free. Later research revealing counter-evidence to the strict complementarity predicted
by the binding theory, and crosslinguistic research into the behaviour of anaphora has
given rise to not only reformulations of the way the binding domains are stated, but
also to reanalyses of the nature of binding itself, e.g. the level(s) of representation at
which the binding theory applies, and how binding relations are actually encoded. As
all of these issues are central to this thesis, this chapter starts with an overview of the
evolution of the binding theory within transformational grammar, providing some the-
oretical context for the analyses proposed in the following chapters.
2.1.1 Chomsky (1973, 1976)
Chomsky (1973) focuses largely on the requirement for disjoint reference between pro-
nouns and other local DPs (or NPs, at the time). He proposes a ‘Rule of Interpretation’
which ensures that two DPs are interpreted as disjoint in reference. Chomsky (1976: 16)
later renames the relevant rule ‘Disjoint Reference’ (DR), “which assigns disjoint refer-
ence to a pair (NP, pronoun)”.1 DR predicts the ungrammaticality of a bound reading
for the pronoun in (1b) and (2b), for example, since wherever the DR rule can apply,
disjoint reference is forced. However, there must clearly be cases in which the applica-
tion of DR is blocked, in order to account for cases such as (3b) and (4b) for example.
Chomsky proposes two conditions responsible for delimiting domains within which
rules such as DR may operate. These are termed the Tensed-S Condition (TSC)2 and the
1As Disjoint Reference is a rather clearer term for this rule, I adopt it in the following discussion. The
reader should be aware that I use this term where Chomsky (1973) uses RI.
2Chomsky (1980) terms this the Propositional Island Condition (PIC). To avoid possible confusion with
the Phase Impenetrability Condition in recent Minimalist theory (see §2.2.2.3 below), we retain the original
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Specified Subject Condition (SSC). The SSC and TSC serve to block the application of
DR, hence these configurations permit bound interpretations for pronouns.3
2.1.1.1 Tensed-S Condition
(5) Tensed-S Condition (TSC)
“No rule can involve X, Y in the structure
... X ... [α ... Y ...] ...
where α is a tensed sentence.”
(Chomsky 1973: 238)
In both (1b) and (2b), the TSC does not block DR, as no tensed-S (finite CP) separates
John from the pronoun. Disjoint reference must therefore hold. Since there is indeed a
finite clause boundary between John and the pronoun in (3b) and (4b), DR is blocked,
hence a coreferential interpretation for the pronoun is permitted.
The TSC also has implications beyond DR. A notable aspect of Chomsky’s (1973)
approach to binding is that other syntactic dependencies, in particular movement, are
constrained by the same principles governing binding. The TSC is not simply a con-
straint on DR, but ensures that ‘no rule’ can operate in the particular structural config-
uration. For example, the TSC predicts that A-movement in passive constructions is
limited to infinitival (i.e. untensed) complements, on the assumption that a passivisa-
tion rule must apply between the moved constituent and its trace:4
(6) a. The footballersi are believed [ti to be promiscuous]
b. * The footballersi are believed [ti are promiscuous]
Another variety of movement rule, ‘each movement’, derives the distribution of
anaphors (or at least reciprocals).5 Following Dougherty (1970), Chomsky assumes that
movement of each is responsible for the appropriate interpretation of reciprocal con-
term.
3Chomsky (1973) assumes that in (4b), for the interpretation where he corefers with John, the rule de-
termining coreference is not subject the SSC or TSC. However, following Lasnik (1976), Chomsky (1976)
assumes that there is no rule at all governing coreference between pronouns and antecedents in nonlocal
configurations such as this.
4As outlined below, it is noteworthy that in the binding theory proposed by Chomsky (1976 et seq.)
passivisation is in fact assumed to be constrained essentially by the binding theory, with the relation be-
tween an A-moved element and its trace assumed to be equivalent to that between an antecedent and an
anaphor.
5A notable oversight of the Chomsky (1973) binding theory is that it offers no account for the distribu-
tion of reflexives.
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structions. So, (7b) is derived from an underlying structure like (7a) by lowering of each
into the position of the (other):
(7) a. The reporters each lied about the other
b. The reporters ti lied about eachi other
Since no intervening finite clause boundary occurs between the position of each in (7b)
and the position it has moved from (the subject DP), the TSC does not block each move-
ment and so is correctly predicted to be grammatical. In (8b), on the other hand, al-
though the apparently analogous sentence (8a) is grammatical, each movement is not,
crossing the finite clause boundary:
(8) a. The reporters each said that Mary lied about the other
b. * The reporters ti said [that Mary lied about eachi other]
*
As each movement and DR are both rules constrained by the TSC (and SSC below),
the complementary distribution of anaphors (reciprocals at least) and pronouns is pre-
dicted.
2.1.1.2 Specified Subject Condition
The second constraint proposed by Chomsky (1973) is the Specified Subject Condition,
devised to explain the distribution of reciprocals and pronouns in non-finite clauses,
and in complex DPs:6
(9) Specified Subject Condition (SSC)
“No rule can involve X, Y in the structure
... X ... [α ... Z ... - WYV ...] ...
where Z is the specified subject of WYV in α.”
(Chomsky 1973: 239)
Just like the TSC, the SSC blocks the application of DR, accounting for the distribution
of pronouns, and the application of each movement, accounting for the distribution of
6Chomsky (1973: 246) further modifies the SSC in order to better explain the properties of wh-
movement, but this need not concern us here. In fact, I will leave aside the matters of whether and how
the SSC can or should constrain wh-movement, as it is only tangential to our purposes here and would
require a rather involved discussion.
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reciprocals. Take first the blocking of DR, resulting in the possibility of a coreferential
reading for a pronoun:
(10) a. The footballersi believe [the supermodel to love themi]
b. The footballersi laughed at [the supermodel’s pictures of themi]
In neither sentence does a finite clause boundary intervene between the pronoun and
its antecedent, so the TSC fails to block DR. Yet the SSC ensures that in both sentences,
the presence of an intervening subject the supermodel(’s) (of the ECM complement in
(10a) and of the complex DP in (10b)) blocks DR from applying on the structure, and so
a bound reading for the pronoun is permitted. Accordingly, when the pronouns in (10)
are replaced with reciprocals, the sentences are ungrammatical, since the SSC blocks
each movement, predicting the observed complementarity.7
(11) a. * The footballersi believe [the supermodel to love each otheri]
b. * The footballersi laughed at [the supermodel’s pictures of each otheri]
The presence of a subject can be shown to be the crucial factor in determining whether
each movement applies since when the DP-internal subject is removed from (11b), each
movement is no longer blocked.
(12) The footballersi laughed at [the pictures of each otheri]
However, as we will see below, the prediction that DR can now also apply is not in
fact borne out. More recently, this has proven to be a weakness of Chomsky’s (1973)
approach to binding and its immediate successors.
(13) The footballersi laughed at [the pictures of themi]
Chomsky’s (1973) system requires that subjects be ‘specified’ with respect to an-
other category. Overt (‘lexical’) subjects, i.e. those not identified as PRO or a trace, are
obligatorily specified, whereas the specifiedness of PRO and trace subjects is contingent
on the relevant controller: if the subject is controlled (e.g. PRO control) by X or by a cat-
egory containing X, then it is not specified with respect to X. This accurately predicts
certain awkward binding facts with control constructions. Take first the case of object
7Tomy ear, though not entirely grammatical, (11b) contrasts significantly with the ungrammatical (11a).
In fact, Asudeh and Keller (2001); Keller and Asudeh (2001); Runner (2003) report that many speakers find
binding into a DP containing a subject completely grammatical. As we will see later in the thesis, the em-
pirical facts concerning binding in complex DPs are rather more complicated than the basic observations
outlined at present.
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control verbs (e.g. persuade, advise, ask), where the PRO subject of the infinitival com-
plement is controlled by the matrix object. In (14a), as PRO is not controlled by we, it
is specified with respect to we, thereby blocking the application of each movement from
we to other in the control clause. Similarly, in (15a), with a pronoun in the place of the
reciprocal, SSC blocks the application of DR, which makes the sentence grammatical on
the bound reading for us. In (14b), however, PRO is controlled by the matrix object us,
and is therefore not specified with respect to us. Hence there is no SSC configuration,
permitting each movement to apply freely between us and other. In the equivalent (15b),
the absence of an SSC configuration permits DR to apply, blocking the bound reading
for us in the infinitival complement.
(14) a. * Wej persuaded Billi [PROi to kill each otherj]
b. Billj persuaded usi [PROi to kill each otheri]
(15) a. Wej persuaded Billi [PROi to kill usj]
b. * Billj persuaded usi [PROi to kill usi]
As predicted under such a theory, the opposite holds with subject-control verbs,
where the PRO subject of the infinitival complement is controlled by the matrix subject.
In (16a), PRO is controlled by we, and hence is not specified with respect to we, allowing
application of each movement; it is in (17a) too, permitting the application of DR. In
(16b), though, PRO is controlled by Bill, and is therefore specified with respect to us.
Hence each movement from us to other is blocked, as is DR between us and us in (17b).
(16) a. Wei promised Billj [PROi to kill each otheri]
b. * Billj promised usi [PROj to kill each otheri]
(17) a. * Wei promised Billj [PROi to kill usi]
b. Billj promised usi [PROj to kill usi]
Similarly, the status of subject traces as specified or not specified with respect to
a pronoun/anaphor results in differing grammaticality judgements. In (18a), the trace
is coindexed with the raised subject, and so is not specified with respect to we. Thus,
DR is not blocked, and disjoint reference is (impossibly) forced between we and us. As
is now familiar, of course, this lack of SSC configuration also allows each movement to
occur from the matrix subject to the infinitival clause object, as in (18b).
(18) a. * Wei seem to Billj [ti to like usi]
b. Wei seem to Billj [ti to like each otheri]
On the other hand, the trace subject of a raising complement is specified with respect to
the experiencer argument, Bill. Hence, DR is blocked between Bill and the object of the
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infinitival clause in (19a), permitting the reading of the pronoun coreferential with Bill,
and each movement from Bill to other is blocked in (19b).
(19) a. Wei seem to Billj [ti to like himj]
b. * Billi seems to usj [ti to like each otherj]
2.1.1.3 Modifications and extensions
Chomsky (1976) revises the role of traces in binding, with important consequences.
The relation between binding and NP-movement becomes formalised in the treatment
of NP-traces as anaphors, hence subject to the same conditions as those governing
anaphora. This is an interesting about-turn. In the Chomsky (1973) system, the TSC and
SSC constrain transformational operations: the distribution of reciprocals is explained
since these constructions involve movement of each. Yet Chomsky (1976) recasts the
TSC and SSC as constraints on anaphora (or in his terms, “surface structure interpre-
tation”), and not on transformations at a more general level.8 Thus, rather than the
distribution of reciprocals reducing to a constraint on movement, Chomsky (1976: 319)
assumes that it is determined by a syntactic interpretive rule, termed Reciprocal In-
terpretation, “which assigns an appropriate sense to sentences of the form NP...each
other”.9 (A-)Movement, on the other hand, can be dealt with in a similar fashion, on
the assumption that the relation between an A-moved DP and its trace is also a case of
bound variable anaphora. The theoretical shift should be clear: the SSC and TSC are no
longer conditions on transformations, but on (surface structure) interpretations.
Once traces are treated as elements with referential properties, they can then act
as antecedents themselves. However, Lasnik (1989b) highlights that Chomsky (1976)
appears to overlook this possibility. Lasnik argues convincingly for a simplification to
the Chomsky (1973, 1976) SSC, based on the idea that nonlexical subjects (traces and
PRO) can themselves act as antecedents for the purposes of the SSC (rather than simply
as specified subjects), proposing that all subjects may be treated as specified subjects,
effectively allowing us to dispense with the notion of specifiedness from the binding
theory. Lasnik shows that not only is this a quite natural assumption, but there is also
empirical evidence for this: wh-movement constructions reveal that the A′-trace, and
not the overt wh-phrase, acts as the binder.
(20) a. * Whoi did Mary say [ti loves himi most]
b. Which meni does Mary think [ti get on each other’si nerves]
8Although see Lasnik (1985) for certain ways in which the distribution of NP-trace is not explained by
its treatment as an anaphor.
9Note that this approach is anticipated in less formal discussions in Chomsky (1975).
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In (20a) and (20b), the TSC should block DR and each movement respectively between
the wh-subject and the embedded clause object. Clearly, this is not the case. Of course, if
we assume that the A′-trace is acting as the antecedent, the data are consistent with the
TSC, since no finite clause boundary intervenes between the trace and the pronoun or
reciprocal.10 Other cases of traces acting as nonspecified subjects can now be reanalysed
accordingly. Take (19a) and (19b), repeated below.
(21) a. Wei seem to Billj [ti to like himj]
b. * Billi seems to usj [ti to like each otherj]
Essentially, it is no longer relevant that the trace induces a SSC configuration for the
binding relation between the experiencer argument of seem and the object in the infini-
tival clause. The trace, which inherits the referential properties of its antecedent and is
not coreferent with the object in the infinitival clause, now counts as a subject for the
SSC, which can be simplified to contain no reference to specifiedness. For example, if
the reciprocal in (21b) is to be bound in a configuration satisfying SSC, it must now be
bound by the trace. Since this trace is coreferential with Bill, Reciprocal Interpretation
will not be able to apply, and the sentence is correctly predicted ungrammatical.
As soon as traces can be shown to act as antecedents, Lasnik argues that PRO
should be reanalysed in the same way. Clearly, at least arbitrary PRO may act as a
binder, e.g. for a reflexive:
(22) PROi to believe oneselfi superhuman is unwise
If PRO can act as an antecedent, the binding facts with control are explained in much
the same way as the raising cases just examined. Take for example (14a) and (14b),
repeated below:
(23) a. * Wej persuaded Billi [PROi to kill each otherj]
b. Billj persuaded usi [PROi to kill each otheri]
All subjects (and not just specified ones) now induce SSC configurations, and as PRO
is a subject, each other will not be able to seek an antecedent beyond PRO. Accordingly,
10In light of more recent theoretical assumptions, such an approach may in fact be inescapable. Under a
view of movement as a copying operation (Chomsky 1993, and much subsequent research in the Minimal-
ist framework; see especially Hornstein 1995), there is no clear reason for traces not to have the binding
properties of antecedents, if traces are simply identical copies of the moved category which simply have
no realisation at PF. From a Minimalist perspective, not only is the elimination of an ad hoc concept (‘spec-
ifiedness’) welcome, but as I show in §4.3, the adoption of Lasnik’s assumptions about nonlexical subjects
has the desirable consequence of reducing binding facts to much more local constraints.
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(23a) is ungrammatical since PRO does not corefer with the required antecedent we,
while (23b) is grammatical because it does corefer with the required antecedent us.
2.1.1.4 Summary
This approach to anaphoric relations represents the first step towards assimilating con-
straints on binding to those on movement, a productive research programme which
has since borne fruit but, equally, has encountered many obstacles. However, there re-
main many empirical gaps, and most importantly, reflexive pronouns are given only a
passing mention.
2.1.2 Chomsky (1980)
Chomsky (1980) makes important steps towards the classical binding conditions, sim-
plifying, formalising and unifying important concepts. Notably, reciprocals, PRO, and
trace are classified together as anaphors, while the concepts bound and free are for-
malised for the first time as follows:
(24) “[A]n anaphor α is bound in β if there is a category c-commanding it and co-
indexed with it in β; otherwise, α is free in β.”
(Chomsky 1980: 10)
With specifiedness eliminated from the definition of the SSC,11 Chomsky aims to
unify the SSC and TSC as the “Opacity condition”, effectively proposing that “Tense
and Subject are ‘operators’ that make certain domains opaque” (Chomsky 1980: 11):
(25) The Opacity Condition
“If α is an anaphor in the domain of the tense or the subject of β, β mini-
mal,[footnote omitted] then α cannot be free in β, β = NP [DP] or S¯ [CP].”
(Chomsky 1980: 10)
The Opacity Condition is presented as a conceptual shift; no longer does the distribu-
tion of anaphors follow from a constraint governing positionswhichmay be involved in
a rule, but this now follows from a condition on anaphors. However, Chomsky (1980)
notes that there is a degree of redundancy in the Opacity condition as stated above
11Though there appears to be no discussion of this, we assume along the lines outlined by Lasnik (1989b)
above.
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(and equally in previous versions of SSC and TSC). The SSC component rules out non-
subject anaphors bound across a subject, in both finite and non-finite clauses; the TSC
component rules out all anaphors (subjects and non-subjects) from being bound across
a finite clause. Hence, when both tense and a higher subject are present in the clause
containing a non-subject anaphor, the presence of each will independently account for
the violation of Opacity, ruling out cases such as (26):
(26) * Theyi told me [what I gave each otheri]
Chomsky eliminates this redundancy by first dispensing with the TSC component of
the Opacity Condition, which now just applies to SSC cases (blocking binding across
subjects):
(27) The Opacity Condition
“If α is in the domain of the subject of β, β minimal, then α cannot be free in β.”
(Chomsky 1980: 13)
Hence the SSC is essentially reinstated as the Opacity Condition. Since the Opacity
Condition rules out cases of non-subject anaphors unbound in their finite clause as
in (26), to replicate the empirical coverage of the Chomsky (1973) system it remains
only to block anaphors in subject positions of finite clauses. Effectively, then, Chom-
sky (1980) allows the TSC (i.e. the ‘tense’ part of the version of the Opacity Condition
in (25)) to apply only to the subject of finite clauses. Given that finite clause subjects
are assigned nominative Case, Chomsky additionally proposes the Nominative Island
Condition (NIC):
(28) The Nominative Island Condition
“A nominative anaphor cannot be free in S¯ [CP].”
(Chomsky 1980: 36)
Chomsky notes that an advantage is the correct prediction of the grammaticality judge-
ments for sentences such as (29a) and (29b). While the grammaticality contrast is sharp,
the TSC predicts both to be ungrammatical, bound across a finite clause boundary. Un-
der the Chomsky (1980) binding theory, however, each other bears nominative Case in
(29b) and is thus blocked by the NIC, but not in (29a), (since it is the DP pictures of each
other which bears nominative Case):12
12In the binding theory literature since, it has often been argued that the reciprocal in positions such
as (29a) is not in fact a true anaphor, since it seems to exhibit different properties from other anaphors.
Equally, there is a possible analysis whereby the DP pictures of each other contains a PRO which locally
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(29) a. Theyi expected [that pictures of each otheri would be on sale]
b. * Theyi expected [that each otheri would be there]
It is important to note that the Opacity Condition and NIC are constraints on
anaphors, whereas in the Chomsky (1973, 1976) system the SSC and TSC also constrain
the application of DR. The Chomsky (1980) system for blocking local binding of pro-
nouns is rather more involved, relying on the technicalities of different indexing algo-
rithms for different types of DP. In the case of movement, Chomsky (1980) suggests
that movement coindexes a moved element and its trace during the derivation. Any
DPs which are unmoved then receive an index one by one, from the top down.13 For
anaphors, coindexation with an antecedent is determined by the construal rules of Con-
trol, Reciprocal, and Bound Anaphora. Nonanaphors are also assigned these referential
indices just like anaphors (assuming that they have not already received one via move-
ment), top down. Each DP is assigned a new, unused referential index. Furthermore,
they are also assigned a different sort of index, an ‘anaphoric’ index. Whereas a referen-
tial index is an integer, an anaphoric index is a set of referential indices. Loosely, if the
DPs already assigned referential indices by the top down algorithm bear the referential
indices 2 and 3, then the anaphoric index of the next DP down will be {2,3}. It will also
be assigned a unique referential index, so the index of a nonanaphor can be treated as
a pair, in this case (4,{2,3}). The anaphoric index serves to ensure disjoint reference with
the the DPs already assigned referential indices: “interpret the anaphoric index A = {a1,
..., an} of α to mean that α is disjoint in reference from each NP with referential index
ai” (Chomsky 1980: 39). To replicate the empirical coverage of DR, it remains to permit
coreference between pronouns and antecedents in nonlocal configurations. To this end,
Chomsky proposes that anaphoric indices on pronouns can be deleted by the Opacity
Condition and the NIC, effectively permitting free reference. Hence a pronoun which
has no c-commanding DPs in its local Opacity/NIC domain will have an anaphoric
index of {}, like he in (30a), while a pronoun with only a c-commanding DP with refer-
ential index 3 in its Opacity/NIC domain will have an anaphoric index of {3}, like he in
(30b):14
binds the reciprocal, which would mean that binding across the finite clause is not in fact taking place
here. Detailed discussion is provided in §4.4.1, but the reader should bear in mind for now that subsequent
developments have made this ‘advantage’ of the Chomsky (1980) binding theory highly controversial.
Furthermore, the ungrammaticality of reciprocals as nominative subjects is unclear. At least in spoken
English, sentences such as the following are often heard (Woolford 1999; Everaert 2001; Bruening 2006):
(i) Wei always seem to know [what each otheri is thinking]
See §4.4.3 for further discussion.
13Formally, “an index is assigned to NP only when all NPs that c-command or dominate it have been
indexed” (Chomsky 1980: 39).
14For the technical implementation of this system, the reader is referred to the discussion in Chom-
sky (1980) (although Chomsky himself admits that details remain to be fully fleshed out). For example,
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(30) a. John(2,{}) told Bill(3,{}) [that he(4,{}) was a fool]
b. John(2,{}) said [that Bill(3,{2}) hated him(4,{3})]
As Lasnik (1989b) highlights, the important departure from the DR rule is that the syn-
tactic and semantic aspects of DR are teased apart, with syntax constraining the index-
ation possibilities and semantics providing an appropriate interpretation to them.
2.1.3 Chomsky (1981)
2.1.3.1 The Binding Conditions
Chomsky’s (1981) version of the binding theory provides a more coherent and complete
account for the distribution of anaphors and pronouns, responding to various empiri-
cal and theoretical shortcomings of the Chomsky (1980) framework. One shortcoming
is the complexity of the indexing conventions required to account for disjoint reference
effects, as outlined above.15 Another is that the Opacity Condition and NIC are some-
what disparate, and it is unclear why subjects of finite clauses and the domain of a
subject should be relevant. In response to these (and other) concerns, Chomsky (1981)
proposes the following binding conditions, to apply at S-structure:
(31) The Binding Conditions
(A) An anaphor is bound in its governing category
(B) A pronominal is free in its governing category
(C) An R-expression is free
(Chomsky 1981: 188)
Here, ‘bound’ is understood as in (24), while in each case, binding is A-binding, i.e. by
an element in an A-position; there is no longer any reference to anaphoric indices.
2.1.3.2 Governing Categories
While these conditions ensure that pronouns must not be locally bound and that ana-
phors must be, the complexities of the Opacity Condition (previously SSC) and NIC
anaphors are also subject to index deletion.
15Moreover, Lasnik (1989b) shows that the indexing conventions introduce a considerable degree of
redundancy in the binding conditions for anaphors.
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are now reapportioned to the definition of the binding domain, the governing category
(GC).16
(32) Governing Category
“β is a governing category for α if and only if β is the minimal category containing
α, a governor of α, and a SUBJECT accessible to α”
(Chomsky 1981: 211)
As this definition introduces some more technical concepts, some clarifications are in
order. Firstly, the notion of government is (naturally) central to the Government and
Binding framework proposed by Chomsky (1981). We need not concern ourselves with
the detail here (the reader is referred in particular to Chomsky 1981: 162–170), but we
may follow Chomsky’s rough characterisation of the relation:
“In a general way, then, we are assuming that a lexical head governs its
complements in the phrase of which it is the head, and that INFL governs
its subject when it contains AGR (and in the unmarked case, is tensed). [...]
Furthermore, we have government across S [TP] but not across S¯ [CP] in
structural configurations that are formally similar to those of a head and its
complements...”
(Chomsky 1981: 162)
Chomsky observes a sort of redundancy between Case and binding, since both treat the
subject position of a non-finite clause as exceptional with respect to other positions. On
the one hand, it is the only NP position that is typically unmarked for Case; coinciden-
tally, it is also the only typically transparent NP position for the purposes of anaphor
binding. With the notion of governing category, not only does Chomsky take steps to-
wards integrating the systems of Case and binding (and other modules of the grammar
where government is critical), but also reduces two apparently independent conditions
on anaphors (Opacity and the NIC) to one.17
Yet the GC also requires reference to another new concept, the ‘accessible SUB-
JECT’. For infinitival clauses, small clauses, and DPs, the accessible SUBJECT is the
16The definition of GC has taken various forms since its original formulation by Chomsky (1981) (see,
e.g., Chomsky 1982, 1986b).
17This reduction of the Opacity Condition and the NIC to the GC is possible as Chomsky (1981: 160)
finally gives up on the assumption that wh-movement is constrained by the NIC. While Opacity clearly
does not constrain wh-movement, Chomsky had previously assumed that the NIC did. Yet if this were
true, then not only would this be unexplained, but the two principles could not be reduced to a single one.
A-movement and anaphora, on the other hand, are subject to both, and so Chomsky (1981) assumes that a
separate principle, informally termed “the residue of the NIC” is required to account for wh-movement.
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subject DP (if it has one, in the case of DPs). This is included in the definition of GC
to account in particular for the disparity in binding domains with possessed and non-
possessed DPs. The intuition is that in computing the GC, if an anaphor’s local domain
does not contain a subject, then the GC is extended. For example:
(33) a. * They heard [DP my stories about each other]
b. They heard [DP the/∅ stories about each other] (Chomsky 1981)
In (33a) then, the governor of the anaphor is about, and an accessible SUBJECT my oc-
cupies SpecDP, making the GC the minimal DP containing it. Coindexation with an
antecedent outside that category, i.e. they, is thus impossible by Condition A. In (33b)
on the other hand, although the governor is still about, the minimal DP containing the
anaphor does not contain an accessible SUBJECT; the GC thus extends to the matrix TP,
permitting coindexation of the anaphor and they.
Not only syntactic subjects count as accessible SUBJECTs for the definition of GC;
in finite clauses, AGR is the relevant accessible SUBJECT, which is obligatorily coin-
dexed with both the subject it governs and the anaphor that that subject binds. With
the definition of accessible SUBJECT as either finite AGR (when present) or a syntactic
subject, the effects previously attributed to Chomsky’s (1980) NIC/Opacity disjunction
are now fully subsumed under Conditions A and B. In the case of NIC effects, as nomi-
native Case is assigned under government by AGR, anaphors are not permitted to occur
as nominatives: since AGR is both the governor and accessible subject for a nominative
anaphor in SpecTP, (finite) TP will always delimit the GC, which in principle cannot
contain a c-commanding binder for the anaphor, hence the ungrammaticality of (34)
(previously an NIC effect):
(34) * [TP Johni believes [CP that [TP himselfi is a saint]]]
Anaphors are permitted as subjects of (non-finite) ECM complements, however, since
the governor of the subject of an ECM complement is the ECM verb (e.g. believe) in the
matrix clause, and the closest accessible SUBJECT is thematrix clause AGR: this extends
the GC for the anaphor (ECM subject) to the matrix TP, allowing a matrix clause subject
to bind the anaphor, as in (35):
(35) [TP Johni believes [TP himselfi to be a saint]]
In both environments pronouns are correctly predicted to be in complementary dis-
tribution with anaphors. Now consider Opacity effects (where the anaphor is not a
subject):
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(36) a. * [TP Johni believes [CP that [TP Mary likes himselfi]]
b. * [TP Johni believes [TP Mary to like himselfi]]
In both (36a) and (36b), for example, the governor for the anaphor is like. In (36a),
where the complement is finite, the closest accessible SUBJECT is AGR, and in (36b),
the closest accessible SUBJECT is the subject of the infinitival clause, Mary. Hence in
each the GC for the anaphor is its minimal TP: as an appropriate binder for the anaphor
is not in the GC, each is ungrammatical.
There is one more twist in the story of GCs, however. Accessibility of SUBJECTs
remains to be defined. First, Chomsky (1981) proposes the (subsequently named) ‘i-
within-i’ condition:
(37) The i-within-i condition
“*[γ . . . δ. . . ], where γ and δ bear the same index.”
(Chomsky 1981: 212)
Accessibility of SUBJECTs then makes reference to i-within-i as follows:
(38) Accessibility
“α is accessible to β if and only if β is in the c-command domain of α
and assignment to β of the index of α would not violate [37]”
(Chomsky 1981: 212)
This definition of accessibility serves two functions. Most importantly in light of the
present discussion, it covers over an empirical gap left from the change from the Chom-
sky (1980) system. Recall that an advantage of the NICwas supposedly that it explained
why anaphors as finite clause subjects were ungrammatical, while those embedded
within finite clause subjects were not necessarily. This was shown in (29a) and (29b),
repeated below:
(39) a. Theyi expected [that pictures of each otheri would be on sale]
b. * Theyi expected [that each otheri would be there]
Clearly, in (39a) the embedded clause TP must not be the relevant GC, while in (39b) it
must be. In both cases, the governor of the anaphor will be inside the embedded clause
TP: of in (39a) and AGR in (39b). Also, in both, the finite complement clause AGR will
be the closest SUBJECT. Yet if AGR were an accessible SUBJECT in (39a), TP would be
the GC for each other, and binding by they would be incorrectly excluded due to locality.
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The definition in (38) blocks this possibility. AGR cannot be an accessible SUBJECT
in this case, since coindexing each other with AGR—and hence also with the subject
pictures of each other—creates an illegal i-within-i configuration, that is, the reciprocal is
coindexed with the DP containing it.
Independent motivation for the i-within-i condition comes from other construc-
tions where a pronoun or anaphor occurs within a coindexed DP:
(40) a. * [DPi the friends of each other’si parents]
b. * There is [DPi a picture of itselfi] on the mantelpiece
c. * [DPi the owner of hisi boat]
d. * [DPi the friends of theiri parents] (based on Chomsky 1981)
Note, however, that (40a) and (40b) are redundantly excluded by the i-within-i condi-
tion, since Condition A also rules them out due to there being no c-command relation
between the antecedent and the anaphor. Yet there are further problems, too, since
Chomsky (1981: 229, fn. 63) notes that relatives embedded in DPs can contain elements
coreferent with the head of the relative, contradicting the i-within-i condition as stated
in (37):
(41) [DPi the man [whoi ti saw himselfi]] (based on Chomsky 1981)
In light of such data, and with there being no obvious motivation for the i-within-i
condition, Chomsky remains tentative about both its definition and its status.
2.1.3.3 Non-overt anaphors
DPs’ satisfaction of the binding conditions depends upon the feature specification of
each type of DP as [±anaphoric] and [±pronominal], although this feature notation
does not in fact appear until Chomsky (1982).18 [+anaphoric] categories must satisfy
Principle A, and [+pronominal] categories must satisfy Principle B. R-expressions, as
both [-anaphoric] and [-pronominal] need satisfy neither Condition A nor B, but are
subject to a different principle, Condition C.
A rather ingenious design of the Chomsky (1981) binding theory is that it ap-
pears to account for the distribution of PRO. Chomsky (1981) claims that PRO should
18The approach is extended and amended by Chomsky (1982), with a greater emphasis on the instantia-
tion of each combination of [±anaphoric] and [±pronominal] features in different types of empty category.
The clarification provided by Chomsky (1982) is important to the GB binding theory, since a very attractive
characteristic of the system is that it aims to explain the distribution of PRO and the distribution of both
A- and A′-traces.
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be treated as [+pronominal] and [+anaphoric]. To some extent, PRO does indeed share
properties of anaphors and pronouns. Like anaphors, PRO typically appears not to
have inherent reference, but must receive it via control; like pronouns, though, PRO
need not have a local antecedent (indeed, pronouns cannot have one), and in fact need
not have an antecedent at all in the case of arbitrary reference. PRO, by virtue of being
both anaphoric and pronominal, could never satisfy both Conditions A and B simulta-
neously, since these are complementary conditions. The only way around the contra-
diction is if PRO by its very nature is effectively exempt from Conditions A and B by
not having a governing category in which it could be bound or free. This entails that
PRO must be ungoverned, which is proposed as The PRO Theorem.
While this approach to binding and PRO has proved fairly successful, Chomsky
(1981) appears to concede that reference to government in the binding possibilities for
overt pronouns and anaphors is largely redundant. In fact, Chomsky highlights that
it is the distribution of PRO alone which requires that the binding conditions refer to
government (which in later years becomes one of the early casualties of the Minimalist
framework): in the defining GCs, the requirement that a governor for the bound/free
DP must be contained within the category is largely redundant, since the governor is
always inside the binding category anyway: without reference to government the same
binding facts are predicted for overt pronouns and anaphors. The only case not pre-
dicted by a theory of GCs without reference to governors is the distribution of PRO.19
Prima facie, then, the binding theory’s reliance on the government relation appears to
bring it into line with other modules of the GB framework (e.g. Case theory), while
the distribution of PRO falls out naturally. Yet clearly, PRO in fact provides the only
empirical motivation for reference to government in the binding theory anyway, so the
elegance of the account is largely illusory.
A final crucial aspect of the GB binding theory is in its formalisation of the relation
between binding and movement phenomena (developed further in Chomsky 1982):
movement traces are also subject to the binding conditions. NP-traces (traces of A-
movement), classified as [+anaphoric] elements (also [-pronominal], like reflexives and
reciprocals), must be subject to Condition A. However, as they are created bymovement
19Interestingly, this is true of the Chomsky (1981) binding theory but not, in fact, of the revision in Chom-
sky (1986b); see below. Zwart (1998) notes that when GCs are thought of in terms of ‘complete functional
complex’, government is required in the binding theory for overt pronouns and anaphors for ECM con-
structions. Without the requirement for the governor of the pronoun/anaphor to be in its minimal binding
domain, the ECM clause would incorrectly be the minimal binding domain for a pronoun/anaphor in the
ECM subject position. However, Zwart notes that the extension of the binding domain may be achieved
in any case on independent grounds on the assumption that the ECM subject raises to the specifier of the
ECM verb. Chomsky (1995b) assumes that this movement is covert, yet Lasnik and Saito (1991); Lasnik
(1997) (following Postal’s 1974 ‘raising to object’ analysis) assume that it is overt, or optionally overt, in
the case of Lasnik (1999a).
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they must also obey a separate principle, Subjacency. Wh-traces are argued to have the
feature specification of R-expressions, i.e. [-anaphoric, -pronominal]. Hence, not only
must they obey Subjacency, but they must also obey Condition C.20
2.1.3.4 Problems
Even restricting our attention to the empirical coverage of the Chomsky (1981) binding
theory for overt anaphors and pronouns (in English), several difficulties arise. First,
given the proposed analysis of PRO deriving from its [+anaphoric, +pronominal] sta-
tus, we would expect that in other cases where there can be no GC for a given pro-
noun/anaphor, the need to comply with the binding conditions can be similarly obvi-
ated. In (42), for example, there can be by definition no GC, since there is no SUBJECT
accessible to the anaphor.
(42) * For themselves to decide to leave would be ridiculous
The sentence is nevertheless impossible and so Condition A still must be invoked in
order to rule it out. Following a suggestion by Norbert Hornstein, Chomsky is forced to
stipulate that root sentences must act as GCs when the element in question is governed.
If the root sentence in (42) is the GC, no DP within it c-commands the anaphor, and so
Condition A is violated.
As noted above, it is not clear that some of the longer-distance cases of anaphor
binding really do involve the same manner of binding as the core cases. Yet Chomsky
(1981) sets up the binding theory to predict, for example, (39a) above. Also, Chomsky
claims (43a) is grammatical, in contrast to (43b):
(43) a. They think [it is a pity [that pictures of each other are hanging on the
wall]]
b. * They think [he said [that pictures of each other are hanging on the wall]]
(based on Chomsky 1981)
Clearly, insofar as this contrast is significant—and it appears to be, for many speakers—
there is a difference between the intervention behaviour of referential and expletive
20Chomsky (1982: 36) hints that Condition C can be dispensed with. His argument is that its principal
role is in accounting for Strong Crossover facts, while he shows that such cases may be predicted ungram-
matical by independent principles. Chomsky does not, however, propose a revised principle to explain
Condition C violations where an overt R-expression is c-commanded by a coindexed DP, yet intriguingly
comments that “there is no reason to suppose it to be part of the binding theory” (Chomsky 1982: 101,
fn.30). This is rather controversial for such a throwaway remark. See in particular Lasnik (1991) for argu-
ments against this approach.
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subjects. This is also borne out in the following:
(44) a. They think [there are [some letters for each other] at the post office]
b. * They think [he saw [some letters for each other] at the post office]
(based on Chomsky 1981)
Chomsky’s (1981) binding theory is set up to derive this contrast as an outcome of the
i-within-i condition constraining the indexing algorithm, coupled with the assumption
that expletives are coindexed with their associates (see Chomsky 1981: 215 for details).
Crucially, he aims to show that it is not due to the fact that there is an intervening
possible antecedent that cases like (44b) are ungrammatical. This story hinges on the
absence of a contrast between (45a), where there is no possible closer antecedent and
(45b), where there is:
(45) a. I think [it pleased them [that [pictures of each other] are hanging on the
wall]]
b. They think [it pleased me [that [pictures of each other] are hanging on the
wall]]
(based on Chomsky 1981)
A number of complications arise, however. Chomsky himself concedes that there is
a fair degree of speaker variation with respect to the acceptability of such sentences.21
The assumption is that in both cases above, the GC extends as far as the matrix clause. If
so, then in (45a), for example, a reflexive bound by the matrix subject should be equally
grammatical:
(46) ?* I think [it pleased them [that [pictures of myself] are hanging on the wall]]
I leave this matter open for now, but in §4.4.1 I argue that following Lebeaux (1984),
the grammaticality of anaphors in such cases is best attributed to factors beyond the
binding theory.22
Evidently, environments where non-complementarity arises between anaphors
and pronouns are the most troublesome. In a commentary of the Chomsky (1981) sys-
tem, Chomsky (1982: 99, fn.24) suggests that DPs which themselves contain an anaphor
21Indeed, I feel that there is a contrast between (45a) and (45b), with (45b) rather worse.
22If so, then the contrasts between (43a) and (43b) and (44a) and (44b) must also be due to these factors,
which are sometimes thought to be related to ‘point of view’ or some measure of discourse prominence.
It is quite conceivable that the use of a referential subject intervening between the matrix subject and the
reciprocal affects these (pragmatic) factors in a way that an expletive does not, explaining the contrast.
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or pronoun represent “the major problem left unresolved by the [Chomsky 1981] ver-
sion of the binding theory... and by its predecessors”. The two environments Chomsky
provides are:
(47) a. They like [each other’s books]
b. Theyi like [theiri books]
(48) a. John heard [a story about himself]
b. Johni heard [a story about himi]
Clearly, the expected complementary distribution of anaphors and pronouns breaks
down in these environments, and this matter is particularly pressing since, unlike the
environments where anaphor binding is possible across a clause boundary, the judg-
ments appear to be fairly clear.23 It is Chomsky’s revision of the definition of gov-
erning category to include an accessible SUBJECT which allows the anaphor in the
above sentences to be bound. Yet given that the GC for both the pronoun and the
anaphor is the matrix clause (the matrix subject being the closest accessible SUBJECT to
the anaphor/pronoun in each case), we expect a Condition B effect in (47b) and (48b).
Chomsky (1982) concludes that cases such as (48b) may be treated on the assumption
that “a hidden pronominal element” contraindexed with John/him occupies the subject
position within the NP (and hence satisfies Condition B). In (47b), on the other hand,
the pronoun is exceptionally understood as an anaphor, without further clarification of
the consequences of such an assumption.
Neither account is particularly satisfactory. The first reason is that Fiengo and
Higginbotham (1981: 399) show that it cannot be the case that a possessive pronoun as
in (47b) escapes the Condition B effect as it is an anaphor. A Condition B effect holds
when, for example, a first person plural antecedent locally binds a first person singular
pronoun and when a first person singular antecedent locally binds a first person plural
pronoun:
(49) a. * We like me
b. * I like us
If the reason that Condition B is not violated in (47b), as Chomsky suggests, is that the
pronoun is an anaphor, the prediction is that when the pronoun cannot be considered
an anaphor, the Condition B effect will kick in. This is not the case. In (50a) and (50b),
the possessive pronoun cannot be anaphoric to the matrix subject.
23At least for the anaphors, in any case. If there is any variation among speakers, it is usually in the sort
of environment in (48b). See §5.2.5 for a detailed discussion and further references.
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(50) a. We read my book
b. I saw our mother
While it may be true that (49a) and (49b) are marginally possible by forcing a particular
stylistic effect, this is also the case in other Condition B contexts, especially for first and
second person violations. Note that in contrast, (50a) and (50b) are entirely natural,
and so the possessive must after all be considered a pronoun which satisfies Condition
B.24 A second reason for doubting Chomsky’s account is that the non-complementarity
phenomenon obtains crosslinguistically (Huang 1983: 555):
(51) a. Zhangsan
Zhangsan
kanjian-le
see-ASP
ziji
self
de
’s
shu.
book
‘Zhangsan saw his own books.’
b. Zhangsan
Zhangsan
kanjian-le
see-ASP
ta
he
de
’s
shu.
book
‘Zhangsan saw his books.’ (Chinese; Huang 1983)
Since the accessible SUBJECT is critical in determining the grammaticality of the pro-
noun or anaphor in such environments, Huang (1983: 556) revises the definition of ac-
cessibility to α as simply “being capable of serving as the antecedent for α”. Under-
stood in this way, it becomes natural that accessible SUBJECTs should only be relevant
to anaphor binding, since pronouns do not require an appropriate antecedent. Accord-
ingly, Huang proposes a modification to the binding domains relevant to conditions
A and B, essentially stating that only if the relevant category is an anaphor must its
governing category contain an accessible SUBJECT.25
2.1.4 Chomsky (1986b)
Chomsky (1986b) followsHuang (1983) in assuming that the GCs for anaphors and pro-
nouns must be different. As a starting point, Chomsky identifies the Complete Func-
tional Complex (CFC) as playing a crucial role in determining the minimal GC for an
24Note that nothing in this argument prevents a possessive as in (47b) from being potentially ambiguous
between an anaphor and a pronoun, i.e. both an anaphor their and a pronoun their satisfy Conditions A
and B respectively. In (50a) and (50b), then, we would simply be dealing with a pronominal possessive
rather than an anaphoric one, and Condition B is satisfied. This approach is not helpful from a theoretical
perspective in the Chomsky (1981) binding theory since the non-complementarity must still be explained.
Yet if these possessives were ambiguously anaphors or pronouns, this would explain the absence of reflex-
ives such as himself’s and themselves’s in the English possessive paradigm: possessive reflexives do exist on
this account but are simply realised with an identical form to pronouns.
25Huang also modifies the definition of SUBJECT so that all NPs and all clauses have SUBJECTs, and no
other category does.
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anaphor or pronoun. A CFC is a minimal category such that “all grammatical functions
compatible with its head are realized in it—the complements necessarily, by the projec-
tion principle, and the subject, which is optional unless required to license a predicate”
(Chomsky 1986b: 169). This definition ensures that the CFC always contains a subject,
and so will only ever be S (TP) or NP (DP). The minimal GC for α must then be the
minimal CFC which also contains the governor of α. The requirement for the GC to
contain an accessible SUBJECT is dropped now, and its effects partially reapportioned
to the definition of CFC, which must contain a subject.
2.1.4.1 Non-complementarity in complex DPs
Chomsky (1986b) now aims to tackle head-on the problems of non-complementarity
of anaphors and pronouns which have, as we have seen above, long proved a thorn
in the side of the various revisions of the binding theory. First, environments where
anaphors and pronouns can both occur as the object in ‘picture-DPs’ without a subject
are handled by assuming the presence of an optional PRO within the DP.
(52) a. * Theyi told [DP PROi stories about themi]
b. Theyi heard [DP PROj stories about themi]
In (52a), the stories are obligatorily ‘theirs’, and hence the PRO subject coindexed with
them induces a Condition B violation internally to DP. In (52b), the stories are someone
else’s, and hence PRO is contraindexed with the pronoun, and no Condition B violation
occurs as them is free in DP. Chomsky (1986b: 167) suggests “[i]n fact, [52a] is acceptable
if we make the (implausible) assumption that someone else’s stories are being told.”
(53) is ungrammatical, on the other hand, since this reading is not available:26
(53) * Theyi took [pictures of themi]
However, in cases where the implicit subject of the DP is not the same as that of the
matrix clause, PRO must somehow be optional in some cases. It is required so that
Condition B can be met in (52b), yet must be absent from (54) since the Governing
Category for the reciprocal must extend beyond the DP containing it.
(54) Theyi heard [stories about each otheri]
In such cases, the anaphor cannot be bound internally to the picture-DP, only by the
binder outside it. Yet if there is a contraindexed PRO in this structure, given the defi-
26At least on the assumption that we are dealing with an ‘idiomatic’ interpretation of the predicate take
pictures, i.e. with a camera.
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nition of GC proposed, the incorrect prediction is that the picture-DP will be the ana-
phor’s GC. Essentially, then, the non-complementarity in these environments is only
illusory, resulting from structures with and without PRO subjects.27
Cases involving anaphors and pronouns in the subject position of DPs are rather
less straightforwardly explained:
(55) a. The childreni like [DP each other’si friends]
b. The childreni like [DP theiri friends] (based on Chomsky 1986b)
Unlike in Chomsky (1981), where it is suggested that the possessive pronoun is in fact
an anaphor, Chomsky (1986b) appears willing to concede that true non-complemen-
tarity does indeed obtain in (55a) and (55b).28 The intuition is that in (55a) there is no
way that Condition A can be satisfied within the possessed DP, since it contains no c-
commanding DP which could bind the reciprocal. So although the possessed DP can be
the GC for the pronoun in (55b), it can never be for the reciprocal in (55a). To formalise
this, Chomsky revises the definition of GC as:
(56) Governing Category
“[T]he relevant governing category for an expression α is the least CFC contain-
ing a governor or α in which α could satisfy the binding theory with some in-
dexing (perhaps not the actual indexing of the expression under investigation).”
(Chomsky 1986b: 171)
In (55a), the object DP is a CFC. Yet crucially, there is no indexing possible where each
other could be boundwithin that DP. The definition in (56) ensures that the whole clause
is the GC, in which each other is bound, satisfying Condition A. In (55b), however, on
any possible indexing their is free within the object DP, so this DP is the relevant GC.
This version of binding thus permits a rather elegant account for non-complementarity.
2.1.4.2 LF-movement of anaphors
While Huang (1983) proposes that only anaphors need their GC to contain an accessible
SUBJECT, Chomsky (1986b) reformulates this as the requirement that an anaphor’s GC
27As the empirical facts are rather complex and do not directly bear on the binding theory’s mecha-
nisms for predicting non-complementarity, I postpone a fuller discussion of these data until my analysis
in chapters 4 and 5 (though I believe the account Chomsky provides is roughly along the right lines).
28Although note that if possessive reflexives are not now obligatorily spelt out with the same form
as non-reflexive pronouns, we lose the explanation for why we do not find himself’s, themselves’s, etc in
English; see note 24.
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must at least contain a potential antecedent for the anaphor. This now explains why
the complement clause does not constitute a GC for the reciprocal in (29a), repeated
here as (57), which is attributed to the definition of accessibility in the Chomsky (1981)
framework:
(57) Theyi expected [that pictures of each otheri would be on sale]
In the spirit of the Chomsky (1981) binding theory, the NIC is effectively eliminated,
while the SSC/Opacity remains. Yet in the Chomsky (1981) system, the definition of ac-
cessibility of SUBJECTs was brought in to cover an empirical gap left by the elimination
of the NIC, such as (29b), repeated here as (58):
(58) * Theyi expected [that each otheri would be there]
Embedding the requirement for an accessible SUBJECT into the definition of the CFC,
Chomsky (1986b) is unable to appeal to accessibility to rule out such cases. Accordingly,
as it stands, the smallest CFC in which Condition A could be satisfied in (58) is the
matrix clause, since there is no potential binder for it in the embedded clause.
First, Chomsky notes that so called “long distance binding” (i.e. across a clause
boundary) in cases such as (57) is subject oriented, so in (59) only they and not us can be
the antecedent of each other:
(59) Theyi told usj that [[pictures of each otheri/∗j] would be on sale]
He claims that subject orientation can be explained if anaphors move to the closest
INFL head (nowadays assumed to be T) at LF.29 As only the matrix subject c-commands
the anaphor that has moved to the matrix INFL, only they is in a position to bind it
at LF. Condition A would not then hold of the relation between an anaphor and its
antecedent but of the relation between the anaphor and its trace. Returning to (58), the
ungrammaticality is no longer due to a violation of Condition A, but attributed to a
violation of the Empty Category Principle (ECP), the trace of LF-movement not being
properly governed.
It is rather unclear that the stipulation of LF-movement of anaphors to cover the
NIC environments is worth the theoretical cost. In fact, it imposes a quite enormous re-
dundancy, with anaphor movement required in all cases where an anaphor is present,
but yet only accounting for ungrammaticality when an anaphor is the subject of a finite
clause. Chomsky attempts to reinforce this approach somewhat by suggesting that this
29See also Pica (1987) for a related analysis of long distance binding as involving INFL-to-INFL
movement.
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LF-movement is simply a non-overt version of the equivalent overt movement of clitic
pronouns in Romance languages. However, it is again unclear whether the analogy is
appropriate. LF-movement is presumably triggered by a property related to anaphoric-
ity. As Hornstein (2000: 193, fn.7) highlights, however, this is clearly not the case in
Romance languages, where pronouns also cliticise and raise to an inflectional head.30
Movement of clitic pronouns therefore seems to be unrelated to their referential prop-
erties.
Empirical problems also arise. First, the subject orientation of the putative long
distance binding in English is not as strict as Chomsky assumes. Hestvik (1990) (at-
tributing the observation to Jane Grimshaw) and Pollard and Sag (1992) note that non-
subject arguments of psychological verbs can also apparently bind reflexives across a
finite clause boundary:
(60) It frightened John that pictures of himself were on sale
In fact, even the evidence for subject orientation is (59) is not clear cut. My own feeling is
that binding of the reciprocal by the expriencer is almost as acceptable as by the subject.
Pollard and Sag (1992) also argue that (59) is grammatical on both interpretations, and
show that structurally similar cases to (59) can be constructed grammatically with only
an object as a potential antecedent for the reciprocal. Similarly, when the reciprocal in
(59) is replaced by a reflexive, binding by the object again appears to be possible:
(61) They told usj that [[pictures of ourselvesj] would be on sale]
It is also noteworthy since some speakers do not find sentences like (57) grammati-
cal in any case, as Chomsky (1986b: 216, fn.109) concedes. Second, the pattern of ‘long
distance’ binding appears not to be commonly replicated in other languages which typ-
ically have only locally bound reflexives. For example, we see in §6.3.3.1 that Norwe-
gian has a reflexive pronoun seg which in fact seems a far better candidate than En-
glish reflexives to receive an analysis involving covert movement. However, (Hestvik
1990: 121) highlights that the binding relation is impossible in equivalent sentences to
(59):
(62) * Johni
Johni
trodde
thought
at
that
bildene
pictures
av
of
segi
REFLi
var
were
til
for
salgs
sale
(Norwegian; Hestvik 1990)
This suggests that there is some particular characteristic of English reflexives in the
picture-DP environment which perhaps interferes with the standard binding theory.
30See Hornstein (2000: 193, fn.7) for indications of other problems with the LF-movement approach.
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We examine this issue in more detail in §4.4, but if so there is no good motivation for an
LF-movement analysis of English anaphors.
2.1.5 Summary
Though theoretical and empirical problems remain (before we have even begun to ex-
amine the crosslinguistic domain), the binding theory can be seen as a successful out-
come of the generative research programme. As we have seen, the theory has evolved
to provide a best fit to capture a range of often problematic data, such as non-comple-
mentarity. However, more recent developments in theoretical syntax have meant that
these successes of the binding theory must be questioned. In particular, moulding the
theory to fit the empirical problem at hand does not provide the most satisfactory sort
of theory, since it offers little explanation for why the empirical facts are the way they
are. Epstein and Seely (2002a: 2) explain that “data is not satisfactorily “covered” if it is
covered by stipulation.” Further, they claim that “empirical “coverage” (though obvi-
ously of great importance) is not the sole issue, rather how the theory “covers” the data,
always a very difficult question to answer, must be posed, discussed, and addressed”
(Epstein and Seely 2002a: 3). The focus on theoretical parsimony was crystalised in the
Minimalist programme in the early 1990s and has had wide-reaching implications for
all areas of syntactic theory, none more so than the binding theory. We now turn our
attention to the methodology and key assumptions of this Minimalist programme to
be adopted in this thesis, and explore the nature of their implications for the classical
binding theory.
2.2 The Minimalist programme
With such a substantial body of research already undertaken on the binding theory, it
important to clarify the role of this research. This thesis aims to put forward a reanal-
ysis of the binding theory consistent with the aims and methodology of the Minimalist
programme, and couched in the assumptions of the Derivation by Phase instantiation of
it. If it were simply a matter of providing a new angle on an old problem, then this
would perhaps not be especially enlightening. However, the search for an explanatory
level of inquiry at the heart of the Minimalist programme ensures that the goal of this
research is in fact different from studies in previous frameworks: we are seeking an
explanation for why binding exhibits the empirical properties that it does. In order to
do so, we must avoid ad hoc stipulation of mechanisms whose sole purpose is to cover
empirical data. The rest of this chapter outlines certain Minimalist assumptions, before
examining their consequences for the binding theory.
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2.2.1 Core Minimalist assumptions
At the heart of Minimalism is the formalisation of the role of economy in the compu-
tational system. In essence, less is more. While particular theories of linguistic phe-
nomena have long been subject to the methodology of Occam’s Razor, Chomsky (1993)
also applies it to the architecture of the grammar; any suspect devices, levels, etc. were
dispensed with. However, a characteristic of Chomsky’s methodology is that this is
done with apparently scant regard for empirical data. Part of the reason why Min-
imalism is a ‘programme’ and not a framework is that at the outset of Minimalism,
Chomsky abstracts away from empirical concerns.31 In later Minimalist work Chom-
sky (2001 et seq.) sets out to examine the extent to which the human language faculty
is in some sense optimally or perfectly designed, given the design requirements of lan-
guage. Broadly, the design requirements are to be able to map sounds to meanings.
More specifically, they are understood as ‘bare output conditions’: conditions on the
legibility of the expressions generated by the language faculty to the external systems
of the mind with which language must interface. The research programme is then to
determine what an optimal design would be, and to examine howmuch theoretical ma-
chinery we must add to what is ‘virtually conceptually necessary’ in order to capture
the properties of natural language. The Minimalist ideal is to reduce all principles of
grammar to bare output conditions, or to economy considerations.32 From an empirical
perspective, the programmemust examine the extent to which apparent ‘imperfections’
in language can receive a principled explanation in these terms.
In order to maximise computational efficiency, given that the brain can have only
finite computational resources, Chomsky (1993) assumes that amaximally efficient (and
hence better designed) system must do with as few levels of representation, operations,
and technical devices as possible. To this end, he first proposes that the only levels
of representation which are necessary in a perfect system are those which interface di-
rectly with the external systems of the brain, known as the S(ensory)-M(otor) system
and the C(onceptual)-I(ntentional) system.33 There must, then, be a level which inter-
faces with S-M (PF) and onewhich interfaces with C-I (LF), but nothingmore is required
a priori.34 Hence, Chomsky proposes that empirical concerns permitting, D-structure
31This is an obvious point on which Minimalism might receive criticism. However, Epstein and Seely
(2002a: 8) highlight that Minimalism does not put empirical coverage at odds with explanatory power,
since empirical data are not satisfactorily covered if stipulations are required. Hence, the ‘success’ of a
theory which covers data only by stipulation should be taken with a pinch of salt.
32In Chomsky’s most recent work with a stronger biolinguistic focus (Chomsky 2005a,b, 2006), these
principles and conditions are viewed as part of the ‘third factor’ in language design, namely principles
concerning ‘structural architecture and developmental constraints’ which are, crucially, not specific to the
language faculty. See especially Chomsky (2005b: 6) for further discussion.
33In the earlier Minimalist literature, including Chomsky (1993), the S-M system was known as the
A(rticulatory)-P(erceptual) system.
34In previous frameworks, LF was taken to be a level of representation mapping syntax to the C-I inter-
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and S-structure must be eliminable, required only for theory-internal reasons in previ-
ous Principles and Parameters models. The computational system of human language
(CHL) must therefore produce two representations, PF and LF, from a lexical array, or
‘numeration’. At some stage, the computation must ‘split’, heading separately to the
PF-representation and the LF-representation. In the Chomsky (1993) system, this point
is called Spell-Out. Between Spell-Out and LF, further syntactic operations may take
place, though it is assumed that the derivation can at this point only manipulate lexical
items already taken from the numeration; there is no further lexical access. The opera-
tions between Spell-Out and PF are rather different in this system, though they do not
concern us here; see Chomsky (1995b: 220).
The role of the computational component of the grammar (‘narrow syntax’) is to
supply the interfaces with legitimate and legible representations. The only elements
available for syntactic manipulation are the formal features of lexical items. The under-
lying assumption since Chomsky (1993) has been that some lexical items bear formal
features which are deficient in some respect. These features must be eliminated by syn-
tactic means, since they cannot be interpreted by the interfaces, and their presence in
the relevant interface representation will crash the derivation (by the principle of Full
Interpretation). As the assumptions about the nature of features have changed some-
what during the lifespan of Minimalism, I now introduce a particular implementation
of the programme, which I term the Derivation by Phase model (Chomsky 2000, 2001,
2004a).
2.2.2 The Derivation by Phase framework
2.2.2.1 Features
With the architecture in place, we turn to the mechanisms of narrow syntax, that is, how
formal features are manipulated. We assume that features are attribute-value pairs,
so a feature attribute might be Case, while its value could be accusative, nominative
etc. The following notation is used: [CASE: Acc]. Feature attributes of lexical items
are either paired up with a particular value in the lexicon, or they are not, in which
case the feature is said to be unvalued, notationally [CASE: ].35 The interfaces do not
face as the input to semantic interpretive rules. More recently, as Chomsky (2005a, 2006) highlights, the
term has been used (as here) to refer to the C-I interface itself. Despite the potential confusion, we will also
adopt this more recent usage.
35In cases where the value is not important for the point we wish to make, we adopt the conven-
tional shorthand of annotating unvalued features with u and valued features with i, e.g. [uCASE] and
[iCASE]. While the convention originates with the distinction between semantically uninterpretable and
interpretable features, it should be highlighted that on my assumptions it is feature values, rather than
semantic interpretability, that is at stake. This is discussed in detail in §2.2.3 below.
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permit unvalued features, so before the terminal interface representations, either these
unvalued features must be erased from the derivation, or they must receive a value in
order to make them legitimate interface objects.
Chomsky (2001) proposes that feature valuation and deletion are in fact closely
linked. He assumes that the features which are unvalued on lexical items are those
which are semantically uninterpreted (e.g. ϕ-features on T, Case). These features, hav-
ing morphological realisation, must thus be present in the PF-representation, though
if indeed they are not semantically interpreted they cannot be present in the LF-repre-
sentation. Chomsky’s idea is therefore that these features must be valued during the
derivation, making them legitimate at PF, yet they must be erased as part of the Spell-
Out operation transferring the syntax to LF. Thus valuation and deletion go hand in
hand, valuation being a syntactic operation, and deletion taking place upon Spell-Out
to LF.
2.2.2.2 Operations
In the Chomsky (1993, 1995b) framework, narrow syntax manipulates lexical items and
determines thematic and morphosyntactic dependencies via the operations Merge and
Move. Thematic dependencies are encoded uponmergerwith a θ-assigning head, while
Move establishes a featural dependency with the head whose specifier is targeted for
movement.36 Wherever a syntactic dependency is not accompanied by overt move-
ment, it must be assumed that the movement takes place covertly, i.e. after Spell-Out to
PF (see below). The Derivation by Phase framework rejects this motivation for move-
ment, introducing a syntactic operation beyond Merge and Move by which feature
valuation is achieved. This is known as Agree. Only Agree can value features, in a
particular structural configuration. An unvalued feature, or ‘probe’ must be the trig-
ger for Agree. The unvalued feature probes a syntactic domain for a feature with the
same attribute, a ‘goal’. This is termed ‘matching’; only under matching can Agree op-
erate. In the matching configuration, Agree then copies the value of the goal onto the
probe, making the probe and goal appear to bear an identical feature.37 The remaining
36This system marks the beginning of the end for the Government relation, which previously covered
both specifier-head and head-complement relations: broadly, Move serves to govern the properties of the
specifier-head relation to license syntactic dependencies, while the head-complement relation required
for θ-assignment can be reduced to the primitive relation of sisterhood (derivable from Merge). Thus,
Government, an ill-fitting and already dubious theoretical relation which does not follow from concep-
tual necessity, can be eliminated in favour of core syntactic operations which are indeed necessary in any
grammatical model.
37While this appears to be the case, it is not true that the features are in fact identical, since the probing
feature must be deleted upon Spell-Out to LF, while the goal feature must remain, as outlined above. See
also §2.2.3 below for further details.
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question concerns the syntactic configurations in which Agree may operate. Chomsky
assumes that the probemust c-command the goal (i.e. that only the c-command domain
of the probe is visible), though additional assumptions are outlined below.
(63) T′
T
[ϕ: ]
vP
DP
John
[ϕ: 3rd, Sing]
v′
v
love v
VP
<love> DP
Mary
(63) shows how the Agree operation is responsible for ϕ-feature agreement. T bears an
unvalued ϕ-feature, which probes the matching valued feature of the subject John in its
c-command domain. As a result, T then also receives the ϕ-feature values of the subject
(which then moves to SpecTP).
So far, there seems to be little departure from ‘virtual conceptual necessity’, with a
structure-building operation allowing lexical items to enter the derivation and combine
to create larger structures (Merge), and an operation to establish interpositional depen-
dencies (Agree). Movement appears at first sight not to be a conceptual necessity now
that its role in establishing dependencies is eliminated, yet displacement is of course an
undeniable property of human language. In the Derivation by Phase framework, how-
ever, movement receives a natural explanation as a function of the two core operations.
Chomsky (2004a) distinguishes between ‘External Merge’, where an item is selected for
merger from the numeration, and ‘Internal Merge’ (i.e. movement) where an item is se-
lected from the derivation. The role of displacement is now somewhatmarginalised as a
particular variety of Merge,38 since it is now relieved of the burden of establishing syn-
tactic dependencies. In the Chomsky (1993, 1995b) model, movement was considered
the only way of valuing (or at the time, ‘checking’) features. Crosslinguistic variation
was captured on the assumption that languages differed according to whether the rel-
38This is important if Chomsky’s (2004a) argument is to be believed that displacement is not an imperfec-
tion of language and should follow naturally from the properties of Merge. See also Chomsky (2002: ch.4),
where a different take on this ‘imperfection’ is offered: movement is an optimal way of encoding both
‘deep’ semantics, e.g. thematic structure, and ‘surface’ semantics, e.g. focus and specificity.
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evant feature needed to be checked before Spell-Out, resulting in overt movement, or
after Spell-Out, resulting in covert movement. In Derivation by Phase, however, Agree
does the work of valuing features. Whether or not movement takes place depends on
the presence or absence of a movement-triggering EPP-feature on the probing head.
With Internal Merge having no special status, locality constraints on movement are im-
posed only indirectly: since Agree is a prerequisite for movement, locality constraints
are understood as constraints on the successful application of Agree.
One result of the shift from Move to Agree in establishing syntactic dependencies
is that dependencies do not generally need to be as locally constrained as envisaged at
the outset of the Minimalist programme (Chomsky 1993, 1995b), where specifier-head
relations were critical. In fact, the Derivation by Phase framework eschews specifier-head
relations altogether, assuming that the specifier of any head is not part of that head’s
c-command domain, hence an unvalued feature cannot probe its specifier.39 Agree ap-
plies at ‘long distance’, and is not affected by whether or not movement subsequently
takes place into the specifier of the probing head. It remains to determine what the
locality constraints on Agree are, however. In the early years of Minimalism (Chom-
sky 1993, 1995b), it was assumed that a minimality condition (building on Rizzi 1990b)
alone was sufficient to explain locality. For example, Chomsky (1995b) proposes the
following condition, minimising the distance between a feature and the category it at-
tracts.
(64) Minimal Link Condition (MLC)
“K attracts α only if there is no β, β closer to K than α, such that K attracts β.”
(Chomsky 1995b: 311)
β is understood to be closer to a probe than α if it asymmetrically c-commands α.
Though the MLC defines the Attract operation which checks features in the Chomsky
(1995b) version of the framework, in essence it extends to the Agree operation of the
Derivation by Phase framework, which values features.40 The tree in (65) suggests how
the MLC might constrain Agree between a [ϕ: ] probe and two potential goals:
39Note that I revise these assumptions somewhat below.
40Indeed, the intuition that only the closest available goal may be selected for probing still survives in
the Derivation by Phase framework (see Chomsky 2000, 2001, 2004a).
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(65) T′
T
[ϕ: ]
vP
DP
John
[ϕ: 3rd, Sing]
...
DP
Mary
[ϕ: 3rd, Sing]
...X
*
A crucial development in Derivation by Phase is the return to a system of ‘abso-
lute’ barriers introduced in Chomsky (1986a), that is, constituents from which extrac-
tion cannot take place (or which cannot be probed) even if minimality constraints are
satisfied. Here we see a possible departure from virtual conceptual necessity,41 and a
nod towards explaining empirical phenomena. This is the theory of phases.
2.2.2.3 Phases
In the framework being outlined, the locality constraints onmovement (Internal Merge)
are derived from those on Agree. However, a fundamental property of movement re-
mains to be explained, namely why it appears to operate successive cyclically. The idea,
carried over in many ways from the Barriers framework in GB (Chomsky 1986a), is that
certain constituents can only be extracted from by movement through a privileged ‘es-
cape hatch’ position. In that framework, with CP and VP stated as barriers, this forces
movement to take place through SpecCP and SpecVP if elements from within CP or VP
are to be extracted further. In the more recent terminology, CP and vP are phases, and
material within a phase can only be probed from outside if the goal occupies an ‘edge’
position (again, SpecCP and SpecvP).42
However, while this offers an account for successive cyclicity in movement (Sub-
jacency effects), phase theory must also stand up to conceptual concerns. If movement
works in this way, then why should it? A common suggestion in the Minimalist liter-
41Although Chomsky clearly does not think it is.
42The rest of the phase is termed the ‘domain’ of the phase.
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ature is that if the brain has limited computational resources, then phases allow a way
of capping what language can use by limiting the derivational workspace.43 Chomsky
proposes that the derivation—all the way from the lexical array to the interfaces—is
composed of chunks (phases), corresponding to at least CP and vP. At any one time,
the derivation can only access one phase (with certain qualifications required), limiting
the computational load in deriving a sentence. Upon the completion of each phase,
that phase is transferred to the interfaces and its contents rendered inaccessible for fur-
ther syntactic manipulation. Hence, if there are unvalued features within a completed
phase, the derivation is doomed to crash, since after Transfer it is inaccessible to the
computation. The exception is the syntactic material in the phase-heads C and v, and
their specifiers, SpecCP and SpecvP, termed the edge of the phase. The material in the
phase-edge is not transferred until the next phase up in the derivation is also com-
pleted. The edge is therefore an escape hatch, and may contain unvalued features since
it is computationally accessible in the next phase up. Chomsky (2000, 2001) formalises
this as the Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC):
(66) [α [H β]]
(67) Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC)44
“In phase α with head H, the domain of H is not accessible to opera-
tions outside α, only H and its edge [its specifier(s)] are accessible to
such operations.”
(Chomsky 2000: 108)
Returning to the hypothetical derivation (65), not only does the MLC rule out
Agree between the ϕ-features of T and Mary, but the PIC also does.45 T can only probe
its own phase and the edge of the previous phase, vP. Yet only John occupies an edge
position in vP. It is important to note that the PIC is modified subtly in Chomsky (2001).
(68) [ZP Z ... [HP α [H YP]]]
(69) Phase Impenetrability Condition (alternative)
“The domain of H is not accessible to operations at ZP [a phase]; only
H and its edge are accessible to such operations.”
(Chomsky 2001: 14)
43However, Butler (2004: 20-21) provides examples showing that it is not clear whether this intuitively
appealing motivation for phases is very effective in reducing computational load, weakening the theoreti-
cal argument for phases.
44For a phase HP, with the structure in (66).
45The MLC therefore need not be invoked in order to rule out Agree between T and Mary in (65). In-
deed, under appropriate assumptions about phases and the PIC, it may be possible to eliminate the MLC,
reapportioning its effects to the PIC. See, e.g., Takahasi (2002) and Müller (2004) for implementations of
this strategy.
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This distinction is important. It is now assumed that when a phase (HP) completes,
its domain is not inaccessible beyond that point. Rather, the domain of the phase only
becomes inaccessible when the head of the next phase (Z) merges. So the version of the
PIC in (68) does not rule out Agree between the ϕ-features of T and Mary in (65): since
the head of the higher phase containing T (C) has not been merged, the domain of the
lower vP phase remains accessible.
The distinction between (67) and (69) relates to the timing of the transfer of phases
to the interfaces. In the Chomsky (2000) approach (and also that of Nissenbaum 2000),
Transfer takes place upon completion of the current phase. Hiraiwa (2002) argues that
the modification in Chomsky (2001), whereby Transfer of one phase takes place when
the phase above it is complete is a weaker approach (presumably since locality con-
straints are more relaxed), suggesting that phases are transferred as they are completed.
Yet a disadvantage of the approach Hiraiwa advocates is that in order that the edges re-
main accessible, at each phase only the domain of that phase can be transferred. The
interfaces will then receive TPs and VPs (rather than CPs and vPs). A common intu-
ition, however, is that the interfaces need to receive chunks of syntax with appropriate
properties, corresponding to those of CPs and vPs.46 It is not clear whether this view of
phasehood is compatible with the assumption that the domains of phases, rather than
complete phases, are transferred. While such matters remain to be clarified, we will
henceforth assume themore restrictive approach (taken by Chomsky 2000; Nissenbaum
2000; Hiraiwa 2002) that only the edge of the immediately lower phase is accessible to
operations in any given phase.
2.2.3 Theoretical problems for Derivation by Phase
This is the broad outline of theMinimalist programme as instantiated in its most widely
adopted version to date, the Derivation by Phase model. Many, many details remain un-
mentioned for reasons of space. However, in this section, I draw attention to some
theoretical and conceptual shortcomings of this framework reported in the recent lit-
erature and propose new solutions to them. Naturally, I concentrate on those areas of
the theory which anticipate consequences for the analysis of the binding theory pro-
posed in later chapters, though this may not be apparent yet. Indeed, as I try to stress
throughout, these theoretical modifications are motivated by problems independent of
the binding theory.
46See §2.2.3.3 for details.
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2.2.3.1 LF-uninterpretability of features valued by Agree
Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2004a) assumes that syntactic operations are driven by mor-
phosyntactic features.47 These are attribute-value pairs that may enter the derivation
either valued or unvalued. For Chomsky, those which enter the derivation valued are
interpretable at LF, e.g. ϕ-features on D, tense features on T. Those which enter the
derivation unvalued, e.g. Case features on D, are uninterpretable at LF and trigger an
agreement operation with a valued version of a matching feature on another category,
which serves to value the feature. While the valuation of an unvalued feature has con-
sequences for PF-representations, any feature valued during the derivation by Agree
remains uninterpreted at LF, being deleted from the LF-representation by the Spell-Out
operation.
As noted by Epstein and Seely (2002b: 68–9), there appears to be a conspicu-
ous redundancy in feature distinctions. Features are both valued/unvalued, and in-
tepretable/uninterpretable, while a predictable relationship appears to connect both
distinctions (unvalued features are never interpreted at LF). The reason for this is that
the Spell-Out operation, by assumption, has no access to the interfaces, and so it cannot
‘know’ which are the right features to transfer to LF (all features make it to PF) and
which to strip off. But when a link is established between feature values and feature
interpretability, Spell-Out can make the right decisions ‘blindly’, simply by examining
whether the features are valued or not. Another problem with this approach to mor-
phosyntactic features, though, noted by Chomsky (2001); Epstein and Seely (2002b);
Legate (2002), is that once an LF-uninterpretable feature is valued during the deriva-
tion, it is indistinguishable from a feature which entered the derivation valued; the
distinction is of course crucial, since only the latter is sent to LF. For Chomsky (2001),
this alone provides the motivation for the cyclic (phasal) application of Spell-Out:48 he
assumes that Spell-Out must operate sufficiently soon after feature valuation that it can
‘remember’ that the relevant feature was previously unvalued and hence strip it from
the portion of the derivation transferred to LF. However, Epstein and Seely argue that
the logical conclusion of this approach is that at any stage after feature valuation has
47Although the Minimalist view of the architecture of the grammar assumes that the role of syntax is
purely to manipulate syntactic features, in the Minimalist literature these features have been subjected
to comparatively little serious scrutiny. Indeed, it is rarely acknowledged that an explicit, robust theory
of such features must lie at the heart of any Minimalist account of the mechanisms and processes of the
syntactic component of the grammar. Given the characteristically restrictive requirements imposed by
Minimalism, Higginbotham (1998: 222–3) emphasises that the high volume of available features provides
the framework with a surprising degree of slack, apparently running counter to the guiding principles
of Minimalism. This section of the thesis at least makes some assumptions about features explicit but
a complete theory of formal features appears to remain some way off. For a discussion of features in
Minimalist syntax, see den Dikken (2000).
48Although in later work Chomsky (2006) cites computational efficiency as strongmotivation for phases.
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taken place (whether ‘shortly’ after or not), the two types of valued feature are indistin-
guishable.
A rather radical solution is presented by Chomsky (2005a, 2006), who suggests
that all operations take place at the phase-level, along with Spell-Out. This entails that
only phase-heads are probes. This is a very bold claim and has not yet, I believe, been
supported by sufficient research to allow it to be incorporated into a workable frame-
work of assumptions for a research project such as this one. It has implications far
beyond what we could start to explore in this outline of theoretical assumptions. In
this case, if all operations are assumed to take place (as and when required) within the
phase, Epstein and Seely’s criticism of Spell-Out stands and we must seek a solution.
Legate (2002) provides further evidence against themechanisms that Chomsky assumes
are involved in Spell-Out, outlining general problems with the idea that features which
enter the derivation valued are semantically interpretable, arguing that interpretable
ϕ-features, for example, are not necessarily semantically interpreted.49 Legate argues
for a different approach to the split in feature types: morphosyntactic features drive
syntactic operations but are not semantically interpreted, while semantic features are
interpreted but play no syntactic or morphological role. As Legate shows, this resolves
the problem of the irretrievable distinction between interpretable and valued uninter-
pretable features at Spell-Out: the matter simply does not arise, since no morphosyn-
tactic features are transferred to the semantic component. Thus, unvalued features can
only crash the derivation at the PF interface, not at LF.
2.2.3.2 Solution: ‘interpret’ all features
An alternative approach to the problem of Spell-Out’s ‘derivational memory’, along
the lines suggested by Legate, is to suppose that all valued features are interpreted,
whether valued upon lexical selection from the numeration or during the derivation.
Interpretation, in the terms I employ here, does not necessarily mean semantic inter-
pretation, but rather interpretation at PF or at LF by the external systems. Recall that
Chomsky’s model assumes that only morphosyntactic features are syntactically active
during the derivation. Recently, however, substantial evidence has been provided that
features entering into agreement operations in narrow syntax seem to have a rather ‘se-
manticosyntactic’ flavour, rather than a purely morphosyntactic one, e.g. Pesetsky and
Torrego (2001, 2003); Butler (2004); Adger and Ramchand (2005). I therefore propose
that the features which drive the narrow-syntactic derivation may either be associated
with semanticosyntactic interpretation, or with morphosyntactic interpretation. Where
49Due to the appearance of non-semantic noun class markers in certain languages, for example. To take
another example, Hornstein (2006: 53-56) reviews a variety of evidence suggesting that the ϕ-features of
bound pronouns carry no semantic import; see Heim (forthcoming) for related discussion.
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Chomsky’s system creates a major split in the two post-syntactic halves of the Y-model,
with no real explanation for why features valued during the course of the derivation
are illegitimate LF-objects but required at PF, our adaptedmodel simply interprets mor-
phosyntactic features at PF and semanticosyntactic features at LF.50
An important advantage of this approach is that feature deletion may be elim-
inated. This will also allow us to circumvent a possible conceptual concern that the
status of features whose derivational aim is to be eliminated is questionable. As Martin
(1999: 19) observes, “insofar as we think that CHL may be perfect or optimal in some
serious sense, the existence of features not interpreted by interface systems is surpris-
ing.” Deletion is required upon Spell-Out in the Chomsky (2001) model in order that
semantically uninterpreted features like Case are present in PF-representations but not
LF-representations, while semantically interpreted features are present in both. If fea-
tures are either phonologically interpreted or semantically interpreted, the motivation
for the deletion mechanism disappears: a feature is only ever interpreted at one of the
interfaces. This theory of features at the interfaces is rather reminiscent of that advanced
by Chomsky (1995a), whereby the Spell-Out operation transfers only the relevant types
of feature to each of the phonological and semantic components. Nunes (1995) argues
for such an approach on the grounds of economy, since deletion is assumed to be a
‘costly’ operation (unlike Merge, for example), and there is no need for deletion of the
‘wrong’ type of feature at each interface.
Just as previously assumed, some features enter the derivation valued, some un-
valued. However, now, the aim of an unvalued feature is not suicidal, but is rather to
make itself a legitimate interface object. An argument along the same lines is also put
forward by Adger and Ramchand (2005: 172). Like the approach we take here, they pro-
pose that no features are inherently uninterpretable, just that features without values
cannot be interpreted: the role of an unvalued feature is to get valued, i.e. to become
interpretable, not simply to get checked and deleted. For Adger and Ramchand, all fea-
tures must be semantically motivated, as they must be semantically interpreted, while
I assume that interpretability is relativised to the particular interface in question.51 So,
as is conventional, I assume that all features must be valued in order to be legible at
the interfaces, and feature valuation works in the usual way, by Agree. All features,
50While it appears that this asymmetry is stipulated and so should ideally receive a more principled
explanation, Chomsky (2006) repeatedly points to a ‘primacy of the C-I interface’ in language design,
which presumably would extend to the asymmetry in feature deletion.
51Another important difference in Adger and Ramchand’s (2005: 174) view is that features in an Agree-
chain are only interpreted once. They concede that the principle they term ‘Interpret Once under Agree’
(IOA) is stipulated, suggesting that it may be considered an equivalent of the PF-requirement for lineari-
sation (pronouncing features only once). This is reminiscent of Frampton and Gutmann’s (2000) analysis
of Agree as an operation of feature-sharing rather than feature-deletion, with the features involved in
agreement ‘coalescing’ into a single shared feature.
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whether valued or unvalued upon entering the derivation, are interpreted, either at PF,
or at LF.
While deletion can be eliminated from Spell-Out, it appears that a disadvantage
of this approach would be that it requires some elaboration of the Spell-Out opera-
tion. As highlighted above, Spell-Out in the Chomsky (2001) framework is assumed
to apply ‘blindly’, without access to interface properties. Yet under the proposals put
forward here, Spell-Out will require some mechanism to ensure that the right type of
feature is transferred to the right interface. However, instead of directly attempting to
resolve this problem, we might instead take a far more reductionist step and state that
Spell-Out can also be effectively eliminated from our model. Suppose that upon com-
pletion of each phase, the interfaces systems simply read off (and presumably store)
the completed phase; that is, semantic and phonological interpretation is genuinely it-
erative, as defended by Chomsky (2004a).52 There is no transfer of features per se, as
the features don’t go anywhere. By assumption, each interface simply reads off only
those features which are interpretable to it. Since we are now bypassing the Spell-Out
operation, which presumably had no access to interface properties, this option is now
available to us: the interfaces impose their own legibility conditions, and so these can
be naturally imposed when inspecting the derivation. So this system appears to allow
us to eliminate Spell-Out and its mechanisms altogether from the grammar, surely a
significant improvement from a Minimalist perspective.53
There are, admittedly, possible objections to a model whereby syntax maps di-
rectly to the interfaces, yet the theoretical issues are as yet rather unclear. In recent
(currently unpublished) work Chomsky (2005a) alludes to phonological and semantic
components at some point between narrow syntax and the interfaces:
“...at various stages of computation there are Transfer operations: one hands
the SO [= syntactic object] already constructed to the phonological compo-
nent, which maps it to the SM interface... the other hands SO to the semantic
component, which maps it to the C-I interface. Call these SOs phases.”
(Chomsky 2005a: 8-9)
52It might be argued that this storage of each phase until the terminal phase of the derivation imposes an
additional memory burden and so is uneconomical. Yet the memory load is no different from Chomsky’s
approach whereby Spell-Out transfers syntactic material to the interfaces iteratively. The interfaces will
still need to keep track of information that it has already read or been sent at each phase. Whether the
operation Spell-Out is responsible for supplying the interfaces with syntactic material makes no difference
in that respect, and the underlying assumption is then that computational load must be capped perhaps
at the expense of increasing memory load.
53We may retain the term Spell-Out due to its familiarity, though where it is employed below, what we
assume is simply the inspection of the derivation at each phase.
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Unfortunately, Chomsky offers no discussion of what the content of these components
might be. However, in another currently unpublished work, Chomsky (2006) states
that Transfer directly maps syntactic objects to the two interfaces. Though the confus-
ing terminology of the phonological and semantic components is eliminated, Chomsky
(2006: 11) does refer to something between narrow syntax and the interfaces, suggesting
that “there may be – and almost certainly are – phase-internal compositional operations
within the mappings to the interfaces.” While the mechanisms of the interfaces and the
mappings to them remain somewhat murky, the ideal Minimalist model should cer-
tainly posit no levels or mechanisms between narrow syntax and the interfaces PF and
LF. We will therefore adopt in this thesis the novel approach to features and the inter-
faces outlined above.
2.2.3.3 Phases at LF and PF
The framework we are developing now relies on the interface systems cyclically in-
specting the derivation, rather than chunks of syntax being handed over to the inter-
faces. Each of the two interfaces interprets only a single type of feature, semanticosyn-
tactic features by LF, and morphosyntactic features by PF. This separation of the two
types of features appears to bear on a question which has been posed in the recent
literature (Felser 2004; Marušicˇ 2005): namely, are the points of interpretation/Spell-
Out (i.e. phases) the same for both PF and LF, or can they apply non-simultaneously?
Chomsky (2005a: 9) views the matter as follows:
“In the best case, the phases will be the same for both Transfer operations.
To my knowledge, there is no compelling evidence to the contrary.[footnote
deleted] Let us assume, then, that the best-case conclusion can be sustained.”
(Chomsky 2005a: 9)
It is not immediately clear why simultaneous transfer (Spell-Out) to both interfaces
should be the best case. Spell-Out (or rather—as we have seen above—the inspection
of narrow syntax to the two interfaces) is not a ‘costly’ operation in the sense that we
should try and reduce the number of times it must apply. Indeed, quite the oppo-
site, since Chomsky (2006) highlights that to maximise computational efficiency phases
should be as small as possible. A possible objection to non-simultaneous Spell-Out (or
interpretation by the interfaces) is that one application of Spell-Out is more economical
than two. But this, I think, is missing the point. On standard assumptions, Spell-Out
transfers to both interfaces: each takes place simultaneously, but it is quite clear that
two operations of transfer are involved. No more operations are involved if the two
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interfaces read off the syntactic material non-simultaneously.54
Let’s view the matter from a different perspective. Imagine that one interface is
able to interpret constituents that are not as large as those required for interpretation
by the other interface. Given that smaller phases are preferred where possible on the
grounds of economy (Chomsky 2006), it seems likely that it is in fact uneconomical
to delay transfer to that interface so that transfer can later apply simultaneously to
both interfaces once a larger constituent is derived. At this point we should make ex-
plicit some assumptions about phases. It is typically assumed that the two interfaces
impose quite separate requirements; not only on the sort of features which are inter-
pretable at each one, but also in terms of the properties of the constituents they receive
(phases). Chomsky (2001) argues that phases must be in some sense complete proposi-
tional units; clearly he has CP and vP in mind. This is what Matushansky (2005) terms
an LF-diagnostic for phasehood. As highlighted by Epstein and Seely (2002b), the fol-
lowing sorts of problematic questions immediately arise:
“Why should a propositional element, where “propositional” is a semantic
notion, be spelled out to PF; why should PF care about the propositional
content of what is spelled out?”
(Epstein and Seely 2002b: 78)
However, phases are also typically required to stand up to PF-diagnostics, typically be-
ing phonologically isolable, being targeted by movement operations, and by receiving
phrasal stress by the Nuclear Stress Rule (Chomsky 2001; Legate 2003; Matushansky
2005). However, these diagnostics will sometimes clash. Notably, for my purposes
in the following chapters, Matushansky (2005) observes that these PF-diagnostics for
phasehood support an analysis of DPs as phases, while DPs typically fail LF-diagnostics
for phasehood. For example, there is no evidence that DPs host an edge-position tar-
geted by QR or A′-movement (they do not provide an ‘escape hatch’ for successive
cyclic movement), and they are not obligatorily propositional.55 It seems that this could
be an important observation, since the (non)phasal status of DPs has been unresolved
since the outset of phase theory. While much research assumes that DPs are phases
(see, e.g., Carstens 2000; Adger 2003; Svenonius 2004; Hiraiwa 2005), this is largely on
the assumption that the architecture of DPs should resemble as closely as possible that
of CPs, as argued by Abney (1987); repeatedly, Chomsky has avoided the matter of
whether DPs are phasal, and we might assume that this is because the matter is rather
less clear than for CPs and vPs.
54If anything, this system involves fewer operations since we have seen in §2.2.3.2 that Spell-Out may
be eliminable.
55It is worth noting here, as I argue in §5.2.3, that certain PPs appear to exhibit the same sorts of proper-
ties as DPs with respect to the PF- and LF-diagnostics for phasehood.
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As Matushansky concludes, under Chomsky’s standard phase-theory it is ex-
tremely unclear how best to interpret the results of the phasehood diagnostics when
applied to DPs (see also note 55). However, the assumption that LF and PF may in-
dependently and non-simultaneously read off semanticosyntactic features and mor-
phosyntactic features respectively raises an intriguing possibility: that DPs are ‘PF-
phases’, but not ‘LF-phases’, explaining Matushansky’s observation that DPs pass PF-
diagnostics for phasehood, but fail LF-diagnostics. Epstein and Seely’s question con-
cerning why PF cares whether the spelled-out chunk is propositional is answered; PF
simply doesn’t care whether the spelled-out chunk is propositional. This then clarifies
the murky phasal status of DPs. At DP, Spell-Out to PF is triggered (or rather, given the
discussion above, PF inspects the derivation), but Spell-Out to LF is not.56
Independently of the evidence from DPs, Marušicˇ (2005) also recently proposes a
system of staggered Spell-Out which works in the same way:
“This would mean that, at the point of Spell-Out, only some features of
the structure built thus far would get frozen and shipped to an interface.
Since lexical items are composed of three types of features, {S[emantic],
P[honological], F[ormal]}, if only one type gets frozen, the other two can
still take part in the derivation. If for example a certain head is an LF phase
head but not a PF phase head, let’s call it an LF-only phase, its completion
would freeze/ship all the features that must end up at LF, but not those
that are relevant for PF. Then, at the next (full) phase, when the derivation
reaches e.g. vP, the structure ready to be shipped to PF would be twice the
size of the structure ready to get shipped to LF, since part of the structure
has been already shipped to LF at an earlier point of LF-only Spell-Out.”
(Marušicˇ 2005: 9)
The reader is referred to Marušicˇ (2005) for a fuller treatment of staggered Spell-Out
to the interfaces than I am able to provide here, and for further empirical motivation
for it. I aim to show in chapters 4 and 5 that it receives independent support from
binding-theoretic facts, and actually can be very fruitfully employed in determining
local binding domains for anaphors and pronouns, a long-standing theoretical puzzle.
We will also see that the LF-/PF-phase distinction goes some way towards explaining
non-complementarity phenomena in English and other languages, as well as certain
aspects of the distribution of the class of ‘simplex expression’ (monomorphemic) re-
flexives in other Germanic languages. This combination of theoretical and empirical
evidence in favour of non-simultaneous Spell-Out to the two interfaces provides the
56We will see further arguments for the PF-/LF-phasehood of different constituents where they become
relevant below. In particular, see §4.5.2, §5.2.3, and §5.2.5.2.
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sort of argument against Chomsky’s rather weakly defended view that it should not be
possible.
2.2.3.4 Further consequences
Assuming that narrow syntaxmanipulates bothmorphosyntactic and semanticosyntac-
tic features has notable implications for standard Minimalist analyses of feature agree-
ment operations. In the Derivation by Phase model, the fact that only features which
enter the derivation valued are interpretable at LF is designed to capture the character-
istic semantic vacuity of Case, since Case features are assumed never to be semantically
interpretable on any head.57 DPs therefore bear unvalued Case features which cannot
be valued by probing for a matching interpretable feature, since Case is never seman-
tically interpretable. Instead Chomsky (2001) suggests, following George and Kornfilt
(1981), that Case is valued as a reflex of a ϕ-feature agreement operation between a DP
bearing [CASE: ] and a valued [ϕ] and a Case-assigning head bearing [ϕ: ]. Chomsky
offers no real explanation for why the mechanisms involved in Case valuation should
be exceptional in this way, however. Under the revised system of feature interpretability
advanced here, there is no assumption that features will typically be both semantically
and phonologically interpreted, hence Case need not be treated as exceptional. If Case
is a purely morphosyntactic feature (i.e. interpreted only by PF), there is no expectation
that it should be semantically contentful, and so we can eliminate the stipulation of the
exceptional valuation of Case features.
One possible concern is that this approach requires the postulation of an addi-
tional Case feature on the head which values a DP’s [CASE: ]. Yet at any rate it is
somewhat alarming that the Chomsky (2001) system requires some reference to special
‘Case-assigning heads’: not all Ts and vs assign Case, of course (e.g. the v that selects un-
accusative VPs). If these heads do not bear a Case feature, then some property of their
ϕ-features will need to be stipulated (‘defectiveness’) in order to explain why they do
not value DPs’ [CASE: ]. It appears to be nomore of a stipulation, then, to propose that
functional heads such as T or v bear a Case feature when they can value [CASE: ] on
DPs. Another potential advantage of teasing apart Case from ϕ-features is that agree-
ment need not be invoked when there is no evidence for it (other than theory-internal
evidence from Case-assignment). So we need not necessarily assume, for example, that
in English, v enters into ϕ-feature agreement with objects in order to assign accusative
Case. The same goes of course for DP complements of prepositions, which are assigned
Case but fail to trigger overt agreement in English.
57Although it seems that this is not necessarily true for other languages. Case in Finnish, for example,
has often been shown to be semantically interpretable.
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2.2.3.5 Probe-goal agreement
If [CASE: ] on DPs is valued by Agree with a head bearing a matching valued fea-
ture, we need to say something more about the mechanisms of the Agree operation in
this case. In particular, a problem arises concerning incompatibility with the configura-
tional requirements of probe-goal agreement. As outlined above in §2.2.2.2, the system
of agreement advanced in Chomsky (2000, 2001) assumes that unvalued features, upon
entering the derivation, probe within their c-command domain for an appropriate goal
bearing a matching set of valued features. Crucially, the c-commanding probe must
always be an unvalued feature, and the goal a valued feature. The problem here is that
assuming [CASE: ] on D probes its complement (say, NP), it will not find a match-
ing [CASE] feature capable of valuing it; the appropriate valued [CASE] on a functional
head in fact c-commands [CASE: ], apparently the reverse of the probe-goal configu-
ration. One way of ensuring that Agree satisfies probe-goal is to revert to Chomsky’s
suggestion that Case-assignment should tie in with ϕ-agreement. That is, T for example
bears a probing [ϕ: ], which matches and agrees with valued [ϕ] on D(P), a subject.
Then, as Agree is established, T’s valued [CASE] can value the [CASE: ] on DP.
(70) [ ... T[ϕ: , CASE: Nom] ... DP[ϕ: 3sg, CASE: ] ]
This takes away one advantage of the proposed system of morphosyntactic and se-
manticosyntactic features outlined above, namely the dissociation of ϕ-agreement from
Case in languages where there is no morphological evidence for ϕ-agreement. Further-
more, [CASE: ] must once again be treated as exceptional in that it is not a probing
feature.
A natural response to this last concern is that the behaviour of [CASE: ] would
not be exceptional if it did probe, but simply did not find find a suitable goal. Faced
with no goal, it must simply wait and get valued ‘from above’, as a reflex of some other
operation. A quite similar alternative is that ‘upward’ probing of unvalued features is
permitted. Suppose that an unvalued feature probes its complement when the head
bearing it enters the derivation (exactly as proposed by Chomsky 2000, 2001), yet if
it fails to find an appropriate goal there, it must wait until an appropriate feature en-
ters the derivation. Anyhow, this is not entirely dissimilar from the position we are
already forced into adopting, where Case, having unsuccessfully probed, must wait to
be valued from above. Recently, Rezac (2004) has also argued for a similar proposal
on independent grounds, which he terms ‘dynamically expanding search space’. Rezac
(2004: 102) highlights that restricting search space to the complement of a head (‘static
search space’) comes primarily from Case/ϕ-agreement. If specifiers of heads could
be probed, then v in accusative constructions could potentially enter into Agree with
the subject in SpecvP, when in fact it must enter into Agree with the object, inside VP.
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Yet as Rezac notes, this is also consistent with a dynamically expanding search-space:
provided that the v first probes its complement (VP), Agree is blocked between v and
the subject in SpecvP, since a goal is already available without expansion of the search
space.58
We should note that Rezac’s assumptions only allow the search space of a prob-
ing head to extend as far upwards as its specifier(s), which is insufficient for both Case
valuation by Agree as tentatively suggested here, and for my purposes with binding in
chapters 4 and 5. Specifically, probes will need to be able to search until the phase con-
taining them has completed. However, Baker (forthcoming) also proposes that agree-
ment must probe upward as well as downward, in particular probing c-commanding
phrases within the current phase of the derivation. Although Baker’s assumptions con-
cerning features are not identical to those we adopt here (he does not assume the val-
ued/unvalued feature distinction, for example), the defence he makes against potential
theoretical objections to upward probing remain valid under our assumptions. In his
manuscript, he notes that Chomsky (2000) argues for a restriction of the search space to
the complement of a probing head on the grounds that it reduces computational bur-
den. Indeed, Chomsky (2006) has recently reiterated this view. Yet Baker assumes that
the independent restriction that the search space extends no further than the current
phase itself ensures that the ‘computational explosion’ that Chomsky imagines will
not arise. Baker also defends his position against theories which assume that probes
must be satisfied as early as possible, i.e. upon entering the derivation. He notes that
the only requirement imposed by cyclic computation is that probes are satisfied before
completion of their phase. We could then argue that imposing a requirement for instant
valuation, for example, would thus not follow from grammatical principles and would
require stipulation.59
2.2.4 Summary
One of the key hypotheses of recent research in the Minimalist programme is that the
computational system is optimally designed (in terms of the technical resources it ex-
ploits) to meet the requirements of mapping sound to meaning. Only very early steps
have beenmade in determining the extent to which the computational systemmeets op-
58Regardless, with accusative Case assignment potentially divorced from ϕ-feature agreement as I spec-
ulate here, it remains to be seenwhether the initial empirical argument for probing the c-command domain
would hold under an alternative analysis.
59Note that if indeed probes do not have any requirement for valuation as early as possible, we might
imagine that rather than all features probing their c-command domain and then waiting for valuation
from above, some features simply do not probe their c-command domain in the first instance. We leave
this possibility aside here since it would require additional assumptions concerning the factors responsible
for whether unvalued features probe their c-command domain.
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timal design, and many issues surrounding how economy is best understood in terms
of the processes of narrow syntax remain unclear. In this thesis we largely adopt the
Derivation by Phase model, an implementation of the programme which has to date
proved relatively successful, although certain technical details are revised. While these
modifications are motivated on independent grounds in order to overcome shortcom-
ings of the present model, we will see throughout the thesis that some of them are also
particularly useful in reanalysing the binding theory within the framework adopted.
2.3 Binding in Minimalism
We have seen that although certain problems remain with the GB binding theory, it may
be viewed, empirically, as a relatively successful outcome of the generative programme.
However, we have also seen that the advent of Minimalism has turned attention away
from achieving empirical coverage at any theoretical cost and towards absolute theo-
retical parsimony. Under Minimalism, the binding theory gets a particularly raw deal:
gone are many of the syntactic mechanisms and theoretical devices which, as we have
seen, were previously crucial to explaining binding facts. Several issues are immedi-
ately apparent, and must be addressed by any Minimalist explanation of binding facts.
2.3.1 Theoretical challenges
The first and most notable casualty of the Minimalist programme, the elimination of
D-structure and S-structure, cuts through the heart of the binding theory as understood
in GB. While the level of representation at which binding applies was previously the
subject of a great deal of debate, it appeared that in some way or other, the binding
conditions would require reference to some combination of D-structure, S-structure,
and LF.60 For example, Belletti and Rizzi (1988) argue convincingly that Condition A
must be met at any of these three levels. However, since only levels which interface
with the external systems are argued to be conceptually desirable under Minimalist
assumptions, the C-I interface (now termed LF) is the only surviving candidate in Min-
imalism (Chomsky 1993; Chomsky and Lasnik 1993).61 Yet Chomsky (2004a et seq.) as-
sumes that even this is no longer a single level of representation, however, with cyclic
Spell-Out resulting in the transfer of intermediate phases (vPs and CPs) to LF. A related
problem is that the binding conditions are representational filters, i.e. conditions which
60Where LF is understood in GB not as the C-I interface but as the input to semantic interpretive rules;
see note 34.
61Even though the current system appears to require predicate-internal positions to have a particular
importance in encoding thematic relations, which bears quite a striking similarity to D-structure. See
Uriagereka (2000) for arguments in favour of retaining D-structure.
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check for well-formedness at the relevant level of representation. With derivational
economy replacing the representational constraints in Minimalism, there appear to be
two ideal scenarios: either binding relationships must somehow be established deriva-
tionally, with the binding conditions reducible to more general economy constraints, or
binding relationships must be established at LF, with the binding conditions reducible
to bare output conditions (see §2.2.1).
The second issue is how binding relations are encoded. Chomsky (1995b) pro-
poses an Inclusiveness Condition, stating that no syntactic objects with semantic import
can be introduced into the derivation after the initial selection of lexical items (the nu-
meration). Chomsky (1995b: 381) highlights that it follows from the adoption of the
Inclusiveness Condition that indices cannot be true syntactic objects since they are not
present in the numeration, and therefore no grammatical principles, such as the bind-
ing conditions, may include reference to them. If indices have no place at all in Min-
imalist syntax, the very concept ‘bound’ (or indeed, ‘free’) must be restated, since of
course binding was previously defined by coindexation with a c-commanding element.
Note also that the binding conditions require knowledge of which DPs are anaphoric
and which are pronominal. Yet unlike the GB framework, Minimalism does not as-
sume that different types of DP bear the features [±anaphoric], [±pronominal]. In par-
ticular, as Manzini and Roussou (2000) and Zwart (2002) highlight, the merit of the
GB approach is lost once traces of A- and A′-movement are reinterpreted as copies
of the moved element, rather than DPs which are [+anaphoric, −pronominal] and
[−anaphoric, −pronominal] respectively.
Third, the local binding domain requires a redefinition, since the theoretical con-
cepts of government and accessible SUBJECT of previous binding theories are elimi-
nated as non-primitive concepts which do not meet ‘virtual conceptual necessity’. Fur-
thermore, while this has proved difficult enough in the past even when these concepts
were available (see the various revisions of the binding theory outlined in §2.1 above),
whatever approach we take will not be able to be based solely on empirical coverage:
the Minimalist methodology dictates that empirical coverage is illusory if no explana-
tion is available to support it (Epstein and Seely 2002b). Therefore, whatever binding
domains we propose will need to receive independent support in order to avoid stipu-
lation.
Finally, a broader theoretical issue concerns the nature of the binding theory it-
self. The modular approach of the GB framework made it possible to propose a theory
of binding whose principles are specific to a particular component of the grammar,
and which do not necessarily interact directly with other components, e.g. θ-theory,
Case theory etc. There was previously no theoretical requirement that the principles on
which the binding theory is based bear any relation to other aspects of the grammar,
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although government in particular was argued to be a kind of unifying factor. In Mini-
malism, on the other hand, there can be no module of the grammar to deal specifically
with (potentially) anaphoric elements, and hence binding should ideally follow from
other global principles in the grammar, just as binding domains should.
Throughout the rest of this thesis, these four general theoretical concerns serve to
frame the picture of the binding theory that I paint.62
2.3.2 Chomsky (1993); Chomsky and Lasnik (1993)
Aiming to respond to some of the challenges for the classical binding theory arising
from these concerns, Chomsky (1993: 43) reformulates the binding conditions as follows
(with D an undefined local domain):
(71) The Binding Conditions
A. If α is an anaphor, interpret it as coreferential with a c-commanding phrase
in D.
B. Ifα is a pronominal, interpret it as disjoint from every c-commanding phrase
in D.
(Chomsky 1993: 43)
Although the aim is that this binding theory should address (at least) the first three of
the theoretical problems outlined in §2.3.1 above, the focus in the argumentation is on
the first one, namely that the binding theory does not require recourse to D-structure
and S-structure. This is perhaps understandable, since this is where the stakes are high-
est for Chomsky: the elimination of these levels is certainly the most radical depar-
ture from his previous frameworks. The binding theory is essentially reapportioned to
the LF interface. We shall first examine, then, the extent to which this is successfully
achieved.
Given that a binding theory that applies at LF will have to be measured for em-
pirical coverage against the previous binding theories allowing the binding conditions
to make reference to S-structure, Chomsky suggests that three types of evidence may be
relevant. Firstly, that it is possible that a given condition can apply LF, without recourse
to S-structure. With the Minimalist methodology that fewer levels of representation are
better thanmore, even this would be appropriate empirical evidence for the elimination
of S-Structure. Chomsky claims that a stronger argument still would be if the relevant
62We will also see additional problems for Condition B in particular in §5.3.1.
2.3. Binding in Minimalism 72
condition in question would sometimes have to apply at LF. The third (and decisive)
empirical argument is if the relevant condition cannot apply at S-structure.
Chomsky (1993: 35) makes use of ‘reconstruction’ environments to show that
reapportioning the binding theory to LF is possible, and indeed desirable. Reconstruc-
tion is the term for the assumed covert operation which takes a moved element and
lowers it back into its initial position for some interpretive effect (such as binding). In
(72), the anaphor each other is outside the c-command domain of its antecedent, the men,
yet apparently fails to violate Condition A:
(72) [which of each other’si friends]k did the meni see tk (Barss 1986)
By assumption, the fact that in the trace position of the wh-phrase, the anaphor is
bound in accordance with Condition A ensures that the sentence is grammatical. This
is termed a connectivity effect. The same effect arises where the binding relation is only
well formed in an intermediate trace position. Hence in (73), John may bind the reflex-
ive, despite not satisfying Condition A either in the initial trace position or in the final
movement position of the wh-phrase:63
(73) [which picture of himselfi/j]k did Johni say tk Billj likes tk
In each case, if the wh-phrase ‘reconstructs’ to one of its trace positions by the point
at which Condition A applies, then Condition A will be satisfied and the sentences
correctly predicted grammatical.64
Chomsky (1993) argues that the operation of reconstruction can be eliminated by
adopting the copy theory of movement. Under this view (outlined in §2.2.2.2 above),
movement is simply an instance of merger of an item already present in the derivation,
coupled with a deletion operation at PF accounting for why only the higher copy is
pronounced. At LF, however, it is not the case that all but the highest copy is deleted.
Chomsky (1993: 38) shows that the copy theory of movement accounts for anaphor
connectivity effects simply by choosing “which option is selected for analysis of the
phrase wh- [containing the anaphor].” This clearly provides the weaker sort of evidence
forMinimalism, namely that the binding theory can apply at LF. Yet Chomsky still seeks
the stronger sort, i.e. where an S-structure binding theory fails. As shown inmore detail
63The connectivity effects and the arguments based on them should come with a warning. It has rather
frequently been proposed in the literature, perhaps most forcefully and prominently by Reinhart and Reu-
land (1993), that reflexives in picture-DP environments are not subject to binding-theoretic constraints,
but are governed by quite separate factors. We review questions concerning picture-DPs in some detail at
various points throughout chapters 4 and 5.
64The reader is referred in particular to Barss’s (1986) seminal work in the explanation of connectivity
phenomena.
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in §3.5.1, Chomsky observes a difference in connectivity effects with Condition A when
a predicate is interpreted idiomatically or non-idiomatically:
(74) Johni wondered [[which picture of himselfi/j]k [Billj took tk]]
(Chomsky 1993)
When take pictures is understood literally (i.e. carrying them away), either Bill or John
may be the antecedent for the reflexive inside the wh-phrase, depending on which copy
is interpreted at LF. Yet when take pictures is interpreted idiomatically (i.e. with a cam-
era), only the embedded subject Bill is able to bind the reflexive. Chomsky argues that
in order for idiomatic interpretation to hold, take a picture (of...) has to be interpreted
at LF as a syntactic unit, that is, the lowest copy must be selected for interpretation.
The point is that if Condition A were to apply at S-structure, the fact that on the id-
iomatic reading for (74) himself cannot be bound in its S-structure position (i.e. by John)
is unexplained.65 This provides Chomsky with a stronger argument against S-structure
conditions than he attained previously: this is a case where Condition A cannot apply
at S-structure, but must at LF, if his assumptions are correct.66
2.3.3 Remaining problems for the Minimalist binding theory
Chomsky therefore shows that the binding conditions may (and based on some evi-
dence, perhaps must) apply at LF. This is a crucial assumption which affects every other
aspect of the binding theory, and merits closer attention than we can provide here: the
following chapter is devoted entirely to examining whether the binding theory should
indeed be assumed to hold at LF. For themoment, our attention turns to how the Chom-
sky (1993) binding theory responds to the other theoretical difficulties presented by the
advent of Minimalism (sketched in §2.3.1). Here, it is far less clear that any degree of
success is achieved at all.
First, does the version of the binding theory in (71) need recourse to indices? On
65See §3.5.1 for a counter-argument.
66It should be noted finally that Chomsky’s (1993) binding theory is elaborated further. Notably, in order
to capture certain differences in the reconstruction behaviour of Condition A and Conditions B and C, he
introduces a mechanism of cliticisation at LF of anaphors to their antecedents. He notes:
“Condition A may be dispensable if the approach based upon cliticizationLF is correct and
the effects of Condition A follow from the theory of movement (which is not obvious); and
further discussion is necessary at many points.”
(Chomsky 1993: 43)
Further discussion of these additional mechanisms and their implications takes us beyond the scope of
this chapter.
2.3. Binding in Minimalism 74
the surface, it does not, since the concepts of ‘bound’ and ‘free’, whose definitions in-
volve indexation in the classical binding theory, do not figure in the new binding condi-
tions, effectively interpretive principles. Yet on the other hand, these principles do rely
on the concepts of ‘coreference’ and ‘disjoint reference’. Unless these are grammatical
primitives, they will require definitions too, which brings us back, presumably, to in-
dices. More problematic still is that the interpretive principles must have implications
beyond simply coreference and disjoint reference, and so (71) cannot stand as it is, in
any case. The previous versions of the binding theory based on indexation allow two
relationships to be dealt with in the same fashion: binding of anaphors or pronouns by
a non-referential, quantifier DP (binding of logical variables), and binding of anaphors
or pronouns by a referential DP (resulting in coreference).67 (71) only allows the latter
relationship, yet clearly, the former must also be explained by the binding theory since
the constraints on binding by referential and non-referential DPs are identical:
(75) a. Whoi loves himselfi?
b. Every mani loves himselfi
c. Johni loves himselfi
(76) a. * Whoi loves himi?
b. * Every mani loves himi
c. * Johni loves himi
(77) a. * Whoi said [that Mary loves himselfi]?
b. * Every mani said [that Mary loves himselfi]
c. * Johni said [that Mary loves himselfi]
(78) a. Whoi said [that Mary loves himi]?
b. Every mani said [that Mary loves himi]
c. Johni said [that Mary loves himi]
It should be evident that the concepts of ‘bound’ and ‘free’ are—as required—able to en-
compass both binding by a quantifier DP and binding by a referential DP. However, to
modify the binding conditions in (71) in the appropriate manner to also explain variable
binding, these terms will now have to be primitive concepts requiring no definitions. It
seems unlikely that this would be a wise theoretical move. Yet the only alternative, of
course, is to revert to the classical definition of binding as involving c-command by a
coindexed category, abandoning the Inclusiveness Condition.
Chomsky’s Minimalist binding theory seems to fare no better than its predeces-
sors with respect to eliminating indices. In terms of defining the domains relevant to
67See §4.2.2.3 below for further clarification regarding the distinction between referential and quantifier
DPs.
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the binding theory, it appears to fare far worse (Heinat 2006). In fact, Chomsky fails
to characterise any of the properties of the local binding domain.68 Although this at
first appears rather conspicuous, since the elimination of government requires a refor-
mulation of the local binding domain, it is arguable whether government is important
in this discussion. In light of the fact that government is only required in the Chom-
sky (1981) binding theory to explain the distribution of PRO, for which Chomsky and
Lasnik (1993) propose an alternative non-binding-theoretic account, government might
not be seen as crucial.69 While government is important in explaining the behaviour of
anaphoric and pronominal ECM subjects in Chomsky (1986b) (as observed in note 19),
Zwart (1998) shows that government is not critical to binding domains if ECM subjects
raise covertly to the specifier of the ECM verb, as Chomsky (1995b) assumes. While
the elimination of government may not be at issue, then, the question of what the local
domain is remains. Chomsky (1993: 43) notes of this version of the binding theory that
“numerous problems remain unresolved”. Yet overlooking arguably the single most
important factor driving each revision of the binding theory since Chomsky (1973) is
perhaps a little much. Furthermore, not only must we seek a descriptively accurate
characterisation of the local binding domain, but a Minimalist analysis should be able
to explain why that particular domain is the relevant one. Chomsky (1993) in fact ap-
pears further from this than at any stage of modern syntactic theory.
Finally, the Chomsky (1993) approach offers little in response to the question of
whether the binding theory can be eliminated as a grammatical module. This raises
a number of related concerns. The binding theory is problematic for Minimalism due
to the central Minimalist conjecture that the computational system is strictly deriva-
tional (i.e. non-representational) and the classical binding theory relies on syntactically
active constraints defined over representations of sentences. Given that the door is
open for a derivational reinterpretation of the binding theory, it is perhaps surprising
that Chomsky (1993) still wishes to view the binding theory in effectively representa-
tional terms (even if the filters can apply at LF). This objection is possibly overcome if,
as Chomsky (1993); Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) argue, the binding conditions simply
represent ‘evaluation procedures’ at LF. However, this approach nevertheless abandons
a highly productive line of research in generative syntax, namely the reconciliation of
the constraints governing binding and movement. And without a formal association
between binding and other syntactic phenomena, worryingly from a Minimalist per-
spective there is little scope for understanding why the binding theory looks the way it
68Indeed, Lasnik and Hendrick (2003: 126) observe that both the concept of being bound and the locality
restriction on binding “are liable to minimalist revisions, though in both cases, the achievement of this
goal remains, as yet, incomplete.”
69Chomsky and Lasnik divorce the distribution of PRO from referential factors by assuming that PRO
bears a particular Case, termed null Case. Only certain functional heads (i.e. nonfinite T) are capable of
assigning null Case, and this accounts for the environments in which PRO occurs.
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does or for reducing it to deeper principles.70
2.4 Conclusion
The history of the binding theory within generative syntax is a fairly impressive one.
Yet whereas binding was previously considered significant enough to provide the core
of the syntactic framework (the Government and Binding theory), since the progression
to Minimalism, Chomsky has remained noticeably reticent on this subject. It remains
conspicuously unclear how the empirical facts previously captured by the binding con-
ditions can be handled within the current assumptions, summarised in this chapter.
This seems incompatible with the methodology of the Minimalist programme. As we
have seen, the goal of Minimalist inquiry is the elimination of ad hoc theoretical ma-
chinery required to account for empirical facts. While the emphasis has shifted towards
theoretical parsimony, only if enough of the empirical data are captured with respect to
less minimal frameworks can this goal be seriously entertained. Until now, however,
there have been remarkably few indications that Minimalist assumptions with respect
to binding (e.g. Chomsky 1993) are on the right track. The immediate goal, then, is
to develop a theory of binding which is capable of making some empirical predictions
and is at least compatible with the core theoretical assumptions. As we see in the fol-
lowing chapters, even this first step requires us to test the very limits of the current
framework, to see how far it can bend in order to capture even the most simple bind-
ing facts. With so much of the binding theory unclear within Minimalism, the journey
now begins by responding to perhaps the most fundamental question of where in the
grammar binding relations are determined.
70Although Chomsky (1993) speculates that Condition A might be reducible to the theory of movement
if, in the spirit of his earlier proposal in Chomsky (1986b), anaphors cliticise to their antecedents at LF; see
note 66.
Chapter 3
The binding theory does not apply
at LF
This chapter argues that the Minimalist relegation of the binding theory to LF is theo-
retically undesirable and empirically untenable. A variety of evidence can be adduced
in favour of viewing the binding theory as based on the application of operations in the
computational component of the grammar, a view supported recently in Minimalist
theory by Epstein et al. (1998); Hornstein (2000, 2006); Kayne (2002); Zwart (2002, 2006).
First we see that theoretical concerns point strongly towards a syntactic approach, antic-
ipating the elimination of the binding conditions in chapters 4 and 5. From an empirical
perspective, we see that Condition B cannot apply at LF, since its effects are shown to be
sensitive to elements not present in LF-representations, including Case features, verbal
agreement, and phonological factors. We then survey several potentially powerful em-
pirical counterarguments to a narrow-syntactic analysis of Condition A, in particular
the putative interaction between anaphor binding and other interpretive phenomena
assumed to hold at LF (scope, idiom, and bound variable interpretation). We see that
the interaction of binding and scope is to some degree undeniable, but questionwhether
Condition A—rather than something outside the binding theory—is really at stake. In
cases of interactions with other interpretive effects, it is shown that a surprising num-
ber of the reported judgements on which the evidence for Condition A at LF hinges are
highly dubious.
3.1 Introduction
As we have seen in §2.3.1 above, it is well known that even the most fundamental the-
oretical principles upon which the classical binding theory (e.g. Chomsky 1981, 1986b)
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is based are simply unstatable under Minimalist assumptions. At the heart of the prob-
lems facing the binding theory in Minimalism is the question of where the binding
theory applies, given the elimination of D-structure and S-structure from the grammar.
The framework now provides only two genuine linguistic levels of representation, the
interfaces with the C-I and S-M systems, LF and PF respectively. This also rules out
the application of the binding conditions at Spell-Out and in the numeration, for exam-
ple, which crucially are not levels of representation. In response, two broad approaches
have emerged. First, as initially proposed by Chomsky (1993); Chomsky and Lasnik
(1993), the classical binding conditions may be reinterpreted as a set of interpretive
procedures at LF.1 If not, as suggested by Epstein et al. (1998); Hornstein (2000, 2006);
Kayne (2002); Zwart (2002, 2006), binding must be determined by processes operating
in narrow syntax: thus, the binding conditions can no longer be viewed representa-
tionally, as narrow syntax provides no level at which some filter could apply. With the
Minimalist elimination of D-structure and S-structure, these actually appear to be the
only two possibilities available.
In light of the apparent shortcomings of the Chomsky (1993); Chomsky and Las-
nik (1993) binding theory which applies at LF, this chapter examines whether a narrow-
syntactic approach to the binding theory could provide a plausible alternative. The
theoretical grounds for adopting this view will ultimately derive from the possibility of
reducing binding to independent principles of the grammar, although a full explication
of how this can be achieved given current theoretical assumptions must be deferred
until chapters 4 and 5. The thrust of the argument in this chapter is empirical. First,
the binding theory cannot apply at LF if it is sensitive to factors to which LF does not
have access, such as Case, verbal inflections, and phonological factors. The fact that
each of these (crosslinguistically) does indeed influence Condition B effects signals the
end for a binding theory that applies at LF. In the literature, however, the empirical ev-
idence which is often considered to offer a testing ground between the binding theory
in narrow syntax and at LF largely concerns Condition A effects. This evidence cen-
tres on how binding relations are affected by moving constituents containing anaphors
and whether or not this movement interacts with interpretive effects determined at LF.
The general insensitivity of Condition B effects to this movement and its interpretive
interactions is expected (on both syntactic and LF-based analyses) since the domain in
which a pronoun must be free is usually the constituent within which it moves. Hence
the movement of pronouns within larger constituents induces no binding-theoretic ef-
fect and the predictions of syntactic and LF approaches to Condition B fail to make
distinguishable predictions. The problem for a narrow-syntactic binding theory is that
1This is not strictly required. Minimalism still allows recourse to representational filters such as the
classical binding conditions, provided that they apply at a legitimate level of representation (i.e. LF or
PF). However, with Minimalism slanted away from representational filters, this statement of the binding
conditions seems to leave an unwelcome taste of GB in the mouth. See §2.3.3.
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the evidence in favour of the LF approach to Condition A initially appears to be strong.
However, taking each sort of evidence in turn, we see that it is typically flawed or mis-
leading. Oncewemake explicit some assumptions about the semantics of variable bind-
ing, we see that a narrow-syntactic Condition A is at least as well (and almost certainly
better) supported empirically. With theoretical concerns and evidence from Condition
B effects both strongly favouring the syntactic approach, we can only conclude that the
binding theory cannot apply at LF.
3.2 Evidence for a syntactic binding theory
3.2.1 Theoretical arguments
The LF-view of the binding theory raises concern under Minimalist assumptions. We
know that recourse to binding-specific theoretical concepts must be a last resort in any
Minimalist binding theory. The ideal, then, is to derive a theory of binding purely
from principles independently required in the syntactic framework. Yet locality in the
binding theory must be explained somehow. It appears that only if we view bind-
ing domains as in some way related to the constraints governing movement can we
hope to find an explanation for why binding domains are the way they are. Since
Chomsky (1973), the classical binding theory has envisaged a single explanation for
the common properties of binding and movement (e.g. c-commanding antecedents of
anaphors/traces, locality constraints). In this respect, Chomsky (1993); Chomsky and
Lasnik (1993) abandon one of the major insights of generative syntax, which I take to
be a shortcoming of their approach. Since movement must be considered a narrow-
syntactic process,2 in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is natural to assume
that binding is too.
More to the point, if the general motivation for locality in syntactic relations de-
rives from requirements imposed by economy of computation, there is little reason to
suppose that any particular domain should play some role independently at LF. This
conclusion is also reached by Hornstein (2000) and Reuland (1996):
“[Chomsky and Lasnik (1993)] downplays the properties that suggest that
binding effects are reflections of grammatical (rather than interface) prop-
erties. For example, the binding theory exploits locality effects similar to
those used in constraining movement and the binding principles crucially
exploit c-command. These are hallmarks of a grammar internal process,
2Perhaps with the exception of head-movement; Chomsky (2001) suggests that head-movement may
apply in the phonological component.
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Consequently, it seems best to try to reanalyze binding effects as grammar
internal processes rather than interface properties, in my opinion.”
(Hornstein 2000: 192-3, fn.1)
“...the null hypothesis is that the behaviour of anaphors and pronominals is
fully determined by their lexical properties and general interpretive princi-
ples. [...] Ideally, no specific statements other than about their lexical make-
up should be necessary.”
(Reuland 1996: 319)
A narrow-syntactic approach to binding lets us make the strong claim that locality ef-
fects are uniquely determined by syntactic factors, and not by properties of the inter-
faces. Locality constraints, as we have seen in §2.2.2, are derived by the Minimal Link
Condition and the phase-based derivation.3 If the binding theory were to apply at LF,
then, we would be forced to concede that binding domains must be stipulated. In light
of the fact that locality in both movement and binding is quite similarly constrained,
an LF binding theory would involve a conspicuous redundancy in that very similar lo-
cality constraints would have to apply in narrow syntax (for movement) and at LF (for
binding). This, I believe, would be a glaring weakness in any Minimalist theory. If, on
the other hand, the local binding conditions are syntactic, we at least have some scope
for explaining why binding domains exist.
Indeed, in the following chapters we will see that all of the central elements of
the binding theory, including c-command, local binding domains, and the encoding of
referential dependencies receive a natural explanation in Minimalist terms. Moreover,
each can be derived from independent properties of narrow syntax. In order to effec-
tively eliminate the binding theory in this way, wemust of course reduce it to operations
of the narrow-syntactic component. I have provided a flavour of the sort of theoretical
arguments in favour of a narrow-syntactic binding theory, but essentially the reader is
invited to anticipate its theoretical advantages until a full explanation is provided in
chapters 4 and 5. In this chapter, then, we concentrate on the empirical evidence for
where the binding theory applies. At any rate, we will see that this evidence alone is
sufficient to prove that the binding theory cannot apply at LF.
3Although the Phase Impenetrability Condition is derived by the interfaces inspecting the derivation
cyclically, so the fact that narrow-syntactic operations can only target syntactic objects in the current phase
of the derivation is to some extent the result of interface properties.
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3.2.2 Empirical evidence for a syntactic Condition B
As noted by Reuland (2001), a syntactic approach to the binding theory will generally
be better equipped to capture crosslinguistic variation in binding, since interface prop-
erties are by assumption universal. We can make this argument more concrete if we
can show that factors which cannot be relevant at LF are capable of influencing binding
possibilities. At various points in this thesis, we will see several cases where this is at-
tested. Here I will bring together and outline some of the more important evidence, in
each case referring the reader to the later and more detailed discussion of the empirical
facts in their context.
3.2.2.1 Case and inflectional features affect Condition B
In standard versions of Minimalism (Chomsky 1993 et seq.), it is assumed that certain
morphosyntactic features are not interpreted (or interpretable) by LF. It follows (from
Full Interpretation) that LF-representations cannot contain such features. For Chom-
sky, these include [ϕ] when not semantically interpreted (on T and v, for example) and
[CASE]. Once we examine crosslinguistic data from other Germanic languages, it be-
comes apparent that these features interact with the possibility of bound readings for
pronouns, a fact which is difficult to reconcile with an analysis of Condition B that ap-
plies at LF. As outlined by Hoekstra (1994),4 Frisian has a 3rd person singular feminine
pronoun har and a 3rd person plural pronoun har(ren), and rather unusually, both may
be locally bound:
(1) a. Hjai
Theyi
skammen
shamed
har(ren)i
themi
‘They were ashamed of themselves.’ (Frisian; Hoekstra 1994)
b. Mariei
Maryi
wasket
washes
hari
heri
‘Mary washes (herself).’ (Frisian; Reuland and Everaert 2001)
However, this is not true of other pronouns in Frisian:
(2) a. Hjai
Theyi
skammen
shamed
*sei
*themi
(Frisian; Hoekstra 1994)
b. Mariei
Maryi
wasket
washes
*sei
*heri
(Frisian; Reuland and Everaert 2001)
4See §6.2.3.2.
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Hoekstra (1994) shows that the difference between har(ren) and se is in their Case spec-
ification: se, which is assigned structural Case, is subject to Condition B effects, while
har(ren), which is assigned inherent Case, is not. Yet the requirement for a structural
Case feature in order to be subject to Condition B could not be incorporated into a
version of Condition B that applies at LF, since the relevant feature is not present in
LF-representations. Case can also be shown to play a role in Condition B effects in Ice-
landic. In ECM constructions, Icelandic typically behaves like English in not permitting
a pronominal ECM subject to be bound by the matrix subject:
(3) Maríai
Maryi
taldi
believed
*hanai
*heri
vera
be
gáfaða
gifted
(Icelandic; Taraldsen 1996)
However, some Icelandic verbs assign a lexically selected oblique (‘quirky’) Case to
their subjects, resulting in nominative Case assignment to their object or to the ECM
subject. In contrast to (3), when the pronoun is an ECM subject assigned nominative
Case, it can be bound by the quirky subject (Taraldsen 1996):
(4) Maríui
Maryi-DAT
fannst
thought-3SG
húni
shei-NOM
vera
be
gáfuð
gifted
‘Mary thought she was gifted.’ (Icelandic; Taraldsen 1996)
An explanation for this is provided in §6.4.3.2, but for our purposes here it suffices to
conclude that Case can again be crucial in determining whether a pronoun is subject to
Condition B.
The interaction between agreement inflections and Condition B effects in Ice-
landic provides us with a similar argument against an LF approach to Condition B.
Since Icelandic quirky subjects do not trigger agreement with their verbs, the verbal
morphology is either a default 3SG or it is governed by the ϕ-features of the nomina-
tive object (Thráinsson 1979). A more detailed exposition is again provided in §6.4.3.2,
but the important fact is that the verbal morphology is critical in determining whether
the ECM subject induces a Condition B violation when bound by the matrix subject
(Taraldsen 1995, following an observation due to Höskuldur Thráinsson):
(5) a. Konunumi
women-thei-DAT
fundust
seemed-3PL
*þæri
*theyi-NOM
vera
be
gáfaþar
gifted-FEM.PL-NOM
‘The women thought they were smart.’
b. Konunumi
women-thei-DAT
fannst
seemed-3SG
þæri
they-NOM
vera
be
gáfaþar
gifted-FEM.PL-NOM
‘The women thought they were smart.’ (Taraldsen 1995)
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When the nominative ECM subject governs the verbal agreement, as in (5a), the bound
interpretation is ruled out by Condition B; when default 3SG morphology appears on
the verb, the Condition B effect disappears, as in (5b). Thus, Condition B is again shown
to be sensitive to morphosyntactic information (here, inflectional features) which is
commonly assumed not to be accessible at LF.
3.2.2.2 Phonological factors can affect Condition B domains
While this appears to be strong evidence against Condition B applying at LF, it relies on
certain assumptions about features and the interfaces. Although I imagine most readers
who might wish to hold on to the assumption that the binding theory applies at LF (i.e.
most likely working within the Minimalist programme) would have few objections to
these assumptions, I amwilling to concede that to a small degree the evidence is theory-
internal. Another variety of evidence can be provided which relies on no particular
theoretical assumptions. Recall that in §2.1.4.1 we have seen that pronouns embedded
in picture-DPs not containing a subject can (often) be bound by the closest subject:
(6) Theyi heard [DP stories about themi]
Subjectless picture-DPs are the focus of a fair deal of investigation throughout this the-
sis, as the analyses presented in chapters 4 and 5 make some interesting predictions
about them. However, Fiengo and Higginbotham (1981) claim that the judgement for
sentences similar to (6) is variable across speakers, a fact also conceded by Chomsky
(1982: 99, fn.24). They provide (7), leaving the grammaticality judgment open (which I
indicate by %).
(7) % Johni read [DP books about himi]
Interestingly, Fiengo and Higginbotham observe that stressing the pronoun removes
the variation, with the sentence grammatical on the bound reading for the majority of
speakers:
(8) Johni read [DP books about HIMi]
It appears then that a phonological factor influences whether the picture-DP is a local
binding domain or not.
A possible objection is that the effect is not due to phonological stress per se, but
due to a semantic correlate such as focus: the pronoun is focussed in (8) but not (7).
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On the assumption that focus is encoded in LF-representations, if Condition B were to
apply at LF the contrast between (7) and (8) for many speakers could be (at least in
principle) explained by an interaction of focus with Condition B. Yet further evidence
from Fiengo and Higginbotham suggests that the explanation based on focus is on the
wrong track. Importantly, they highlight that the variable grammaticality of (7) con-
trasts robustly with (9), where the pronoun is unstressed and reduced to ’im.
(9) * Johni read [DP books about ’imi] (Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981)
For a majority of speakers, (9) is sharply ungrammatical. However, there appears to be
no perceptible difference in terms of the focus of the pronoun between (7) and (9), while
the contrast in the Condition B effect appears no less sharp than the one between (7)
and (8). We can conclude that the source of both contrasts is the phonological ‘weight’
of the constituent, and indeed, substantial further evidence is provided in support of
this position in §5.2.5.2. Since this phonological information cannot be present in LF-
representations, we are once again forced to draw the conclusion that Condition B can-
not apply at LF.
This is by no means the extent of the evidence against Condition B applying at
LF but provides a flavour of the different sorts of evidence that support the conclusion.
Furthermore, in §3.4.3 we will see another variety, from A-movement constructions (in
which either a pronoun or its antecedent undergoes raising). Unfortunately the ar-
gument requires reference to some theoretical concepts that we have yet to outline in
this chapter, and are primarily of relevance to the evidence for where Condition A ap-
plies. Hence I defer the presentation of the evidence for Condition B until the required
background assumptions have been outlined in sufficient detail to make the argument
clear. In §5.4.1 we will implement an analysis of Condition B which explains why both
phonological factors and semantically uninterpreted features are relevant in determin-
ing Condition B effects. The fact that these effects are sensitive to both semanticosyn-
tactic and morphosyntactic factors indicates that they are determined in narrow syntax
(where both types of features are present) and not at either of the interfaces.
3.2.3 Empirical evidence for a syntactic Condition A
3.2.3.1 Condition A applies anywhere, not just at LF
Our attention now turns to empirical evidence for where Condition A applies. Al-
though we will ultimately see that matters here are rather more complex (with the em-
pirical arguments rather more involved), at least the prima facie evidence concerning
anaphor binding in movement constructions appears to support a syntactic account,
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consistent with our conclusions for Condition B. It is well known that Condition A ap-
pears to be able to apply throughout the derivation, at any intermediate movement
landing site, following the proposals of Belletti and Rizzi (1988).
(10) a. [Every picture of himself]i seems to John ti to be faked
b. Johni seems to himself ti to be the best candidate
(11) a. [Which picture of himself]i did John like ti best?
b. Johni wondered [which picture of himself]i Mary liked ti best
In (10a) and (11a), the anaphor appears to be bound in its pre-movement position (pre-
viously D-structure), and even though it is not bound in its surface position (previously
S-structure), this does not affect grammaticality. In (10b) and (11b), though, the anaphor
is not bound in its pre-movement position but it is in its surface position. Still the sen-
tence remains grammatical, suggesting that Condition A may be met at any level of
representation (Belletti and Rizzi 1988), or at any stage of the derivation (Epstein et al.
1998; Lebeaux 1998; Saito 2003; Hicks 2005b).5
At the very outset of the Minimalist programme, Chomsky (1993) is well aware
of the difficulties that the elimination of D-structure and S-structure present for the
binding theory. His reaction to the sort of empirical facts presented above, apparently
requiring binding relations to be evaluated at D-structure and S-structure, is to suppose
that an LF-representation can contain appropriate information about the pre-movement
positions of certain elements. Thus, at LF, moved items could potentially ‘reconstruct’
into positions in which they entered the derivation. As mentioned in §2.3.2 above, this
is made possible by the ‘copy theory’ of movement. Under this approach to movement,
revised and amended but adopted by and large since, movement does not leave be-
hind a trace, but simply copies an element and merges an identical copy in a higher
position in the tree. It is then up to the phonological component to ensure that one
copy (typically in the final landing site) is pronounced. Therefore, even in an LF ap-
proach to binding, the data above can still be explained, by assuming the following
LF-representations:6
(12) a. [Every picture of himself] seems to John <every picture of himself> to be
faked
5On the other hand, it can be argued that Condition B must be met at every level of representation,
or everywhere during the derivation (Lebeaux 1998): a violation before or after movement cannot be
rectified even if there is a stage at which Condition B is met. This leads Lebeaux in particular to conclude
that Condition B must be syntactic. See §3.4.3 for an empirical argument supporting this view.
6For simplicity, even though there is no reconstruction operation per se once it is reduced to copy inter-
pretation at LF, we will still descriptively refer to the phenomenon as reconstruction. Note that wherever
the trace (t) notation is not employed for movement constructions, movement copies are indicated in an-
gled brackets <>.
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b. Johni seems to himself <John> to be the best candidate
(13) a. [Which picture of himself] did John like <which picture of himself> best?
b. Johni wondered which picture of himself Mary liked <which picture of
himself> best
3.2.3.2 Covert movement doesn’t feed Condition A
So with overt movement of constituents containing anaphors, the argument that Con-
dition A applies during the derivation can be headed off by the copy theory of move-
ment. Yet there is also some empirical evidence from covert movement constructions
that might be thought of as arguing against the hypothesis that Condition A applies
at LF. If Condition A applies at LF, and if covert movement applies before the syntax is
read off by the LF interface, then we expect that moving DPs covertly should create new
binding possibilities. Yet in general, as Lasnik (1997) notes, covert A-movement does
not create new binding domains: while raising an antecedent to satisfy Condition A at
S-structure saves a D-structure violation, LF-movement cannot. Take first the expletive-
associate construction. It has frequently been assumed that the associate of there moves
covertly to adjoin to or replace the expletive, as in (14b).
(14) a. There seem to be many men in the room
b. <many men> there seem to be many men in the room
If this is an appropriate analysis, many men should be able to bind the reflexive at LF
in (15a). It is well known though that associate raising in expletive constructions fails
to affect binding possibilities (Lasnik and Saito 1991; Lasnik 1995a,b, 1997; den Dikken
1995):
(15) a. * There seem to themselvesi to be many meni in the room
b. <many men> there seem to themselves to be many men in the room
Clearly, the sentence is ungrammatical, and the prediction of the LF approach is not
borne out. Barss (1986) also observes similar effects with covert wh-movement. On the
assumption that in situ wh-phrases undergo covert movement to a SpecCP position,
in (16a) we should be able to bind the reflexive by John, just like we can when these
wh-phrases move overtly into SpecCP, as in (16b):
(16) a. * Johni wonders [who showed which picture of himselfi to Susan]
b. John wonders [<which picture of himself> who showed which picture of
himself to Susan]
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While this sort of evidence looks appealing for a narrow-syntactic approach to
binding, the problem is that the status of covert movement is rather unclear nowadays.
Also, the argument from associate raising relies on almost certainly outdated theoreti-
cal assumptions. The evidence that expletive raising takes place comes from agreement
behaviour between nonlocal elements (assuming the Chomsky (1995b) version of the
framework, where agreement is restricted to local specifier-head and head-head con-
figurations. Since nonlocal probe-goal agreement can do the bulk of the work in the
current framework, there is really no longer a need for covert associate raising. From
an empirical perspective, it is more worrying that Lasnik (1995a) has shown that covert
movement fails to feed other sorts of phenomena involving licensing at LF, like bound
pronouns and NPIs: even if covert movement does not feed Condition A, we cannot
therefore take this as strong evidence against Condition A applying at LF.
Perhaps surprisingly, given this, Uriagereka (1988) argues that in expletive con-
structions such as (17), the antecedent only binds the reciprocal at LF (under the covert
movement analysis of these constructions), and not at S-structure (presumably two
knights occupies a VP-internal position while the anaphor is embedded in an adjunct
to VP).
(17) There [VP[VP arrived two knightsi] [on each other’si horses]]
Yet Lasnik (1997) highlights that covert associate movement may not be the relevant
factor here, since Lasnik and Saito (1991) show that even direct objects may apparently
c-command adjuncts, which is again unexpected if the direct object is VP-internal, and
the adjunct adjoins to VP:
(18) I saw two meni on each other’si birthdays
Lasnik suggests that movement of the object to SpecAgrOP can account for the ‘high’
binding behaviour of the objects in (17) and (18), from where the antecedent binds into
VP (containing the adjunct).7 These contrast with (15) since the antecedent there is a
subject and cannot move to SpecAgrOP. Another case of movement to SpecAgrOP (as
argued by Postal 1974; Lasnik and Saito 1991; Lasnik 1997) is the subject of an ECM com-
plement clause. In ECM constructions where an adjunct clause contains an anaphor,
Lasnik shows that the ECM subject can bind it. If the adjunct clause is adjoined to the
matrix VP (higher than the ECM clause), unless the ECM subject moves to SpecAgrOP
c-commanding the matrix VP, the possibility of binding is unpredicted.8
7That is to say, that the bracketing in (17) is incorrect.
8The (pragmatically disfavoured) reading where the two men are at the scene during each other’s trials
is unproblematic, since it involves the ECM subject binding into the adjunct to the infinitival VP. This is
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(19) The DA proved two meni to have been at the scene during each other’si trials
Lasnik goes further, following Koizumi (1993, 1995) in assuming that movement to
SpecAgrOP is overt in English, while the verb raises to a head position higher than
AgrO (in more recent terms, AgrOP sits between vP and VP).9 Despite repeated re-
sistance to this variety of object movement over the years, Chomsky (2006) concedes
that this movement may indeed take place (in narrow syntax) after all. However, not
wishing to invoke Agreement projections, Chomsky assumes that the movement is to
SpecVP within vP. Questions arise concerning the adjunction site and whether a raised
object would c-command the adjunct, but it suffices to conclude that Uriagereka’s sen-
tences can be given a natural explanation in the literature without recourse to a binding
theory that applies at LF.
3.2.3.3 A-movement pied-piping an anaphor
As we have seen above, ‘reconstruction’ for the purposes of anaphor binding takes
place in both A′-movement (e.g. (11a)) and A-movement constructions (e.g. (10a)).
Reconstruction for the purposes of scope, however, is known to behave quite differ-
ently, and an unresolved debate has centered on whether A-movement can reconstruct
in this case. Notably, it has been argued by Chomsky (1995b: 326) that A-movement
does not reconstruct (see, e.g., Lasnik 1999a for a summary of the arguments for this
approach). Lasnik proposes that A-movement and A′-movement are underlyingly dif-
ferent in that A-movement does not leave a trace/copy.10 The evidence used typically
concerns the scope relations involved between raised quantifiers and quantifiers that
they are assumed to have raised across. A well known empirical argument for the non-
reconstruction of A-movement is that when a universally quantified DP is raised out
of a clause containing negation, the reading where negation outscopes the universal is
unavailable:
(20) a. It seems that everyone isn’t there yet ∀ > ¬ ; ¬ > ∀
b. Everyonei seems [ti not to be there yet] ∀ > ¬ ; *¬ > ∀
possible as long as the ECM subject occupies a position at least as high as SpecTP, as is fairly uncontro-
versially assumed. The relevant reading for the argument Lasnik presents is that the DA proved the facts
about the men during the two trials.
9In later work, Lasnik (1999a: 200-1) suggests (largely on the basis of scope interactions) that raising of
the ECM subject into the matrix clause is in fact optional (or rather is triggered by the optional presence of
AgrO). For example, if the ECM subject needs to raise to bind into an adjunct, it does.
10Boeckx (2001: 508, fn.2) highlights that Epstein and Seely (1999) reach a similar conclusion and that
Fox (1999) argues alternatively that A-movement leaves a simple trace, not a true copy.
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There are problems, though. May (1977) notes that raised indefinites can in some cases
be interpreted with narrow scope, originally taken as evidence for ‘quantifier lowering’,
and nowadays for A-movement reconstruction (as suggested by Barss 1986; Lebeaux
1998; Fox 2000 among others).11
(21) Someone from New York is likely to win the lottery. ∃ > likely ; likely > ∃
Suppose we leave such complications aside for the moment. We might well won-
der what the consequences for anaphor binding would be if we were to assume, with
Chomsky (1995b) and Lasnik (1999a), that A-movement does not reconstruct. We could
imagine that if an anaphor can be contained in an A-moved subject, we could impose
conflicting requirements of reconstruction on both scope and anaphor binding. Let’s
take one such case. Independently of binding facts, Boeckx (2001) shows that raising an
indefinite across a universal quantifier creates a kind of intervention effect with respect
to scope reconstruction. So in (22a), the existential can take wide or narrow scope, while
in (22b) with the universal as an experiencer argument it can only have wide scope, i.e.
no scope reconstruction:12
(22) a. A red car seems to be parked at the corner. seem > ∃ ; ∃ > seem
b. A red car seems to every driver to be parked at the corner.
*seem > ∃ ; ∃ > seem
(Boeckx 2001)
When the raised subject contains an anaphor bound by the experiencer as in (23), the LF
approach to Condition A would seem to impose conflicting requirements (and hence
ungrammaticality): the DP containing the anaphor must be interpreted in its surface
position for scope, but in its base position for binding (so that every man can c-command
the anaphor).
(23) A story about himselfi seems to every mani [<a story about himselfi> to have
been maliciously concocted]
Unexpectedly for that approach, the sentence is grammatical. It is tempting, then, to
take this as evidence that Condition A does not apply at LF, but during narrow syntax,
as the LF-representation in which the anaphor is in the scope of the universal seems
unavailable, but the binding configuration is good. However, Boeckx (2001) shows
that this argument can be circumvented—correctly, I think—by assuming that different
11Lasnik (1999a: 206) suggests as an alternative that the phenomenon might simply be “a consequence
of the meaning of indefinites, rather than the result of a syntactic operation”.
12It appears that some speakers do not agree with the reported contrast, though.
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parts of a complex DP can be separately reconstructed (as in Chomsky 1993, see e.g.
(12a) and (13a) above). Hence a possible LF-representation for (23) would be (24), with
the anaphor bound and the existential taking wide scope.
(24) A story about himselfi seems to every mani [<a story about himselfi> to have
been maliciously concocted]
In summary, even if the quantificational head in an A-movement construction
cannot reconstruct, the evidence from A-movement when the anaphor is contained in
the raised DP is not especially helpful in determining whether Condition A applies
during narrow syntax or at LF. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence we have against
Condition A applying at LF is not extremely strong. This makes it all the more impor-
tant to look at evidence which has been provided in favour of Condition A at LF and
figure out a way of explaining it.
3.3 Counter-evidence 1: trapping effects
For the reasons outlined in §3.2.1 above, I follow Hornstein (2000) in assuming that all
else being equal, a syntactic approach to binding is preferred over the LF approach.
Empirical evidence from Condition B effects in §3.2.2.1 was shown to provide further
support for this view. Yet in order to confirm that binding relations are determined
in narrow syntax rather than at LF, we must show that a narrow-syntactic version of
Condition A fares at least as well as the LF approach in terms of its empirical cover-
age. Given that direct empirical evidence for the syntactic approach has not proved
overwhelming, the rest of the chapter teases apart and tests the predictions of the two
approaches with respect to interactions between anaphor binding and other interpre-
tive phenomena. Since the putative interactions are sometimes taken as evidence that
Condition A applies at LF, it is particularly important to examine how well a narrow-
syntactic approach compares. First I deal with cases where an anaphor embedded in
a moved constituent is trapped in a ‘high’ position for the purposes of interpretation,
due to other factors in the sentence; this is known as a ‘trapping effect’.
3.3.1 Condition C interacting with anaphor binding
Trapping effects are observed in the interaction between Condition A and Condition
C,13 sometimes adduced in favour of the conclusion that Condition A applies at LF. It
13In this thesis I do not offer an analysis of Condition C effects. Although Condition C has been an im-
portant component of the binding theory since Chomsky (1981), it is now a fairly commonly held view that
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is well known that Condition C displays different behaviour according to whether the
relevant R-expression is embedded in an adjunct or an argument (see especially van
Riemsdijk and Williams 1981; Freidin 1986; Lebeaux 1988).
(25) a. [Which argument [that Johni made]]k did hei believe tk
b. * [Which argument [that Johni is a genius]]k did hei believe tk
Chomsky (1993) follows Lebeaux’s conclusion that adjuncts may be ‘late-merged’ in
the derivation, avoiding a Condition C violation. Under this approach, in (25a), the
wh-phrase which argument merges as the object of believe, and then undergoes wh-move-
ment. Only at this stage does the relative that John made merge, acyclically. At no point
during the derivation is Condition C violated (as John never c-commands him), and the
R-expression containedwithin the relative clause will not be able reconstruct to the base
position of the wh-phrase: the sentence is correctly predicted grammatical. This option
is not available in (25b) since the clause containing the R-expression is a complement to
argument, which must merge with argument to satisfy its thematic requirements. Hence,
John, contained within the complement clause, must also merge before wh-movement
takes place. Coreference between John and he results in a violation of Condition C, since
he c-commands John before wh-movement takes place.
When the clause inside the wh-phrase is a relative, as in (25a), it is assumed that a
choice can be made whether to merge the relative before or after wh-movement. In (25a)
we are forced to choose the latter since merging the relative clause before wh-movement
would induce a Condition C violation, just as in (25b). In other cases, though, we will
have to merge the relative clause before wh-movement, for example when it contains an
anaphor which must reconstruct in order to be bound by an antecedent, i.e. an anaphor
which is not c-commanded by its binder in its surface position. The grammaticality of
(26) confirms that this is possible.
(26) [Which stories about each other]k did the journalists publish tk
Suppose, though, that the adjunct also contains an R-expression, which results in a
Condition C violation if the adjunct reconstructs (i.e. is merged before wh-movement).
As predicted, then, (27) is ungrammatical as at LF we must either violate Condition C
(with reconstruction) or Condition A (with late-merge and hence no reconstruction).
Condition C as a syntactic condition can be dispensed with (Chomsky 1982; Reinhart 1983a,b; Grodzinsky
and Reinhart 1993; Reinhart and Reuland 1993). Following work by Reinhart (1983a,b), it seems that in-
terpretive procedures related to variable binding apply at LF and are sensitive to c-command, but not the
same sort of locality constraints as those on narrow syntax. If Condition C reduces to such procedures,
then this explains why it differs in terms of locality from Conditions A and B, yet also why c-command is
nevertheless relevant. See §4.2.2.4 for further discussion of variable binding mechanisms at LF.
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(27) * [Which stories about each other’si characterizations of the typical male
viewerj]k would hej conclude the journalistsi should publish tk
(Sportiche 2001)
When reconstruction for Condition A does not induce a Condition C violation, the sen-
tence is grammatical:
(28) [Which stories about each other’si characterizations of himj]k would the typ-
ical male viewerj conclude the journalistsi should publish tk
(Sportiche 2001)
The difference is explained as follows. In (27), reconstruction of the wh-phrase brings
the typical male viewer into a configuration in which it is c-commanded by he, in violation
of Condition C. In (28), however, reconstruction brings the pronoun into a configuration
in which it is c-commanded by the the typical male viewer. So rather than Condition Cwe
are dealing with Condition B in (28), which is satisfied since the the typical male viewer is
not sufficiently local to the pronoun.
It appears that reference to reconstruction possibilities at LF is required in order
to explain the Condition A data: some constituent containing the anaphor needs to be
reconstructed at LF in order for the anaphor to be locally bound, while this also induces
a Condition C violation at LF, since he then c-commands the typical male viewer. How-
ever, it is not strictly true that a binding theory that applies at LF is directly supported
by this data. Presumably, each other’s characterizations... must be an argument of stories,
and so here there is no possibility for late merger. In (27), then, there will be a stage of
the derivation at which he c-commands the typical male viewer. This, it seems, is enough
to induce a Condition C violation in any case, so independently of reconstruction pos-
sibilities, (27) must be ruled out, just as (29) is:
(29) * [Which stories about Johni] does hei like t?
As is well known (see, e.g., Lebeaux 1998), interpretation of an R-expression in a ‘high’
position cannot save a derivation in which Condition C was violated before A′-move-
ment.14 It seems, then, that (27) tells us nothing about the interaction of Condition A
with Condition C, since it is ruled out for exactly the same reason as an equivalent
sentence with no anaphor, like (29).
14Though Lebeaux (1998) highlights that A-movement of a constituent containing an R-expression can
save a derivation in which the R-expression was previously in a Condition C configuration; Lebeaux terms
this the ‘hole in Condition C’.
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3.3.2 Quantifier scope interacting with A-movement across an anaphor
Trapping effects are more robustly observed in the interaction of Condition A with
quantifier interpretation. In §3.2.3.3 we saw that the evidence for where Condition A
applies was inconclusive based on scope interactions where an anaphor is contained in
a quantifier DP, and is raised across its antecedent (another quantifier DP). However,
the evidence appears to be rather clearer when we take an anaphor which is unmoved,
and raise its antecedent, again a quantifier DP, across it. As noted by Aoun (1982);
Lebeaux (1998); Fox (2000), raising a quantifier DP across an unmoved anaphor bound
by it results in a trapping effect for the purposes of scope interpretation of the raised
DP.15 In (30), from Fox (2000: 145), two scope alternations are possible (though ∃ > ∀ is
pragmatically implausible of course, requiring one or more soldiers to each die in more
than one battle):
(30) [At least one soldier]i seems (to Napoleon) [ti to be likely to die in every
battle]. ∀ > ∃ ; ∃ > ∀
When the experiencer is an anaphor (or a bound pronoun, as in (31b)), however, the
(plausible) inverse scope reading disappears.16
(31) a. [At least one soldier]i seems to himselfi [ti to be likely to die in every
battle]. *∀ > ∃ ; ∃ > ∀
b. [At least one soldier]i seems to hisi commanders [ti to be likely to die in
every battle]. *∀ > ∃ ; ∃ > ∀
Unless the anaphor has to be bound by its antecedent at LF, we cannot explain why the
inverse scope reading is impossible. Note that narrow-syntactic approaches would not
naturally predict this. Presumably, once an anaphor has been linked to its antecedent,17
the binding relation is established and reconstruction should not be able to tamper with
it.
15Aoun (1982: 31-2, fn.7) attributes this observation to Luigi Rizzi, noting that this provides support for
a binding theory which applies at LF, rather than at S-structure.
16Lebeaux (1998); Fox (2000);Wurmbrand and Bobaljik (1999) take this as evidence that the inverse scope
reading is not derived from long distance Quantifier-Raising of the universal in the embedded clause, since
otherwise the trapping effect in (31a) is unexplained.
17For example, by the operation Agree, as suggested in the following chapter.
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3.4 A modification to the analysis of Condition A effects
This effect is sufficiently robust that it strongly argues for Condition A applying at LF.
If we wish to maintain that a narrow-syntactic binding theory is the ideal in light of
this evidence, we must do some work in explaining why LF-positions of the anaphor
appear to be relevant, making some assumptions about anaphor binding explicit.
3.4.1 Two requirements of anaphor binding
Superficially, the interaction between scope reconstruction and anaphor binding does
indeed seem to suggest that a single LF representationmust be the input to Condition A
and quantifier scope interpretation. This is the conclusion of Lebeaux (1998: 11). How-
ever, Fox (2000: 146, fn.9) hints that this conclusion is not necessarily correct: leaving
aside Condition A for amoment, note that exactly the same predictionwould arise from
simply stating that an anaphor must be c-commanded (regardless of how locally) by its
antecedent at LF. Moreover, adopting an LF approach to Condition A also offers no ex-
planation for the appearance of the trapping effect in (31b), where a bound pronoun
appears in the place of the anaphor. Clearly, in order to explain the trapping effect in
(31b) we need a constraint independent of the classical binding theory, requiring vari-
ables to be in the scope of (i.e. c-commanded by) their binders at LF. Since anaphors are
obligatorily bound variables, this constraint will also explain the absence of an inverse
scope reading in (31a), independently of Condition A.
I suggest, then, that trapping effects have nothing to do with Condition A, strictly
speaking.18 Anaphor binding is now governed by two principles.
(32) Constraints governing anaphor binding:
a. Bound variables must be c-commanded by their binder at LF.
b. An anaphor must be bound during narrow syntax by an antecedent which
is sufficiently local to it.
For the moment we will refer to the latter as Condition A, even though it is not yet
satisfactorily defined and we will reduce it to independent operations in the following
chapter. Crucially, (32) makes two different empirical predictions from any LF approach
to Condition A:
18This possibility has been explored in previous work. Romero (1998) adopts the proposal of an earlier
draft of Lebeaux (1998) that i) Condition A must be met at some stage of the derivation, and ii) anaphors
must be c-commanded at LF: “anaphor licensing is not just a matter of Principle A but also a matter of
scope” (Romero 1998: 356). I do not have access to this draft, but this is clearly not how the argument is
presented in Lebeaux (1998), where Condition A is argued to apply at LF.
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(33) a. An anaphor will be ungrammatical if not c-commanded by its antecedent
both in narrow syntax and at LF.
b. Local c-command need not hold between an anaphor and its antecedent at
LF.
It is these two predictions we now set out to test.
3.4.2 C-command in variable binding
One criticism of the approach to anaphor binding in (32) could be that it introduces
a redundancy with respect to c-command. The requirement that the antecedent c-
command the anaphor holds both during narrow syntax (due to Condition A) and also
at LF (for successful variable binding). While this is perhaps just a minor technical
inelegance, there is empirical evidence that the apparent redundancy really should be
there: I suggest that this is in fact an advantage over the LF-only view of Condition
A. As first noted (to my knowledge) by Reinhart (1976, 1983b), some well-known cases
of variable binding do not in fact involve c-command at LF. As Hornstein (1995: 118)
notes, typically a non-c-commanding quantifier can bind a variable if it is either the
subject of a DP or embedded inside an adjunct PP.19
(34) a. [[Every girl’s]i father] thinks shei’s a genius (Kayne 1994)
b. [Someone [from every cityi]] loves iti (Hornstein 1995)
c. [The owner of [every car in the street]i] should move iti on Mondays
(Reuland 1998)
Similarly, other phenomena assumed to require c-command at LF in order to be licensed
show the same behaviour, like Negative Polarity Items (NPIs):
(35) [[No-one’s] ticket] will be worth anything after the US GP sham.
We might suppose, then, that in a way we perhaps do not properly understand,20 the c-
command requirement on certain licensing procedures at LF can be slightly relaxed
19Hornstein dubs this relation “almost c-command.”
20See, e.g. Kayne (1994); Hornstein (1995); Reuland (1998) for suggestions. For example, Hornstein
(1995: 25-26) suggests that the binder for the pronoun undergoes Quantifier Raising (QR) into a position
which c-commands the pronoun, rectifying the c-command configuration, which must hold at LF. While
this may be plausible to account for some of the data (though apparently not why quantifier DP comple-
ments do not show the same behaviour), the particular account adopted is not crucial for the point I wish
to make here. See also Hornstein (1995: 118-122) for further possibilities for analysis.
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somehow. Yet it is also well known that the c-command requirement is stricter on
anaphors than on bound pronouns: anaphors must always be c-commanded by their
antecedent:
(36) * [[Every girl’s]i father] admires herselfi (Kayne 1994)
If both simply hold at LF then this fact is unusual. Yet if anaphors are subject to an ad-
ditional requirement (which we assume cannot be relaxed) that they be c-commanded
by their antecedent during narrow syntax, then we have an explanation for this.
It should be noted here that Kayne (1994) has questionedwhether the c-command
requirement for anaphors really is as strict as it appears. Kayne provides the follow-
ing examples where the c-commanding DP is not an appropriate antecedent for the
anaphor (unlike cases such as (36), which Kayne concedes are ungrammatical). This is
supposed to make the sentences somehow more grammatical:21
(37) a. ? [[Every girl’si] room] contains a picture of herselfi
b. ? [[Everyone’si room] suited himselfi
However, it could well be that for speakers who find these sentences acceptable to
some degree, the possibility of interpreting the reflexive as a ‘logophor’ (a type of often
stressed reflexive pronoun which does not necessarily require a syntactic antecedent)
interferes with the judgements. I believe that this is supported by a significant contrast
for many speakers between the relative acceptability of (37a) and (37b). Logophors are
particularly common in the object position of picture-DPs as in (37a), which is certainly
not entirely ungrammatical for me.22 On the other hand, all native speakers I have
consulted find (37b) ungrammatical. I suggest that this is because reflexives as objects
of transitive verbs cannot typically be logophors for most speakers, always requiring a
local c-commanding antecedent.
21It is not clear to me how exactly the presence of a ‘potential antecedent’ can be used to determine
the grammaticality of the anaphor in terms of a distinction between (36) and (37b). The intuition, as
Hornstein (1995) reports, is that every girl’s father is closer to the anaphor herself than every girl’s, hence the
ungrammaticality of (36). On the other hand, everyone’s room is not a potential antecedent for the anaphor
himself, hence there is less of an interference. But why is it not a potential antecedent? An inanimate DP
can of course bind an anaphor, if only itself. Animacy cannot be responsible, so what about a ϕ-feature
mismatch between everyone’s room and himself ? This cannot be the case either, since this would also rule
out (36), where every girl’s father and herself mismatch.
22See §3.7 and much further discussion in §4.4 below.
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3.4.3 Locality is not met at LF
Locality is the key difference between the narrow-syntactic approach to Condition A
and an LF approach: the LF approach predicts that local c-command must hold at LF,
while the syntactic approach does not. Unfortunately, the only evidence I have di-
rectly in favour of the syntactic approach is theory-internal, relying preemptively on
arguments made later in the thesis, namely that binding domains for anaphors are
phases.23 However, independently of whether the narrow-syntactic approach to Condi-
tion A is correct, I believe that on Minimalist assumptions we still have to treat binding
domains as phases. Minimalism dictates that we should do away with any stipulated
construction-specific grammatical domains, and derive them instead from deeper prop-
erties of the grammar and their interaction with syntactic operations. This leaves us
more or less with the phase, and nothing else. I therefore assume that this is the right
way to determine local binding domains, as I argue in the following two chapters, but
I readily concede that the following evidence is only as good as that assumption is.
If Condition A were to hold at LF, the raised DP every player-manager in (38a)
would have to reconstruct to SpecvP of the embedded clause so that the anaphor has
an antecedent in its phase (vP):
(38) a. Every player-manageri seems (not) to be predicted to drop himselfi
from the team
b. Every player-manageri seems (not) [TP to be predicted to [vP <every
player-manageri> drop himselfi from the team]]
Yet (38b) should be an impossible LF representation for (38a), since for whatever rea-
son, universals cannot reconstruct in A-movement constructions, as we know from
Chomsky’s (1995b) original evidence that A-movement does not reconstruct, outlined
in §3.2.3.3 above. Since reconstruction as in (38b) is unavailable, on a purely LF ap-
proach to Condition A, the locality requirement would not be met, and the sentence
would be incorrectly predicted ungrammatical. Under the proposal in (32), though, the
requirement that the anaphor be c-commanded by its antecedent at LF is met without
recourse to reconstruction, while locality is met in narrow syntax (within vP, before the
matrix subject has raised).
While this is by no means a knock-down argument against Condition A applying
at LF, note incidentally that the evidence from locality in Condition B effects in fact pro-
vides us with a much stronger case against an LF approach to Condition B. As noted in
§3.2.3.3, Chomsky (1995b) argues that reconstruction cannot take place in A-movement
23More specifically, they are LF-phases; see §4.3.
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constructions. He provides (39) as evidence:
(39) * Johni expected [TP himi to seem to me [TP <himi> to be intelligent]]
If reconstruction were allowed to apply to the raised pronoun in (39), a version of Con-
dition B that applies at LF would be incorrectly satisfied, since the unpronounced copy
would not then be in a local configuration with the antecedent John. Yet Wurmbrand
and Bobaljik (1999) show that if Condition B were to apply at LF, reconstruction would
in fact be forced in other A-movement constructions in order to predict the attested
Condition B effect.
(40) * Johni seems to me [TP <Johni> to be expected [TP <Johni> to [vP <Johni>
like himi]]]
Unless the copy of John in the deepest embedded vP (also containing the pronoun) is
interpreted, Condition B is not violated at LF, since John and the pronoun are not then
in a local configuration.24 So, just as we argue that anaphors must be c-commanded by
their antecedents at some point during narrow syntax, Wurmbrand and Bobaljik con-
clude that (irrespective of whether A-movement reconstructs) pronounsmust be locally
free from their antecedent at all points during narrow syntax; Condition B cannot hold
only at LF.
3.5 Counter-evidence 2: idiom interpretation
While Lebeaux (1998) concedes that Condition B must apply throughout the derivation
rather than at LF, he nevertheless argues strongly against Condition A also applying
during the derivation. Lebeaux proposes that a bundle of conditions related to seman-
tic interpretation apply at a single level, LF: quantifier (scope) interpretation, bound
pronoun interpretation, Condition A, and idiom interpretation. I have argued above
24It could be argued that under different assumptions about local binding domains to those developed in
this thesis, the binding domain in raising constructions like (40) extends as far as the closest (overt) subject,
John. If so, even without reconstruction (40) would violate Condition B. However, this characterisation of
the local binding domain is incorrect, since it also predicts that the experiencer of the raising verb—in fact
closer to the pronoun than the overt copy of John—should be able to induce the same sort of Condition B
effect, contrary to fact:
(i) John seems to mej [TP <John> to be expected [TP <John> to like mej]]
The reader is referred to §2.1.1.3 for related discussion. (See also §5.2.3 for confirmation that the experiencer
me c-commands into the raising infinitival and so would potentially be capable of inducing Condition B
effects with a pronoun within the infinitival if locality conditions were met.)
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that Condition A should not come under this group, but that the relevant aspect of
anaphor binding which should do is subsumed by bound variable interpretation. We
have assumed that quantifier interpretation also applies at LF, and seen that evidence
from scope trapping effects is at least consistent with my approach. With the empiri-
cal evidence in favour of a narrow-syntactic Condition A perhaps not overwhelming,
our attention now turns to the evidence in the literature against it; we start with idiom
interpretation.
3.5.1 Subjectless picture-DP idiom chunks
As outlined in §2.3.2, Chomsky (1993) devised the argument that idiom interpretation
is determined by reconstruction at LF to support his assumption that the binding con-
ditions apply there.
(41) Johni wondered [[which picture of himselfi/j]k Billj took tk]
(Chomsky 1993)
When take pictures has a literal reading (i.e. carrying them away), in previous frame-
works it was possible to say that (41) showed that Condition A could be met either
at D-structure (with Bill the antecedent) or at S-structure (with John the antecedent).
Chomsky’s claim is that even if D-structure and S-structure are eliminated, these two
readings could instead arise from two different LF-representations for (41), i.e. (42a) or
(42b):
(42) a. John wondered [which picture of himself] [Bill took which picture of him-
self]
b. John wondered [which picture of himself] [Bill took which picture of
himself]
However, when the predicate take pictures is interpreted idiomatically (i.e. with a cam-
era), the only possible reading is the one where the reflexive is bound by the embedded
subject.25 Chomsky claims that on the idiomatic reading, take a picture of himself has to
be interpreted at LF as a syntactic unit, so reconstruction is forced. So a reconstructed
interpretation for the idiom chunk containing the anaphor results in the same type of
trapping effect as seen above. We might wonder whether there could be another expla-
nation though. It has been suggested on several occasions (see Lebeaux 1998; Bhatt and
25Note that Lasnik andHendrick (2003) are ‘unconvinced’ that there is a significant contrast in the crucial
sentences with the idiomatic and non-idiomatic readings of take pictures.
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Pancheva 2001; Fox and Nissenbaum 2004, and particularly Safir 1999) that there could
be syntactic differences between the idiomatic construction and the literal one: it could
be that the picture-DP in the idiomatic construction has a PRO subject controlled by the
subject of take, as in (43).
(43) Johni wondered [which PROj picture of himselfj]k [Billj took tk]
If so, regardless of any reconstruction of the wh-phrase, it will always contain a PRO
which acts as the antecedent of the reflexive. Since PRO must be interpreted as corefer-
ent with the subject of take pictures, this explains why the anaphor in that construction
cannot be bound by the matrix subject.
If (43) is plausible, such cases tell us nothing about whether or not Condition A
applies at LF: the binding domain for the anaphor in question is its minimal DP, so
the wh-movement of that DP is irrelevant to binding. Condition B effects suggest that
the PRO analysis is indeed plausible, as the idiomatic take pictures also differs from the
literal reading in terms of Condition B. Assume that pronouns have to be free in their
minimal DP. On the literal reading of (44a), the grammaticality of the bound reading for
the pronoun follows. On the idiomatic reading though, the equivalent interpretation is
ungrammatical, only explained as a Condition B violation if a PRO subject is inside the
DP, as in (44b).
(44) a. Johni took [DP several pictures of himi]
b. * Johni took [DP several PROi pictures of himi]
Bhatt and Pancheva (2001) suggest that more generally, in cases where a matrix verb’s
semantics require its agent to corefer with subject of its DP complement, a PRO subject
is obligatory. This correctly predicts the following contrast:
(45) a. * Johni told [DP PROi lies about himi]
b. Johni heard [DP several rumours about himi]
Further details concerning Condition B effects in picture-DPs are elaborated in §5.2.2 in
particular.
An argument for Condition A at LF from ‘creation verbs’ (e.g. compose songs and
invent jokes) receives a similar explanation. Building on work by Heycock (1995), Fox
and Nissenbaum (2004) assume that creation verbs by their very nature require recon-
structed LFs when their object wh-moves. Since these predicates force reconstruction,
if Condition A applies at LF we expect ungrammaticality when the requirements of
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Condition A and creation verb interpretation clash, i.e where wh-phrase reconstruction
is obligatory but where Condition A requires the wh-phrase that it is embedded in to
have the surface interpretation in order to meet locality requirements:26
(46) a. I asked Johni how many ideas about himselfi Mary is likely to {hear
about/*have}
b. I asked the boysi how many jokes about each otheri Mary is likely to
{retell/*invent} (Fox and Nissenbaum 2004)
In (46a), have (ideas) is a creation verb, while hear about (ideas) is not; in (46b), invent
(jokes) is a creation verb, while retell (ideas) is not. As Fox and Nissenbaum (2004: 479)
concede, we might equally assume that creation predicates force a PRO subject in their
DP complement. As before, it seems highly plausible that picture-DPs contain a PRO
subject when the agent of the picture-noun has to be interpreted as the subject of the
predicate which selects it.27 This takes away the argument from idiom and creation
verb interpretation that Condition A applies at LF.
3.5.2 Picture-DP idiom chunks containing subjects
Lebeaux (1998) claims that in some idiom constructions, no PRO subject analysis will
be available, as the position PRO occupies must already be filled:
(47) a. Sue and Bill wondered [how much of each other’s minds]i Mary and John
blew ti
b. It was [DP each other’s shoulders]i that the boys said ti that the girls cried
on ti
c. It was [DP each other’s heads]i that John and Mary said ti that Bill and
Sue turned ti (Lebeaux 1998)
The crucial question is whether the binding of the reciprocal always has to be by the
deepest embedded subject, so by Mary and John in (47a), the girls in (47b), and Bill and
Sue in (47c). During the derivation, in each sentence the anaphor reaches a position
in which it can be bound by the higher antecedent (in the final position in (47a) and
in the intermediate trace position in (47b)/(47c)). Yet idiom interpretation would re-
26While the judgements seem pretty clear to me, it is worth highlighting that (46a) is extremely odd,
implying that ideas are quantifiable, and that the quantity is perceivable. It seems to me that any possible
answer like Mary is likely to have four ideas about John would be pragmatically extremely bizarre (for reasons
independent of the binding theory).
27See §4.5.1 for further details.
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quire the interpretation of the lowest copy of the DP which contains the anaphor. Af-
ter reconstruction, the anaphor would remain in the c-command domain of the higher
antecedent, while it would only be in the local c-command domain of the lower an-
tecedent. So if Condition A applies at LF, only the lower reading should be possible for
the anaphor. But if only bound variable interpretation is required at LF, then the higher
reading should remain possible. Lebeaux (1998) claims that in each case only the lower
antecedent is possible, supporting his conclusion that Condition A applies at LF. Here
I simply disagree with Lebeaux’s judgement, and many speakers feel no preference at
all for the lower reading over the higher one. If so, and idiom interpretation does re-
quire reconstruction, then these sentences provide evidence that only bound variable
interpretation and not Condition A applies at LF.28
To summarise, both arguments that idiom interpretation (at LF) and Condition A
interact are flawed. In the cases where the idiom chunk contains no subject, I believe
the PRO analysis is correct as it goes some way towards explaining certain Condition B
contrasts as in (45). Where the idiom chunk does contain a subject, the empirical facts
simply do not seem robust. The absence of a preference for the reconstructed reading of
the reflexive (47) might in fact be taken as arguing against the LF approach to Condition
A, and for a narrow-syntactic one. It may, however, be that the assumptions concerning
reconstruction with idiom chunks are flawed in any case. Based on the analysis of cer-
tain DPs and their movements at LF proposed by Diesing (1992), Runner (2002) argues
that certain constructions involving idioms such as this cannot be assumed to form
a complete unit at LF as Chomsky (1993) assumes. Lasnik and Hendrick (2003: 142)
also suggest that sentences can be found where apparently conflicting requirements of
high interpretation for scope and low interpretation for idioms are not, as would be ex-
pected, ungrammatical. See also Sportiche (2001) for further arguments against idiom
reconstruction. At the very worst though, the evidence from the interaction between id-
iom interpretation and anaphor binding does not force us to reject the hypothesis that
Condition A is syntactic.
3.6 Counter-evidence 3: Reconstruction with associates of ex-
pletives
Fox and Nissenbaum (2004) look for a different sort of example involving reconstruc-
tion, but like Lebeaux, where there can be no suggestion of PRO interfering in the test.
28David Adger (p.c.) suggests that these predicates are not idiomatic in the relevant way (and hence
do not require reconstruction), which would also explain the absence of the contrast that Lebeaux reports.
This still of course takes away Lebeaux’s argument that Condition A applies at LF, but does not then offer
support for my alternative.
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They come up with (48):
(48) a. I asked John how many books about him Mary thinks there are in the
library
b. I asked John how many books about himself Mary thinks {are in the li-
brary/*there are in the library}
In (48b), we have two options in the embedded clause: to use an expletive construc-
tion or not. Fox and Nissenbaum assume that in how many questions with an expletive
there, reconstruction of the wh-phrase is forced, for reasons related to the definiteness
restriction on the associate. So by assumption the wh-phrase has to reconstruct to its
pre-movement position in the LF representation. Assuming that reconstruction really
is obligatory, my approach to Condition A and the LF-only approach make separate
predictions. On the LF-only approach, reconstruction of the wh-phrase results in a con-
figuration which is in violation of Condition A, since the anaphor is not sufficiently lo-
cally bound. On my approach, no violation follows, since Condition A would be met in
narrow-syntax, and reconstruction still leaves the anaphor in a position c-commanded
by its antecedent, satisfying the condition on bound variables. So the LF-only approach
predicts (48b) to be ungrammatical with the expletive construction, while my approach
predicts that there should be no difference between the construction with the expletive
and the one without. While Fox and Nissenbaum (2004) claim the judgement for (48b)
supports the former, this judgement seems plainly incorrect. I feel that there is simply
no contrast whatsoever, and Tohru Uchiumi (p.c.) informs me that his survey suggests
that a high proportion of native speakers find no difference between the two construc-
tions in (48b). Once again, we see that the evidence in favour of Condition A applying
at LF falls some way short of being convincing.
3.7 Counter-evidence 4: Reconstruction with bound pronouns
Fox and Nissenbaum (2004) go on to provide an apparently more robust empirical ar-
gument for Condition A at LF. This time it comes from the interaction of Condition A
with bound variable interpretation of pronouns. The crucial sentence is (49a).
(49) His aides should have explained to President Clintoni...
a. * ...[what kinds of pictures of himselfi and herj baby] no motherj wants to
see
b. ...[what kinds of pictures of himselfi and herj baby] Mrs Jonesj wants to
see
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They assume that the ungrammaticality of the bound reading for the pronoun in (49a)
is the result of two contradictory requirements: reconstruction having to apply so that
the bound pronoun is c-commanded at LF, but not being able to apply since this would
induce a Condition A violation – if, of course, Condition A also applies at LF. In (49b)
on the other hand, we are dealing with a coreferential pronoun rather than a bound
one and so there is no requirement for reconstruction, and Condition A is met at LF.
The problem for the approach to anaphor binding in (32) is that if Condition A applies
in narrow syntax, then it is met in (49a) after movement, while reconstruction of the
wh-phrase still leaves the anaphor in a position c-commanded by its antecedent: the
sentence is incorrectly predicted to be grammatical.
The judgements here are not as sharp for me, and I find (49b) less than perfect.
Some speakers I have consulted find no contrast, with both sentences being accept-
able. The high degree of speaker variation in these sentences leads me to suspect that
the example might be more complicated than Fox and Nissenbaum assume. Typically
judgements become quite variable when the reflexive in question is ‘logophoric’ rather
than a locally bound anaphor. It is well known that when a picture-DP has no subject,
the reflexive object of the picture-noun may exhibit certain properties suggesting that
the reflexive may not be a true anaphor; see §4.4 below for further details. Therefore
in (49), in theory we could be dealing with a logophor, and these are not subject to
Condition A. Fox and Nissenbaum concede this much, but claim that logophoric re-
flexives do not typically take objects as their antecedents. They claim that choosing
President Clinton as the object of the matrix clause rather than the subject removes the
possibility that we could be dealing with a logophor, and so Condition A really is at
stake here. However, things are more complicated still, since logophors can also take
non-c-commanding antecedents:
(50) Max’si eyes watched eagerly a new picture of himselfi in the paper
(Reinhart and Reuland 1991)
What Fox andNissenbaum apparently fail to notice is that in (49) there is another poten-
tial antecedent for the logophor, namely the pronoun his, which corefers with President
Clinton. So what we might have in this sentence is not an anaphor bound by President
Clinton but a logophor which takes the pronoun his as an antecedent. To check, we need
to eliminate the latter possibility, as in (51).
(51) The senators should have explained to President Clintoni...
a. ?? ...[what kinds of pictures of himselfi and herj baby] no motherj wants to
see
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b. ?? ...[what kinds of pictures of himselfi and herj baby] Mrs Jonesj wants to
see
I am not entirely sure of my judgements on these, but it seems to me that (51a,b) are to
some extent worse than (49a,b); certainly, the contrast is blurred. The final thing I wish
to highlight in connection with these sentences is that very similar cases seem to differ
unpredictably in their acceptability. So although (49a) and (52) would be expected to
show the same effect, I find (52) considerably better.
(52) ?? No-one told President Clintoni [which pictures of himselfi holding herj baby]
every motherj would want to see.
I think that the fluctuation in speaker judgements and the variation across similar sen-
tences points towards the possibility that the logophoric reflexive is interfering here. It
is difficult to be sure that the contrast reported in (49a,b) is significant, and even if it is,
it may well be that we are not really testing Condition A effects here either.
An alternative approach to refuting Fox and Nissenbaum’s evidence is to in fact
follow Pollard and Sag (1992, 1994); Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and assume that all
of the classic connectivity effects in wh-movement constructions are instances of lo-
gophoric reflexives. Note that in these cases, objects can also bind picture-DP reflexives
in the left-edge of CP, just as subjects can:
(53) a. Johni asked Mary which pictures of himselfi looked the best
b. John asked Maryj which pictures of herselfj looked the best
Under Fox and Nissenbaum’s assumptions about subject orientation of logophoric re-
flexives, this evidence would be taken to support the view that that these are instances
of locally bound anaphors. However, this conclusion may be incorrect. First, some
speakers simply do not judge these sentences as grammatical, presumably since their
grammar does not contain the logophoric reflexive.29 Second, it appears that prag-
matic factors may interfere with the (putative) binding relation between the reflexive in
the embedded clause and the antecedent in the matrix clause, which of course is a well-
known (if not well-understood) property of logophoric reflexives. Compare (54a)/(54b)
and (53a), where the locality relation between the picture-DP reflexive and the subject
binder is identical:
(54) a. ?? Johni asked Maryj which pictures of himselfi shej liked best
b. *? Johni asked Maryj which pictures of herselfj hei should keep
29Thanks to Annabel Cormack (p.c.) for pointing this out to me.
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The possibility of the matrix subject (54a) or object (54b) binding the reflexive is ap-
parently overridden if the wh-phrase has moved across an embedded subject coreferent
with the matrix object or subject respectively. Presumably this gives the embedded sub-
ject (and coreferent matrix argument) some sort of higher discourse prominence, and
so the logophoric reflexive is degraded when bound by the less prominent argument.
If we were indeed dealing with a true anaphor in such cases, this sort of effect would
not be explained at all.
3.8 Conclusion
When it comes to figuring out where the binding theory applies, the stakes are high-
est when it comes to Condition A, largely because the evidence for the binding theory
applying at LF in the first place is strongest from Condition A effects. For example,
Lebeaux (1998), who claims that Condition A applies at LF, nonetheless suggests that
Conditions B and C apply during the derivation rather than at LF. I have highlighted
that various interpretive phenomena do not necessarily interact with Condition A in
the way that they are often assumed to if Condition A applies at LF. Some interac-
tions between interpretive phenomena and anaphor binding are indeed robustly ob-
served, most notably in scope trapping effects when a quantifier DP is raised across an
anaphor bound by it. However, we have shown that the interacting factor with scope
is not Condition A (i.e. the requirement that an anaphor be locally c-commanded by
its antecedent) but rather an independent constraint that bound variables must be c-
commanded at LF by their binders: the same trapping effect is observed with bound
pronouns in the place of anaphors. It is crucial that the two constraints are distin-
guished. Ideally, of course, we would want to look at whether the various interpretive
phenomena interact with Condition B effects in the same way. The problem, however,
is that when we move a constituent containing a pronoun, that constituent is usually
the pronoun’s local binding domain in any case, since being free in the minimal DP
or PP containing a pronoun is usually sufficient to satisfy Condition B. So, looking for
data from reconstructing pronouns is not an especially fruitful strategy: a pronoun that
is locally free before movement of a constituent containing it is usually locally free after
that movement, and a pronoun that is locally bound before movement of a constituent
containing it is, again, usually locally bound after that movement.
Through examining a good range of Condition A data, we have shown that the
evidence provided in the literature that Condition A (rather than just the constraint re-
quiring variables to be c-commanded by their binder) applies at LF does not stand up.
At the same time, however, we have only been able to draw tentative conclusions that a
narrow-syntactic version of Condition A makes more successful empirical predictions
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than the LF approach. However, by no means do the two approaches to Condition A
(and indeed, to the binding theory) start out on an even footing. As noted at the outset
of the chapter, empirical evidence for a narrow-syntactic Condition B strongly argues
against an LF approach, since its effects can be influenced by elements which cannot
be present in LF-representations: we have seen various examples showing that Con-
dition B interacts with Case features of pronouns, verbal agreement, and phonological
factors. Indeed, further evidence in this vein is provided in chapters 5 and 6. Further-
more, theoretical concerns also lead us to strongly favour a narrow-syntactic approach,
in particular because it allows us to determine locality effects uniquely by syntactic fac-
tors, and allows more promising avenues for capturing crosslinguistic variation. In the
following chapters we will reinforce this position, arguing that it is more minimal to
assume that the referential constraints on anaphors and pronouns are determined in
narrow syntax, since these constraints can then be reduced to independent properties
of the grammar rather than stated as primitive properties of the LF-interface. Following
Hornstein (2000), we can therefore realistically aim for the most natural conclusion, that
the behaviour of anaphors and pronouns is determined entirely by their lexical (feat-
ural) composition. We will now see that once we adopt this approach, we can derive
Condition A effects entirely from the lexical properties of anaphors and their interac-
tion with syntactic operations. Thus, it paves the way for a complete elimination of the
binding theory.
Chapter 4
Eliminating Condition A
This chapter presents a treatment of Condition A of the binding theory which is argued
to overcome the theoretical constraints imposed by Minimalism. The goal, primarily,
is a theoretical one. The first of the obstacles encountered in this chapter is the long-
standing ‘domain problem’, which is resolved by reducing the binding domain for Con-
dition A to the (LF-)phase, an independently motivated domain in current Minimalist
theory. This reduction is then explained by encoding anaphor binding as simply an in-
stance of the narrow-syntactic operation Agree. This restores the link between locality
in binding and movement—a long-time ‘holy grail’ of generative syntax—without ap-
pealing to a movement-based theory of binding Hornstein (2000); Kayne (2002); Zwart
(2002). Though anaphor binding and movement are separate syntactic phenomena,
the fact that Agree is a subcomponent of the complex operation Move ensures that the
phase-based derivation imposes similar requirements of locality on each. Finally, the
empirical scope of Condition A is fully determined, examining and explaining cases
where the local domain appears to extend beyond the phase.
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I propose a reanalysis of Condition A of the classical binding theory.
Crucially, this is argued to overcome the theoretical constraints imposed on the binding
theory byMinimalism (as outlined in §2.2 and §2.3), and is consistent with the argument
defended throughout the previous chapter that Condition A effects are determined in
narrow syntax. Proposing a revision of Condition A which is at least compatible with
current Minimalist assumptions would alone be sufficient grounds for us to defend this
theoretical framework, since Condition A could then be stated within a more restrictive
framework of assumptions than previously. Therefore, all else being equal, Minimalism
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should win out. However, I conjecture that Minimalism receives yet stronger support
from my treatment of Condition A effects: I propose in this chapter that Minimalism
in fact paves the way for a complete elimination of Condition A from the grammar,
without any loss of empirical coverage.
Below I tackle each of the major obstacles encountered in a Minimalist binding
theory. First, we deal with the ‘encoding problem’, that is, how anaphor binding oper-
ates syntactically. In a similar vein to recent work by Heinat (2006), I claim that local
binding may be instantiated by means of the Agree operation employed in the Chom-
sky (2000, 2001, 2004a) framework and to which it displays obvious similarities. This
comes at a very small theoretical cost, namely the addition of a new feature to the lex-
ical entry of DPs, but this in turn offers an explanation for why anaphors are obligato-
rily referentially dependent. At the same time, the Agree-based approach also resolves
the ‘level problem’: the disagreement—or, at best, lack of consensus—concerning the
level(s) of representation at which the local binding conditions apply. As we have
seen above, this problem is brought into yet sharper focus by the Minimalist conjec-
ture that LF can be the only relevant level at which binding relations are evaluated.
Yet the Agree-based approach, effectively eliminating Condition A, is fully compatible
with the conclusion of chapter 3 that binding is in fact determined during the course
of the narrow-syntactic computation. While it has remained unclear until now how
best to deal with the empirical facts previously explained with reference to D-structure,
S-structure, and LF, the narrow-syntactic binding theory is able to derive Belletti and
Rizzi’s (1988) insight that Condition A may apply at any of the levels of representation
(in the GB framework). This insight is then further constrained by the Agree-based
explanation for anaphor binding.
Finally, the Agree-based Condition A leads us to a resolution of the ‘domain prob-
lem’. While the precise definition of the local domain relevant for Conditions A and B
has long been a subject of debate within the generative literature, a far deeper problem
underlies any Minimalist treatment of the local domain. Essentially, the framework
must reject construction-specific constraints, deriving them from the interaction of lex-
ical properties with deeper underlying grammatical principles. In the case of the local
domain for anaphors, this is overcome through the observation that binding domains
coincide closely with the single generalised derivational domain employed in the Mini-
malist framework of Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2004a), the phase. This is precisely what the
Agree-based approach predicts, and it is shown that all of the core binding data from
English fit this prediction. Putative counter-examples where the local domain for an
anaphor apparently extends beyond the phase, can, I argue, be treated as instances not
of true anaphors, but of homophonous DPs which bear a different feature set (which re-
sembles that of pronouns). Pragmatic and syntactic properties particular to these ‘non-
local’ anaphors are adduced in favour of a treatment separate to that of locally bound
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anaphors. Finally, the same diagnostics are applied to cases where anaphors are embed-
ded inside complex DPs, notably including ‘picture-DPs’, a long-problematic empirical
phenomenon. This is shown to have critical implications for the empirical scope of the
binding theory.
4.2 Encoding binding relations through features
This thesis so far has argued that if the binding theory must be revised in light of Mini-
malist assumptions, the effects of Condition A of the binding theory should be reappor-
tioned to the narrow-syntactic computation. If this is the case, then the next question
is how anaphor binding is achieved in narrow syntax. In the framework developed
in Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2004a), all syntactic dependencies are established through a
meta-operation, Agree. Essentially, Agree does not operate freely, but must be trig-
gered. If anaphor binding could be reduced to an application of Agree, the encoding
problem would be resolved without modification of the framework for construction-
specific purposes, which is the ideal solution.
4.2.1 Why bind by Agree?
Hornstein (2000), also adopting the assumption that binding is determined in narrow
syntax, argues for the elimination of the binding theory on methodological grounds.
He notes that the GB binding theory requires syntactic dependencies to be established
either by movement rules or by construal rules. From a Minimalist perspective, elimi-
nating one type of rule would be a welcome development. Since displacement seems to
be an ineliminable property of languages, the construal rules involved in binding look
easier to eliminate, and Hornstein thus proposes to reduce binding (and control) opera-
tions to movement. I believe that Hornstein’s methodology is the right one, though the
result may not be.1 The Derivation by Phase framework, however, introduces a separate
operation which encodes interpositional dependencies, namely Agree. Retaining the
idea that binding operations should involve no ad hoc operations or rules, if we adopt
the Derivation by Phase model, then we must consider whether binding can reduce to
Agree, which would be an equally parsimonious solution to Hornstein’s.
Intuitively, Agree seems an appealing way of encoding anaphor binding rela-
tions since an anaphor must share the ϕ-features and reference of its antecedent. This
appears to be the intuition behind the derivational account for binding facts proposed
by Kayne (2002) (and developed by Zwart 2002; Heinat 2003), though under different
1It requires departures from the assumptions I adopt here whose implications are far-reaching.
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assumptions. Essentially, a pronoun or anaphor and its antecedent enter the derivation
as a complex DP (i.e. they merge, as in (1)),2 internally to which a local (specifier-head)
agreement operation ensures coreference between the two elements. At a later stage
of the derivation, the antecedent moves from its position within the complex into a
θ-position in order to acquire a θ-role.
(1) [DP [DP John] [D him(self)]]
Even aside from the empirical predictions, such an analysis faces theoretical difficul-
ties in the framework of assumptions I adopt here. Notably, Kayne’s analysis crucially
assumes a version of movement theory and θ-theory based on Hornstein (1999, 2000),
contrary to the θ-theoretic assumptions of Hale and Keyser (1993) based upon which
Chomsky (2000: 103) argues that movement into θ-positions is illegal (the ‘θ-theoretic
principle’). Furthermore, it is unclear what selectional property of an anaphor or pro-
noun motivates the merger of the antecedent with D. This is particularly unclear in the
case of pronouns, which of course do not need a sentence-internal antecedent at all.3
Here we would need to say either that the DP antecedent is an adjunct, or that we have
two types of pronoun, one requiring the merger of an antecedent in its specifier and
one not.
If we wish to retain the intuition behind Kayne’s approach that anaphor bind-
ing is instantiated through the application of agreement between an anaphor or pro-
noun and its antecedent,4 the various problems are most simply overcome by adopt-
ing the assumptions of Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2004a). The background to the Kaynian
approach is that strict locality is required for agreement, that is, a specifier-head con-
figuration, as in the Chomsky (1993) model. For agreement (or ‘feature-checking’) to
hold between nonlocal elements, overt or covert movement is required in order that one
moves to the specifier of the other. In the Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2004a) system, however,
the generalised specifier-head configuration is eliminated, in favour of allowing the
feature-valuing/checking operation Agree to apply at ‘long distance’ between a prob-
ing category, and a goal in its c-command domain.5 Yet now, since agreement operates
non-locally in the probe-goal configuration, the dependency between an anaphor and
its antecedent could in theory be established without recourse to antecedent-pronoun
complex DPs, and movement out of them.6
2Zwart (2002) suggests that only anaphors merge inside complex DPs.
3Although this issue is resolved in the approach of Zwart (2002); see note 2.
4Note that Chomsky and Lasnik (1993:553) also suggest that “it is plausible to regard the relation be-
tween a reflexive and its antecedent as involving agreement.” Lasnik (1999a: 211, fn17) suggests that it
might be possible to think of Condition A in terms of a involving an operation of formal feature-checking,
noting that this approach is hinted at by Chomsky (1995b: 381, fn.7).
5This is outlined in §2.2.2.2 above.
6Heinat (2006) has independently capitalised on this possibility. Themechanisms he employs, however,
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(2) John seems to love himself
Agree
So, instead of interpreting binding as agreement, with agreement being strictly local
and movement constraining locality, in the current framework we still interpret bind-
ing as agreement, but with agreement itself constraining locality. The advantage (for
anaphor binding) of adopting the Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2004a) framework is clear: we
can retain a syntactic approach without recourse to a movement-based analysis.7
This approach also offers a new angle on uniformity between binding and move-
ment. The assumption that uniformity of binding and movement constraints could be
formalised was first put forward by Chomsky (1973) and gave rise to a highly pro-
ductive line of research in the GB framework. However, the interface approach to the
binding theory of Chomsky (1993); Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) severs the link between
binding and movement. Consider now the relation between the syntactic operations
of Agree and movement. In the Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2004a) framework, agreement
(instantiated by Agree) is essentially completely dissociated from movement. The ap-
plication of Agree between two categories is a prerequisite for movement of one into
the specifier of another; movement is simply the consequence of an EPP-type trigger on
the agreement probe, requiring its specifier to be filled. Locality constraints on move-
ment must then be reinterpreted as constraints on Agree. The well-known similari-
ties between the locality constraints on movement and binding may thus be plausi-
bly explained without requiring binding to be interpreted as a movement operation:
movement involves the application of Agree satisfying locality constraints, followed
by displacement; binding involves the application of Agree satisfying the same locality
constraints but without subsequent displacement.
4.2.2 Features involved in binding
If, as proposed here, there is scope for encoding binding relations in terms of an agree-
ment operation, wemust turn our attention to themechanisms of this agreement. Agree
operates between features, assumed to be attribute-value pairs.8 Features of lexical
items with a particular attribute either bear a value upon entering the derivation, or
are quite different from those suggested in this chapter, and I outline them below for comparison in §4.3.1.
7This can be taken to mean either a Kaynian approach where the anaphor and antecedent merge, and
the locality between the two are determined by the possibility of moving the antecedent, or an analysis
where the anaphor itself moves covertly to bring it into a local configuration with the antecedent, e.g.
Lebeaux (1983, 1984); Chomsky (1986b).
8The mechanisms of Agree are outlined here, but see §2.2.2.2 for a more complete explanation. Some
important modifications to Chomsky’s (2000; 2001; 2004a) assumptions are proposed in §2.2.3.2, and as-
sumed here.
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they do not. A valueless feature is uninterpretable at the interfaces (by the principle of
Full Interpretation) and so must enter into a syntactic dependency during the course
of the derivation capable of valuing it. Agree is the only operation capable of valuing
features. As valued features do not need to enter into any syntactic dependency in or-
der to make them legitimate interface objects, only unvalued features act as the trigger,
or probe, for Agree. Probes search within a computationally accessible domain for a
‘matching’ feature with the same attribute, but which bears a value. Only in this gen-
eralised ‘probe-goal’ configuration under matching can Agree operate. The operation
copies the value of the valued feature onto that of the valueless one, thereby ensuring
that the syntactic object bearing the feature is interpretable by the interfaces.
If local binding is reducible to Agree between an anaphor and its antecedent, then
we must assume that one enters the derivation with a particular feature valued, and the
other with a matching feature unvalued. Since it is the anaphor whose grammaticality
depends on the presence of an antecedent, we assume that it is an unvalued feature of
the anaphor that triggers Agree. As Chomsky (2006: 12) highlights, in cases where the
value of a feature is determined by its context, it is natural to assume that the feature
is unvalued in the lexicon and valued by Agree. This of course precisely the case with
anaphors: the referential value depends upon another DP in a local syntactic relation.
4.2.2.1 ϕ-features
Assuming this, we next examine whether anaphor binding by Agree is possible using
features that we already assume DPs to bear: under standard assumptions, these com-
prise a valued ϕ-feature set [ϕ] and an unvalued Case feature [CASE: ] which must
be valued during the derivation. However, it soon becomes apparent that an Agree-
based account of binding involving these features alone cannot be articulated. First,
Case-feature agreement cannot be responsible for binding: for this to work, an anaphor
would be required to bear the same Case value as its antecedent, which is plainly un-
true. There seems to be more hope, however, for an approach to anaphor binding as
ϕ-agreement, since anaphors and their antecedents do share the same values for [ϕ].
Indeed, Agree between [ϕ: ] on an anaphor and a matching valued feature on its an-
tecedent is assumed (with rather little explanation) by Heinat (2006). One difficulty is
that it appears that [ϕ] both on anaphors and their antecedents has to be a valued fea-
ture. Anaphors in object positions can clearly value the [ϕ: ] probe on v (typically
resulting in accusative Case assignment), just as their antecedents in subject positions
value [ϕ: ] on T (typically resulting in nominative Case assignment). Since Agree
cannot operate between two valued features, ϕ-feature agreement could not then be
responsible for binding. Heinat resolves this by assuming that an anaphor in an object
position bears an unvalued [ϕ: ] which enters into Agree with the [ϕ: ] on v: both
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are then valued upon merger of a subject in SpecvP.9
While the technical problem can perhaps be overcome, I believe that the use of
ϕ-features in binding relations is more deeply problematic. What is at stake in anaphor
binding is referential dependency, not simply a ϕ-feature dependency. While the shared
reference of an anaphor and its antecedent naturally implies that the two share the same
ϕ-features, it is not at all clear that referential properties are encoded in ϕ-features. A
system of ϕ-feature agreement between anaphors and their antecedents simply predicts
that the two ϕ-feature values should be identical, but nothing more. If Agree were to
simply match the ϕ-feature values of John and himself in John loves himself, for example,
himself could in theory refer to any other male individual, contrary to fact. Another
problem is that anaphors are commonly considered to bear a defective or reduced set of
ϕ-features, rather than features simplymatching those of their antecedent. For example,
it is common crosslinguistically that anaphors lack Person and Gender specifications.
Bouchard (1984), Burzio (1991), and Reinhart and Reuland (1993) all propose binding
theories which exploit an implication that if a DP is lacking a (complete) ϕ-feature set,
then it is incapable of independent reference.
4.2.2.2 Referential features
We need to assume, then, that additional features are involved in an Agree operation
between an anaphor and its antecedent. This is not problematic from a theoretical per-
spective, since features apparently ‘come for free’ in the Minimalist framework, pre-
sumably if they can be identified as having some morphological or semantic basis and
so are not entirely ad hoc. Let’s recap what we know about anaphors in comparison
with pronouns and referential DPs, which can act as their antecedents. Anaphors are
obligatorily parasitic upon the reference of their antecedent. Therefore, these are good
candidates for bearing an unvalued version of some feature, for two reasons: first, they
are in some sense ‘defective’, and second, the requirement for an antecedent is obliga-
tory, resulting in a derivation crash if there is none available. Pronouns, on the other
hand, may take an antecedent, but do not need to. They can be, like other DPs, refer-
entially independent. Pronouns and referential DPs are therefore good candidates for
bearing a valued version of the feature. This is reminiscent of the split in the featu-
ral specification of DPs that Reinhart and Reuland (1993) propose, based on referential
independence, or the ability of a DP to pick out a discourse antecedent. Hence, ref-
erential DPs and pronouns bear [+R], anaphors bear [-R]. A similar approach is taken
by McGinnis (1998), who also proposes an ‘R’ feature encoding referentiality on DPs.
McGinnis suggests that the R-feature of a referential DP, for example, must be copied
9An alternative explanation is that ϕ-agreement is not in any case implicated in accusative Case assign-
ment in English, as tentatively suggested in §2.2.3.4. See also §4.4.3 for further discussion.
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onto an anaphor in the course of the derivation, though there is little explanation or
discussion of how this is achieved. Clearly, this sort of feature—which, as required,
corresponds to a semantic characteristic of different types of DP and ties this to their
syntactic behaviour—is just the sort of thing we need to pursue an agreement-based
approach to anaphor binding. It only remains to identify the relevant feature.
One possibility is to propose a feature which encodes certain aspects of the ref-
erence of DPs; call this [REF], unvalued on anaphors and valued on other DPs and
pronouns.10 On the assumption that features of lexical items are attribute-value pairs,
we must examine what sort of values the feature [REF] might take. The most obvious
possibility for a feature value is simply an integer, corresponding to the indices of pre-
Minimalism approaches to binding. This offers a solution—albeit perhaps not a partic-
ularly elegant one—to the problems posed by the adoption of the Inclusiveness Condi-
tion. DPs can now be assumed to enter the derivation with limited information about
their referential possibilities; essentially, enough to relate them as disjoint/intersecting
in reference with other DPs in the same numeration. Anaphors enter the derivation
with no such information, but in order to receive a semantic interpretation at LF, must
receive a value for [REF] during the course of the derivation. It should be noted that
Chomsky (1995b) appears to anticipate and warn against such an approach to indices:
“With sufficiently rich formal devices (say, set theory) counterparts to any
object (nodes, bars, indices, etc.) can be readily constructed from features.
There is no essential difference, then, between admitting new kinds of ob-
jects and allowing richer use of formal devices; we assume that these (basi-
cally equivalent) options are permitted only when forced by the empirical
properties of language.”
(Chomsky 1995b: 381, fn.7)
From a theoretical perspective, then, [REF] comes under suspicion for simply being an
index masquerading as a formal feature. Indeed, the proposed values of the referential
feature (integers) do not appear to have any significance other than as binding indices,
which can now only be treated as a form of notational shorthand. If so, Minimalism
requires us not to accept them as real grammatical entities, and so they are no more
theoretically palatable than true indices, in any case. From an empirical perspective, a
crucial problem with this feature is that a good number of the DPs involved in bind-
ing relations (in both Condition A and B effects) are in fact non-referential, i.e. quan-
tified DPs (including wh-phrases).11 It therefore makes little sense to explain indices
10For further details see Hicks (2005b), on which parts of this chapter are based. There I present an
earlier revision of the account for Condition A developed in this chapter.
11See §2.3.3.
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as referential features, with the value of this feature corresponding to an index, since
non-referential DPs will also need indices.
4.2.2.3 Operator and variable features
One way of alleviating these concerns to some degree is to imagine that the relevant
feature attributes involved in binding relations are ones which are in fact more closely
related to the semantics of the DP in question. We must first clarify some semantic con-
cepts. DPs can either be referential or quantificational. A DP is referential if it is able
to pick out a particular object in the mind of the speaker or hearer. Names, definite
descriptions, and pronouns are commonly considered to be referential.12 The interpre-
tation of quantifier DPs, however, does not require the identification of any particular
object.
Now suppose that we conceive of DPs—quantifier or referential—as categories
which (can) enter into operator-variable relations. Very much in the spirit of Adger
and Ramchand’s (2005) proposals for the features giving rise to operator-variable de-
pendencies in wh-movement constructions, I propose that operators and variables are
in fact encoded syntactically as distinct semanticosyntactic features, [OP] and [VAR] re-
spectively. The values for [OP] might be ∀ and ∃, for example. The role of a variable, on
the other hand, is to be able to covary with an element on which it is dependent. The
variable’s value must be able to identify it with respect to other variables, and to this
end we assume that it is simply an integer or an alphabetical index, x, y, or z, say. This
is by nomeans ideal, since we again must examine whether this is simply an indexmas-
querading as a feature. To some degree the criticism is inevitable, but note that in any
case we will require LF-representations to be able to determine whether or not a par-
ticular pronoun is bound by a quantifier. For example, LF must be able to distinguish
between the two logical representations for a sentence like (3a): one where a pronoun
is bound by a quantifier, and one where it is deictic, referring for example to John (or
some other third party).
(3) a. Every boy thinks Mary loves him
b. ∀x[boy(x) → think(x, love(Mary,x))]
c. ∀x[boy(x) → think(x, love(Mary,John))]
If LF must distinguish between (3b) and (3c), the only relevant question is whether
information concerning the variable index of a pronoun is simply assigned at LF or
12Although it has long been the subject of debate in the philosophical literature whether definite de-
scriptions are in fact quantifier DPs; see below.
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whether it is present from the numeration. If it is the latter, then we can employ it in
our narrow-syntactic binding theory, and since we will eventually see that it leads to
the complete elimination of the binding theory, we will adopt this assumption hence-
forth. A second possible sticking point concerns the feature values of [VAR]. Clearly, for
DPs which enter the derivation with a valued [VAR] (R-expressions and pronouns), the
integer value cannot be listed in the lexical entry. What appears to be required is that
upon selection of the numeration, a value is selected for [VAR]. In some sense, then,
the value of [VAR] on R-expressions and pronouns is simply an instruction to assign an
integer upon selection for the numeration.13 Note that while the discussion here and
below centres on 3rd person pronouns, the analysis extends to 1st and 2nd person pro-
nouns. We might imagine reserving a special indexical value for [VAR] on 1st and 2nd
person pronouns, since their referents are picked out by the context of the utterance
in which they occur. However, it seems that there is no need for such stipulation: 1st
and 2nd person pronouns’ referents are not only picked out in this manner: Rullmann
(2004), Kratzer (2006) and Heim (forthcoming) highlight that they can indeed be bound
by other 1st and 2nd person pronouns, in a sense which becomes clearer in §4.2.2.4. As
the evidence for bound readings of indexical pronouns relies on tests and assumptions
which are outlined below in this and the following chapter, I delay a fuller explana-
tion until §5.4.3.4. Pending this discussion, we will assume that 1st and 2nd person
pronouns have similar sorts of values to 3rd person pronouns (x, y, z, etc.) and that it
is their ϕ-feature specification that ensures that they are interpreted in the appropriate
manner with respect to the context.
We assume that pronouns and anaphors, as variables, are lexically specified only
with a [VAR] feature but no [OP]. They differ in that an anaphor’s [VAR] enters the
derivation unvalued, which is the trigger for an Agree operation with the correspond-
ing valued feature of its binder. Therefore, during the derivation of (4a), we get the
following representations pre- and post-Agree respectively, automatically resulting in
the correct semantics, with the variable introduced by the anaphor in the scope of the
universal quantifier.
(4) a. Every boy loves himself
b. Every[OP:∀],[VAR: x] boy loves himself[VAR: ]
c. Every[OP:∀],[VAR: x] boy loves himself[VAR: x]
13I do not speculate whether there is any sort of algorithm for valuing [VAR] upon selection for the nu-
meration. Since the numeration is not a level of representation, the intuition is that as little as possible
should happen there. However, in Minimalist theory many questions remain concerning the selection of
a numeration which will result in a convergent derivation, and the consequences of the kind of approach
proposed here for variable features might not be clear until further research into the nature of the numer-
ation has been undertaken.
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We assume, straightforwardly, that every boy is read off at LF as ∀x(boy(x)), presum-
ably with the ‘is a boy’ semantics supplied by the lexical entry for the NP part of the
quantifier DP: for example, the same feature set, [OP: ∀, VAR: x], could be borne ev-
ery dog, and the semantics of the dog NP ensures that the x variable is interpreted as
something which is a dog.14 This feature specification ensures that at LF, anaphors are
indistinguishable from bound pronouns, that is, they have the the semantics of bound
variables, which is a welcome result.
While this provides a semantically satisfactory account of anaphor binding by
quantifier DPs, it remains to deal with binding by referential DPs. First of all, we have
assumed that pronouns do not bear [OP], yet pronouns which are themselves unbound
can of course still serve to bind anaphors:
(5) He[VAR: x] loves himself[VAR: ]
The problem is that the anaphor appears to be bound by the pronoun yet the pronoun
has no [OP] capable of binding it. Similarly, Heim (1998) assumes that referential DPs
correspond to variables which are unbound, so names and definite descriptions will
presumably also bear only an unbound [VAR], resulting in the same configuration as
(5). What happens then in the cases where a free variable (e.g. x) c-commands another
instance of the same variable? This leads us to questions concerning the semantics
of DPs which remain unclear, but at least some indications of an approach we could
adopt are in order. Heim (1998) proposes that each free index in an LF-representation is
assigned a distinct referent by the context.15 This carries over quite straightforwardly
to the approach being developed here. There is a single free variable index (x in (5), for
example), and upon interpretation the context assigns an appropriate individual to x,
at once for the pronoun and for the reflexive.
There are various alternatives we could explore. Since the questions that arise
take us largely beyond the scope of this chapter, I will only provide brief indications
of the directions the analysis could take. For example, the analysis of definite descrip-
tions as referential expressions is questioned by Russell (1905), who assumes that they
are essentially quantificational. Russell’s definition of definites presupposes both a re-
14Note that in standard logical representations of quantifier DPs we do not simply have an operator and
a bound variable, but also an ‘argument variable’ (the underlined variable in a logical expression such as
∀x[boy(x)]) telling us what in the scope of the operator is bound by it. It appears that we will need to
provide some way of telling the quantifier which variable to bind, essentially ruling out the possibility
of ∀x(boy(y)). In fact, all we need to do is state that the variable bound by the quantifier is simply the
variable that the same D head introduces (understood as an argument of the NP complement). Put simply,
if D introduces a feature [OP: ∃/∀] and a feature [VAR: x], the operator is obligatorily interpreted as binding
only occurrences of the x variable in its scope.
15In Heim’s terms, a ‘guise’ rather than a referent is assigned by the context, but the distinction is not
critical for our purposes here.
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quirement for existence and for uniqueness, so that the definition of the definite article
can be articulated in quantificational terms, i.e. ‘there exists exactly one’. The distinc-
tion can be clarified as follows. A referential treatment of definites would assume that
verifying the truth of the man is happy involves identifying a particular man and check-
ing whether that man is an individual in the set of happy things. A quantificational
treatment such as Russell’s treatment verifies the truth of the sentence by first checking
that there is at least one and at most one individual in the set of things that are men,
and then that every member of the set of things that are men is a member of the set
of things that are happy. In this respect we do not need to pick out individuals at all.
Russell’s definition of definite determiners has often been given a translation in formal
logic as an ι (iota) operator or uniqueness quantifier ∃!, resulting in logic translations
of the man as ιx[man(x)] or ∃!x[man(x)]. One possibility, then, is that the values of the
feature [OP] could be elaborated so that definite descriptions also bear a feature such
as [OP: ∃!]. We do not discuss these alternatives further here, however, since the appro-
priate logical translation of different types of DP remains the subject of much debate in
the semantic and philosophical literature. In any case, we will now see further evidence
that our initial assumptions about referential DPs may need to be elaborated further.
4.2.2.4 Binding and coreference
If definite DPs do not also bear an [OP] feature, a somewhat problematic outcome of
this system of features is that anaphors are not bound (in a strict semantic sense) by
their antecedents (unless of course the antecedent itself is a quantifier DP). In (5) above,
the reflexive and its antecedent he simply share a value for their variable (x), which
means that on the assumptions adopted above, when the context assigns a referent to
x, the same referent is assigned to both DPs. We will term this a coreferential reading
for the two DPs, which we might give the sort of semantic representation in (6b):16
(6) a. He loves himself
b. x loves x
x = John (etc.)
Coreference, strictly speaking, is not subject to the same constraints as variable binding
by a quantifier DP. As described in §3.4.2 above, with one or two possible exceptions a
quantifier DP must c-command a pronoun that it binds. Therefore (7a) allows a bound
reading for the pronoun (as indicated), but (7b) does not: his must be assigned an ap-
16Note that this semantic representation is revised below. It should also be highlighted that coreferential
readings might also arise if two different variables happen to be assigned the same referent, often termed
‘accidental coreference’. This becomes particularly relevant in the discussion to follow.
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propriate referent by the context.17
(7) a. [Every boy] loves his mother
∀x[boy(x) → thinks(x, genius(x))]
b. [The nasty girl [who hates every boy]] actually likes his mother
When the antecedent for a pronoun or anaphor is a referential DP, as in (6a), de-
spite the predictions of the analysis highlighted above, it remains to be seenwhether the
relation between the two is simply one of coreference, or whether (in the appropriate
c-command configuration) bindingmay also take place. The problem is that it is hard to
distinguish between a bound reading of a pronoun or anaphor and a coreferential read-
ing, since in both cases the pronoun or anaphor and its antecedent, as definites, will
both pick out the same referent. As we have just seen, if referential DPs do not also bear
[OP] features which can be interpreted as binding variables, an anaphor or pronoun
may only be linked to a referential DP with the same value for its [VAR] by coreference,
and not binding. Yet once we find syntactic environments in which the distinction be-
tween coreference and binding can be shown to bring about interpretive differences, the
evidence is that some cases must indeed be treated as instances of binding rather than
of coreference. An example of such an environment is VP-ellipsis constructions, like
(8).
(8) John [VP loves his mother] and so does Bill <[VP loves his mother]>
= Bill loves his own mother, or: ‘sloppy’/bound reading
= Bill loves John’s mother ‘strict’/coreferential reading
In the first conjunct, the pronoun is assigned the same referent as John, whether it is
bound by John or coreferent with it. The interpretation of the pronoun in the elided VP
is crucial, though. The elided his can be assigned the same referent as John, or as Bill. In
order to license ellipsis, we assume a ‘parallelism’ requirement that the elided element
be identical (in certain relevant respects) to the ‘antecedent’ VP. The use of a bound
pronoun in the antecedent VP is assumed to result in the bound reading of the pronoun
in the elided VP. This is also termed the ‘sloppy’ reading. Parallelism is satisfied since
both the antecedent VP and elided VP involve a pronoun bound by the subject of its
17An important exception to this is the case of so-called ‘donkey’ pronouns:
(i) [Every farmer [who owns a donkey]] beats it
The pronoun here is anaphoric to a donkey, yet not c-commanded by it. The effect appears to arise when
an indefinite is embedded within a quantifier DP which c-commands the pronoun: hence the relevant
interpretation is much harder to get in (7b), for example. More generally, however, pronouns can be
anaphoric to indefinites even intersententially, so it seems likely that some mechanism other than variable
binding is at play in such contexts.
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VP. However, if a referential pronoun is used in the antecedent VP in (8), a different
reading arises in the elided VP. If John and him in the antecedent VP simply corefer with
no binding relationship established (i.e. they just share the same value for their [VAR]),
another way of satisfying the parallelism requirement is if the pronoun in the elided
VP shares the same value for [VAR] as the one in the antecedent VP.18 This results in
the pronoun being assigned the same referent as John, also termed the ‘strict’ reading.
Thus the bound and coreferential readings for (8) can be given the following semantic
representations respectively:
(9) a. John(λx[x loves x′s mother]) ∧ Bill(λx[x loves x′s mother])
b. (x loves x′s mother) ∧ (y loves x′s mother)
x = John; y = Bill
The bound reading involves semantic binding, that is, by a λ-operator. The coreferential
reading simply involves shared variable feature values, ensuring that when the context
assigns a referent to the free variables, the same referent is picked out for both pronouns.
The two available interpretations of (8) show that our analysis must be able to derive
both bound and coreferential readings for the pronoun; at present it only derives the
latter.
It well known that anaphors contained within elided VPs do not display the same
strict/sloppy ambiguity as pronouns under VP-ellipsis (e.g. Sag 1976; Williams 1977;
Partee and Bach 1981; Reinhart 1983b); only the sloppy reading is possible:19
(10) John [VP loves himself] and so does Bill <[VP loves himself]>
18The terminology of ‘shared values’ for [VAR] (i.e. two DPs bearing [VAR: x]) should be distinguished
from ‘covaluation’. The latter is already often employed in the literature to describe the situation where
two distinct variables happen to be assigned the same referent; see note 16. The distinction becomes im-
portant below.
19This is true for VP-ellipsis but not, it seems, for comparative deletion:
(i) John [VP defended himself] better than Bill did (Hestvik 1995)
= better than Bill defended himself
= better than Bill defended John
Though it is rather unclear why the two constructions should differ in this respect (Lidz 2001: 128, fn.7),
Fiengo and May (1994) and Hestvik (1995) show that the relevant distinction is between deletion in coor-
dinations (like (10)) and subordinations, only the latter allowing the strict reading for the reflexive:
(ii) John [VP voted for himself] because Bill did (Hestvik 1995)
= because Bill voted for himself
= because Bill voted for John
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= Bill loves himself, but:
6= Bill loves John
See §4.4.1 below for further explanation. The analysis as it stands (based on the feature
specifications for anaphors and referential DPs proposed in §4.2.2.3) assumes that the
anaphors in both the elided VP and the antecedent VP simply receive the value of their
[VAR] from the local subject in each case. Again, this ensures simply that the anaphor
corefers with its antecedent, not that it is semantically bound by it. In other words, the
context assigns a referent to the free variable shared by both the anaphor and its local
antecedent: John in the antecedent VP, Bill in the elided VP. Our approach to the feature
specification for anaphors and referential DPs outlined above can thus explain the ab-
sence of a strict reading for the anaphor, but it runs counter to the prevailing intuition
that anaphor binding involves semantic binding by a λ-operator, rather than corefer-
ence. More complex empirical arguments can be constructed in favour of a variable
binding analysis, too. Coreference does not depend on any particular syntactic con-
figuration (such as c-command): provided that Condition B is met, a pronoun can in
theory corefer with any DP in the same sentence or in a different sentence. Yet in §3.4.1
we reviewed evidence from trapping effects that anaphor binding—just like variable
binding, and independently of Condition A effects—is subject to a constraint that the
anaphor must be c-commanded by its antecedent at LF. This is true only if the relation
between an anaphor and its antecedent is of the same type as between a bound pronoun
and its antecedent, namely a semantic variable-binding relation.
Wemust assume, then, that a semantic bindingmechanism beyond simply shared
[VAR] values is at play even for anaphors or pronouns bound by a referential ante-
cedent. Two options seem plausible. The first, along the lines of our tentative sug-
gestions in §4.2.2.3, is that all referential DPs bear a feature [OP], whose value cor-
responds semantically to a λ-operator. Yet since even pronouns can bind anaphors,
they would also then be assumed to bear [OP] obligatorily, and the parallel between
anaphors and (possibly bound) pronouns would be lost. A more promising alterna-
tive is that at LF, if the configurational requirements of binding are met (shared [VAR]
values and c-command), a λ-operator is inserted on the c-commanding DP, resulting in
a binding relation. Since we have seen that anaphors must be c-commanded by their
antecedents at LF, we would assume that this is an obligatory interpretive process at
LF under the appropriate configurational requirements. The intuition of this approach
dates back to Reinhart (1983a,b), who argues that for a given interpretation, a binding
relation must be employed wherever possible instead of coreference. This is termed
Rule I by Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993). However, the strict/sloppy ambiguity of
pronouns in VP-ellipsis contexts (as in (8)) appears to cause problems for this analy-
sis, since pronouns whose [VAR] value is shared with a c-commanding antecedent are
clearly ambiguous between coreferential and bound interpretations. If—as the ambigu-
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ity suggests—interpreting the c-commanding DP as binding the pronoun is optional,
then it should presumably be optional with anaphor binding too. Yet as we have just
concluded, anaphors must be bound; mere coreference is insufficient.
A satisfactory solution to this problem lies in the assumptions of classical theories
of VP-ellipsis. Sag (1976) and Williams (1977), for example, assume that the coreferen-
tial reading for sentences such as (8) is the result of ‘accidental coreference’. In the terms
of the proposed analysis, we may assume that accidental coreference involves two DPs
which bear distinct values for their [VAR] features, while both variables end up be-
ing assigned the same referent. This is termed ‘covaluation’ in the literature, though I
try to minimise its use here to avoid confusion with what we refer to as [VAR] values
‘shared’ by DPs; the distinction, I hope, is clear. Nothing in our analysis precludes this
possibility. So, the bound reading for the elided pronoun in a VP-ellipsis construction
such as (8) is derived as follows. The pronoun in the antecedent VP and the subject
of that VP bear [VAR] features with shared values. Since a c-command relation holds
between the two, the c-commanding DP is obligatorily interpreted at LF as binding the
pronoun (perhaps through the insertion of a λ-operator on definite Ds). The elided VP
has a parallel derivation, with shared [VAR] features for the corresponding pronoun
and its antecedent, resulting again in a bound interpretation at LF. This corresponds to
the semantic representation (9a), repeated here:
(11) John(λx[x loves x′s mother]) ∧ Bill(λy[y loves y′s mother])
Turning to the coreferential reading, the pronoun in the antecedent VP enters the deriva-
tionwith a [VAR] value (say, y) distinct from that of the subject of the antecedent VP (say,
x). The elided VP satisfies Parallelism since its pronoun also shares the same value for
[VAR], thereby coreferring with it. There is no possibility of a binding relation between
the pronouns with [VAR: y] since there is no c-command relation between them. The
crucial point is that upon interpretation, the context assigns an appropriate individual
to y (the two pronouns) and also assigns the same individual to x (the subject of the an-
tecedent VP). So the coreferential reading does not result in the semantic representation
(9b), but rather as follows:
(12) (x loves y′s mother) ∧ (z loves y′s mother)
x = John; y = John; z = Bill
Finally, returning to the explanation for why anaphors are obligatorily bound by (rather
than coreferent with) their antecedents, we see that the latter option of accidental coref-
erence is impossible: an anaphor’s [VAR] will always share the value of its antecedent’s
and it will always be c-commanded by it, by virtue of the mechanisms of Agree. So, the
configuration is effectively identical to that of a bound pronoun.
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It appears, then, that another advantage of the [OP]/[VAR] feature specification
of DPs is that it may be able to account quite straightforwardly for bound and coref-
erential readings of pronouns. Furthermore, it explains why anaphors share certain
properties with bound pronouns. I must highlight however that many other complex
issues surround this analysis, which I do not have the opportunity to do justice to here.
Hopefully at least a flavour of how certain technicalities of the Agree-based analysis
of Condition A may operate is sufficient. The reader is referred in particular to Fox
(2000: ch.4) for certain intuitions underlying this approach and a very clear overview
of the sorts of empirical and theoretical questions which have implications for it. One
important observation is that variable binding at LF is constrained by local economy. In
particular, Fox argues (following Heim 1998) that the most local antecedent must act as
the variable binder in a construction where there is more than one possible binder for a
given interpretation of a sentence. Fox terms this Rule H. I would like to highlight, then,
that a general LF-procedure regulating variable binding relations between a pronoun
or anaphor and referential DPs which c-command them receives independent support
in the literature and seems compatible with the feature specifications for different types
of DP proposed in this section. We have simply assumed that LF-procedures similar
to Heim’s and Fox’s will be parasitic upon the semanticosyntactic features borne by
different types of DP.
We have come some way since outlining our initial aim of this section, to show
that Agree is an ideal candidate to establish the relation between an anaphor and its
antecedent. I believe that the syntactic analysis of binding (based on Agree) must be
underpinned by a solid semantic basis, which the explicit theory of features and their
interpretation at LF provides. To summarise the section, we have seen that an account
for anaphor binding based on Agree offers an explanation for the ‘encoding problem’
and the ‘level problem’ with respect to Condition A effects. Anaphor binding is syn-
tactically encoded as an application of Agree in narrow syntax, between the [VAR] fea-
tures responsible for establishing certain semanticosyntactic dependencies. Quantifier
DPs come from the lexicon with both a valued operator feature and a variable fea-
ture [OP: ∀/∃], [VAR: x/y/z]. Referential DPs, including pronouns and anaphors, only
bear a variable feature [VAR: x/y/z]; this feature is unvalued in the case of anaphors.
The properties of anaphor binding are simply reduced to the general constraints on
all Agree operations, plus certain general mechanisms for interpreting variables at LF,
independently motivated for bound pronouns. Condition A as an independent gram-
matical principle can thus be entirely eliminated from the grammar, an ideal result from
a reductionist perspective. Moreover, since Condition A does not exist as a representa-
tional filter, its effects are no longer required to be determined at a particular level, or
levels, of representation. Given this Agree-based approach to anaphor binding, specific
empirical predictions are made concerning the distribution of anaphors and their an-
tecedents. We now examine whether it can also lead us to a possible resolution of the
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domain problem.
4.3 Implications for the domain problem
If anaphor binding indeed reduces to the narrow-syntactic operation Agree applying
between features of an antecedent and features of an anaphor, we predict that the con-
straints on the locality of the antecedent to the anaphor follow simply from those gov-
erning the locality of Agree. As we have seen in §2.2.2.3, locality of agreement in the
Chomsky (2000, 2001, 2004a) framework is constrained by the nature of the compu-
tational component, which proceeds incrementally in phases. The locality constraints
on anaphor binding should then simply reduce to the Phase Impenetrability Condition
(PIC), as introduced in §2.2.2.3:
(13) [α [H β]]
(14) Phase Impenetrability Condition (PIC)
“In phase α with head H, the domain of H is not accessible to opera-
tions outside α, only H and its edge [its specifier(s)] are accessible to
such operations.”
(Chomsky 2000: 108)
In the clausal architecture, phases are commonly assumed to correspond to every CP
and transitive vP. I argue below that other constituents may be phases, too, but we put
aside these concerns for the moment. The Agree-based reinterpretation of Condition A
therefore envisages a response to the domain problem (at least for anaphors), provided
that the local binding domain can indeed be reduced to the phase. Given this prediction,
we must now carefully examine the empirical facts.
4.3.1 Phases as local binding domains
Though the possibility that the local binding domain might be reduced to the phase
has been largely overlooked in the recent literature, it is not an entirely new suggestion.
Lee-Schoenfeld (2004) proposes a phase-based approach to local binding, examining
binding possibilities in German with particular attention to Accusativus cum Infinitivo
constructions. Lee-Schoenfeld concludes that reflexives must be bound within their
minimal phase, while pronouns must be free in their minimal phase.20 She follows
20Lee-Schoenfeld assumes that a phase is defined as the portion of the derivation that spells-out as a
unit in the Chomsky (2001) system, namely the complement of phase heads, e.g. TP and VP; see, e.g.,
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Chomsky (1993); Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) in ‘relegating’ the binding conditions to
an evaluative procedure at LF. However, in the previous chapter we have seen evidence
that led us to conclude that the relegation of the binding theory to LF is unnecessary.
While I agree that it is a desirable outcome that the binding domain reduces to the
only syntactic domain of any relevance under Minimalist assumptions (if this can be
shown to account for a wide range of empirical facts), only an explanation based on
narrow-syntactic operations has much hope of explaining why the phase should be the
relevant domain for anaphors. Moreover, an approach such as Lee-Schoenfeld’s still
requires the binding conditions to be stipulated, as in previous frameworks, instead of
following from independent principles or operations, such as Agree.
An approach along the lines of Heinat (2006) is closer to an ideal Minimalist
binding theory. Heinat assumes that binding relations between an anaphor and its
antecedent must be encoded syntactically, observing—as we have in this chapter—that
the Agree operation is an ideal candidate. However, there are numerous ways in which
Heinat’s implementation of this idea differs from mine. First, as argued against in
§4.2.2.1, Heinat assumes that binding relations can be determined by Agree between
unvalued ϕ-features on anaphors and matching valued features on their antecedents.
Second, assumptions concerning the mechanisms of the Agree operation differ from
mine. A problem encountered by both my analysis and Heinat’s in attempting to re-
duce binding to an application of Agree is that in theDerivation by Phase framework only
heads probe, and only the head’s c-command domain can be probed. The difficulty is
that it is the anaphor that must be assumed to bear the unvalued feature responsible
for its entering into a binding relation, yet clearly this would predict that an anaphor
must c-command its antecedent. Obviously, only the reverse is true. As we see shortly,
this is overcome if, as outlined in §2.2.3.5 above, the suggestion of Rezac (2004) can be
extended, with the search space for a probe extending ‘upwards’ if no goal can be found
in its c-command domain. Heinat also adopts a nonstandard approach to probing, sug-
gesting that not only heads, but also phrases act as probes. Once this assumption is
adopted, the [CASE: ] feature of DPs is assumed to probe the DP’s c-command do-
main and then its valued ϕ-features are capable of valuing the anaphor’s unvalued
ϕ-features.21
Boeckx and Grohmann (2004) for discussion. Edge-positions in CP and vP must in fact constitute part
of the immediately higher phase. While this is not implausible, the empirical facts require a DP in an
edge-position to be able to bind an anaphor in the lower edge, so as Lee-Schoenfeld concedes, a somewhat
paradoxical situation arises whereby the phase-edge in some sense belongs to two phases at once.
21The procedure is in fact a little more involved. Strictly speaking, for an anaphor in the object position
of a transitive verb, say, v’s [ϕ: ] probes the anaphor’s, and Agree takes place, despite both features
being unvalued. Then, once the antecedent merges in SpecvP, its [CASE: ] (or in Heinat’s terms, an
uninterpretable [T] feature as in Pesetsky and Torrego 2001, 2003) probes [ϕ: ] on v, valuing at the same
time [ϕ: ] on the anaphor.
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A crucial point of departure from both of these phase-based approaches to bind-
ing is in my assumption that a distinction must be made between LF- and PF-phases, as
outlined in §2.2.3.3. This is coupled with an analysis of features as either semanticosyn-
tactic (legible by LF) or morphosyntactic (legible by PF). At LF-phases, e.g. CP and vP,
LF reads off semanticosyntactic material present in the derivation, while at PF-phases,
e.g. CP and vP but also DP and PP, PF reads off morphosyntactic material. I show in
this chapter and in chapters 5 and 6 that this distinction can be exploited by the bind-
ing theory to solve various long-standing problems and can be shown to account for
a range of empirical facts that a binding theory without such a distinction could not.
I therefore continue to pursue the phase-based Agree approach within the framework
of assumptions outlined in §2.2.1, examining its compatibility with empirical evidence
from English.
4.3.2 Some preliminaries on probing
We may now set out to examine the empirical predictions made by the analysis of
anaphor binding based on the [OP] and [VAR] feature specifications proposed in §4.2.2.3
coupledwith the wider theoretical assumptions of §2.2.1. It is natural to assume that the
[OP] and [VAR] features encoding binding relations must be of the semanticosyntactic
type. Therefore, at each LF-phase, these features will be read by LF and thus inacti-
vated from the narrow-syntactic computation. The prediction is, then, that an anaphor
bearing [VAR: ] must receive its value before the LF-phase containing it is complete,
i.e. that an anaphor must be bound in its phase. Since we have assumed in §2.2.3.3
that LF-phases amount to CP and vP, that is, the core phases in the Derivation by Phase
model, this analysis of Condition A effects makes broadly the same predictions as the
approaches of Lee-Schoenfeld (2004) and Heinat (2006). We will see that a good deal of
further explanation is in order, however, to capture the full range of data.
We start out by fleshing out some of the assumptions of the analysis and at the
same time testing how the predictions fare with respect to some of the core data that
the classical Condition A accounts for. Take a simple finite clause where the anaphor
occupies the object position, with the subject its antecedent.
(15) John likes himself
Upon entering the derivation, himself bears [VAR: ], ignoring other features for now.
This immediately raises concern, since upon merger, an unvalued feature should probe
its c-command domain for a matching feature. In (15), there is no problem, since himself
does not c-command any other DP, yet in other constructions we must rule out the
possibility of himself valuing its [VAR: ] upon entering the derivation by probing its
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c-command domain. Otherwise, binding configurations such as (16) where the anaphor
c-commands its antecedent would be incorrectly predicted grammatical:
(16) * Himself likes John
A quite natural solution is that reflexives and reciprocals (at least the ones we are
looking at in English, for now) are not simply D heads, but select an NP complement.
Therefore the anaphor is composed of a D bearing [VAR: ], which enters the derivation
by merging with NP. D’s [VAR: ] thus does probe upon merger, just like other unval-
ued features. Yet it cannot find a matching goal within its c-command domain (since
NP (self ) contains no [VAR]), and so it must wait until a matching feature enters the
derivation, as proposed in §2.2.3.5. Alternatively, it maybe that the structure of reflex-
ives is morphologically analyzable, as has been claimed on numerous occasions (e.g.
Postal 1966; Helke 1970; Solà 1994; Déchaine and Wiltschko 2002, 2003). For example,
Postal (1966) first argued that the structure of a reflexive consists of a pronominal D
head, and self a nominal complement, which in current terms we might represent as in
(17).
(17) DP
D
him
NP
self
Equally, given that the first and second person reflexives in Standard English differ from
the third person reflexives in having a possessive pronoun preceding self, we might
propose that the pronominal component in fact occupies the specifier of DP, as is often
assumed for possessives:
(18) DP
DP
D
my
NP
∅
D′
D
∅
NP
self
Regardless, provided that the D head of the anaphor has a complement, we can allow
its [VAR: ] to probe, just like other unvalued features, upon entering the derivation.
However, it will never find a matching goal within its NP complement and so must
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wait to be valued from above.22
4.3.3 Binding in finite clauses
We now return to the derivation of a sentence involving an anaphor bound in a finite
clause, as in (15). Himself requires a c-commanding DP to enter the derivation bearing
a matching feature before completion of its minimal LF-phase. This is clearly the case,
since the subject John enters the derivation in SpecvP, before the vP phase is complete.
(19) [TP John[VAR: x] [vP <John[VAR: x]> likes [VP himself[VAR: ]]]]
More precisely, the sentence is derived as follows. The head D of the anaphor in
(19) merges with NP (possibly null), whereupon [VAR: ] on D probes NP, unsuc-
cessfully. The unvalued semanticosyntactic feature must therefore be valued by a c-
commanding element (bearing a matching feature) which enters the derivation before
the LF-phase containing it is read off by LF. When the DP John enters the derivation in
the c-commanding position SpecvP, its valued [VAR] feature will potentially be able to
value the anaphor’s [VAR: ] before the completion of the vP phase: the sentence is
correctly predicted grammatical.
Now take a sentence where the potential antecedent does not enter the derivation
within the same vP phase as the anaphor, as in (20). When the minimal vP containing
the anaphor completes, John has not yet entered the derivation, so its [VAR] cannot
value the anaphor’s unvalued feature, and the sentence is ungrammatical.
(20) * [TP John [vP <John> said [CP that Mary [vP <Mary> likes himself]]]]
Note, however, that an interesting consequence of this analysis of anaphor binding is
that the derivation of (20) (and other sentences involving similar configurations) does,
in fact, converge. It is not the case that the anaphor’s [VAR: ] is simply unvalued
when read off by LF, resulting in a violation of Full Interpretation. In (20), the locally
c-commanding DP Mary will simply value the anaphor’s [VAR: ]. The problem, of
course, is that the feminine ϕ-features of Mary mismatch with those of the masculine
reflexive. However, there is no reason to suppose that narrow syntax has enough infor-
mation (or indeed, the technical devices) to block the application of Agree between the
valued and unvalued instances of [VAR] in (20). We can assume, then, that the sentence
is only ungrammatical because in interpreting it the speaker cannot allow the referent
22If we were to adopt (18), we would have to assume that the pronominal specifier of the anaphor bears
no [VAR], since this would always be able to value [VAR: ] on the D head of the anaphor. This possibility
could in any case potentially be ruled out by some version of the i-within-i condition (see §2.1.3.2).
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of Mary to be understood as both female and male at the same time, while its derivation
simply proceeds in exactly the same way as the grammatical (21).23
(21) [TP John [vP <John> said [CP that Paul [vP <Paul> likes himself]]]]
We will not dwell any longer on the matter since it is not the primary focus of the
section, yet it is nevertheless a notable characteristic of the theory of anaphor binding
proposed here, no doubt with further implications.
4.3.4 Binding in non-finite clauses
4.3.4.1 Raising, control, and ECM
With certain details of the analysis now clarified in the discussion of simple cases of
anaphor binding in finite clauses, our attention now turns to other binding domains.
A central issue in the binding theory since the very earliest incarnations has been the
effect of non-finite tense in determining binding domains, for example in raising and
control constructions such as (22a) and (22b) respectively:
(22) a. I tried [CP PRO to free myself]
b. John seems [TP to have freed himself]
The prima facie problem posed by such constructions is that the antecedent for the
anaphors surfaces in the matrix clause, not in the embedded clause which contains
the anaphor. In (22a), though, we may assume that PRO is in fact an antecedent for
myself, as the two must corefer: given that the PRO subject enters the derivation in the
embedded vP phase, Agree can operate internally to the vP phase before Spell-Out to
LF renders the anaphor’s [VAR] inaccessible to the computation:24
23Mary likes himself, then, is only ungrammatical since usually no context can be assigned in which Mary
can be presented as male. Cases where such context can be assigned seem possible, perhaps indicating
that this aspect of our theory of anaphor binding is on the right lines. Take for example female characters
whose act depends to some degree on the audience’s knowledge that they are played by a man, e.g. Lily
Savage, Dame Edna, a pantomime dame, etc. Though the DP would typically be assumed to be feminine,
it can bind a masculine reflexive (provided that the speaker/hearer is able to identify the character):
(i) Dame Edna shot himself yesterday.
(ii) * Dame Judy Dench shot himself yesterday.
See Heim (forthcoming) for a similar formal analysis of the ‘ungrammaticality’ of reflexives bound by an
antecedent with apparently mismatching ϕ-features.
24An important question arises concerning the feature specification of PRO. Here, I assume that PRO
bears a valued [VAR] feature, though I concede that this would appear to leave PRO’s well-known
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(23) ... [TP PRO[VAR: y] to [vP <PRO[VAR: y]> free [VP myself[VAR: ]]]]
It is entirely natural to assume that PRO may bind an anaphor, since this is of course a
property of overt pronouns, too. Moreover, such an assumption seems to be required
independently to account for the acceptability of sentences like (24), where (arbitrary)
PRO is the only possible binder for oneself :
(24) PROi to get oneselfi arrested is unadvisable
The raising construction in (22b) is also straightforwardly explained. If, as standardly
assumed, the subject of a raising construction moves from a θ-position in the embedded
clause, it must enter the derivation within the vP phase containing the anaphor:
(25) ... [TP <John> to have [vP <John[VAR: y]> freed [VP himself[VAR: ]]]]
As we have noted above, the fact that the antecedent for the anaphor moves out of its
phase at a later stage of the derivation is immaterial since anaphor binding is achieved
by a one-off application of Agree in narrow syntax.25 Essentially, then, this explains
Chomsky’s (1976: 321) observation that “the rules apply as though the noun phrase
binding the trace t were actually present in the position of t.”
Simple cases of anaphor binding in raising and control constructions thus present
no threat to the Agree-based approach to Condition A effects. As we have seen in §2.1,
ECM constructions have hadmore of an impact on the definition of the binding domain
throughout the classical period of the binding theory.
(26) John believes [TP himself to love Mary]
If an anaphor must be able to find an antecedent within its minimal LF-phase, the pu-
tative problem with (26) is that no antecedent is available within the vP in the ECM
complement where the anaphor enters the derivation. However, this generalisation is
simply a descriptive statement of the empirical facts we have seen so far, deriving from
the requirement imposed by bare output conditions that an anaphor not be interpreted
with an unvalued feature. If an Agree-based approach is on the right lines, then the
anaphoric properties unexplained. This relates to a long-standing debate on the possibility of reducing
control to binding, which I am not able to enter into here: a satisfactory treatment of control must be left
for future research.
25Although as highlighted in §3.4.1, just as for other instances of variable binding, the c-command
relation must be preserved at LF. That is, if an anaphor moves out of a configuration in which it is c-
commanded by its antecedent, only the movement copies of the anaphor which are c-commanded by the
antecedent can be interpreted at LF.
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application of Agree between the antecedent and anaphor must be subject to the same
conditions as those on other operations. In this case, the position in which the anaphor
enters the derivation is crucial. Subjects of transitive verbs (like love) merge in SpecvP,
a phase-edge position:
(27) ... [vP <John[VAR: y]> believes himself[VAR: ] to [vP <himself[VAR: ]> love
Mary]]
By the PIC, upon completion of the vP phase (interpretation by LF) of the ECM com-
plement, the material in the edge of vP remains computationally accessible in the im-
mediately higher phase. Just as the unvalued Case feature of a subject in SpecvP does
not crash the derivation provided that it is valued in the immediately higher phase, an
anaphoric subject in SpecvP with its [VAR: ] unvalued does not crash the derivation,
provided that [VAR: ] can be valued in the immediately higher phase. This is pre-
cisely the case in ECM constructions. The anaphor moves into SpecTP of the embedded
clause, and now must find an antecedent by the time that phase completes. As the ECM
complement is a TP and not a CP (as has been assumed since Chomsky 1981), the ECM
clause does not constitute an LF-phase: the next phase boundary is therefore vP in the
matrix clause. The correct prediction of the Agree-based approach to Condition A, then,
is that an antecedent for an anaphor which is an ECM-subject must enter the derivation
before completion of the matrix vP phase.26
4.3.4.2 For...to complements and ‘Avoid Pronoun’ effects
Predicates which optionally take for...to complements cause a little more difficulty. Take
want and prefer, for example, whose infinitival complement may or may not include for
when the subject is overt:27
(28) a. John prefers/wants (very much) [for Bill to win]
b. John prefers/wants [Bill to win]
In the construction with for as in (28a), as predicted by a phase-theoretic account of
binding, anaphors are not generally acceptable:28
26Note that the analysis is also consistent with the assumption that the ECM subject raises into thematrix
vP in narrow syntax (see §3.2.3.2 for discussion). Since the issue is not critical here, we need not commit
ourselves to a particular analysis.
27There seems to be a degree of variation in each case. To my ear, for sounds less strained with prefer
than want, though this need not concern us here.
28Although Reinhart and Reuland (1993) judge an almost identical sentence to (29a) as fully grammat-
ical. For readers who object to my judgment, see the discussion below. Note also that there may well be
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(29) a. *? John wanted very much [CP for himself to win]
b. *? John would have preferred [CP for himself to have been chosen]
When the CP LF-phase completes, the anaphor in SpecTP has not had its [VAR: ] val-
ued, and so the derivation crashes. SpecTP is not a phase-edge position, and so the
anaphor’s [VAR: ] will not be accessible in the matrix vP phase. This is not problem-
atic for our analysis of Condition A so far, though we will return to these sentences
shortly. Consider now the equivalent construction without for. Since null complemen-
tisers cannot (by assumption) assign an accusative value to the [CASE: ] feature of
the infinitival subject, we are led towards assuming that (28b) involves an ECM-type
TP complement rather than a CP; see Radford (2000b) for a summary of the evidence
in favour of the ECM analysis of want. In such cases, however, it seems that for many
speakers reflexives are significantly worse than those in the equivalent position in ‘true’
ECM complements, i.e. complements of verbs which select an infinitival clause which
cannot be introduced by for:
(30) a. ?? John wanted [himself to be a contender]
b. John believed [himself to be a contender]
It appears that wherever the verb selecting the infinitival complement optionally se-
lects for, the judgments become murky. Indeed, Chomsky (1976: 329) notes that for
cases both with and without the complementiser ((29a)/(29b) and (30a) respectively),
some speakers allow the reflexive. (Personally, I find the examples where the anaphor
is preceded by for consistently worse.) Note also that there may be idiosyncratic fac-
tors playing a role in the acceptability of the reflexive. For example, I find (31) almost
perfect:
(31) (?) John wanted [himself to win]
I believe that an important conclusion to draw from these somewhat unclear facts
is that we are very probably dealing with principles beyond Condition A. For verbs in
the class of want and prefer, the possibility of an identical reading derived by a con-
struction with PRO as the infinitival subject seems to interfere with our judgement of
the reflexive. This is formalised by Chomsky (1981) as the Avoid Pronoun Principle,
stating that overt pronouns (presumably, including reflexives) must be avoided wher-
ever a non-overt pronoun can be employed. Evidence for this approach abounds. For
syntactic differences between the constructions (with want and prefer). Some speakers perceive a contrast
between the two constructions in the examples provided in this section, and perhaps more so when the
anaphor is replaced with a pronoun.
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example, reciprocals, which should in theory obey the same locality constraints as re-
flexives,29 are perfectly acceptable as the subject of the TP want complement:
(32) John and Mary wanted [each other to win]
This is presumably due to the fact that replacing the reciprocal with PROwould result in
a different interpretation. A principle such as Avoid Pronoun accounts for the contrast
with cases such as (30a), since replacing the reflexive with PRO would not result in a
distinguishable interpretation. Further evidence might be that stressing the reflexives
in (29), (30a), and (31) appears to improve their acceptability. The explanation for the
improvement could then be that using reflexives permits a contrastive focus semantics
which is impossible with PRO; compare (33a) and (33b):
(33) a. John wanted HIMSELF to win, rather than Bill
b. # John wanted to win, rather than Bill
The use of a reflexive in this way results in an interpretive difference from the same sen-
tence with PRO and so may (perhaps still marginally) circumvent the Avoid Pronoun
effect. If this analysis is correct, the consequence for our explanation of Condition A
effects is that the locality constraint on Agree is met in both (30a) and (32) (as predicted
under an ECM-type analysis), yet in (32) there is simply no possible alternative for de-
riving the same reading with a PRO subject instead. Thus Avoid Pronoun cannot apply
to block (32), whereas it can in the more marginal (30a) and (31).
So far so good, then, for the phase-based approach to Condition A. Unfortunately,
although distinguishing Avoid Pronoun effects from true ‘Condition A’ (i.e. Agree) vi-
olations helps us make sense of some murky judgements in infinitivals without for, the
status of the binding relation in infinitivals with a complementiser (such as (29)) re-
mains less clear. The difficulty comes in determining whether the degraded status of
such sentences comes from a binding-theoretic violation, the interference of an alterna-
tive with PRO, some interaction of these factors, or something else. We have assumed
above that (29a) and (29b) are true Condition A effects, explained by the impossibility
of Agree between the reflexive subject in the infinitival CP phase and the subject in the
matrix vP phase. This is supported by the fact that many speakers find (29a) and (29b)
more strongly degraded than the corresponding cases without for, as in (30a) and (32);
we have seen that the conditions for Agree are met in these cases but Avoid Pronoun
degrades the reflexive.
However, assuming that such configurations are Condition A violations is some-
what controversial, particularly given Chomsky’s (1976) observation that some speak-
29Cases where this appears not to hold are accounted for below.
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ers allow the reflexive. Closer attention and further clarifications are therefore in order.
One problem with my proposed binding-theoretic account for the ungrammaticality of
(29a) and (29b) is that the reciprocal in the same position appears to be significantly less
degraded.
(34) a. ? John and Mary wanted very much [CP for each other to win]
b. ? John and Mary would have preferred [CP for each other to have been cho-
sen]
Yet even though the reciprocal is more or less acceptable for many speakers, we will
see in more detail in §4.4.1 and §4.4.3 that sometimes reciprocals (and indeed reflexives)
in English can be bound outside the normal Condition A domain, for reasons that are
perhaps not entirely clear. One test that is commonly used to judge whether a putative
anaphor really is a true locally bound anaphor is to examine whether it is in comple-
mentary distribution with pronouns.30 One thing wemight check is whether a pronoun
in this position satisfies Condition B. Unfortunately, Avoid Pronoun will in any case de-
grade the pronoun, yet the ungrammaticality is fairly weak, just as we have seen in
other Avoid Pronoun environments where all other binding-theoretic constraints are
satisfied.
(35) a. ?? Johni wanted very much [CP for himi to win]
b. ?? Johni would have preferred [CP for himi to have been chosen]
Indeed, Reinhart and Reuland (1993: 712) also observe that the Condition B effect in
this environment is “unclear”, reporting the following example from Kayne (1981) as
acceptable:31
(36) ? Shei has recently requested [for heri to be allowed to attend the meeting]
(Kayne 1981)
Moreover, the addition of contrastive stress to the pronoun again appears to make these
sentences almost perfectly acceptable. Returning now to the case of (putative) anaphors
30Although we will reject this test below, arguing throughout chapter 5 that non-complementarity is
pervasive crosslinguistically and must be accounted for by the binding theory. (The reader is also referred
back to the discussion in §2.1.4.1.) However, while I argue that anaphors must be free if their minimal
LF-phase is CP, I also argue in chapter 5 that pronouns must be free in CP (if a pronoun is not embedded
within a smaller minimal binding domain): this is one environment, then, where the binding theory pro-
posed in this thesis predicts non-complementarity, with the bound pronoun acceptable but the anaphor
unacceptable.
31It should be noted that his judgement is contested by Bruening (2006), who finds it ‘sharply
ungrammatical’.
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as for...to subjects, we may now follow Reinhart and Reuland (1993) in assuming that a
true anaphor is excluded by Condition A (or Agree, as argued here). What is accept-
able, for some speakers, is what Reinhart and Reuland term a focus logophor, a type
of reflexive not subject to strictly local binding. (We deal with these reflexives in more
detail in §4.4 below.) As Reinhart and Reuland (1993: 712) highlight, logophoric for...to
subjects are employed for contrastive effect, serving to “distinguish the reading from
the standard anaphoric reading with PRO.” There is at least some support, then, for
our conclusion that the infinitival CP does indeed constitute a local binding domain, as
predicted by the phase-based Agree approach. Though we will leave aside the remain-
ing question concerning the difference in acceptability of reflexives and reciprocals as
for...to subjects, we will see in §4.4.3 that there may yet be further complicating factors
concerning anaphors in subject positions more generally.
In summary, we have seen so far that an account for anaphor binding based on
Agree in narrow syntax predicts—correctly for the data examined thus far—that the
phase is the local domain in which an anaphor must be bound. With further data to be
added, there is at least a light at the end of the tunnel for the long-standing ‘domain
problem’. At a purely descriptive level, successful anaphor binding involves a config-
uration whereby the antecedent (or copy thereof) occupies a c-commanding position in
the same phase as the anaphor. In fact, it is not even critical that a copy theory of move-
ment is assumed: the anaphor is simply bound at the point in the derivation where its
antecedentmerges, and once the anaphor’s [VAR: ] is valued, themechanism bywhich
the antecedent may later move from its initial position is irrelevant. We have also seen
evidence from ECM constructions that just as for other instances of Agree, if an anaphor
occupies a phase-edge position, its [VAR: ] can remain unvalued upon completion of
that phase since it remains computationally accessible in the immediately higher phase
(by the PIC). It remains now to furnish the proposed analysis with a broader empirical
coverage.
4.4 Binding at longer distance
Wehave seen above that in several syntactic environments, the local binding domain for
anaphors corresponds to the phase, as predicted by the Agree-based reanalysis of Con-
dition A. However, as hinted at in the previous discussion, the picture is complicated
by the fact that in certain environments in English, anaphors may apparently find an
antecedent outside their usual binding domain. Clearly, how we deal with these cases
will be crucial to the account of anaphor binding outlined above: if these longer dis-
tance anaphors must be treated in the same way as those we have seen so far, we must
explain why Agree can operate across larger portions of the derivation than usually
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assumed. However, the properties of the relation between antecedent and ‘nonlocally
bound’ anaphors differ from the properties of local binding. These properties help us in
trying to draw a distinction between cases of local anaphor binding and cases involving
pronouns homophonous with anaphors. This brings the local binding theory’s domain
of application into sharper focus, and allows some fresh observations to be made about
some old problems, such as picture-DPs and connectivity effects.
4.4.1 Teasing apart nonlocal and local binding configurations
We may preface the discussion of anaphors which do not show the usual sensitivity to
Condition A of the binding theory by highlighting that there must be some DPs which
have the morphological form of reflexives but which cannot be true anaphors, there
being no coreferent DP in the sentence:
(37) a. Physicists like herself are rare (Fiengo 1977)
b. Both John and myself knew the answer but didn’t dare say it.
c. No-one misbehaved, myself excepted.
Reinhart and Reuland (1993) term these ‘logophoric’ reflexives.32 There is little doubt
that these reflexives are becoming increasingly common in spoken British English. Rein-
hart (1990), citing examples from Zribi-Hertz (1989), highlights that their use in literary
texts is also underestimated. Yet the use of such reflexives is subject to individual and
dialectal variation. Southern Hiberno-English, for example, permits reflexives which
appear with no antecedent far more freely than most British dialects (Siobhán Cottell,
p.c.):
(38) “Ah, it’s yourself. Hello.”
From the sitcom Father Ted. [Priest speaking to a picture of Jesus]
Interestingly, while most British dialects do not permit even logophoric reflexives in
finite subject positions, this is not true of Southern Hiberno-English:
32This may be somewhat misleading since the term ‘logophoric’ was famously coined by Clements
(1975) to describe pronouns in the West-African language Ewe that take as an antecedent an individual
whose belief or attitude towards of a certain state of affairs is being reported. Reinhart and Reuland extend
the term to cover all instances of reflexives in English which appear grammatically despite not satisfying
(their version of) Condition A, including reflexives which do not have an antecedent in the same sen-
tence. See, e.g., Sells (1987) and Zribi-Hertz (1989) for further discussion of logophoricity and alternative
definitions.
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(39) Did himself go out last night?
Bouchard (1984: 35) argues that these “false anaphors” are pronominals, rather
than anaphors (in the terms of the GB binding theory). We will assume, then, that at
least some DPs with the morphological appearance of anaphors must have the featural
specification of pronouns, that is, they bear a valued [VAR] upon entering the derivation
and therefore do not require a local antecedent. It is less clear how to deal with anaphors
which do have an antecedent, but which do not appear to satisfy the usual requirements
of locality:
(40) a. John and Mary thought [CP that there were [DP some pictures of each
other/themselves] for sale on ebay]
b. John and Mary thought [CP that [DP some pictures of each other/ them-
selves] were destroyed in the fire]
c. John and Mary both bought strychnine [CP for each other to kill poison
pigeons with]
In (40a), the anaphor is embedded inside a picture-DP associated with an expletive
subject, and its minimal LF-phase is the embedded clause CP. The apparent antecedent
does not enter the derivation until the vP phase of the matrix clause. Similarly, in (40b)
the anaphor is embedded inside a picture-DP which is the subject of the embedded CP,
while the antecedent again does not enter the derivation until the matrix vP phase.33 In
(40c), the embedded subject is simply an anaphor, again apparently bound across a CP
phase boundary.34
As a starting point, we may take Lebeaux’s (1984) observation that certain syntac-
tic properties distinguish instances of local binding (of the sort we have seen so far in
this chapter) from nonlocal binding. Dealing only with reflexives, Lebeaux notes that
four characteristics typically distinguish local binding from nonlocal binding. First, as
highlighted by Helke (1970), only nonlocal binding permits ‘split’ antecedents for a plu-
ral reflexive. An antecedent is split if it consists of (at least) two DPs occupying separate
argument positions, i.e. not conjoined DPs:
(41) a. John told Mary [CP that there were [DP some pictures of themselves] for
sale on ebay]
b. * John told Mary about themselves
33The reader may recall from §2.1.4.1 the Chomsky (1986b) analysis of picture-DPs as involving a PRO
subject locally binding the anaphor. We examine the possibility shortly in §4.4.2, and in much greater
detail in §4.5.1.
34For further discussion of this binding configuration, see §4.3.4.2 above.
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Second, the requirement that an antecedent c-command an anaphor only holds of local
binding:
(42) a. [DP[DP John’s] success] depended on [[DP every picture of himself] por-
traying him as a superhero]
b. * John’s mother respects himself
However, these two diagnostics are not entirely robust since many speakers find the
nonlocal binding in (41a) and (42a) ungrammatical to some degree (although there is
still typically some degree of contrast with (41b) and (42b)). Third, under VP-ellipsis,
nonlocally bound anaphors give rise to strict/sloppy ambiguities, unlike locally bound
anaphors, which only give rise to a sloppy reading (see also Bouchard 1984; Grodzinsky
and Reinhart 1993; Reinhart and Reuland 1993):35
(43) a. John thought there were some pictures of himself for sale on ebay, and Bill
did too
= pictures of John, or:
= pictures of Bill
b. John respects himself, and Bill does too
= respects Bill, but:
6= respects John
Finally, nonlocally bound anaphors are apparently in free variation with pronouns.
Compare (43a) with (44):
(44) Johni thought there were some pictures of himi for sale on ebay, and Bill did
too
It should be noted that in some environments locally bound anaphors appear to be
in non-complementary distribution with pronouns. It is then a theory-internal matter
whether these anaphors are in fact logophors (as in Reinhart and Reuland 1993) and
the complementarity between locally bound anaphors and pronouns is absolute, or
whether there is true non-complementarity. If the binding theory is set up to explain
true non-complementarity, then this last diagnostic is not entirely robust, so it is wise
to leave it aside in the following discussion.36
35For further clarification, see §4.2.2.4 above.
36Precisely this point is also made in very recent work by Bruening (2006), who highlights that any
conclusions concerning logophoricity drawn from this diagnostic must be made in conjunction with the
other tests.
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As Lebeaux notes, each of the properties of nonlocally bound anaphors is shared
with pronouns, which permit split antecedents, do not require a c-commanding an-
tecedent, and exhibit strict/sloppy ambiguities under ellipsis. It would appear, then,
that just as for the logophoric reflexives which do not require an antecedent in the same
sentence, nonlocally bound reflexives are best treated as pronouns, which enter the
derivation with a valued [VAR]. However, before we go any further we should exam-
ine whether nonlocally bound reciprocals also exhibit the same properties as nonlocally
bound reflexives.37 With respect to the property of taking split antecedents, the picture
is complicated by the apparent impossibility of assigning a possible interpretation to the
relevant sentences, even though they do not always sound obviously ungrammatical:
(45) a. * Bush told Kerry [CP that there were [DP some pictures of each other] sold
to every major network]
b. * Bush askedKerry [CP whether [DP each other’s voters] weremisinformed]
However, it seems that a nonlocally bound reciprocal can in some environmentsmargin-
ally take an antecedent which does not c-command it.
(46) a. ? [DP[DP Bush and Kerry’s] campaigns] required that each other’s voters
not show up on election day
b. ?? [DP[DP Bush and Kerry’s] campaigns] required that each other not make
a TV appearance on election day38
Under VP-ellipsis, although the sloppy reading is overwhelmingly preferred, it seems
that it might be very marginally possible to get a strict reading for the nonlocally bound
reciprocal:
(47) Bush and Kerry knew that pictures of each other with their families would
encourage turnout on election day, and so did Blair and Howard
= Blair andHoward knew that pictures of each otherwith their families would
encourage turnout, or:
37There is some difficulty with respect to ‘logophoric’ reciprocals. Reinhart and Reuland (1991) assume
that reciprocals cannot be interpreted logophorically, yet this position is changed in Reinhart and Reuland
(1993: 660, fn.7). They argue that there are cases where the antecedent does not c-command the reciprocal.
See also Pollard and Sag (1992). Hornstein (2000: 186) also argues that nonlocally bound reciprocals do
exhibit the same properties as nonlocally bound reflexives. As I show below, the judgements do not seem
to me to be as clear as Hornstein would suggest.
38Undoubtedly, for some speakers reciprocals as finite clause subjects are ungrammatical, though they
are nevertheless significantly better than reflexives in the same position. In §4.4.3 below I argue that the
reason for this is due to factors independent of the binding theory.
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= ?? Blair and Howard knew that pictures of Bush and Kerry with their fami-
lies would encourage turnout.
Note finally that nonlocally bound reciprocals are in free variation with pronouns (with
differences inmeaning due to the semantics of reciprocals), although recall that we have
played down the conclusions that can be drawn from this test. Both (46a) and (48) are
both grammatical (though (46a) for some speakers is not perfect):
(48) [TP[DP Bush and Kerry’s campaigns] required that their voters not show up
on election day]
The diagnostics for nonlocal binding proposed by Lebeaux (1984) are not nearly
as robust for reciprocals as for reflexives, though the indications from the data above
(perhaps with the exception of split antecedents) are that the reciprocal in English may
also be a logophoric pronoun. By assumption, the logophoric reciprocal enters the
derivation with a valued [VAR] which must, like logophoric reflexives, be identified
with a pragmatically appropriate DP. Just as for the locally bound reciprocal, the lo-
gophoric reciprocal differs in interpretation from reflexives, naturally, in adding the
semantics of reciprocity at LF.39
In trying to examine whether the local domain for anaphor binding corresponds
to the phase, a crucial task is to filter out cases where an apparent anaphor is bound by
a nonlocal antecedent, since by their feature specification, nonlocally bound anaphors
can be treated essentially as pronouns. So far we have seen the following environments
in which nonlocal binding holds, that is, a DP homophonous with a true anaphor is not
subject to the normal requirements of anaphor binding.
(49) a. antecedent ... [CP there was [DP picture of anaphor] ... ]
e.g. (40a), (41a), (43a)
b. antecedent ... [CP[TP[DP picture of anaphor] ... ]]
e.g. (40b), (42a), (47)
c. antecedent ... [CP[TP[DP anaphor] ... ]]
e.g. (40c), (46b)
d. antecedent ... [CP[TP[DP anaphor’s NP ] ... ]]
39Many questions remain here, but perhaps the most natural assumption is that reciprocity is a purely
semantic feature of reciprocals, which therefore plays no role during narrow syntax: the reciprocal must
simply enter into Agree with its antecedent so that the two share values for their [VAR] features, and the
reciprocity is sorted out at LF. A possible weakness of this approach is that in chapter 6 we introduce a
reflexivising feature on certain types of reflexive which is assumed to be operative in narrow syntax, so
we might wonder if a reciprocal feature could be, too.
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e.g. (46a)
From these abstract structural representations we can generalise that binding across CP
(a phase) has nonlocal properties and that the system we have developed for anaphor
binding in this chapter is not brought into play. This is what the Agree-based approach
predicts, since by the PICAgree should not be permitted between an element in a higher
phase (here, an antecedent) and one in the domain of the immediately lower phase (an
anaphor). However, a finer-grained analysis reveals a variety of possible complications,
which have important consequences for certain empirical phenomena associated with
anaphor binding.
4.4.2 Complications with picture-DPs
The structural configurations in (49a) and (49b) have been the focus of much attention
in the literature. A complication is the possibility of analysing subjectless picture-DPs
as containing a PRO subject, as suggested by Chomsky (1986b). We examine the matter
in some detail throughout §4.5, but in short, if subjectless picture-DPs in fact contain a
PRO subject, then the possibility arises that the reflexives above, which are assumed to
be nonlocally bound, are in fact locally bound by PRO, as in (50):
(50) Johni thought [CP that there were [PROi pictures of himselfi]]
The reflexive could then be treated as locally bound, strictly speaking, while the ‘long
distance’ properties of the reflexive follow independently from PRO’s long distance re-
lationship to its controller. Conceding that such an analysis might be possible in certain
cases, Lebeaux (1984) argues that at least not all of the instances of nonlocal binding of
anaphors within picture-DPs can be explained in this way. Lebeaux claims that the in-
terpretation predicted by the analysis in (50) is simply not observed, since the pictures
do not have to have been taken by, or belong to, John.40 Moreover, in cases involving
not a reflexive within a subjectless picture-DP but rather a reciprocal subject of a DP (as
in (46a)), binding of the reciprocal appears to take place similarly across CP. Yet since
the reciprocal itself is the subject of the DP, there can be no PRO subject assumed to
locally bind it. Since reciprocals in this environment can also be assumed to be nonlo-
cally bound (according to the diagnostics above), there is no real value in assuming the
presence of a PRO subject locally binding the reflexive for cases such as (50). Further, as
both of the possible structures appear to give rise to the properties of nonlocal binding,
we have little scope for teasing apart the two alternatives. Though we can entertain
the possibility that some of the cases of apparently long distance binding involving re-
40Although that interpretation does seem to be favoured, at least for some speakers.
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flexives or reciprocals embedded within a subjectless picture-DP may be structurally
ambiguous between local and nonlocal binding configurations, it is not essential that
we do.
4.4.3 Non-binding-theoretic constraints on reflexives
It is clear from the preceding discussion that reciprocals and reflexives exhibit distribu-
tional differences in English, as is well known (see, e.g., Chomsky 1981; Lebeaux 1983;
van Riemsdijk 1985; Everaert 2005). It should be noted that the representations (49c)
and (49d) are only applicable to reciprocals, not to reflexives. Lebeaux highlights that
the differences between the distribution of reflexives and reciprocals arise by and large
in subject positions:41
(51) a. ?? John and Mary think that each other will win
b. * John thinks that himself will win
(52) a. John and Mary brought some friends for each other to meet
b. ?? John would like some friends for himself to meet
(53) a. John and Mary like each other’s parents
b. * John likes himself’s parents
(Examples and judgements from Lebeaux 1983)
In the literature, it is often assumed that reflexives are ruled out of finite subject po-
sitions either because they have no nominative form or because they cannot control
verbal agreement; see Bruening (2006) for references for each approach. While this ex-
plains (51b), it appears to miss the generalisation that reflexives make poor subjects
compared to reciprocals. Assuming that Condition A should govern both reflexives
and reciprocals, Lebeaux (1983) and van Riemsdijk (1985) suggest that this disparity is
the consequence of some factor independent of the binding theory. Lebeaux argues—as
41Chomsky (1986b), following Lebeaux (1983), assumes the contrast between the weak ungrammatical-
ity of nominative reciprocals compared with the strong ungrammaticality of nominative reflexives to be
significant. I agree with the judgement; there are some cases of nominative reciprocals which seem to me
to be (almost) perfect. Curiously enough, these often seem to involve indirect questions:
(i) ? John and Mary wondered [what each other should do] (Everaert 2001)
(ii) We didn’t know [what each other wanted] (Bruening 2006)
(iii) We always seem to know [what each other is thinking]
It is acknowledged, though, that there is a great deal of speaker variation and as Bruening (2006) notes,
the judgements are controversial in the literature.
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seems natural in light of the data—that reflexives must be subject to a principle be-
yond simply Condition A. He generalises that the subject position of tensed clauses,
the subject of a for...to infinitival, and the subject of a DP are all positions which are not
properly governed. Given that the requirement for proper government is essentially
the ECP, Lebeaux argues that reflexives, but not reciprocals, undergo movement at LF,
leaving traces in ungoverned positions in violation of the ECP.42
Under updated theoretical assumptions (which do not permit use of the ECP) and
an alternative analysis of anaphor binding, I speculatively suggest instead that the dis-
tributional difference between reflexives and reciprocals is due to reflexives’ deficient
ϕ-feature specification, which fails to fully satisfy the featural requirements of the rele-
vant [ϕ: ]. This seems natural in light of Rizzi’s (1990a) generalisation (the ‘anaphor
agreement effect’) that languages which exhibit subject-verb agreement never permit
anaphors in subject position. The anaphor agreement effect is extended by Woolford
(1999), who observes that agreement with object anaphors is also impossible in lan-
guages with object agreement. She thus concludes that agreement, rather than Case, is
ultimately responsible for blocking nominative anaphors. While I wish to follow Wool-
ford’s intuitions, an obvious obstacle is that English reflexives are overtly marked for
person, number, and gender (in the 3rd person). Yet it is not clear that these ϕ-features
are features of the head of a reflexive, rather than of a pronominal element within the
reflexive. In order to tell, what we need is a variety of English in which reflexives can
be permitted in finite subject positions, and then to check the verbal agreement it trig-
gers. Recall that this is the case in Southern Hiberno-English, even though the reflexives
in question are not bound anaphors. Wherever these reflexives do occur in finite sub-
ject positions, the verbal morphology indicates that the agreement is not with the overt
ϕ-features of the reflexive but with some default ϕ-set. For example, for all singular
reflexives, the verbal agreement is always for third person. (Person agreement in any
case fails to show up in plural contexts in English.)
(54) a. Is/*are yourself going out tonight?
b. Are/*is ourselves going out tonight?
Though the internal structure of anaphors is left as a matter for future debate, this is
compatible at least with the suggestion made in §4.3.2 that the internal structure of
reflexives is as follows:
42A version of the LF-movement analysis is later adopted by Chomsky (1986b, 1993); see §2.1.4.2.
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(55) DP
DP
D
my
NP
∅
D′
D
∅
NP
self
My tentative conjecture is that Southern Hiberno-English pronominal reflexives may
occur in subject positions because in this variety the D head of the reflexive bears a
default ϕ-feature set. The ϕ-set on Standard English reflexives is incomplete, both for
locally bound reflexives and for logophoric reflexives with the [VAR] specification of
pronouns. More specifically, it may be that the Person feature is absent in Standard
English, with the Southern Hiberno-English reflexives specified with a default feature
[PERSON: 3]. This seems to be a more accurate account of the difference, in view of
the evidence from (54) that Southern Hiberno-English reflexives do trigger agreement
for Number. Reciprocals, on the other hand, would be assumed to bear a ϕ-feature set
consisting of both Person and Number features (in all dialects of English), explaining
their appearance in the three types of subject positions where Standard English blocks
reflexives (to varying degrees).43
In order to extend the analysis to the other cases where the distribution of re-
flexives and reciprocals differs, we must assume that the heads responsible for other
instances of Case-assignment to subjects also have a [ϕ: ] requirement. This is natural
under the Derivation by Phase framework in any case, since Case is viewed as a reflex
of ϕ-agreement. However, we have suggested in §2.2.3.1 that under the modified the-
oretical assumptions of this thesis the two may be dissociated. One way of explaining
the data is to speculate that Case-assignment to subjects involves (abstract) agreement
for full ϕ-features, whereas Case-assignment to objects either does not involve abstract
agreement or does not require the presence of a full ϕ-set (since reflexives, apparently
lacking [PERSON], can occur in object positions).44
43I do not speculate here on whether the specification for a default Person feature on Southern Hiberno-
English reflexives correlates with the absence of any requirement for binding, though it seems plausible.
For example, Burzio (1991: 87) aims to link morphological properties to binding properties, claiming that
“the ability to refer depends on morphological content”: a DP lacking features is therefore an anaphor. For
Burzio, the rich morphological specification of English reflexives means that the implication can only go
one way: a DP with full features could still be an anaphor. Interestingly, if reflexives have the structure
in (55), with the D head lacking a Person feature in Standard English, the stronger claim that only DPs
lacking full ϕ-features are anaphors could become a possibility. However, this is not consistent with the
view of reciprocals as bearing a complete ϕ-feature set. Further discussion would unfortunately take us
well beyond the present scope.
44See Taraldsen (1995) for a related proposal, developed by Tobin (2005). It might be objected that
the absence of nominative reflexives should receive a separate explanation from the absence of genitive
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To summarise this section, we have seen that an important prediction of the
phase-based binding theory is that binding across a vP or CP boundary should be un-
grammatical. A complicating characteristic of English is that when an anaphor occurs
within a particular local domain which contains no possible antecedent, a logophoric
reflexive or reciprocal is often possible. In delimiting the empirical scope of the binding
theory, it is crucial to have some way of telling apart locally bound anaphors (gov-
erned by the binding theory) from logophors (governed by independent factors, per-
haps largely pragmatic). In the past (notably Chomsky 1986b; see §2.1.4), local binding
across a CP has been taken to be possible. Closer inspection reveals that the motivation
for assuming that binding across CP is a case of local rather than logophoric binding
is at best dubious, relying on notoriously murky judgements. While the empirical pre-
dictions of an Agree-based reanalysis of Condition A are largely borne out where an
anaphor’s minimal local domain is CP or vP, we now examine the predictions for a
highly controversial set of environments, known as picture-DPs.
4.5 Binding into picture-DPs
We have seen in the previous section that binding across a CP phase boundary into a
subjectless picture-DP has the properties of nonlocal ‘logophoric’ binding, which we
have treated as not involving Agree between the two coreferent DPs. We have not yet
considered the properties of binding into picture-DPs where a CP phase boundary does
not intervene between the antecedent and anaphor, e.g. (56a):
(56) a. John likes [DP pictures of himself]
b. John and Mary like [DP pictures of each other]
Given that on our assumptions so far the minimal LF-phase for the anaphor is the vP
which contains the antecedent, the expectation is that local binding is possible. How-
ever, it seems that empirical facts will in any case force us to revise our assumptions
about LF-phases, with constituents other than CP and vP also apparently constituting
local binding domains for anaphors:
(57) [TP Johni [vP <Johni> likes [DP Bill’sj pictures of himself∗i/j]]]
reflexives in Standard English, given that Southern Hiberno-English is otherwise expected also to allow
unbound genitive reflexives. As it turns out, they may be marginally possible in this dialect, apparently
sounding somewhat ‘clumsy’:
(i) ?? Is that yourself’s bag over there?
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Comparing (56a)/(56b) with (57), we see that the presence of the agentive or possessive
subject within DP is crucial in determining the binding domain for an anaphor inside
that DP. Although John c-commands the anaphor in its minimal vP in (57), only Bill can
bind it.45 Though I return to such cases, offering them a full treatment in §4.5.2.1 be-
low, for our current purposes of distinguishing locally bound anaphors from nonlocally
bound anaphors it suffices to note that it is inescapable that DP, like CP and vP, must
sometimes be the local binding domain.
4.5.1 Binding into a subjectless picture-DP within the same clause
Given that at least some DPs may be able to constitute LF-phases, and in light of the
discussion in §4.4.2 above, three sorts of derivation could plausibly give rise to (56a)
(and equally, (56b)):
(58) a. John[VAR: x] likes [DP pictures of himself[VAR: ]]
b. John[VAR: x] likes [DP PRO[VAR: x] pictures of himself[VAR: ]]
c. John[VAR: x] likes [DP pictures of himself[VAR: x]]
In (58a), an antecedent locally binds an anaphor, and the anaphor’s binding domain
is assumed to be vP. Given the blocking effect induced by a DP-internal subject as in
(57), we would subsequently have to assume that DP only acts as an anaphor’s local
binding domain when it contains a subject, in the spirit of the original Specified Subject
Condition (see §2.1.1.2) and the Chomsky (1981) definition of the Governing Category
(see §2.1.3.2). The alternative is to imagine that all picture-DPs—with or without a
subject—constitute local binding domains. We would then have to assume either that
the reflexive inside a subjectless picture-DP is locally bound by a PRO subject, as shown
in (58b), or that it is not locally bound, as shown in (58c). This last option, treating
the anaphor in a subjectless picture-DP as a logophor, is advocated most notably by
Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and has subsequently received a great deal of attention in
the literature. The matter is a very complex one, however, largely due to the plausibility
of each of the analyses in (58). Furthermore, as we see now, the empirical evidence we
use to tease apart the analyses is somewhat less than clear cut.
If the reflexive or reciprocal object in a picture-DP is obligatorily a true anaphor,
then it should fail to exhibit Lebeaux’s (1984) properties of nonlocal binding outlined
45As noted in §2.1.1.2, Asudeh and Keller (2001); Keller and Asudeh (2001); Runner (2003) report that
for some speakers, examples such as (57) are grammatical on both readings for the anaphor.
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in §4.4.1 above. Applying these tests is a good starting point, and may allow us to
eliminate at least (58c). First, we examine whether the reflexive may accept a split an-
tecedent:
(59) a. Bush showed Kerry various pictures of themselves
b. *? Bush told Kerry a story/rumour/lie about themselves
While (59a) seems grammatical, other types of DP assumed to be in the class of picture-
DPs may contrast fairly sharply, as in (59b). With respect to the possibility of a non-c-
commanding antecedent, the reflexive may also exhibit properties of nonlocal binding,
though again, not in all cases:
(60) a. Max’s eyes watched eagerly a new picture of himself in the paper
(Reinhart and Reuland 1991)
b. * Bush’s opponents spread malicious rumours about himself
Similarly, under VP-ellipsis it appears that reflexives in subjectless picture-DPs may
sometimes—but not always—exhibit properties of nonlocal binding, giving rise to am-
biguities between strict and sloppy readings for the elided reflexive.
(61) a. Bush wouldn’t show the reporters pictures of himself in a pretzel factory,
but Kerry would
= show the reporters pictures of Kerry, or:
= show the reporters pictures of Bush
b. Bush told a great joke about himself, and Kerry did too
= tell a great joke about Kerry, but:
6= tell a great joke about Bush
Note finally that althoughwe have somewhat discredited the non-complementarity test
for logophoricity above, the evidence is again split:
(62) a. Johni likes [DP pictures of himselfi]
b. Johni likes [DP pictures of himi]
(63) a. Johni told [DP stories about himselfi]
b. * Johni told [DP stories about himi]
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Comparing (62a) with (62b), the reflexive is in free variation with the pronoun, consis-
tent with an analysis of the reflexive as a nonlocally bound anaphor.46 On the other
hand, complementary distribution between reflexives and pronouns obtains in (63a)
and (63b).
For each diagnostic we have at least some evidence that clause-internal binding
into a subjectless picture-DP can be treated as a configuration involving nonlocal lo-
gophoric binding. However, given that certain sentences do not exhibit the relevant
nonlocal properties, the picture seems rather inconclusive. It is not the case, I believe,
that the judgements are unclear, but rather that in some contexts the judgements go one
way, and in others the other way. The data seem to be split: in one type of context we
have obligatorily local binding of an anaphor, and in the other we have a logophor. I
suggest that DP-internal PRO subjects interfere with the locality tests in apparently sub-
jectless picture-DPs, and that this can begin to account for the distinction. For example,
Bhatt and Pancheva (2001) suggest that in cases where the matrix verb’s semantics re-
quire the DP-subject to corefer with its agent, a PRO subject is obligatorily present.47
This assumes the following structure:
(64) a. Davidi told Victoria [DP PROi lies about himselfi]
b. Davidi made up [DP PROi stories of himselfi]
When there is no such requirement that an implicit DP-internal subject corefer with the
subject of the matrix verb, Bhatt and Pancheva assume that PRO may be optional or
perhaps in fact always absent, as in the following:
(65) a. David heard [DP stories about himself]
b. David showed Victoria [DP pictures of themselves]
Bhatt and Pancheva’s approach to PRO subjects of DPs has interesting conse-
quences for our problem of the split in local/nonlocal binding properties of reflexives
inside subjectless picture-DPs. The sort of verbs that on Bhatt and Pancheva’s assump-
tions require a PRO subject inside their picture-DP object to corefer with their agent
(e.g. tell, make up, sell) are precisely those which are involved in the sentences which
fail the tests for nonlocal binding, e.g. (59b), (60b), (61b). This is exactly what Bhatt and
Pancheva’s approach predicts, since the anaphor is now locally bound DP-internally by
46The grammatical status of (62b) is commonly assumed in the literature, though many speakers feel a
strong preference for the reflexive in this environment. See §5.2.5 for detailed discussion.
47A similar idea is proposed by Safir (1999: 596, fn.10) for idiomatic expressions, e.g. take (PRO) pictures
(of...). As suggested in §3.5.1 above, Bhatt and Pancheva’s analysis can also cover this sort of idiomatic
construction and also ‘creation verb’ constructions, e.g. compose (PRO) songs. The approach is further
developed in §5.2.2 to account for the distribution of pronouns in subjectless picture-DPs.
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PRO. The fact that PRO is obligatorily coreferent with the subject of the matrix predi-
cate ensures, for example, that a split antecedent is impossible. Happily enough, Bhatt
and Pancheva’s analysis also sheds some light on the possible counter-examples. For
example, Jonny Butler (p.c.) points out that while (59b), repeated here as (66a), is un-
grammatical, additional contextual information can improve the sentence:
(66) a. *? Bush told Kerry a story/rumour/lie about themselves
b. Bush told Kerry a story about themselves that he’d read in The News of The
World that morning
This is problematic since the picture-DP in (66b) is expected to contain a PRO subject
coreferent with Bush, yet cannot then bind the plural reflexive. However, as the ex-
amples above show, nor is nonlocal logophoric binding usually permitted where the
picture-DP contains a PRO subject. Yet it is natural to suppose that the typical xi told yk
[a PROi story] structure is overridden in (66b) by the additional contextual information
supplied here: if Bush read the story in The News of The World, the story is highly un-
likely to be his own, of course. The same account can be extended to accommodate the
obviation of the Condition B effect in (63b) for some speakers, again, particularly when
further information is supplied within the DP:
(67) (?) Johni told [DP stories about himi that had been printed in The News of The
World that morning]
The analysis of the picture-DP as containing a PRO subject is overriden, resulting in him
being free within the picture-DP, satisfying Condition B (see §5.2.2). Following Bhatt
and Pancheva’s suggestion, we will assume that for the predicates which give rise to
nonlocal binding possibilities (e.g. show, hear, like), PRO does not occupy the subject
position of the picture-DP.48
So far, then, the sentences not exhibiting nonlocal binding properties (e.g. (59b),
(60b), (61b), and (63a)) are assumed to involve local binding by a DP-internal PRO, i.e.
the configuration in (58b). Essentially, they are not subjectless.49 The natural assump-
tion for the cases exhibiting nonlocal properties is that they involve logophoric binding,
i.e. the configuration in (58c). This view is taken by Pollard and Sag (1992, 1994); Rein-
hart and Reuland (1993); Runner (2002); Baltin (2003); Uchiumi (2004), and no doubt
48It may be that PRO can optionally occupy the subject position, as in Chomsky (1986b). Under that
account, outlined in §2.1.4.1, PRO appears as and when required in order to meet the needs of the binding
theory. An optional PRO is not required in these other contexts on our analysis, so we do not pursue this
possibility further here.
49We henceforth reserve the term ‘subjectless picture-DP’ for those which do not contain any subject,
even PRO.
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many others. Yet note that the diagnostics we have been using are not entirely suffi-
cient to base such a conclusion on. They merely confirm that the relevant sentences
can have a derivation in which the reflexive or reciprocal is not locally bound, not that
an alternative derivation involving a locally bound anaphor (as in (58a)) is impossi-
ble. That is, it is logically possible that these sentences are ambiguous between the two
configurations (58a) and (58c). The question has critical implications for the binding
theory. In each of his major revisions of the binding theory (Chomsky 1981 et seq.),
Chomsky has maintained that the binding theory must account for anaphors in object
positions of subjectless picture-DPs. We pursue this question further below, since it also
has implications for phase-theory.
4.5.2 Are DPs (LF-)phases?
4.5.2.1 Theoretical evidence
We have assumed so far that CP and vP constitute LF-phases, and supposed that the
local binding domain for an anaphor is its minimal LF-phase, deriving this from the
properties of the operation Agree (itself constrained by the cyclic Spell-Out model).
However, it is sometimes assumed that categories other than C and v head phases.
In particular, Chomsky (2001) highlights that DPs might well be considered phases,
and the general tendency following Abney (1987) towards unifying the nominal and
clausal architecture (DP and CP) would also be consistent with such an approach (see
Svenonius 2004 for an overview). Similarly, we noted above that at least for picture-DPs
with overt subjects as in (57), repeated here as (68), the local domain must not extend
as far as vP or CP, and that DP must be the relevant local domain:
(68) [TP Johni [vP <Johni> likes [DP Bill’sj pictures of himself∗i/j]]]
Given that binding into subjectless DPs displays properties consistent with a logophoric
binding analysis, the most natural conclusion to draw might be that picture-DPs con-
stitute LF-phases: if a reflexive or reciprocal object of the picture-noun can find an an-
tecedent within DP, it must be bound by it, and if not it is bound logophorically. While
this is at least a plausible analysis, the alternative that only DPs with subjects are bind-
ing domains (or LF-phases) is still possible. In that case, the picture-DP would be an
LF-phase in (68) and in cases where a PRO subject is present, while binding into subject-
less picture-DPs would be ambiguous between logophoric binding and local binding,
as suggested above.
Since binding domains for anaphors are reduced to LF-phases in this thesis, we
cannot consider the question of binding domains independently of the question of
4.5. Binding into picture-DPs 152
phases. The latter possibility, though it appears to introduce a redundancy by assuming
alternate derivations, follows the intuitions of the standard phase-theory. It remains the
subject of some controversy how to define phases (ideally, intensionally). Chomsky’s
(2000) original suggestion is that a phase is:
“...the closest syntactic counterpart to a proposition: either a verb phrase in
which all θ-roles are assigned or a full clause including tense and force.”
(Chomsky 2000: 106)
Chomsky (2001:43) later claims that v only heads a phase when it has “full argument
structure”, as in transitive or experiencer vPs.50 While we assume a distinction between
LF- and PF-phases, it seems that requirements such as full argument structure will be
LF-properties, and so characteristics of LF-phases (which are also relevant to anaphor
binding). So, it seems to be the case that a phase must at least contain a subject, since
for Chomsky, only those vPs which project subject positions are phasal, while all CPs
must contain a subject by the traditional EPP. This is also reminiscent of Chomsky’s
(1986b: 169) complete functional complex (CFC), a characterisation of the local binding
domain as a constituent in which “all grammatical functions compatible with its head
are realized”, as we saw in §2.1.4. Crucially, the CFC must contain a subject, so infor-
mally, if a picture-DP does not contain a subject, the binding domain extends further.
However, DP as an LF-phase is clearly also problematic given Chomsky’s definition.
DP is neither a “verb phrase in which all θ-roles are assigned” nor a “full clause includ-
ing tense and force”. If these are true phasehood properties, then we are led to assume
that noDPs are LF-phases. Though this initially seems problematic for our binding facts
that apparently require at the very least DPs with subjects to be LF-phases, I will now
argue that assuming that DPs are never LF-phases is in fact the only way of explaining
the full range of data from DPs with and without subjects.
First, if DPs—even only those with subjects—are LF-phases, then another subcase
of binding into picture-DPs becomes problematic. Lebeaux (1983) and Huang (1983)
observe that reciprocal subjects of DPs pose a problem for the classical binding theory
since they do not exhibit complementary distribution with pronouns:
(69) a. John and Bill loved [DP their wives]
b. John and Bill loved [DP each other’s wives]
50In fact, Chomsky (2001) terms these vPs ‘strong phases’, notated v*P, while raising, passive, and unac-
cusative vPs are ‘weak phases’. Since weak phases have no consequences for the derivation, there appears
to be no reason to think that weak phases are phases at all (Boeckx and Grohmann 2004). I assume that the
relevant distinction is simply between phases and non-phases.
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Based on Lebeaux’s non-complementarity diagnostic, we might imagine that this is an
environment in which the reflexive is really a logophor, yet we have seen above that
this test alone does not provide sufficient evidence to draw conclusions concerning lo-
gophoricity, as also highlighted by Bruening (2006). Unfortunately, as we have seen in
§4.4.1, Lebeaux’s (1984) other diagnostics for nonlocal binding do not apply comfort-
ably to reciprocals, so applying them to configurations such as (69b) will not offer us
any firm conclusions.
If we were to continue to assume that DPs with subjects are LF-phases, a possible
escape might be that if the DP-internal subject position occupied by the reciprocal is
SpecDP, Agree should be able to operate between the antecedent in the higher vP phase
and the anaphor edge of DP. However, there is evidence that the DP-subject does not
occupy a position as high in the DP structure as SpecDP.51 Suppose that a DP-internal
subject’s [CASE: ] feature must be valued by a matching valued feature on a functional
head. This functional head cannot be D of the picture-DP, since that head already bears
its own [CASE: ] feature. This system of Case-feature valuation does not, therefore,
allow D to be the head which assigns genitive Case to the DP-internal subject, since
it would then be required to bear both valued and unvalued ϕ-feature sets, which is
clearly impossible.52 So movement to SpecDP cannot take place, since the DP-internal
subject does not agree with D. It is sometimes assumed (see, e.g., Carstens 1991) that
DP-internal subjects occupy a ‘mid-level’ projection in DP, e.g. SpecNumP. Not only
does this approach provide symmetry with clausal syntax, but it is also compatible
with our assumptions concerning Case and ϕ-feature agreement: we therefore assume
that Num bears [CASE: Gen], with the subject moving to SpecNumP:53
51This assumption is also required in §5.2.2 to explain why the pronoun is grammatical in the same
environment (e.g. (69a)), i.e. why non-complementarity obtains between reciprocals and pronouns in the
subject position of DP.
52The same argument applies on the more standard Minimalist assumption that Case is valued as a
reflex of ϕ-agreement, except that D will then be required to bear both an unvalued ϕ-feature responsible
for genitive Case assignment, and a valued ϕ-feature responsible for it being able to trigger agreement
itself. Also, in §4.4.3 above we have suggested that DP-internal subjects must satisfy a [ϕ: ] feature
within DP.
53Radford (2000a) argues that N→n raising (by analogy with V→v raising) takes place. This is omitted
from the derivation in (70) as it is not important for our purposes here.
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(70) DP
D
∅
NumP
John Num′
Num
[CASE: Gen]
nP
<John> n′
n NP
picture of Mary
If DP were an LF-phase, a reciprocal subject would not occupy an edge position, and
so anaphor binding would be incorrectly predicted to be ungrammatical or nonlocal in
cases such as (69b).
4.5.2.2 nP as an LF-phase
The theory-internal evidence supports Chomsky’s position that DP is not a phase (for
our purposes here, an LF-phase), as expected, given his phasehood diagnostics. Fur-
thermore, we have seen in §2.2.3.3 that Matushansky (2005) highlights that DPs typi-
cally fail other syntactic and LF-diagnostics for phasehood: they do not host an ‘escape
hatch’ edge-position targeted by QR or successive cyclic A′-movement and they are
neither obligatorily propositional (unlike CPs) nor predicate phrases in which all pos-
sible θ-roles are assigned (unlike vPs and nPs with subjects). The assumption that DP
is not an LF-phase allows us to handle binding a reciprocal subject of a DP, as well
as binding into a subjectless picture-DP (which also has an alternative derivation in-
volving logophoric binding). What we cannot yet account for is why binding across a
DP-internal subject (including PRO) is blocked.
The structure of picture-DPs in (70) indicates a solution, however. As suggested
by Carstens (2000, 2001); Adger (2003); Svenonius (2004), we assume that n—by analogy
with the preverb v—heads a phase internally to DP. vP constitutes a phase (in our terms,
at least an LF-phase) when it assigns a θ-role to an argument in SpecvP. Suppose that the
same is true of nP. This is independently argued by Carstens (2001: 162), who proposes
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that “the highest nP in any DP is a phrase [sic. = phase], given that it constitutes the full
domain of argument structure for noun phrases”. It might even be possible to reduce v
and n to a single functional element, dependent on the category of the phrase it merges
with (VP and NP, respectively).54 Now recall (57), repeated again in (71a) but with
revised assumptions about the internal structure of the DP. The relevant stage of the
derivation is now (71b):
(71) a. [TP John [vP <John> likes [DP[NumP Bill’s [nP <Bill> pictures of
himself]]]]]
b. [nP Bill[VAR: y] pictures of himself[VAR: ]]
The [VAR: ] of the anaphor must be valued upon completion of its minimal LF-phase,
nP. Therefore Bill is the only possible antecedent, since John does not enter the derivation
until the next LF-phase, the matrix vP. The prediction is of course correct, since Bill is
the only possible antecedent.55
Finally we must confirm that our updated assumptions about phases also still
predict the other cases of binding into picture-DPs. First we take binding reciprocal
subjects of picture-DPs, as in (69b), repeated here as (72a).
(72) a. John and Bill loved [DP each other’s wives]
b. [vP [John and Bill][VAR: y] loved [DP[NumP each other’s[VAR: ] [nP <each
other[VAR: ]> wives]]]]
The reciprocal’s minimal LF-phase is nP, yet since it occupies an edge position (SpecnP)
on entering the derivation, it can enter into Agree with an antecedent in the next LF-
phase up (vP). It then moves to SpecNumP, though this is not crucial since it does not
affect the local binding domain, and an antecedent merges before the vP LF-phase com-
pletes. Agree operates, and local binding is successfully established. Next we take the
controversial question of binding into subjectless picture-DPs, as in (56a), repeated here
as (73a).
54Chomsky (2006) suggests a related but opposite idea (attributed to Alec Marantz), that it is the func-
tional element v which determines the verbal properties of an abstract ‘root’ category it selects.
55As highlighted in note 45 above and in chapter 2, note 7, Asudeh and Keller (2001); Keller and Asudeh
(2001); Runner (2003) report that for many speakers, binding by John in configurations such as (71a) is
grammatical. For these speakers, we would have to conclude that nP (like DP) is never an LF-phase, and
that the presence of a subject has no effect on the phasehood of nP. Interestingly, unlike the classical binding
theory which relies largely on the same constituents being local domains for anaphors and pronouns, on
the analysis of Condition B proposed in the following chapter, the fact that a pronoun is also grammatical
for such speakers is expected. That is, the fact that the nP fails to constitute a local domain for the anaphor
does not have any consequences for the local domain of a pronoun in the same environment.
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(73) a. John likes [DP pictures of himself]
b. [vP John[VAR: x] likes [DP [nP <pictures of himself[VAR: ]>]]]
nP, lacking a subject, fails to constitute an LF-phase, as does the picture-DP itself, since
DPs are never LF-phases. So the local binding domain for the anaphor is in fact vP, its
minimal LF-phase. Since this configuration also exhibits properties of nonlocal bind-
ing, we may assume that it is ambiguous between a local binding construction as in the
derivation (73b) and an instance of logophoric binding. This has been suggested inde-
pendently in the literature by Fox andNissenbaum (2004: 482) andHasegawa (2005: 68),
while a similar conclusion is hinted at by Boeckx (1999: 229).
4.5.2.3 Support from Dutch: ‘hemzelf’
While I believe this approach provides a successful way of dividing up the instances
of local and logophoric binding, because of the intensity of the debate on the subject-
less picture-DP configuration I feel the need to defend it further. Plainly, the problem
in teasing apart locally bound reflexives from logophoric reflexives is that they share
a single morphological form. However, it seems that Dutch may help us out in this
respect. While it is widely known that the Dutch reflexives zich and zichzelf do not have
a logophoric use, it is arguable that Dutch has a separate reflexive logophor.56 Koster
(1985) argues that there is an entirely overlooked third type of Dutch reflexive form,
which he annotates ’m zelf. This is a reduced form of hem zelf (literally, ‘him self’).
Koster claims that the reduced forms ’m zelf and d’r zelf (‘her self’) are in fact anaphors,
and a phonological distinction can be drawn: when ’m zelf functions anaphorically, zelf
is unstressed, whereas it is otherwise stressed. While ’m zelf cannot occur as the object
of an inherently reflexive verb or of a transitive verb, it can occur in other environments
where neither zich nor zichzelf can, as in (74c):
(74) a. Johni
Johni
haat
hates
zichzelfi
SELFi
/*zichi
/*SEi
/*’m
/*him
zelfi
selfi
‘John hates himself.’
b. Johni
Johni
wast
washes
zichzelfi
SELFi
/zichi
/SEi
/*’m
/*him
zelfi
selfi
‘John washes (himself).’
c. Johni
Johni
zei
said
dat
that
er
there
een
a
foto
picture
van
of
*zichzelfi
*SELFi
/*zichi
/*SEi
/’m
/him
zelfi
selfi
hing
hung
‘John said there hung a picture of himself.’ (Koster 1985)
56A detailed exposition of the distribution of anaphors in Dutch is provided in §6.2.
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Koster notes that intriguingly, this is precisely the sort of case where in English the pos-
sibility of a reflexive pronoun causes problems for the binding theory. Dutch therefore
makes a morphological distinction with respect to which reflexive is chosen in this en-
vironment (employing ’m zelf in the nonlocal environment instead of zichzelf ). As also
noted by Zwart (2002, 2005), ’m zelf may therefore be treated as a logophor.
Suppose that this is true. In §4.5.2.2 above, we claimed that an anaphor embed-
ded in a subjectless picture-DP with an antecedent in the same clause may be ambigu-
ous between a locally bound reflexive and a logophor. In light of that argument, a
very important question is now whether the logophoric reflexive and/or the locally
bound reflexive in Dutch occurs as the object of a subjectless picture-DP bound within
its clause. The analysis above predicts that both a locally bound reflexive zichzelf and a
logophoric reflexive ’m zelf will be possible in Dutch, and this is borne out by the data:57
(75) Johni
Johni
zag
saw
een
a
foto
picture
van
of
zichzelfi
SELFi
/’m
/him
zelfi
selfi
‘John saw a picture of himself.’ (Koster 1985)
Incidentally, the Dutch logophor provides support for the analysis of logophors
as bearing the feature specification of pronouns, at least in the respect that they enter
the derivation with a valued [VAR], ensuring that they are subject to Condition B (see
chapter 5). In English, there is of course no clear way of telling whether the logophoric
reflexive is subject to Condition B, since the morphologically identical locally bound re-
flexive never needs to satisfy Condition B. The best we can do is use the diagnostics for
nonlocal binding from Lebeaux (1984) and highlight that a logophoric reflexive is typ-
ically impossible in configurations in which Condition B would be violated, i.e. there
is no ambiguity between a locally bound anaphor and a logophor. Yet this is less than
satisfactory for environments where complementarity between locally bound anaphors
and bound pronouns (or logophors) appears to break down, such as subjectless picture-
DPs. In Dutch, where the logophor and locally bound reflexive have different morpho-
logical forms, we see that the logophor ’m zelf is indeed subject to Condition B, as noted
by Zwart (2005), suggesting it indeed behaves syntactically more like a pronoun than a
reflexive.
57In the following context often assumed to involve logophoric binding, it appears that both the locally
bound reflexive and the logophoric reflexive can occur:
(i) Die
That
foto
picture
van
of
hemi
himi
/zichzelfi
/SELFi
/’m
/him
zelfi
selfi
/*zichi
/SEi
heeft
has
Johni
Johni
beroemd
famous
gemaakt
made
‘That picture of him(self) made John famous.’ (Koster 1985)
The grammatical status of zichzelf is puzzling. It may indicate the presence of an optional PRO subject,
a possibility which we have not otherwise been forced to adopt. PRO would need to be optional in this
environment since ’m zelf would otherwise violate Condition B; see below.
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(76) a. * John’si
John’si
beschrijving
description
van
of
’m
him
zelfi
selfi
‘John’s description of him self.’
b. * Johni
Johni
beschrift
describes
’m
him
zelfi
selfi
‘John describes himself.’ (Koster 1985)
It appears, then, that our claims concerning the logophoric reflexive interfering with
the canonical binding theory in environments where a picture-DP reflexive is bound
within its clause are supported by independent evidence from Dutch.
In summary, this section has clarified issues concerning the locality of binding
into both subject and object positions within picture-DPs, a matter surrounded by con-
siderable controversy in the literature for some time. Just as we have seen for instances
where binding appears to take place across a CP phase (logophoric binding), we have
seen that reciprocals and reflexives in certain picture-DP environments can be filtered
out of our binding theory on the basis that they do not exhibit the usual properties of
locally bound anaphors. However, we have concluded that binding can always take
place into DP, since DP is not a phase. Where binding into DP apparently cannot cross
a DP-internal subject, this is due to the fact that binding must in this instance take place
into an nP LF-phase, correctly predicted ungrammatical by an Agree-based reanalysis
of Condition A. Another crucial consequence is that binding into a subjectless picture-
DP is a configuration in which both local binding and logophoric binding are possible,
provided that it does not cross any other LF-phase boundary (such as CP). Contrary to
many suggestions (Baltin 2003; Pollard and Sag 1992, 1994; Reinhart and Reuland 1993;
Uchiumi 2004; Runner 2002), such binding configurations are not therefore exempt from
the binding theory,
4.6 Anaphor connectivity
If local binding (by Agree) can take place into picture-DPs, it remains to reconsider the
extent of the distance at which local binding could hold. For example, we concluded in
§4.4.1 that in the phase-based binding theory under development here, binding across
a CP boundary (an LF-phase) should be impossible. The fact that this configuration
exhibits nonlocal binding properties is at least consistent with this view. However, an
approach to binding based on PIC-constrained Agree also appears to make another pre-
diction, namely that local binding into the edge of an LF-phase should also be possible.
If an anaphor occupies a position in the edge of CP, then its [VAR: ] should be visible
in the immediately higher LF-phase (e.g. vP). This is precisely the case in (77a):
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(77) a. John wondered [which pictures of himself looked best]
b. [vP John[VAR: x] wondered [CP[DP which pictures of himself[VAR: ]]
[TP looked best]]]
The minimal LF-phase containing the anaphor is CP, yet the picture-DP occupies an
edge-position, SpecCP. The anaphor’s [VAR: ] can therefore be valued in the next
phase up, by the matching valued feature of John. This appears to be a considerable
advantage for the phase-based binding theory, which predicts through the PIC that
such instances of local binding should be possible. However, the examples crucially
rely on subjectless picture-DPs, since if the anaphor is contained within a picture-DP
containing a subject, its minimal LF-phase will always be the nP within the wh-phrase,
and so the movement is expected to have no effect on the anaphor’s binding domain.
Since only anaphors in subjectless picture-DPs are expected to exhibit the connectivity
effect, there will always be an alternative analysis of these constructions as involving a
logophoric reflexive. As pointed out to me by Ken Safir (p.c.), it is therefore impossible
to use these constructions as support for the Agree-based approach to anaphor binding.
In the following discussion, then, I simply highlight that the binding theory developed
here is at least capable of explaining binding into wh-phrases in the CP-edge.
4.6.1 The interaction of binding and A′-movement
A more interesting case than (77a) is the sort of sentence first examined in detail by
Barss (1986).
(78) a. Johni wondered [CP[DP which pictures of himselfi/j/k] Billj claimed
[CP Paulk had bought]]
b. Johnwondered [CP which pictures of himself Bill claimed [CP <which pic-
tures of himself> Paul had bought <which pictures of himself>]
The reflexive is embedded in a picture-DP which successive cyclically moves to the
highest embedded SpecCP. The relevant observation is that the reflexive can be bound
by the most local antecedent at any of the intermediate wh-movement positions (as in-
dicated in (78b)), resulting in three binding possibilities. This phenomenon of anaphor
connectivity receives a rather natural explanation explained under the analysis of ana-
phor binding proposed here. Within the vP phase of the deepest embedded clause, the
anaphor obviously bears [VAR: ]. The natural option is to value this feature by the
matching feature of the antecedent Paul within the vP phase, when it enters the deriva-
tion:
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(79) [vP Paul[VAR: z] bought [DP which pictures of himself[VAR: ]]]
However, if the option of valuing [VAR: ] in this configuration is not chosen, the
derivation does not crash: the picture-DP, by virtue of its wh-feature requirements,
moves into the phase-edge SpecvP. When the phase completes, the picture-DP remains
accessible to the higher phase (CP). Subsequent movement takes place to SpecCP of
the deepest embedded clause, at which point the anaphor, within the CP-edge, is once
again in a local binding configuration, this time with Bill:
(80) [vP Bill[VAR: y] claimed [CP[DP which pictures of himself[VAR: ]][TP ...]]]
Once again, the closest c-commanding [VAR] feature (of Bill) may value the anaphor’s
[VAR: ]. But once again, if Agree does not operate at this point, the derivation does not
crash: the picture-DP again moves to the edge of the vP phase and remains accessible
to the higher phase. The same configuration as (80) then arises in the next clause up:
(81) [vP John[VAR: x] wondered [CP[DP which pictures of himself[VAR: ]][TP ...]]]
If the picture-DP’s [VAR: ] remains unvalued at this stage, then it must enter into
Agree with the matching feature of John, since there are no other DPs left to enter the
derivation, and [VAR: ] will be read off unvalued at LF, crashing the derivation.
4.6.2 The interaction of binding and A-movement
The interest in these constructions lies in the fact that an anaphor which during the
course of the derivation moves through various potential local binding configurations
can actually be interpreted as bound by any of those antecedents. We can see, then,
that the possibility of an anaphor being bound by an antecedent which is not within the
phase in which the anaphor enters the derivation is related to its ability to reach phase-
edge positions fromwhich its [VAR: ] is computationally accessible in the immediately
higher phase. The only requirement is that an anaphor’s [VAR: ] is valued before
it becomes inaccessible to the computation. Well known connectivity effects with A-
movement are also consistent with this analysis, showing that if a binding relation is
established during the derivation, later movement out of the configuration does not
affect it. For example, Belletti and Rizzi (1988) argue that for the Italian example (82)
the picture-DP questi pettegolezzi su di sé (‘these gossips about self’) enters the derivation
in a VP-internal position c-commanded by Gianni.58
58Note that Belletti and Rizzi do not provide a gloss for (82), so the one provided is mine. I have taken
the liberty of changing gossips in their translation to the singular, since my dialect of English does not
permit a plural form of gossip.
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(82) Questi
These
pettegolezzi
gossips
su di
about
sé
self
preoccupano
worry
Gianni
Gianni
più
more
di
than
ogni
any
altra
other
cosa.
thing
‘This gossip about himself worries Gianni more than anything else.’
(Belletti and Rizzi 1988)
Just as for connectivity effects with A′-movement, the anaphor’s [VAR: ] can be valued
before the picture-DP containing it undergoes A-movement to SpecTP. Once the bind-
ing relation is successfully established, further movement of the picture-DP pied-piping
the anaphor out of the binding configuration does not matter.59
The grammaticality of the English translation of (82) also indicates that a parallel
analysis may well extend to English psych-verbs, as suggested by Pesetsky (1987).
(83) a. Old pictures of themselves usually seem to the children [<old pictures of
themselves> to be amusing]
b. [Old pictures of themselves] usually strike the children as [<old pictures
of themselves> amusing]
Barss (2001) argues that the strike...as construction involves a raising configuration, on
the evidence that the anaphor in (83b) is grammatical. Baltin (2003) argues that these
anaphors should be treated as logophors, following the sorts of arguments we have
seen from Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and others. Baltin argues that if the binding
theory is capable of explaining (83b), then it should also predict—incorrectly—that
raised anaphoric subjects should be able to be bound before movement past their an-
tecedents.60
(84) * Himselfi strikes Johni as [<himselfi> amusing]
However, we have seen in §4.4.3 that nominative reflexives are ruled out independently
of binding-theoretic constraints, because they do not bear a complete ϕ-feature set ca-
pable of valuing the [ϕ: ] probe of finite T.61 Baltin’s point, that for the configuration
59Although we have seen in §3.4.1 that just as for pronominal binding, the anaphor must be c-
commanded by its antecedent in the LF-representation.
60Baltin’s argument is against an analysis involving reconstruction to a pre-movement position, yet
seems to apply equally to the analysis proposed here.
61Alternatively, Lebeaux (1998) suggests that sentences such as (84), often taken to indicate that recon-
struction does not apply in A-movement constructions, are in fact ruled out independently as Condition
C violations, with the anaphor c-commanding its antecedent. Since we do not commit ourselves to a
particular account for Condition C in this thesis we leave this suggestion aside.
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in (83a) and (83b) there is a plausible alternative derivation involving a logophoric re-
flexive, is nevertheless well taken, as stated above. So while an alternative analysis
involving a logophor may be available for such sentences, a binding theory relying on
the Agree operation (constrained by the Phase Impenetrability Condition) is capable
of deriving them, too. Effectively, it derives the observation due to Belletti and Rizzi
(1988) that Condition A applies ‘anywhere’. Yet while for Belletti and Rizzi ‘anywhere’
means ‘at any level of representation’ (i.e. D-structure, S-structure, or LF), in our terms,
it means at any point in the derivation where the conditions for Agree are met. Just as
Belletti and Rizzi argue for their version of Condition A as an anywhere principle, the
binding theory developed here does not predict any distinction with respect to A- and
A′-movement.
The Agree-based reanalysis of Condition A correctly predicts that binding con-
figurations can be affected by movement of the anaphor into a binding configuration
which was not established at an earlier stage of the derivation. It also predicts that they
can be affected by movement of an antecedent into a particular binding configuration,
too. One case which has received particular attention is the following raising context:
(85) John [vP seems to himself [TP <John> to be a genius]]
Within the GB framework, such cases were taken as evidence that an anaphor need not
be bound at D-structure, provided that it is bound at S-structure. In our approach to
binding, no additional explanations are required. As usual, the anaphor bears [VAR: ]
upon entering the derivation in the matrix vP. It must then simply wait until an ap-
propriate antecedent with a matching feature enters the derivation in a c-commanding
position. John does, of course, presumably in SpecTP.62 Since we do not need to make a
distinction between External Merge and Internal Merge (movement), we need say noth-
ing more about the fact that the antecedent first entered the derivation in a position in
which it did not c-command the antecedent. A possible objection is that if the process
of A-movement involves Agree (valuing the subject’s [CASE: ] and T’s [ϕ: ]) fol-
lowed by the merger of a copy into the specifier of the Case-assigning head, we might
expect that the antecedent in SpecTP is inactive for the purposes of Agree (with the
anaphor), all of its unvalued features having been valued.63 This raises difficult ques-
tions about the timing of feature valuation, and we will not enter into this discussion
here for reasons of space. However, one way around this objection is to assume that
raised subjects target an intermediate subject position between the two SpecTPs, a non-
62If we assume that raising constructions involve movement directly from the embedded SpecTP to the
matrix SpecTP (Chomsky 1981, 1993). See the discussion below for an alternative.
63To clarify, Chomsky (2000: 123) suggests that [CASE: ] on D specifies D’s valued [ϕ] as active to a
[ϕ: ] probe. Unless DP bears some other unvalued feature(s), valuing [CASE: ] on DP will inactivate its
[ϕ].
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thematic SpecvP of the raising verb.64 This is argued for by Sauerland (2001) on the
basis of scope reconstruction effects with English raising constructions.65 Contrary to
standard phase theories (e.g. Chomsky 2000, 2001), this would appear to indicate that
raising vPs may also be phases. Indeed, Legate (2003) and Matushansky (2005) provide
evidence that at least passive and unaccusative vPs should also be considered phases.
Since this assumption would require further integration into the theory of LF- and PF-
phases proposed in this thesis, and involve another set of empirical predictions, I leave
this question aside here.66
At this point, the reader may object that this approach to anaphor binding makes
incorrect predictions for a configuration like (85) where it is an A′-moved antecedent
that moves across the anaphor in order to bind it. Contrast (85) with (86):
(86) * [CP who does [DP each other’s mother] love <who>]
Here, the would-be antecedent for each other, who, does not c-command the anaphor be-
fore wh-movement, but it does in the root phase. Moreover, it c-commands the anaphor
in a sufficiently local configuration, under our assumptions, since there is no interven-
ing LF-phase boundary between the overt copy of who and the anaphor. We cannot
appeal to a violation of Condition C before movement as in note 61, since each other
does not c-command the copy of who. Why the binding relation is not successful, while
the similar configuration in (85) is, is therefore not clear. However, the indications are
that the ungrammaticality of (86) has little to do with Condition A, or in our terms, the
constraints on anaphor binding imposed by Agree. (86) represents a case of a weak
crossover violation, a configuration in which a variable is bound by an element which
moves across it, but whose trace the variable does not c-command:
(87) ?? [CP whoi does [DP theiri mother] love <whoi>]
Crucially, A′-movement gives rises to weak crossover effects, whereas A-movement
does not:
64Contra Chomsky (1995b), but in line with more recent assumptions (Collins 1997, Chomsky 2001, and
more recent research), I assume that the ‘light’ (nonphasal) v is projected in raising constructions, even
though v is traditionally associated with agentive verbs.
65See §3.2.3.3 for examples of scope reconstruction. McGinnis (1999) also argues that an intermediate
A-movement position must be available in principle. According to McGinnis, passive v’s may bear an
EPP-feature which may result in object DPs moving into a SpecvP position; presumably, this position must
also be a type of A-position, and although inside vP, a nonthematic one.
66For example, if all vPs are LF-phases, then all nPs presumably are too. Then, binding into all sub-
jectless picture-DPs would be (unambiguously) of the nonlocal logophoric sort, as would the connectivity
environments with that we have seen above. No doubt many people would not disagree with such an
approach.
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(88) Johni seems to [DP hisi mother] [TP <Johni> to be happy]
Various explanations have been proposed for weak crossover effects. Without exam-
ining them here, we may simply note that it is at least unlikely that weak crossover
can receive an explanation in terms of the classical binding theory. We can conclude
then that the contrast between (85) and (86) is expected independently of Condition A
effects.67
We have seen, then, that while classical binding theory required reference to dif-
ferent levels of representation in order to explain why anaphors bound at some but not
all stages of the derivation are nevertheless grammatical, our Agree-based approach
handles these data very comfortably. The only requirement is that an anaphor has its
[VAR: ] valued by Agree before interpretation by LF, which itself derives from deeper
interface principles (Full Interpretation). Whether the antecedent moves into or out of
the phase containing the anaphor, and whether the anaphor moves into or out of the
phase containing an antecedent is irrelevant, provided that the conditions for Agree are
met at the relevant point in the derivation. The binding domain for anaphors is thus
entirely dynamic, and this prediction in fact allows us to assume that no reference to
levels of representation need be stated in determining Condition A effects.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the extent to which we can reinterpret the constraints gov-
erning anaphor binding, concluding that Condition A is eliminable from the grammar
without empirical loss. A crucial insight is that we can eschew definitions of the local
domain specific to anaphor binding, since the relevant domain turns out to be the LF-
phase, a core derivational domain employed in current Minimalist theory. While this
is an important observation, indicating that anaphor binding is determined in more
local configurations than perhaps previously imagined, this reduction can only be of
descriptive rather than explanatory value unless it can be interpreted as a consequence
of the mechanisms involved in anaphor binding. To this end, we have seen that not
only can the phase theory of the recent Minimalist framework be fruitfully employed
in reanalysing local anaphor binding, but its feature theory also can. The distinction
between features which are unvalued upon entering the derivation, receiving a value
by syntactic means, and those which are already valued upon entering the derivation
corresponds elegantly to the properties of anaphors, which are referentially deficient
67There may be slightly stronger ungrammaticality in (86) over the characteristically weak ungrammati-
cality of the weak crossover configuration in (87). I am not too sure of the strength of the ungrammaticality
in (87) and have accordingly hedged my bets with a simple *. It remains to be seen whether the contrast,
if perceptible, is particularly significant.
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and need to pick up a referent syntactically, and pronouns and referential DPs, which
do not. All that is needed in order to formalise this correspondence is an additional
syntactically active [VAR] feature on DPs (and perhaps its corresponding operator fea-
ture, [OP]), which is unvalued on anaphors but valued on pronouns. Given this, we
assume that the anaphor’s unvalued feature is valued via the core operation Agree.
This permits a complete elimination of Condition A from the grammar, an ex-
tremely appealing view from a reductionist perspective. The distribution of anaphors
is governed purely by generalised derivational operations which interact with bare out-
put conditions on interface representations in familiar ways (i.e. Full Interpretation).
Furthermore, we can provide a new angle on the classical generative observation that
the constraints on anaphor binding and movement largely coincide: both binding and
movement involve the application of Agree, constrained by the PIC. However, the anal-
ysis of binding as an Agree operation relies on certain theoretical modifications. In par-
ticular, we must follow the assumptions in §2.2.3.2 that semanticosyntactic features of
lexical items are syntactically active, which led us to a revised characterisation of the
nature of the computational procedure and the operation(s) transferring syntactic ma-
terial to the interfaces. This theoretical cost is minimal compared to the gain that it
makes possible, namely an explanation for a wide range of Condition A effects, while
eliminating all ad hoc principles of anaphor binding from the grammar.
With the aim of extending the empirical scope of the Agree-based analysis of
anaphor binding, we tackled some complications that arise in determining the local
binding domain of English anaphors due to the appearance of ‘nonlocally bound’ re-
flexives and reciprocals homophonous with locally bound anaphors. Supported by em-
pirical evidence, we assume that these are best treated syntactically as pronouns sim-
ply with the morphological form of anaphors. Filtering out these anaphors makes the
case for phase-internal binding stronger. In the following chapter, these elusive bind-
ing domains again take on critical importance, and the account that we will shortly
propose for Condition B effects will be shown in particular to shed new light on the
long-standing ‘problem’ of non-complementarity between anaphors and pronouns.
Chapter 5
Eliminating Condition B
So far we have responded partially to the problems facing the local binding conditions
in Minimalism with an analysis of anaphor binding as an application of Agree, elimi-
nating Condition A. The same problems also face Condition B, namely how to resolve
without stipulation variousmatters concerning accurate characterisation of the relevant
local domain, the level(s) of representation at which the effects are determined, and how
binding relations are encoded. Following the methodology of chapter 4, we assume
that the ideal outcome is to show that the binding condition (here, Condition B) can be
eliminated by reducing its properties to independent and more general principles. We
first discover that the local binding domain for pronouns is reducible to the PF-phase.
Exploiting the distinction between PF- and LF-phases made in §2.2.3.3 permits an ex-
planation for the hitherto problematic non-complementarity environments. We then
pursue an approach which both offers an insight into the motivation for Condition B’s
effects and incorporates an explanation for why the PF-phase is the relevant domain.
Condition B is subsumed by a more general structural economy condition (applying
at every stage of the derivation, as a constraint on Merge) which ensures that where
possible, economy of lexical resources favours establishing dependencies by syntactic
relations. The absence of a syntactically determined relation (e.g. by Agree) between a
pronoun and an antecedent in a compatible configuration (local c-command) violates
the structural economy condition.
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we saw that three central concerns of encoding, relevant level(s)
of representation, and local domains must underlie any version of the binding theory.
It was shown that for anaphor binding, the first two matters are resolved under the
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assumption that Agree relates an anaphor to its antecedent, while the local domain,
the LF-phase, falls out naturally from this treatment. We start out in this chapter by
examining whether the relevant local domain for Condition B can also be reduced to
the phase. We see that while in many cases the domain appears to be the same as for
anaphors, it can be shown that it is in fact the PF-phase rather than the LF-phase in
which a pronoun must be free. This is supported by the observation that phonological
factors appear to be able to affect domains in which pronouns must be free (PF-phases),
but not domains in which anaphors must be bound (LF-phases). This novel approach
makes clear predictions about environments in which non-complementarity arises be-
tween anaphors and bound pronouns. These predictions are fully borne out in English
and in other languages, explaining in particular the problems associated with binding
into PPs (‘snake’ sentences) and picture-DPs.
The reduction of the binding domain to the PF-phase, however, is unexplained
since the Agree operation cannot be directly responsible for the requirement that a pro-
noun not be bound by a DP in a particular structural configuration. We are forced then
to seek a new way of ensuring that the relevant disjointness requirement holds of pro-
nouns. We will pursue the rather ambitious best-case scenario that Condition B, like
Condition A, need not be stated as an ad hoc principle of the grammar, but that its
effects follow from independent and more general grammatical principles. The theo-
retical challenge is to incorporate an analysis of Condition B grounded in economy (and
thereby motivated on Minimalist assumptions) with an explanation for why PF-phases
constitute local binding domains. We will argue that the fact that Condition B must
incorporate a sensitivity to both phonological and semantic factors points towards a
syntactic explanation, since at each of the interfaces, access to properties of the other
interface is unavailable.
The relevance of the PF-phase is explained on the assumption that once the pro-
noun’s minimal PF-phase completes, its features are rendered ‘inactive’ due to its Case
feature having been read off at PF. Although Condition B does not reduce to Agree,
it is shown that the pronoun being in a configuration in which Agree could apply be-
tween it and an antecedent is critical: configurations where the pronoun’s features are
inactive (eliminating the possibility of Agree) result in an obviation of the Condition
B effect. The intuition that we then aim to formalise is that when a pronoun is bound
in its PF-phase by a c-commanding antecedent, Agree could have applied in order to
establish the dependency, and the fact that the Agree option is not taken results in an
economy violation. The proposed analysis piggybacks on approaches to Condition B
effects which are of interest for a Minimalist account in that they formalise an intuition
that pronouns are in some sense ‘uneconomical’ in environments where Condition B
effects arise. In order to implement this I propose a structural economy condition re-
quiring that feature-sharing is maximised in narrow syntax. Condition B effects are
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then subsumed by this condition, since it is simply a less economical strategy to em-
ploy two separate occurrences of a valued [VAR] feature than to establish the depen-
dency by Agree. With only minor modifications to assumptions concerning Merge and
Agree, the economy principle can be incorporated into the Merge algorithm. Condition
B therefore reduces to economy and is eliminable.
5.2 Empirical evidence for the local domain
We have seen in the previous chapter that the local domain for anaphor binding reduces
to the LF-phase. Given the general complementary distribution of anaphors and bound
pronouns, the LF-phase again appears to be a good candidate for the local domain for
Condition B effects. This would of course be a welcome result since phases are the
only domains which would require no additional binding-specific stipulation. We see
shortly, though, that in some cases the binding domain for pronouns needs to be smaller
than an LF-phase, leading us to examine whether PF-phases are also relevant.
5.2.1 vP as the local domain
Assuming that our ideal scenario is that the relevant domains for Condition B reduce
to phases, the most obvious way to interpret the difference between the grammaticality
of (1a) and (1b) is by proposing that a copy of the antecedent within the same vP phase
as the pronoun induces a Condition B effect. This is effectively a similar approach to
that taken for Condition A, where the copy of the antecedent in the same phase as an
anaphor is available to value the anaphor’s [VAR] before the antecedent then moves out
of its phase, if necessary.
(1) a. * [TP Johni [vP <Johni> likes himi]]
b. [TP Johni [vP <Johni> said [CP that Mary [vP <Mary> likes himi]]]]
Evidence from raising and control supports this view, under the proposed derivations.
(2) a. * Ii tried to free mei
b. Ii tried [CP PROi to [vP <PROi> free mei]]
(3) a. * Johni seems to have freed himi
b. Johni seems [TP <Johni> to have [vP <Johni> freed himi]]
The derivation (2b) of the ungrammatical control construction (2a) shows that the min-
imal vP containing the pronoun also contains a copy of the antecedent PRO. In the un-
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grammatical raising construction (3b), the minimal vP containing the pronoun contains
a copy of the coreferent matrix subject. This albeit small set of data leads us to hypothe-
sise the following provisional descriptive generalisation which captures the Condition
B effect:
(4) A pronoun cannot be bound by a c-commanding DP in its LF-phase.
The rest of this section examines the extent to which this generalisation holds in a wider
variety of contexts.
Another structural configuration which gives rise to a Condition B configuration
involves movement of an antecedent into the local domain of a pronoun, as in (5a):1
(5) a. * Johni seems to himi to be a genius
b. Johni seems to himi [TP <Johni> to be a genius]
The violation of Condition B is induced by the overt copy of John in the matrix SpecTP.
Since raising verbs do not introduce subjects, they do not constitute LF-phases and
so him, an argument of seem, occupies the same LF-phase as John in SpecTP (the root
phase). Alternatively, as suggested in §4.6.2, it is also possible to assume that the subject
of a raising construction raises through the matrix SpecvP. In that case, the pronoun
and John also occupy the same LF-phase even if we assume that raising vPs are also
LF-phases.
We see, then, that movement copies both in their initial positions and intermedi-
ate or final positions act as potential binders for pronouns in their phase, inducing the
Condition B effect. Now take the evidence provided by ECM constructions where the
ECM subject is a pronoun:
(6) a. * Johni believes himi to love Mary
b. [TP Johni [vP <Johni> believes [TP himi to [vP <himi> love [VP Mary]]]]]
1We might wonder whether the ungrammaticality of (5a) is in fact the result of a Condition C violation,
with him c-commanding the copy of John. (We confirm in §5.2.3 that despite the presence of the preposition
introducing the experiencer, him c-commands into the raising infinitival.) However, the indications are that
for some reason, A-movement is able to bleed Condition C (Lebeaux 1998; Fox 2000):
(i) Every argument that Johni is a genius seems to himi <every argument that Johni is a genius>
to be flawless (Fox 2000)
(ii) Pictures of Johni seem to himi <pictures of Johni> to be great (Lebeaux 1998)
In (i) and (ii) him c-commands the copy of John, but since John moves out of this configuration Condition
C is satisfied. I assume, then, that the Condition C effect is probably obviated in (5a), and that it is up to
Condition B to account for the ungrammaticality of the coreference reading.
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Here, something more needs to be said about the sort of elements that are subject to the
requirements imposed by Condition B. The derivation (6b) for the ungrammatical (6a)
shows that him is free within the vP phase in which it enters the derivation, yet this is
clearly not sufficient to escape the Condition B violation. We must assume, then, that
it is the phonologically realised copy of him in (6b) that induces a Condition B effect,
since only that copy occupies the same LF-phase as the copy of its antecedent, John (on
the assumptions about ECM constructions outlined in §4.3.4.1).
Although we have seen that the pronounced copy of a pronoun cannot be bound
by a DP (or a copy thereof) within the same phase, it remains to be seen whether un-
pronounced copies of the pronoun must also satisfy some version of Condition B. The-
oretical concerns suggest that they must. If the phonological component regulates the
pronunciation or deletion of movement copies (Nunes 1995; Chomsky 2004b, and oth-
ers), then unless the principle regulating the reference and distribution of pronouns ap-
plies at PF, no distinction can be made between pronounced and unpronounced copies.
Indeed, if such a distinction were to be made, as Hornstein (2000:67, fn.49) notes, we
would effectively return to a system with traces as distinct grammatical objects, a posi-
tion which is excluded on Minimalist grounds. The most natural prediction, supported
by empirical evidence as we will see below, is that all copies of a pronoun in any given
derivation are subject to Condition B, at this stage generalised as in (4). The environ-
ments we have looked at so far are very restricted, and all involve CP or vP as the local
domain. This is of course to be expected if the Condition B domain reduces to the LF-
phase. Note, however, that CP and vP are also PF-phases, so from the evidence so far
we cannot yet rule out the PF-phase from being the Condition B domain.
5.2.2 DP/nP as a local domain
In the previous chapter (in particular §4.5.2.2) we concluded that by analogy with vP, nP
must be considered an LF-phase when it contains a subject. If our descriptive generali-
sation (4) holds, the prediction is that when a pronoun occupies an object position of a
DP as in (7), only the genitive DP Peter which enters the derivation inside the pronoun’s
minimal nP phase should be able to induce a Condition B violation.
(7) Johnj dislikes [DP Peter’sk pictures of himj/∗k]
We assume that in deriving (7), we reach the following stage (an LF-phase):2
(8) [nP Peter picture [NP <picture> of him]]
2See chapter 4, note 53 on N→n raising within DP.
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Since nP is the minimal LF-phase containing the pronoun him, the generalisation (4)
correctly predicts that it cannot corefer with Peter, since Peter occurs within the same
phase. John, on the other hand, which merges later than the nP LF-phase, is correctly
predicted to be able to bind the pronoun.
Cases where the pronoun occupies the DP-internal subject position cause a lit-
tle more difficulty. On the basis of Chomsky’s phasehood diagnostics (supported by
empirical evidence from binding anaphors in picture-DPs), we concluded in §4.5.2 that
DP does not constitute an LF-phase, unlike CP. However, we indicated in §2.2.3.3 that it
must certainly be considered a PF-phase, satisfying PF-phasehood diagnostics by virtue
of typically being phonologically isolable, stressable, and targeted by movement oper-
ations. Bearing this in mind, take example (9a):
(9) a. Peterk loves [DP hisk pictures (of Mary)]
b. [DP[NumP his [nP <his> pictures [NP <pictures> (of Mary)]]
The derivation of (9a) involves movement of the pronoun from the edge of the nP LF-
phase to a subject position within DP, call it SpecNumP.3 Both copies of the pronoun
should satisfy (4), if our assumptions are correct. The unpronounced copy in SpecnP is
of course free within its minimal LF-phase (nP), yet the pronounced copy in SpecNumP
is more problematic. Since DP is not an LF-phase on our assumptions, the pronoun’s
minimal LF-phase (the vP headed by loves) contains a copy of Peter. However, Peter is
unexpectedly able to bind the pronoun, clearly with no Condition B effect. Matters get
worse still when the picture-DP contains no subject at all, with the pronoun the object
of the picture-noun.
(10) Peterk despised [DP every single [nP picture of himk]
Here, the pronoun him can be bound by thematrix subject Peter. Yet neither a subjectless
nP, nor DP, constitutes an LF-phase, and so him occupies the same minimal LF-phase
(vP) as a copy of its binder, Peter. Again, this appears to be evidence against our provi-
sional generalisation in (4).
In fact, we also saw that for anaphors, matters are more complicated in the latter
case, i.e. when the anaphor occurs inside a subjectless picture-DP (see §4.5.1). One pos-
sible counter-argument against the putatively problematic (10) is that an optional PRO
(not controlled by Peter) may be inserted in SpecnP, resulting in the nP becoming an
LF-phase in which him is free.4 However, in the previous chapter we showed that fol-
3The reader is invited to recall the discussion of the DP-internal subject position in §4.5.2.1.
4Indeed, this sort of approach was initially proposed by Chomsky (1986b); see §2.1.4.1 for more detailed
discussion of this.
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lowing suggestions by Bhatt and Pancheva (2001) it was possible to eliminate ‘optional’
PROs inside DPs: in cases where the matrix verb’s semantics require the DP-internal
subject to corefer with the verb’s agent, a PRO subject is obligatory, and in all other
cases, no PRO subject is present. This gives an account for the following:
(11) a. * Davidi told lies about himi
b. Davidi told [DP PROi [nP <PROi> lies about himi]]
(12) a. * Davidi took photos of himi
b. Davidi took [DP PROi [nP <PROi> photos of himi]]
(13) a. Davidi denied every rumour about himi
b. Davidi denied [DP every [nP rumour about himi]]
In (11a), the predicate tell (lies) presupposes that the lies are those of the person telling
them, and therefore a PRO subject controlled by the agent occupies the DP-internal
subject position. The fact that this PRO is obligatorily controlled by David means that
as indicated in (11b), upon merger in SpecnP PRO will occur in the same LF-phase as
the pronoun, which induces a Condition B violation. The structural configuration is the
same in (12a), where the Condition B effect is perhaps slightly stronger: the predicate
take pictures is understood as idiomatic (i.e. with a camera), a case which Safir (1999)
also suggests should be treated as involving a DP-internal PRO subject obligatorily
controlled by the agent.5 In (13a), though, the matrix predicate is changed deny. There
can be no requirement that the rumours that David denies are his own. Hence we
assume that no DP-internal structural subject is present in (13b), nor indeed in (10). So,
nP in these sentences is not an LF-phase, since it does not contain a subject, and nor
is DP. Even if we were to resort to optional PROs to rescue us from the unexpected
grammaticality of (10) and (13a), we would still be left without an explanation for the
grammaticality of (9a), so such an approach would in any case seem to be on the wrong
track.
We might envisage providing sentences such as (14) in support of the view that
the LF-phase is the relevant domain, or at least that the binding domain for pronouns
extends beyond DP. Sentences of the sort in (14) are sometimes adduced (Nunes 1995;
Hornstein et al. 2005) to support the widely held view that movement does not obvi-
ate a Condition B violation; Condition B is assumed to be violated before movement
of the wh-phrase containing the pronoun. If this is the case, then the pronoun’s local
domain must extend out of DP (the wh-phrase) and into the vP in the embedded clause
containing Bill.
5See, for example, §3.5.1 and §4.5.1 above.
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(14) (*) Mary wondered [CP which pictures of himi Billi bought <which pictures of
himi>]
However, it seems that the reported ungrammaticality is simply wrong; the reading
whereby Bill and him corefer seems to me perfectly grammatical. I believe that there
may be possible confusion due to Chomsky’s (1993) demonstration of obligatory recon-
struction forced by his ‘Preference Principle’. As discussed in §2.3.2 and §3.5.1, Chom-
sky (1993: 42) shows that when (15) is interpreted idiomatically, coreference between
the object of the picture-DP and the subject of the predicate take (pictures) is blocked:
(15) * John wondered [CP howmany pictures of us we expected to take<howmany
pictures of us>]
Chomsky does not explicitly state that under the non-idiomatic reading (e.g. stealing
pictures) the coreference reading is grammatical, although it is strongly implied in his
presentation, and a structurally similar example where no idiomatic reading interferes
is judged grammatical (Chomsky 1993: 41):
(16) John wondered what stories about us we had heard
The distinction between literal and idiomatic predicates is crucial, though. Under the
assumptions concerning picture-DPs outlined in §4.5.1, beforewh-movement takes place
the idiomatic and non-idiomatic readings for (15) give rise to the structural representa-
tions (17a) and (17b) respectively:
(17) a. * [vP wei take [DP how many PROi [nP <PROi> pictures of usi]]]
b. [vP wei take [DP how many [nP pictures of usi]]]
If the local domain for Condition B is the LF-phase, the Condition B violation is pre-
dicted for (17a) without the pronoun’s binding domain extending beyond DP. Since nP
contains a subject, it is an LF-phase and so the pronoun cannot be bound by PRO in
SpecnP. Unfortunately, though, if the LF-phase were the relevant domain, a Condition
B violation would also be expected in (17b), since nP does not contain a subject and does
not constitute an LF-phase, and nor does DP. The minimal LF-phase for us is vP, also
containing we, yet no Condition B effect is observed on that reading. The same goes for
(16).
It seems that at least either the minimal DP or subjectless nP must be the relevant
domain for Condition B effects, though neither of these is assumed to be an LF-phase.
However, we have assumed that at least DP is a PF-phase, while vP and CP also are.
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So we can still capture all of the sentences examined so far providing we change our
generalisation (4) to:
(18) A pronoun cannot be bound by a DP in its PF-phase.
Once again, we can test this hypothesis further. What is required is another constituent
(like DP) assumed to be a PF-phase, but not an LF-phase. PP appears to be a good candi-
date. PPs are constituents that seem to satisfy PF-diagnostics for phasehood in that they
are typically phonologically isolable, capable of undergoing movement, and can bear
phrasal stress by the Nuclear Stress Rule. On the other hand, PPs fail LF-diagnostics by
not being either obligatorily propositional, nor clauses capable of expressing tense and
force.
5.2.3 PP as a local domain
Binding into PPs has been the subject of much discussion in the literature (Lees and
Klima 1963; Chomsky 1981; Hestvik 1990, 1991; Reinhart and Reuland 1993). In par-
ticular, pronouns in different varieties of subcategorised and non-subcategorised PPs
exhibit different binding behaviour; see in particular Hestvik (1990) and Reinhart and
Reuland (1993) for detailed discussions of binding into different PPs. Here wewill sum-
marise the most important empirical facts for the analysis we are working towards in
this chapter. When a pronoun occurs within a locative or directional PP it appears to be
able to be bound by the closest subject:
(19) a. Johni piled the newspapers [PP in front of himi]
b. Johni glanced [PP behind himi]
c. Johni dropped his glasses [PP in front of himi]
d. Johni located the treasure [PP right beneath himi] (Hestvik 1990)
This strongly indicates that PP is the local domain for the pronoun. When a PP is sub-
categorised, the same pattern obtains, with Condition B satisfied:
(20) a. Johni pulled the blanket [PP over himi]
b. Johni pushed the box [PP away from himi] (Hestvik 1990)
It is perhaps controversial whether these PPs are selected by the verb or not; Hestvik
(1990) and Reinhart and Reuland (1993) suggest that such they are. The distinction is
not in fact crucial for our purposes: note that in both instances the pronoun is assigned
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a θ-role by the preposition. There is an important difference however when the preposi-
tion in question is a ‘grammatical’ preposition, that is, a preposition which has limited
semantic import, does not assign a θ-role to its object, and serves largely to assign Case.
These PPs are specifically selected, that is, no other preposition will do, while in the PPs
we have seen above, it is simply a locative or directional preposition that is selected, and
any one will do.6
(21) a. * Johni talked [PP about himi]
b. * Johni wrote a letter [PP to himi]
The pronominal object of the PP is assigned a θ-role by talk and write respectively, not
by about and to. Clearly these PPs do not constitute binding domains for the pronoun,
since the pronoun is free in PP but still the Condition B effect obtains.
How can we make sense of these initial patterns of binding into PPs? If the pro-
noun’s local binding domain is the minimal PF-phase, we need to ensure that ‘gram-
matical’ PPs do not constitute PF-phases, while the others do. In fact, this is not unrea-
sonable. There is good evidence that these PPs may not in fact be PPs at all. It has long
been known that for the purposes of c-command in binding, such PPs behave as if the
preposition layer were not present.7
(22) a. John talked to Maryi about herselfi
b. * John spoke to heri about Maryi
In (22a), Mary, an argument of talk, must c-command the reflexive in order to satisfy the
binding theory. This is impossible if Mary is embedded within a larger PP structure as
in (23), as Mary would then fail to c-command out of PP:
(23) [PP to [DP Mary]]
Similarly, (22b) shows a Condition C effect induced by the pronoun her. Unless her
c-commands Mary, however, the effect is inexplicable. Compare (22a) and (22b) with
(24a) and (24b), where Mary and her respectively fail to c-command into the PPs in
question as they are possessors within a larger DP:
(24) a. * John talked to [DP[Mary’si] father] [PP about herselfi]
b. John spoke to [DP[heri] father] [PP about Maryi]
6For further discussion see Marantz (1984) and Reinhart and Reuland (1993).
7See, for example, Reinhart (1983a), Williams (1983, 1989, 1994), Kayne (1998, 2004), Kitahara (1997).
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The internal structure of arguments introduced by grammatical prepositions has
long been debated. A recent analysis by Kayne (2004) may help us understand these
prepositions, though. Kayne suggests that grammatical prepositions do not enter the
derivation by merging with a DP complement. Rather, the DP merges with its θ-
assigner, as in (25), an early stage in the derivation of the constituent (talk) to Mary:
(25) VP
DP
Mary
V′
V
talk
...
Here, Mary then c-commands any other arguments of the verb that have already en-
tered the derivation, giving rise to the sort of binding effects observed in (22a) and
(22b). Mary then raises from its VP-internal position in order to receive Case, before the
preposition merges.8 We might call this projection AgrP.
(26) AgrP
DP
Mary
Agr′
Agr VP
<Mary> V′
V
talk
...
Finally, to merges, probing VP and raising it into its specifier, deriving the correct word
order:
8For clarity of exposition of the analysis we omit other arguments from the example derivation.
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(27) toP
VP
<Mary> V′
V
talk
to′
to AgrP
DP
Mary
Agr′
Agr <VP>
We may leave the c-command problem open for now, noting that much independent
research has also sought to account for how DPs c-command out of grammatical PPs.
We may conclude that there may be a number of possible solutions, such as the one
provided by Kayne.
It appears then that arguments introduced by a grammatical preposition behave
syntactically as if the preposition were not there, for reasons which we will not examine
any further here. If so, it is no surprise that these putative PPs do not constitute local
binding domains for pronouns contained within them. We may speculate that gram-
matical PPs tend not to exhibit phonological properties of PF-phases either: unlike the
PPs which do constitute binding domains, grammatical prepositions appear not to be
able to receive stress and do not as readily undergo movement such as preposing, for
example. We will attempt to formalise this observation, linking it to evidence from
DP binding domains, and evidence from Norwegian (also detailed in §6.3.2.3) that the
phonological ‘weight’ of a constituent affects the Condition B effect for a pronoun em-
bedded inside it.
So far, we have suggested that PPs headed by grammatical prepositions do not
constitute PF-phases, while locative and directional PPs (whether subcategorised or
non-subcategorised) do. However, a problem for our analysis is that while we have
seen in (19) and (20) that a pronoun contained in a θ-assigning PP can be bound by the
matrix subject, it cannot necessarily be bound by a matrix object:
(28) a. Maxi rolled the carpet [PP over himi]
b. * Max rolled the carpetj [PP over itj] (Reinhart and Reuland 1993)
It seems to me that any sort of predicate involving movement of a theme argument
with the location or direction of movement specified by a PP gives rise to the same
pattern, namely a clear Condition B effect when a pronoun inside PP is bound by the
object. Yet Reinhart and Reuland (1993) highlight that these constructions also exhibit
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another intriguing binding property: an anaphor can be bound be either the subject
or the object, resulting in another case of non-complementarity between anaphors and
pronouns when the reflexive or pronoun is bound by the matrix subject.
(29) a. Maxi rolled the carpet [PP over himi/himselfi]
b. Max rolled the carpetj [PP over *itj/itselfj]
Pragmatically plausible contexts are not that easy to construct, but the pattern appears
to be robust. When binding by the matrix subject takes place, non-complementarity
arises both between reflexives and pronouns and between reciprocals and pronouns.9
When the binding is by the matrix object, there is complementary distribution:
(30) a. Johni turned the anglepoise lamp [PP towards himi/himselfi]
b. John turned the anglepoise lampj [PP towards *itj/itselfj]
(31) a. [Max and Jane]i rolled the carpet [PP over themi/each otheri]
b. Max rolled the carpetsj [PP over *themj/each otherj]
Clearly, with respect to the possibility of anaphor binding, this evidence is consistent
with the analysis of Condition A effects proposed in chapter 4: PP is not an LF-phase, so
an anaphor can find an antecedent outside PP. Yet apparently if we continue to assume
that PP is a PF-phase and that Condition B domains correspond to PF-phases we cannot
explain the Condition B effect in (29b), (30b), and (31b).
Reinhart and Reuland (1993: 690, fn.31) offer a possible solution to this problem
which is fully consistent with my assumptions concerning binding domains for Condi-
tions A and B.10 They suggest that the PP contains a PRO subject, obligatorily controlled
by the object of the verb:11
(32) a. * Maxi rolled the carpetj [PP PROj over itj]
9At least, there is often non-complementarity. In non-complementarity environments speakers com-
monly feel a preference for a reflexive or pronoun, while not judging the other completely ungrammatical.
For example, in (29a) some speakers feel a preference for the pronoun over the reflexive; for me, both are
perfectly grammatical.
10The analysis is credited to a manuscript by Teun Hoekstra, since published in Hoekstra (2004).
11If PP contains an obligatorily controlled PRO, its controller (the direct object of the matrix verb) must
c-command it. Particularly if the PP were considered to be a VP-adjunct, it seems that the direct object
would fail to c-command PRO, refuting the analysis. Yet as reported in §3.2.3.2, Lasnik and Saito (1991);
Lasnik (1997) show that, quite generally, direct objects c-command VP-adjuncts, as attested by binding
data:
(i) I saw two meni on each other’si birthdays
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b. Maxi rolled the carpetj [PP PROj over himi]
This is reminiscent of the analysis we have adopted for the idiomatic reading of take
pictures (of), for example. PRO does not affect the phase status of PP: just as we have
already seen for DPs, the presence of a subject does not alone suffice to create a phase,
or more precisely an LF-phase.12 Yet these PPs will still constitute PF-phases, just like
other locative and directional PPs. Now, the minimal PF-phase for the pronoun in (32a)
contains a c-commanding DP, PRO. The Condition B effect is therefore consistent with
our provisional generalisation (18), while the possibility of an anaphor in the same po-
sition is also explained by the analysis of Condition A effects from the previous chapter.
5.2.4 Implications for non-complementarity
We have seen that while an anaphor’s binding domain must be an LF-phase, a com-
plete CP or a vP/nP containing a subject, pronouns have to be free only in a smaller
domain, which crucially may but need not contain a subject. These smaller domains
are DPs and (certain types of) PPs, which we assume are PF-phases. This leads to an
explanation for perhaps the three configurations that have been the most notoriously
puzzling throughout the history of the binding theory, due to the non-complementarity
between locally bound anaphors and pronouns in these environments.13
(33) a. John found a snake [PP near himself]
b. Johni found a snake [PP near himi]
(34) a. John likes [DP pictures of himself]
b. Johni likes [DP pictures of himi]
(35) a. They loved [DP each other’s wives]
b. Theyi loved [DP theiri wives]
Each is grammatical since the anaphor’s antecedent enters the derivation before the
completion of its minimal LF-phase, while the same potential binder for the pronoun
is not within its minimal PF-phase. Non-complementarity in these environments has
often been glossed over or explained away, with the general complementarity between
anaphors and pronouns taken to be the cornerstone of the binding theory. I contend
12This is an important difference from Chomsky’s (1986b) characterisation of complete functional com-
plexes. For Chomsky (2000, 2001), the presence of a subject does seem to play a role in determining
whether what we might think of as a ‘thematic domain’, vP is a phase (on our assumptions, an LF-phase).
We have also extended this to nPs in §4.5.2.2.
13We may add the configuration in (29a)/(30a)/(31a) to this rogues’ gallery, since we have argued that
it differs structurally from (33a)/(33b) despite the apparent similarity.
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that this approach is flawed. First, once we look at other Germanic languages, we have
to deal with another set of anaphors, known as ‘simplex expression’ (SE) reflexives,
which in some sense exhibit both anaphoric and pronominal properties: it is shown
throughout chapter 6, for example, that SE reflexives in Germanic languages are neither
in complementary distribution with pronouns nor with other reflexives, and that com-
plementary conditions such the classical Conditions A and B are insufficient.14 More
importantly perhaps, there are interesting crosslinguistic parallels in each of the three
configurations above. Clearly non-complementarity is a recurrent theme in these en-
vironments, and a robust binding-theoretic explanation such as the one proposed here
should be an important goal.
(36) a. Ulrichi
Ulrichi
las
read
[DP ein
[DP a
Buch
book
über
about
sichi
SEi
/ihni]
/himi]
‘Ulrich read a book about him(self).’ (German; Kiss 2001)
b. Ivani
Ivani
ne
not
videl
saw
[DP etot
[DP that
svoji
self’si
/?egoi
/?hisi
portret
picture
v
in
gazete]
newspaper]
‘Ivan didn’t see that picture of him in the newspaper.’ (Russian; Kuno 1987)
(37) a. Ulrichi
Ulrichi
hat
has
Annette
Annette
[PP bei
[PP at
sichi
SEi
/ihmi]
/himi]
bewirtet
fed
‘Ulrich fed Annette at his place.’ (German; Kiss 2001)
b. Jani
John
zag
saw
een
a
slang
snake
[PP naast
[PP near
zichi
SEi
/hemi]
/himi]
‘John saw a snake near him(self).’ (Dutch; Koster 1985)
c. Giannii
Giannii
vide
saw
un
a
serpente
snake
[PP vicino
[PP next
a
to
luii
himi
/sei]
/SEi]
‘Gianni saw a snake near him(self).’ (Italian; Chomsky 1981)
d. Ég
I
tók
took
kanínunai
the rabbiti
[PP úr
[PP out of
búrinu
cage
sínui
SE’si
/?hennari]
/?itsi]
‘I took the rabbit out of its cage.’ (Icelandic; Maling 1986)
(38) a. Zhangsani
Zhangsani
kanjian-le
see-ASP
[DP ziji
[DP selfi
/tai
/hei
de
POSS
shu]
book]
‘Zhangsan saw his books.’ (Chinese; Huang 1983)
b. Johni-wa
Johni-TOP
[DP zibuni-no
[DP selfi-GEN
/karei-no
/hei-GEN
hon-o]
book-ACC]
yon-da
read-PAST
‘John read his books.’ (Japanese; Koji Kawahara, p.c.)
c. Ziji
Theyi
zagen
saw
[DP elkaarsi
[DP each other’si
/huni
/theiri
auto]
car]
‘They saw each other’s/their car.’ (Dutch; Koster 1985)
14Specifically, we will see that SE reflexives are subject both to a requirement of being bound, and a
requirement of being free, which is incompatible with assumptions of the classical binding theory.
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We have seen that the relevant domain in which a pronoun must be free is not
the same as that in which an anaphor must be bound. We thus expect non-comple-
mentarity between anaphors and bound pronouns to arise because their binding do-
mains are in fact different. Yet unlike previous versions of the binding theory, these
domains do not have to be stipulated, or constructed in response to the binding data.
The binding domains for anaphors and pronouns are phases (LF-phases and PF-phases
respectively), crucial constituents at which the interpretation of narrow syntax by the
interfaces takes place, as outlined in §2.2.3.3. The often assumed complementary dis-
tribution of anaphors and pronouns is illusory and overlooks syntactic environments
in which non-complementarity recurs crosslinguistically. This ‘near-complementarity’
arises because what we might think of as the ‘core’ phases vP and CP are both PF- and
LF-phases. Assuming that pronouns must be free in their PF-phase allows us to capture
both the complementarity environments, as well as predicting non-complementarity
wherever the antecedent for an anaphor or pronoun occurs within a particular ‘slice’
of syntactic structure, namely in the gap between a minimal PF-phase and the mini-
mal LF-phase. The non-complementarity configuration can therefore be schematised as
follows:
(39) Environments where non-complementarity obtains
[LF-phase ... DPi ... [PF-phase ... anaphori/pronouni ... ]
5.2.5 Is the PF-phase really relevant?
5.2.5.1 Comparison with coargument-based binding theories
We now look to provide support for our assertion that the PF-phase is the relevant local
domain for Condition B effects. This is particularly important since the data we have
examined so far could also lead to a different conclusion, often drawn by competitors to
the various revisions of Chomsky’s binding theory. Much of the data presented in this
chapter is also consistent with an empirical generalisation that a pronoun cannot be the
argument of a predicate which also assigns a θ-role to its antecedent. In other words,
a pronoun and any other DP cannot be coarguments of a single predicate (Pollard and
Sag 1992, 1994; Reinhart and Reuland 1993). This, strikingly, predicts the effect on bind-
ing domains that θ-assigning and non-θ-assigning prepositions have, which we saw in
§5.2.3 was rather problematic. Recall (21a) and (21b), for example, repeated below:
(40) a. * Johni talked [PP about himi]
b. * Johni wrote a letter [PP to himi]
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In each case, him is an argument of the matrix verb and so cannot be bound by its sub-
ject. Where the preposition assigns a θ-role to its object, as in (20a) and (20b), repeated
below, the pronoun is not an argument of the matrix verb and so can corefer with the
subject.
(41) a. Johni pulled the blanket [PP over himi]
b. Johni pushed the box [PP away from himi] (Hestvik 1990)
We suggested above that the PF-phasehood of each type of PP was the relevant factor
in determining whether the PP was the pronoun’s local binding domain, though the
thematic status of the pronoun (as an argument of the preposition or of the matrix verb)
seems to be a good candidate, too.
The most compelling argument against a coargument approach to the binding
theory is ECM constructions. For example, take (6a), repeated below as (42):
(42) * Johni believes himi to love Mary
An approach to Condition B violations based on a constraint on coreference between
coarguments encounters difficulty with (42) since him is an argument of love, and John
is an argument of believe: John and him are not coarguments, yet still cannot corefer.15
Reinhart and Reuland (1993) suggest that such cases are not Condition B violations per
se, but violations of a separate syntactic condition on the well-formedness of A-chains,
here between the matrix subject and the ECM subject.16 It seems slightly suspect that
the acceptability of an anaphor in this environment requires a quite different sort of
modification under a similar coargument-based treatment of Condition A whereby an
anaphor must be bound by a coargument. Reinhart and Reuland argue that Condition
A is a condition on syntactic rather than semantic predicates. Under this approach the
reflexive or reciprocal ECM subject is understood as a syntactic argument of the ECM
verb, so the reflexive and the ECM subject are syntactic coarguments. The Condition
B effect cannot be given the same explanation though, since Reinhart and Reuland ar-
gue that Condition B constrains semantic rather than syntactic predicates. Thus, an
independent condition on A-chains must be invoked.
The by-now-notorious subjectless picture-DPs provide another example of where
a coargument restriction on pronouns is insufficient to explain Condition B effects.
15Fox (1993: 19, fn.15) points out that this is not a problem for syntactic frameworks in which ECM
constructions are no different from control constructions, i.e. the ECM subject is an argument of the higher
verb.
16Further details of Reinhart and Reuland’s binding theory and the condition on A-chains are provided
in §5.3.2.2.
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Fiengo and Higginbotham (1981) highlight that (43) is ungrammatical on the bound
reading for the pronoun, in particular when the pronoun him is unstressed and reduced
to ’im.
(43) * Johni read [DP books about ’imi] (Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981)
Here, the pronoun is an argument of books, while John is an argument of read: again,
the two DPs are not coarguments yet still the Condition B effect obtains.17 Of course,
the ungrammaticality of (43) is equally problematic for the approach to Condition B
domains that we are developing in this chapter: if DP is always a PF-phase, then the
absence of an antecedent within the picture-DP should mean that the pronoun is able
to corefer with any other DP, such as John.
5.2.5.2 Phonological properties of Condition B domains
Wemight in any case prefer the approach being developed here over coargument-based
theories on the grounds that it more naturally accommodates binding data in ECM con-
structions and picture-DPs. Yet there is another significant advantage. Perhaps themost
intriguing aspect of Fiengo and Higginbotham’s observations about bound pronouns
in picture-DPs is that phonological properties appear to play a crucial role in deter-
mining binding domains for pronouns. An analysis whereby PF-phases are relevant
at least potentially provides scope for explaining why phonological factors are appar-
ently able to influence the acceptability of bound interpretations for a pronoun. Note
also that any binding theory that applies at LF (such as Chomsky 1993) will by its very
nature be unable to explain this, since there can be no phonological properties in LF-
representations.18 The facts are perhaps not sufficiently clear to provide a full treatment
here, but an indication of the sort of approach we could take is in order.
Let’s now start to complete the picture of bound pronouns in subjectless picture-
DPs. As Fiengo and Higginbotham observe, heavily stressing the pronoun appears to
alleviate the Condition B effect completely:
(44) Johni read [DP books about HIMi] (Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981)
The vast majority of speakers perceive a contrast between (44) and (43). When the
17I have to concede that I do not find (43) particularly ungrammatical, though many speakers do. It
is well known that the strength of the Condition B effect in this environment is notoriously unclear and
somewhat variable across speakers (Chomsky 1982: 99, fn.24), particularly when the pronoun is neutrally
stressed. See §5.2.5.2 below for further clarification.
18Furthermore, we will see evidence from Icelandic in §6.4.3.2 that features that are not assumed to be
present at LF are also critical in Condition B violations.
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pronoun receives what we might call a ‘neutral’ stress, however, speakers tend to vary
in their acceptance of the bound reading.19 Indeed, Fiengo and Higginbotham do not
even commit themselves to a particular judgement (% is the symbol I use to indicate
the observed variation across speakers):
(45) % Johni read [DP books about himi]
It appears that the more stress the pronoun receives, the more likely it is to be able to be
bound by the matrix subject: stressed, the judgement for the pronoun is grammatical;
neutrally stressed, marginal (or variable); destressed, ungrammatical. Given that the
possibility of bearing stress is one of the properties of PF-phases that we identified in
§2.2.3.3, we might therefore suggest that for many speakers, a subjectless picture-DP
containing a pronoun which fails to bear stress does not constitute a PF-phase. The
picture-DP in (43) (and for some speakers in (45)) fails to constitute a PF-phase, and the
resulting ungrammaticality of the bound reading of the pronoun is consistent with our
assumption that Condition B domains correspond to PF-phases: the pronoun’s minimal
PF-phase is then the matrix clause vP, which also contains a copy of John.20
If an approach along these lines is tenable, an important distinction is predicted
between the effect of stress in anaphor binding and in Condition B effects. Given that
the local domain for anaphor binding is the LF-phase, the expectation is that the binding
domain of anaphors—unlike that of pronouns—should be entirely unaffected by such
factors. As Fiengo and Higginbotham (1981: 401) note, this is true, with all possible
stresses of the reflexive grammatical for most speakers:
(46) a. Johni read [DP books about ’imselfi]
b. Johni read [DP books about himselfi]
19I would like to note informally that in judging these sentences some (non-linguist) informants are con-
sciously aware of the alternative of using a reflexive in place of the pronoun. We might speculate that
this interferes somewhat with some informants’ judgements, since it seems quite common that in non-
complementarity environments, even where a pronoun is deemed grammatical, speakers show a prefer-
ence for a reflexive.
20We might wonder whether in fact the stress of the pronoun does not determine whether the picture-
DP containing it is a phase, but rather whether the pronoun itself is subject to Condition B at all. We
can confirm that the latter is incorrect, however, since when we insert a subject inside the picture-DP, the
possibility of the pronoun being bound by that subject is unaffected by stress; it is never possible. If it
were simply a case of the stressed pronoun not being subject to Condition B in (44), we would expect that
reading also to be possible in (iii):
(i) * John read [DP Bill’si books about ’imi]
(ii) * John read [DP Bill’si books about himi]
(iii) * John read [DP Bill’si books about HIMi]
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c. Johni read [DP books about ’imSELFi]
d. Johni read [DP books about himSELFi] (Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981)
As argued in §3.2.1, the minimal LF-phase containing the reflexive is the matrix vP con-
taining John, and so anaphor binding is unaffected by the PF-phase status of the picture-
DP books about himself. This contrast in the subjectless picture-DP environment between
the effect of stress on the Condition B domain and the absence of any corresponding
effect on the Condition A domain is also reflected in issues relating to the determiner
of the picture-DP. Fiengo and Higginbotham (1981) highlight that the binding theory
(at that time Chomsky 1980, but equally in all Chomsky’s subsequent revisions) fails to
predict the contrast between the ungrammatical (43) and an equivalent sentence with a
demonstrative determiner:
(47) Johni read [DP that book about ’imi] (Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981)
They assume that specificity of the determiner is responsible for the contrast. Hestvik
(1990) develops this point further, arguing that specific picture-DPs, but not non-specific
ones, constitute local binding domains. However, this makes incorrect predictions for
Condition A: just like the stress factor, specificity appears to be irrelevant in determin-
ing the anaphor’s local binding domain:
(48) a. John likes [DP pictures of himself]
b. John likes [DP those pictures of himself]
Hestvik argues that even though the local domain for the reflexive in (48b) is the spe-
cific picture-DP, it can never actually serve as a Condition A domain since it contains no
antecedent. Much in the same way as Chomsky (1986b) proposes (see §2.1.4.1), Hestvik
suggests the binding domain must extend in (48b) to the whole sentence. This then
constitutes a case of ‘long distance’ binding in the sense of Lebeaux (1984). The ten-
ability of this approach then relies on the configuration in (48b) contrasting with (48a)
in exhibiting the properties of nonlocally bound reflexives outlined in §4.4.1 above. If
binding into a specific DP is nonlocal, then it should permit binding by split antecedents
in (49b), and it should exhibit a strict/sloppy ambiguity under ellipsis in (50b):
(49) a. * John told Mary about [DP a picture of themselves]
b. John told Mary about [DP those pictures of themselves]
(50) a. John likes [DP a picture of himself], and so does Bill
= a picture of Bill, but:
6= a picture of John
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b. John likes [DP those pictures of himself], and so does Bill
= pictures of John, or:
= pictures of Bill (Hestvik 1990)
I must stress that the judgements are Hestvik’s, and furthermore that the contrasts
Hestvik reports are simply not attested for many speakers. I find (49a) grammatical
(at least to the extent that (49b) is),21 and similarly, I feel that there is a strict reading
possible for the ellipsis in (50a). In fact, both cases show properties of nonlocal binding,
which is expected on our analysis in §4.5.1 that this configuration permits both local
binding of an anaphor and nonlocal binding of a logophor. Since the contrast Hestvik
requires simply fails to hold up robustly, we assume that there is no difference in the
locality of anaphor binding into specific and non-specific DPs.
This absence of any real contrast between anaphors embedded in specific and
non-specific subjectless picture-DPs is predicted on the analysis of Condition A effects
developed in chapter 4, and I assume that there is no difference in the LF-phase status
of specific and non-specific DPs. Yet as we have seen in (47), specificity does affect the
local domain for pronouns. As hinted above, further data might lead us to reconsider
whether specificity is indeed the crucial factor, however. Hestvik (1990) reports a con-
trast (at least to some degree for many speakers) between the ungrammatical (51a) and
the grammatical (51b):
(51) a. % Johni saw a picture of himi
b. Johni saw some pictures of himi
While I do not find (51a) ungrammatical at all (unless the pronoun is reduced to ’im, as
suggested by Fiengo and Higginbotham 1981), for speakers who do, the contrast with
(51b) does indeed seem clear enough. Note that Number also appears not to be the
source of the contrast, since when a null indefinite plural determiner is employed, the
Condition B data pattern with the singular picture-DP in (51a) rather than the plural
one in (51b):
(52) % Johni saw pictures of himi
Hestvik observes precisely the same pattern in Norwegian. As wewill see in the follow-
ing chapter (see especially §6.3.2), the Norwegian SE reflexive seg induces a Condition
B effect, ruling out (53a) in much the same manner as the pronoun is ruled out in (53b):
21In fact, two of my informants reported a preference for (49a) over (49b).
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(53) a. * Joni
Johni
snakket
talked
om
about
segi
SEi
b. ?* Vi
We
fortalte
told
Joni
Johni
om
about
hami
himi
(Norwegian; Hellan 1988)
The Condition B effect in the English (52) and (51a) for some speakers is reflected in
the Norwegian (54a) and (54b) respectively, while when a demonstrative is used in
both (48b) and (54c) the Condition B effect is obviated. Returning now to Hestvik’s
‘specificity’ contrast in Condition B effects, take the following Norwegian sentences.
(54) a. ??* Johni
Johni
liker
likes
biler
pictures
av
of
segi
SEi
b. ??* Johni
Johni
fant
found
et
a
bile
picture
av
of
segi
SEi
c. Johni
Johni
liker
likes
disse
these
bilene
pictures
av
of
segi
SEi
‘John likes these pictures of him(self) (Norwegian; Hestvik 1990)
If it is not specificity that is at stake (as the contrast between (51a) and (51b) suggests),
it must be some other property of DPs headed by a or a null determiner that accounts
for why they fail to create Condition B domains. It is not unreasonable to speculate that
the phonological ‘lightness’ of these determiners coincides with their failure (perhaps
only for some speakers) to head a PF-phase.22 As additional evidence for this, I have
found that speakers who find (51a) ungrammatical often feel that the Condition B effect
is reduced or eliminated when the determiner is stressed (with a particular stylistic
effect). Take the following example, where a context is provided to highlight the effect:
(55) A: I feel sorry for John. The Tate Britain was supposed to have an exhibition
of various pictures of him painted by famous 20th century artists. But
when he turned up he was horrified that only Lucian Freud had bothered
to do one.
B: Well, at least [John saw [DP A picture of (h)im]]. It’s more than most peo-
ple get.
With the determiner stressed, the picture-DP might be more likely to constitute a PF-
phase, and so the Condition B effect is improved, even when the pronoun is reduced to
22Hestvik (1990: 78, fn.20) notes that some speakers find (54b) grammatical. This reinforces our position
that specificity is not a significant factor. We could suggest that for these speakers, the improved accept-
ability over (54a) may be because an overt determiner et (‘a’) ensures that the DP is a ‘heavier’ phonological
domain and so is more likely to constitute a PF-phase than a DP headed by a null determiner, just as in
(54c) with a demonstrative.
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’im.
While the judgments in this context are—as we have consistently highlighted—
notoriously variable across speakers, further evidence that the phonological ‘weight’ of
a constituent has some effect in determining its behaviour as a binding domain can be
found in Norwegian. Recall that in Norwegian both pronouns and the SE reflexive seg
induce Condition B effects. Hellan (1988) notes that these Condition B effects disappear
when the pronoun or seg is embedded inside a constituent with heavier phonetic con-
tent, for example containing a conjunction. Compare (53a) with (56a) and (53b) with
(56b):
(56) a. Joni
Johni
snakket
talked
om
about
segi
SEi
og
and
sinei
SE’si
gjerninger
deeds
‘John talked about himself and his deeds.’
b. Vi
We
fortalte
told
Joni
Johni
om
about
hami
himi
og
and
hansi
hisi
kusine
cousin
‘We told John about himself and his cousin.’ (Norwegian; Hellan 1988)
If PF-phase boundaries delimit the local binding domains for Condition B, the conjunc-
tion of additional syntactic material to the pronoun might conceivably ensure that the
object DP containing the pronoun or seg is treated as a PF-phase. Indeed, a similar effect
appears to arise in English:
(57) Johni talked about [DP himi and hisi mother]
We have seen some evidence, then, that phonological factors within a constituent
which is typically a Condition B domain (like DP) appear to influence whether the
domain is indeed a PF-phase. Specifically, the greater the phonological ‘weight’ (in a
sense which remains to be properly clarified) appears tomake a particular domainmore
likely to be a PF-phase, and therefore more likely to constitute a Condition B domain.
However, the empirical evidence is less than clear and further research is required to
clarify the nature of the correlation. For example, take PPs, another case of a constituent
which we assume is a PF-phase but not an LF-phase, i.e. where non-complementarity
typically obtains:
(58) a. Johni saw a snake [PP near ’imi]
b. ?? Johni saw a snake [PP near HIMi]
Here, the contrast (based on my own small and informal survey) appears to go the
opposite way to the data presented by Fiengo and Higginbotham. When the pronoun
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is unstressed, binding of the pronoun by John is perfectly grammatical, while a stressed
pronoun appears to quite strongly disfavour the same reading.23 Yet also note that once
a contrast is established, as in (59), what appears to be a mild Condition B effect in (58b)
disappears:
(59) Johni saw a snake [PP near HIMi] and not [PP near hisi mother]
This appears to indicate that Condition B may not in fact be at stake at all in (58b). This
should perhaps warn us that the data examined here, while certainly indicative, are far
from conclusive. Further inquiry will hopefully identify interfering factors and allow
us to draw firmer conclusions.
5.3 Motivating Condition B effects
The PF-phase appears to be an excellent candidate for the local domain in which pro-
nouns must be free. This is supported by the observation that pronominal binding pos-
sibilities interact with phonological factors. Also, just as we predict under the analysis
in chapter 4, these factors do not affect the binding possibilities for anaphors. While our
Minimalist aim of reducing binding domains to independently motivated domains (i.e.
phases) has proved empirically successful, it remains to be explained why this should
be the case for the binding domain of pronouns. For anaphor binding, the fact that the
local domain is the anaphor’s minimal LF-phase was shown in §4.3.1 to follow from the
treatment of anaphor binding as a narrow-syntactic Agree operation, constrained by the
PIC. However, it would make little sense to try to reduce Condition B to feature agree-
ment, since at least intuitively, what we require is precisely the opposite of Agree, that is,
that a pronoun’s reference does not coincide with that of another local c-commanding
DP. As highlighted by Hornstein (2000, 2006), a less appealing consequence of a reduc-
tion of Condition A to independent principles (movement, he assumes) is that the clas-
sical approach of simply stating Condition B as the flip side of Condition A is no longer
possible. In this section we work towards the elimination of Condition B, examining
various insights into what might ultimately motivate its effects.
23Although note that again, there is (as expected) no equivalent effect on the Condition A domain. All
possible stresses for the reflexive are grammatical:
(i) Johni saw a snake [PP near ’imselfi]
(ii) Johni saw a snake [PP near himselfi]
(iii) Johni saw a snake [PP near ’imSELFi]
(iv) Johni saw a snake [PP near himSELFi]
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5.3.1 Improving on the Minimalist Condition B
In §2.3.2 we identified several problems of the standard Minimalist binding theory, and
showed in chapter 4 how our analysis of Condition A can overcome them. We should
proceed in a similar vein for Condition B, identifying the ways in which our analysis
must improve over its predecessors, and ideally incorporating an explanation for why
the PF-phase is the relevant Condition B domain. A standard Minimalist version of
Condition B is outlined in Chomsky (1993):
(60) “Ifα is a pronominal, interpret it as disjoint from every c-commanding
phrase in D [an undefined local domain].”24
(Chomsky 1993:43)
As we have seen in §2.3.3, an obvious problem with (60) is how to determine the local
domain, particularly since the government relation has been abandoned, making the
formulation of a Governing Category impossible. Clearly, the issue is ignored in (60).
Given our observations so far in this chapter, we appear to be able to resolve this now,
since we have discovered that the local binding domain for pronouns can be identified
as the PF-phase. We could thus envisage an update to Chomsky’s (1993) Condition B
as follows:
(61) If α is a pronominal, interpret it as disjoint from every c-commanding
phrase in its PF-phase.
Yet this introduces a rather fundamental contradiction. Chomsky (1993); Chomsky and
Lasnik (1993) argue that Condition B (as for all of the binding conditions) is simply an
evaluation procedure which takes place at LF. Yet PF-phases can have no relevance at
LF: they can only play a part if Condition B applies during narrow syntax or at PF.
This might be considered a theory-internal argument against (60), relying on the
notion of PF-phases as proposed in §2.2.3.3. However, we have identified evidence in
§5.2.5 that phonological factors which cannot be present in LF-representations influ-
ence Condition B effects. Moreover, we have briefly outlined in §3.2.2.1 some crosslin-
guistic data indicating that features which cannot be assumed to be present in LF-
representations (Case on pronouns and agreement inflections) can play a crucial role
in determining whether a pronoun will be subject to Condition B. We examine these
data in more detail and provide more at various points in the following chapter. Case
features and agreement inflections are, however, present in both narrow syntax and in
24The Chomsky (1993) Condition B is very reminiscent of the Disjoint Reference rule of Chomsky (1973);
see §2.1.1.
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PF-representations, so the interaction between them and Condition B is (at least in prin-
ciple) explainable if Condition B effects are determined either during narrow syntax or
at PF.
It remains to identify whether Condition B at PF or in narrow syntax is best
equipped to cover the relevant empirical facts. On the assumptions developed in chap-
ter 4, binding relations are determined by semanticosyntactic [VAR] features which are
not interpretable by PF. Since the value of these features is also critical in determining
Condition B effects (with shared values for DPs’ [VAR] resulting in a binding relation at
LF), it seems that Condition B cannot be determined (solely) at PF. Although this argu-
ment appears to be theory-internal, relying on a new approach to features proposed in
§4.2.2.3, it seems likely in any case that however binding relations are encoded, the rel-
evant information will not be interpretable by PF. Reuland (2001) puts forward a more
powerful argument against stating the binding conditions at PF, or indeed at either of
the interfaces. Reuland highlights that interface properties are assumed to be universal,
rather than language-specific, and so an interface approach to binding will be not be
well placed to accommodate crosslinguistic variation in Condition B. Experimental evi-
dence from the acquisition of Condition B is similarly awkward for the approach to the
binding conditions as universal interface properties. The evidence indicates that Con-
dition B has to be learned: it is well known, for example, that even at a nearly adult-like
stage of syntactic development, children often fail to apply Condition B appropriately
in certain syntactic environments (Chien and Wexler 1990; Grodzinsky and Reinhart
1993, and others). Moreover, this ‘delay’ in the acquisition of Condition B also appears
to be subject to considerable crosslinguistic variation, suggesting that particular syntac-
tic properties of individual languages may play a role. This is unexplained if Condition
B applies at some level beyond narrow syntax, i.e. the PF or LF interfaces.
A narrow-syntactic account of Condition B will therefore be preferable to one that
applies at either of the interfaces, and so should provide the basis for the analysis to be
developed. Yet there are other ways in which we might ideally wish to improve on
Condition B as stated in (60)/(61). From a broader theoretical perspective, the status
of Condition B as a ‘negative condition’—defining the state of affairs which must not
obtain in order for a pronoun to be grammatical—remains highly unusual, just as in
previous frameworks (Reinhart and Reuland 1991; Gamon 1996; Koster 1997; Lebeaux
1998). This does not appear to be overcome in (60), despite superficial modification to
the wording, rather neatly tucking away the negation in the definition of ‘disjoint’. For
example, we might equally imagine stating (60) as (62):
(62) Ifα is a pronominal, do not interpret it as bound by any c-commanding
phrase in D.
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This leads us to the broadest conceptual problem facing Condition B as in (60)—and, in-
deed, its predecessors—namely the absence of any insight into its ultimate motivation.
Chomsky (1981) puts the problem as follows:
“As is well-known, pronouns enter into disjoint reference under essentially
the conditions under which other anaphors enter into coreference, as illus-
trated above. This seems an odd state of affairs. Why should languages
have this peculiar design, which in fact gives rise to the complexity of the
indexing conventions...? Why shouldn’t pronouns have coreference, rather
than disjoint reference, where, for example, reciprocals do?”
(Chomsky 1981: 161)
It is difficult to see how any interpretation of ‘virtual conceptual necessity’ could predict
that a pronoun should not be able to corefer with a givenDP, regardless of any particular
structural configuration that the pronoun and its antecedent may be in. In other words,
the function of pronouns is to be able to refer to entities that are contextually salient
(without having to repeat a proper name or definite description to identify the referent),
and not to have to not refer to them.
5.3.2 Possibilities for a reanalysis of Condition B
Just as for Condition A, which we saw in chapter 4 reduces to Agree, an important ad-
vantage of a narrow-syntactic reanalysis of Condition B is that it potentially allows for
the reduction of Condition B to independent principles. This would avoid the stipula-
tion of previous versions of Condition B and provide scope for an answer to the elusive
question of why Condition B effects arise. The problem is that the technical details must
differ considerably from the reanalysis of Condition A. As noted above, there is no
scope for reducing Condition B to Agree, say. We now briefly examine some alternative
approaches to Condition B, revealing the extent towhich the intuitions andmechanisms
underlying them might be fruitfully incorporated into our Minimalist analysis.
5.3.2.1 Condition B as an elsewhere condition
Since the first generative investigations into binding facts (e.g. Jackendoff 1972), the
general complementary distribution of anaphors and pronouns has been highlighted
and usually built into binding theories.25 Informally, then, a common intuition for the
motivation behind Condition B is that a pronoun is ungrammatical if it appears in a
25See Safir (1997) for an overview of anaphor/pronoun complementarity.
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position where an anaphor can. Koster (1997) formalises this idea as the Principle of
Maximal Specialization, a general grammatical principle which subsumes Condition B.
(63) Principle of Maximal Specialization
“In a grammatical dependency relation R, select the most special-
ized form.”
(Koster 1997: 244)
A form is understood to be more specialised if it ‘can fulfil fewer functions’. In Koster’s
system this has the result that reflexives, as forms which are more specialised than pro-
nouns, will be chosen over pronouns in contexts where they are licensed. However,
Maximal Specialization seems incompatible with central assumptions of the Minimal-
ist framework adopted in this thesis. (63) has the flavour of an economy principle, yet
the standardMinimalist assumption is, as Fox (2000: 2) puts it, that “[e]conomy is obliv-
ious to the nature of the output.” Therefore, for any one selected array of lexical items
(numeration), the computation must simply select the optimal (i.e. most economical)
procedure to a derivation which converges to an interpretable representation at both
interfaces. As argued by Chomsky (1995b: 227), economy principles cannot, therefore,
choose between derivations arising from different numerations: if a derivation contain-
ing a pronoun can converge to an interpretable representation at the interfaces, econ-
omy concerns cannot rule out the derivation due to a possibly convergent alternative
derivation involving a different lexical item (an anaphor) instead.
Fox (2000) and Reinhart (2006), for example, advocate a different view, whereby
economy can be evaluated by comparison with less optimal derivations arising from
alternative numerations, provided that all derivations to be compared give rise to iden-
tical LF-representations. Koster’s approach to Condition B effects could then be incor-
porated into such a framework. An alternative but related approach is outlined by
Taraldsen (1996: 203). Taraldsen proposes an ‘Economy of Representation’ metric, ac-
cording to which reflexives must be preferred over non-reflexive pronouns as they bear
fewer specified features than pronouns (at least for the Icelandic reflexive Taraldsen
is concerned with).26 Even from these two examples, it is striking that a number of
different metrics for evaluating economy of derivations and of interpretations are the-
oretically plausible; many questions remain. For example, it could be argued that an
equally plausible a priori view of economy is that a derivation involving a pronoun is
more optimal than one (with an identical interpretation) involving a reflexive: a deriva-
tion involving a reflexive will require at least one more narrow-syntactic operation than
one involving a pronoun, since anaphors trigger Agree with their antecedent but pro-
nouns do not. Of course, such an approach to economy would give the wrong result,
26A similar approach is also taken by Richards (1996).
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i.e. that pronouns are preferred over anaphors.
Approaches such as Koster’s and Taraldsen’s, which pit anaphors and pronouns
against each other in competition, have the advantage that they at least provide a mo-
tivation for Condition B. Moreover, they are consistent with the emphasis placed on
economy in the Minimalist programme: pronouns are less economical than anaphors
(by some measure), and so are disfavoured. Yet they also require us change our as-
sumptions concerning economy, and it is reasonable to suppose that comparison of
derivations for economy with those deriving from alternative numerations sharply in-
creases the computational burden. This is inconsistent with the Minimalist thesis that
language is designed tomaximise computational economy. Hornstein (2006) offers a so-
lution within the standard Minimalist view of economy, formalising the intuition that
pronouns are employed only as a last resort, i.e. where reflexives fail. Like our analysis
in chapter 4, Hornstein sets out with the assumption that Condition A can be elimi-
nated, reduced to movement, following Hornstein (2000); Kayne (2002); Zwart (2002).27
Hornstein assumes that derivations ruling out bound pronouns must be eliminated by
virtue of a possible derivation where an anaphor is used, merging a bound pronoun
being generally avoided as more ‘expensive’ than Move. In order for the two deriva-
tions to compete, however, they must be made up of the same lexical items: just as
we assume in this thesis, derivations with different numerations cannot be compared
for economy. Hornstein suggests then that neither bound pronouns nor reflexives can
be part of the numeration. From here it follows that bound pronouns and reflexives
can have no semantically interpretable feature content, since the addition of semantic
material not present in the numeration during the derivation violates the Inclusiveness
Condition.28 Thus, in the spirit of Lees and Klima (1963), pronouns and reflexives are
introduced into the derivation not as lexical items but by grammatical operations: a
reflexive is employed unless it is impossible to do so (due to the constraints on locality
of movement). This is incorporated into a more general theory of avoiding pronouns
unless a movement strategy fails, as in the case of resumptive pronouns and expletives
as a last resort.
While this overcomes the obstacle of the illegal comparison of derivations and
follows the sort of methodology that we seem to require, I suggest that pronouns and
anaphors must bear semantic content and so must be present in the lexicon. Seman-
tically, both introduce variables and bear θ-roles, for example. Hornstein’s system of
anaphor binding overcomes this problem to some degree, since the θ-role is picked
up by the antecedent, which then moves to another θ-position to pick up a second
27In chapter 4 we have argued that it is Agree, rather than movement, which should be responsible for
establishing the binding relation between an antecedent and an anaphor, yet Hornstein’s argumentation
clearly extends to our approach.
28An additional requirement of this approach is therefore that bound pronouns and reflexives (unlike
deictic pronouns) do not bear semantically interpretable ϕ-features.
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θ-role, with the reflexive just the spell-out of this movement operation. In this the-
sis I adopt the more standard Minimalist position that movement does not take place
into θ-positions, following Hale and Keyser’s (1993) configurational version of θ-theory,
adopted by Chomsky (2000) et seq.
(64) The θ-theoretic principle
“Pure [= External] merge in θ position is required of (and restricted
to) arguments.”
(Chomsky 2000: 102)
Even if movement into θ-positions is permitted (see Hornstein 2000), with the reflexive
as the spell-out of the lower copy, the objection still stands for cases when the reflex-
ive strategy fails: wherever a bound pronoun is employed, it will have to serve as a
θ-bearing element and be interpreted as a variable. It must therefore have semantic
content, and its insertion in the derivation will surely violate Inclusiveness. There is a
final possible problem in that both the lexicon and the grammar must specify a mor-
phologically identical set of pronouns, which differ semantically. Bound pronouns are
introduced by the grammar when the reflexivisation strategy fails, while other free or
coreferential pronouns are introduced from the lexicon. Thus the system introduces a
rather unwelcome redundancy, and also makes Zwart (2002), Jacobson (2003), Kratzer’s
(2006) observations that bound and free pronouns crosslinguistically never appear to
differ in their morphological form somewhat surprising.
Even though Hornstein’s approach is by his own admission only a prolegomenon
to a binding theory, from a theoretical perspective it appears to be the most successful
formalisation of the competition between anaphors and bound pronouns. However, all
‘elsewhere condition’ analyses of Condition B fail empirically in that the expected com-
plementarity simply does not obtain between reflexives and bound pronouns. While
these analyses must overlook or downplay the significance of non-complementarity,
we have seen in §5.2.4 that non-complementarity quite consistently arises (crosslinguis-
tically) in a particular set of environments sharing the abstract structural configuration
(65):
(65) [LF-phase ... DPi ... [PF-phase ... anaphori/pronouni ... ]
The approach we have taken to binding domains so far asserts that the typical comple-
mentary distribution of anaphors and bound pronouns is simply an accident of the fact
that the minimal Condition A domain and Condition B domain (LF- and PF-phases re-
spectively) are often the same constituents, namely CP and vP/nP containing a subject.
Non-complementarity is expected, and explained, in environments where the minimal
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PF-phase containing the anaphor or pronoun is not also an LF-phase, e.g. DP and PP.29
I follow Huang (1983) and Chomsky (1986b) in assuming that the occurrence of non-
complementarity is not to be overlooked, since it tells us something important about the
differences between the mechanisms of Conditions A and B. Non-complementarity can
only be satisfactorily explained if the mechanisms responsible for regulating Condition
B effects are divorced from the mechanisms responsible for Condition A effects.
5.3.2.2 Condition B as a Chain Condition violation
We have seen that the assumption that locally bound pronouns are degraded due to
economy is rather appealing from a Minimalist perspective, yet it cannot be reflexives
that they are in competition with. An alternative view which has gained considerable
support is that a pronoun locally bound by a c-commanding antecedent may create an
illegal binding chain. This view is advocated notably by Reinhart and Reuland (1993);
Reuland and Reinhart (1995), whose highly influential alternative to the classical bind-
ing theory appeals to binding conditions defined over predicates, not over structural
configurations. Conditions A and B are therefore not conditions directly governing the
distribution of pronouns, but rather conditions on the way that reflexivity is marked on
predicates:
(66) a. Condition A
A reflexive-marked predicate is reflexive
b. Condition B
A reflexive predicate is reflexive-marked
(Reinhart and Reuland 1993: 678)
A predicate is either reflexive-marked in the lexicon (e.g. inherently reflexive verbs,
such as behave (oneself )) or by a ‘self’ reflexive. In simple Condition B violations such as
(67), a predicate is reflexive but not reflexive-marked, since a pronoun fails to reflexive-
mark a predicate.
(67) * Johni loves himi
As noted in §5.2.5.1 above, (66b) is insufficient to rule out some important cases.
In ECM constructions such as (42), repeated here as (68), the ECM subject is not an
29We see further crosslinguistic evidence for this approach throughout chapter 6, where the possibility
of also subjecting certain types of anaphor to Condition B is crucial. In such cases, the anaphor must be
free in its PF-phase, but (usually) bound in its LF-phase: this would represent a contradiction in comple-
mentarity-based binding theories.
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argument of the matrix verb, yet it still cannot corefer with the matrix verb’s subject.
(68) * Johni believes himi to love Mary
Reinhart and Reuland appeal to an independent structural condition on A-chains to
rule out (68) (and indeed many other cases). An A-chain is a sequence of at least two
coindexed DPs headed by an A-position, which satisfies antecedent government. In-
formally, A-chains may only contain one member which is referentially independent (a
pronoun or an R-expression), bearing a complete ϕ-feature set.30
(69) Condition on A-chains
A maximal A-chain (α1,. . . , αn) contains exactly one link – α1 – which is fully
specified for ϕ-features
(Reuland and Reinhart 1995: 256)
Yet equally this rules out (67), so evidently there is a great deal of overlap between
Chain Condition effects and Condition B effects.31 In a thorough critique of Reinhart
and Reuland (1993), Fox (1993) highlights that the Chain Condition does rather more
work in the Reflexivity framework than Reinhart and Reuland’s presentation suggests.
Indeed, Fox shows that Reinhart and Reuland’s Condition A (66a) must be reduced
to the Chain Condition, again leaving Condition B as the left over part of the binding
theory. The fact that the Chain Condition constrains arguments rather than predicates
appears to undermine a central tenet of Reinhart and Reuland’s binding theory, namely
that binding constraints are defined over predicates. Even this brief glance at the Re-
flexivity approach to Condition B reveals that many of the design requirements of our
Minimalist Condition B are once again not met. We still require a module of the gram-
mar to deal with binding, and more worryingly, it even fails to cover the full range
of Condition A and Condition B effects, if part of the burden is reapportioned to the
Chain Condition, independently of the binding theory. Finally, the binding conditions
are again relegated to the interfaces, which we have by now argued against at some
length in thesis.32
30Importantly in light of the analysis to be proposed in §5.4, note that Reinhart and Reuland also view
structural Case as a ϕ-feature. Therefore if a DP fails to bear structural Case, it is not subject to the Chain
Condition.
31I tuck any suggestion of redundancy away in this footnote, as it is somewhat unfair that in this brief
exposé of Reinhart and Reuland’s binding theory we do not examine how this approach explains the
distribution of SE and SELF anaphors in Dutch, one of the strongest empirical arguments in favour of it.
Reinhart and Reuland (1993: 702) argue that the apparent redundancy is required since many sentences
(particularly when we examine SE reflexives) must be ruled out either by one or the other condition. In
§6.2.2 I propose an alternative analysis for Dutch SE reflexives which does not rely on the Chain Condition.
32Furthermore, Fox (1993) highlights that since Condition B applies to ‘semantic’ predicates (i.e. a pred-
icate and its arguments), whereas Condition A applies to ‘syntactic’ predicates (i.e. a predicate, its argu-
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5.3.2.3 Condition B as a by-product of chain formation
Gamon (1996) develops the chain theory of binding relations in a manner which ap-
pears more consistent with the framework of assumptions adopted here. Gamon pur-
ports to improve on Reinhart and Reuland (1993) by offering an insight into the moti-
vation for why an A-chain may only contain one member which is fully specified for
ϕ-features. As later argued by Epstein et al. (1998), Hornstein (2000), Kayne (2002), and
indeed in this thesis, Gamon assumes that binding relations are best explained by oper-
ations of the narrow-syntactic component. Working within the Minimalist framework
of Chomsky (1995b), Gamon suggests that Condition B effects arise due to an obliga-
tory yet illegal application of chain formation. Gamon distinguishes chains created by
movement from those created by binding, the crucial difference being that the items
involved in a binding chain are separate items in the numeration, whereas those in-
volved in a movement chain are the same item in the numeration. He assumes that
the chain formation algorithm applies wherever possible throughout the derivation be-
tween coindexed DPs in a c-command relationship.33 In this system, an anaphor must
enter into a ‘binding link relation’ with a c-commanding antecedent in order to be li-
censed syntactically. Pronouns, however, are not subject to such a requirement, since
they can be properly interpreted even without a syntactic antecedent as they are ref-
erentially independent. Gamon suggests that economy considerations are ultimately
responsible for Condition B violations. If a pronoun occupies a position sufficiently
local to a c-commanding coindexed DP, the chain formation algorithm creates a bind-
ing link between the two elements. This chain formation is then assumed to violate
economy of representation, i.e. a derivation that contains more symbols than a com-
peting derivation. If chain links can be considered syntactic symbols, the alternative
derivation without a chain formed between a pronoun and a coindexed c-commanding
DP yields a semantically identical but more economical output. Since the chain forma-
tion algorithm applies blindly, and everywhere it can, the more economical competing
derivation without a chain is never produced; the only way to remedy the Condition B
violation is to change the index of the pronoun or c-commanding DP, thereby blocking
the application of chain formation.
Gamon’s analysis of Condition B appeals to a new type of syntactic object, a bind-
ing chain. The role of binding chains in the grammar is entirely to license anaphors; it is
only indirectly that binding chains account for Condition B effects. However, we have
seen in chapter 4 that binding chains are not required in order to explain anaphor bind-
ing in a Minimalist framework which already provides the operation Agree to establish
ments, and crucially, an external argument), the two conditions must in fact hold at different levels of of
the grammar.
33Contra Chomsky’s (1995b) Inclusiveness Condition, Gamon assumes that indices are assigned during
the course of the derivation.
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the relevant relation. We assume that a system with fewer types of syntactic object
(i.e. no binding chains) is preferred over one with more. Given this, we clearly can-
not appeal to the uneconomical formation of binding chains in order to rule out locally
bound pronouns. A more general problem for Gamon’s analysis (and indeed Rein-
hart and Reuland’s) is that the status of A-chains in the Minimalist framework is quite
unclear. Notably, Hornstein (1998) claims that the grammar should have no place for
chains, since chains and movement express the same relation: one of the two concepts
is therefore eliminable. Hornstein argues that movement is an inescapable property of
languages and so chains should be eliminated.34 While we might imagine that bind-
ing facts provide empirical motivation for retaining chains, the paradigm case, anaphor
binding, does not require recourse to chains as long as Condition A reduces to Agree
(or equally movement, as in alternative analyses such as Hornstein 2000, 2006; Zwart
2002). A reinterpretation of Condition B effects as illegal chains is then rather question-
able. We have seen several approaches that formalise a common intuition that pronouns
are somehow disfavoured on the grounds of economy. While all appear to suffer from
technical problems, the broad approach offers at least an avenue for explaining why
Condition B effects obtain. What it is exactly that pronouns are less economical than
is less clear, but non-complementarity environments suggest that a comparison with
reflexives resulting in the same interpretation is not relevant.
5.4 Condition B as an economy violation
We aim to incorporate various appealing aspects of the analyses outlined above into
a new account for Condition B effects, since none of those we have seen is entirely
successful, either from an empirical perspective, or from the design requirements of
a Minimalist binding theory. While the economy-based motivation for Condition B
seems attractive, we have also concluded in §5.2.4 that binding domains for anaphors
and pronouns should be divorced from one another, with the binding domain for pro-
nouns reduced to the PF-phase. If we can integrate the observation that PF-phases are
Condition B domains with an account for why the Condition B effect arises, we may be
able to improve substantially on the analyses above.
5.4.1 Why PF-phases are local domains
It is quite natural to wonder why the PF-phase is relevant, of course. To start with,
then, let’s recap what happens at each PF-phase. We suggested in §2.2.3 that when a
PF-phase is constructed in narrow syntax, PF (the interface with the S-M system) reads
34See Brody (1999), however, for the opposite view in a representational framework.
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off the morphosyntactic material within that phase, which ensures that it can no longer
be accessed by narrow syntax (with the possible exception of material in the phase-
edge). For example, this means that at each PF-phase, Case features will be interpreted
by PF and no longer be active in the derivation.35 It is particularly puzzling why the
interpretation by PF of morphosyntactic features affects semantic interpretation, i.e. the
binding possibilities for pronouns, since the [VAR] feature whose value is presumably
responsible for Condition B violations is a semanticosyntactic feature which cannot be
interpreted by PF.
Some very recent work within the Minimalist framework has aimed to establish a
role for Case features in determining binding possibilities. For example, as highlighted
in §4.3.1, Heinat (2006) proposes that the [CASE: ] of an antecedent is responsible for
its probing an anaphor in its c-command domain. Canac-Marquis (2005) argues that
[CASE] plays a crucial role in defining phases (and so binding domains), suggesting
that every head that values [CASE: ] heads a phasal constituent. I aim to provide
below a rather different account for the role of Case in binding, or more accurately in
determining Condition B effects: unlike Heinat’s and Canac-Marquis’s analyses, Case
plays no role in Condition A on the analysis in chapter 4. Returning to more stan-
dard assumptions concerning Case features in the Minimalist framework, Chomsky
(2000: 123) argues that an important function of [CASE: ] is to ensure that the features
of the DP bearing it are syntactically active, that is, they are capable of entering into an
Agree operation (see also note 35). I propose that the mechanisms giving rise to Condi-
tion B effects are sensitive to whether the features of the pronoun are active at the point
when another DP sharing the same value for [VAR] enters the derivation. This allows
us to explain Reinhart and Reuland’s observation that a structural Case feature on a
pronoun is required to ensure that it induces the relevant disjointness effect (for them,
the Chain Condition; see §5.3.2.2). Structural Case can be shown to be a critical factor in
certain crosslinguistic cases where Condition B effects are circumvented. As mentioned
in §3.2.2.1, Frisian, for example, has a 3rd person singular feminine pronoun har and
a 3rd person plural pronoun har(ren) which may be locally bound, and an equivalent
pronoun se that cannot:
35The prediction of this analysis is that [CASE: ] on any DPmust be valued before the completion of the
minimal PF-phase containing it, i.e. CP, vP, PP, or DP. To the best of my knowledge, the prediction appears
to be borne out, since Case valuation does not normally take place across these constituents. One exception
is the subject of a transitive verb, which enters the derivation in vP but has its [CASE: ] valued during
the immediately higher phase (e.g. CP). Yet the subject of a transitive verb occupies a phase-edge position
(SpecvP) and so its [CASE: ] remains accessible to the higher phase. Further, note that if [CASE: ] is
a prerequisite for A-movement (serving to ensure that the DP’s features are active to a probe), then A-
movement cannot cross CP, vP, PP, or DP boundaries. Again, the prediction seems more or less accurate,
with the details to be clarified.
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(70) a. Hjai
Theyi
skammen
shamed
harreni
themi
/*sei
/*themi
‘They were ashamed of themselves.’ (Frisian; Hoekstra 1994)
b. Mariei
Maryi
wasket
washes
hari
heri
/*sei
/*heri
‘Mary washes (herself).’ (Frisian; Reuland and Everaert 2001)
Hoekstra (1994) provides substantial independent evidence for the conclusion that the
pronouns har(ren) and se differ in their Case specification, the former bearing inherent
Case and the latter bearing structural Case. On our analysis, the absence of a structural
Case feature on har/harren means that it is inactive, and so unable to enter into Agree
operations. Van Gelderen highlights that similar data can be found for earlier stages of
English which also permitted locally bound pronouns, as in (71). She also shows that
the pronoun’s Case is inherent rather than structural.
(71) ac
but
hei
hei
hynei
himi
gewyrpte
recovered
‘but he recovered himself.’ (Old English, Beowulf 1746; van Gelderen 2000)
5.4.2 Is Condition B derivable from Agree after all?
If activity of features can be invoked in Condition B effects, we could imagine a com-
mon explanation for the absence of Condition B effects with inherently Case-marked
pronouns and with structurally Case-marked pronouns that are free in their minimal
PF-phase. In both instances, the relevant features of the pronoun (presumably [VAR])
are not active at the stage of the derivation when an antecedent merges: the former fail
to bear [CASE: ] in the first place, while the latter have their [CASE: ] read off by
PF and so the capability of [CASE: ] to render other features of the pronoun active is
cancelled upon completion of their minimal PF-phase. While the details remain to be
clarified, this is an appealing view for numerous reasons. It suggests that we can in-
corporate into our analysis four facts about Condition B effects that we have argued for
in this chapter on empirical and theoretical grounds. First, they are determined during
narrow syntax; second, there is no need for a comparison of economy with anaphors;
third, the PF-phase is the relevant domain (for pronouns bearing structural Case); fi-
nally, they may be derivable from other grammatical principles or operations, such as
Agree.
Unless activity of features is invoked in Condition B effects (with Case feature
interpretation at the PF-phase being crucial), we have no explanation for why PF-phases
rather than LF-phases should be relevant. Yet activity is only assumed to play a role in
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the application of Agree, and as we have suggested, Agree is an unlikely candidate for
determining Condition B effects. Essentially, there are only two options for the feature
specification of pronouns. First, we could say that pronouns come with the feature
specification of anaphors, which results in Agree with an antecedent. This is clearly the
wrong move, since it incorrectly predicts that pronouns need an antecedent. Moreover,
the effect of Condition B is to block the sort of interpretation that Agree derives, i.e.
a pronoun can’t have the same [VAR] value as any c-commanding DP in its PF-phase.
Instead, wemust continue to assume that the [VAR] feature on pronouns is valued upon
entering the derivation. The problem is that the [VAR] feature on the pronoun is already
valued upon entering the derivation so there is no requirement for Agree to take place
between the pronoun and an antecedent with the same value for [VAR] in its phase.
Thus in neither approach does Condition B fall out naturally from Agree in the way
that Condition A appeared to in chapter 4.
5.4.3 Deriving Condition B from other principles
5.4.3.1 Maximise Structural Economy
Clearly, we do not actually want Agree to have applied in Condition B violations. The
intuition that we would like to formalise is that the ungrammaticality in Condition B
configurations arises from the fact that Agree could have applied, were it not for the
fact that pronouns bear valued [VAR] features and so are incapable of triggering Agree.
Ideally, this could then be reduced to some more general economy principle. We have
already seen that pronouns losing out in competition with an alternative derivation
involving a reflexive is not a satisfactory way of formalising the economy motivation
behind Condition B effects. However, it seems that comparison with a derivation in
which the pronoun bears an unvalued feature [VAR: ] (which would result in Agree
with its local antecedent, just as for anaphors) is not quite the correct characterisation of
economy, either. In particular, the two derivations could never compete as such, since
the numeration for the derivation where a pronoun bears [VAR: ] is in any case im-
possible: pronouns obligatorily enter the derivation with valued [VAR] features. The
more economical derivation cannot therefore be derived, and cannot be more econom-
ical than the derivation that we wish to rule out.
What is required perhaps is a slightly different view of economy. For example,
Citko (2006) argues for a structural economy condition which does not fully allow
comparison of derivations with different numerations (even for derivations resulting
in identical semantic interpretations, as in Fox 2000; Reinhart 2006), but rather prefers
numerations with fewer instances of the same lexical items over those with more. Ap-
plying the analysis to data from Across-the-Board (ATB) movement constructions in
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Slavic, Citko proposes that if two alternative derivations are possible, one arising from
a numeration involving two tokens of a single lexical item and one from a numeration
involving a single token of the lexical item, the former must be selected.36 Derivations
consisting of different lexical items are not included in the reference set for compari-
son. Citko envisages an explanation for this constraint on numerations grounded in
economy, broadly in accordance with the Minimalist methodology:
“...numerations with lower indexes on lexical items are more economical
than the ones with higher indexes on the same lexical items. Such numera-
tions, if convergent, will result in derivations with maximal structure shar-
ing. ”
(Citko 2006: 242)
It follows that if more structure is shared during the narrow-syntactic computation, less
use is made of lexical resources in the numeration, and the derivation is more econom-
ical.
Citko’s structural economy condition is perhaps not a fully-fledged account, and
forms only a small part of her analysis of ATB movement in Slavic. Yet if the motiva-
tion for the condition is correct, it indicates something important about the nature of
economy within the architecture of the derivation: narrow-syntactic operations (by as-
sumption, Internal/External Merge and Agree) ‘come for free’, and numerations must
be optimised in such a way that lets narrow syntax take the burden of establishing
dependencies. I suggest below that these intuitions may reveal an economy-based mo-
tivation for Condition B compatible with our assumptions and the binding evidence
presented in this thesis, if Citko’s structural economy condition is modified, extended,
and strengthened. On the assumption that derivations are more economical if they
make greater use of structure sharing, the structural economy condition can be broad-
ened to formalise a preference for feature-sharing, too. In particular, feature-sharing is
maximised not only when the number of tokens of identical lexical items is reduced,
but also when as many features as possible enter the derivation unvalued (provided, of
course, that they can be valued by the relevant interface in order to avoid a violation of
Full Interpretation).
We could thus propose a different sort of economy condition to minimise the
number of features that enter the derivation identically valued, proposing the follow-
ing:
36Citko assumes that the number of tokens of a lexical item in the numeration is indicated by an index.
A numeration involving a lexical item bearing an index of 1 is preferred over one where the same lexical
item bears an index of 2 (or greater), if they result in the same interpretation at LF.
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(72) Maximise Structural Economy
Establish dependencies via syntactic operations where possible
In a manner outlined in greater detail below, this economy condition ensures that when
two matching features with identical values are in a configuration in which Agree can
apply between them, Agree must have applied, thereby establishing feature-sharing by
syntactic means. It may now be apparent to the reader how we intend to set about
reducing Condition B to concerns of structural economy, namely (72). The intuition of
the approach is basically the same as Hornstein’s (2006). That is, when a derivation fails
to employ well-formed syntactic mechanisms to establish dependencies (i.e. relying on
properties of the numeration to establish dependencies between syntactic objects) the
derivation is degraded on the grounds of economy. Informally for the moment, let’s see
how the Condition B effect is explained in a simple case like (73a):
(73) a. * Johni loves himi
b. [TP John[VAR: x] [vP <John[VAR: x]> likes him[VAR: x]]]
As shown in (73b), the pronoun enters the derivation with a valued [VAR] feature, as
does its locally c-commanding antecedent in the same minimal PF-/LF-phase (vP). Yet
if the pronoun’s [VAR] were unvalued upon entering the derivation, precisely the same
output could be derived (by Agree), and so Maximise Structural Economy as stated
in (72) kicks in to block the derivation in (73b). Employing a pronoun that enters the
derivation with [VAR] already specified with the same value as its local antecedent is
uneconomical.
There are three ways in which the Maximise Structural Economy violation could
potentially be circumvented. First, the pronoun could enter the derivation with its
[VAR] unvalued, and the derivation of (73a) would then involve Agree between the
pronoun and its antecedent, as required. However, we have assumed that the only lex-
ical items that enter the derivation with [VAR: ] are anaphors; we would then need
to propose that pronouns have separate lexical entries, one where [VAR] is valued, and
one where it is unvalued. In any case, there is no empirical reason to permit this pos-
sibility since (73a) would then incorrectly satisfy Maximise Structural Economy. The
second way is to simply value the pronoun’s [VAR] differently. In this derivation, Agree
between the pronoun and John would not derive the same feature values, and so Max-
imise Structural Economy does not rule out the derivation. This then predicts that the
pronoun and the locally c-commanding DP are disjoint in reference, which is consistent
with the Condition B effect, since the reference of the pronoun is of course the crucial
factor. Finally, we could ensure that at the stage of the derivation where the antecedent
merges, the pronoun’s [VAR] features are inactive: the absence of the possibility for
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Agree between the pronoun and its antecedent ensures that (72) is not violated. As we
have seen in §5.4.1, there are (at least) two ways in which the pronoun’s [VAR] features
can be inactivated: either by the pronoun bearing inherent (rather than structural) Case,
or by distancing it from its antecedent by embedding it within a constituent which is a
PF-phase. [CASE] would then be read off at the minimal PF-phase, ensuring that by the
time the antecedent merges the pronoun’s features are inactive in the derivation. Since
neither of these possibilities is available in (73a), Maximise Structural Economy rules
out the derivation.
5.4.3.2 Where does Maximise Structural Economy apply?
The immediate question is where this economy condition applies, and it is not an easy
one to answer. First let’s examine the properties of the framework we are assuming.
The Derivation by Phase model is often termed a ‘weakly’ derivational implementation
of the Minimalist programme, since it admits representational filters, albeit only at the
interfaces.37 Therefore both syntactic operations and interface representations are sub-
ject to constraints. In this chapter we have argued at some length for a syntactic ap-
proach to Condition B (building on evidence provided in §3.2). For example, as we
have seen above, [CASE] and [VAR] are critical in determining Condition B effects and
so Maximise Structural Economy must apply at a stage where there is access to both. If
it applies at LF, [CASE] is not visible to the principle, and if it applies at PF, [VAR] is not
visible. The alternative, consistent with the evidence we have seen from Condition B
data above, is that Maximise Structural Economy applies in narrow syntax. However,
narrow syntax contains no internal levels of representation at which such a principle
could apply.
Syntactic principles only constrain the application of syntactic operations as they
take place. So if Maximise Structural Economy does not hold at the interfaces, the alter-
native is to integrate it into one of the operations. The problem we now face is that in
Condition B violations there is no operation that takes place, so no syntactic principle
can be violated: we have already seen that the fact that Agree does not apply in Con-
dition B configurations is ultimately the reason for the violation itself. This leaves only
Merge as an operation into which we could incorporate Maximise Structural Economy,
and the early signs look bad for this approach, too: Merge is often thought to be the
most basic conceptually necessary operation, simply taking two syntactic objects and
creating a larger one from them. Yet this characterisation of Merge somewhat disguises
the fact that it must be composed of more complex and less obvious algorithms. For
Chomsky (1995b), Merge must select an item from the numeration, and reduce the nu-
meration index (the number of tokens of that item in the numeration) by one. This of
37See, e.g., Epstein et al. (1998) for a strongly derivational framework.
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course happens before the algorithm that combines this item with another constituent
can apply. Yet things are not that always simple. Presumably Merge must also know
to select two items from the numeration in some cases (such as the first instance of
merger in the derivation), and no items from the numeration in the case of External
Merge.38 It is likely that Merge must also be sensitive to selectional factors, ensuring
that selectional requirements (perhaps features) of at least one of the objects it com-
bines is satisfied by the operation. Finally, it must determine which of these two objects
is projected as the ‘label’. Merge is not, therefore, the maximally simple combinatorial
operation it first seems, so positing an additional mechanism related to the structural
economy principle as in (72) is not perhaps such a strange move.
With somemild theoretical modifications, I suggest that the incorporation ofMax-
imise Structural Economy as a component of Merge can be made rather more palatable.
These theoretical modifications may be considered as a kind of reapportioning of cer-
tain elements of Agree to elements of Merge. First, note that if Maximise Structural
Economy were a constraint on Merge, in Condition B configurations it would have to
be violated at the point where an antecedent enters the derivation, rather than when
the pronoun does. This is because no violation will occur, of course, unless the an-
tecedent merges in the minimal PF-phase. The violation cannot arise upon merger of
the pronoun into the derivation, since at that stage (inmany cases at least) no antecedent
has merged. Let’s now start out with a standard view of structure-building by Merge,
which takes two syntactic objects α and β and creates a set {α, β} from them.39 To in-
troduce the background to the modifications we wish to make, we will take a case of
local anaphor binding by Agree, which should be familiar from chapter 4 (see especially
§4.3.2). In deriving a sentence like (74a), a point is reached where merger of the v head
of the vP phase with VP creates the complex syntactic object in (74b):
(74) a. Maryi hates herselfi
b. {v, {hates, herself[VAR: ]}}
We have left aside complicating factors not relevant for our purposes in (74b), but note
that the syntactic object contains an unvalued feature [VAR: ].40 The next operation
of Merge pairs the syntactic object in (74b) with Mary (which itself may have internal
structure that need not concern us here), creating the larger set (75):
38If External Merge is achieved by Copy and Merge operations rather than by remerging items from the
numeration.
39We will use this notation in the following examples as it perhaps indicates each application of Merge
more clearly than the usual representations with constituent structure indicated by square brackets.
40In §4.3.2 (following assumptions laid out §2.2.3.5) we argued that the anaphor’s [VAR: ] remains un-
valued until its antecedent merges since the feature enters the derivation on the D head and its c-command
domain (the null NP complement) contains no features capable of valuing it.
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(75) {Mary[VAR: x], {v, {hates, herself[VAR: ]}}}
We have assumed so far that the unvalued feature [VAR: ] on anaphors probes ‘up-
ward’ in search of a matching feature, but an equally possible alternative is that upon
merger, sisters can simply satisfy each other’s features: So at the point where Mary
merges, its sister is visible, and so any unvalued matching features of its sister can be
valued by it.41 In fact, if upward probing in the sense intended here is indeed possible,
this is a more natural approach than stipulating that upon merger of an element in a
c-commanding position the anaphor probes it. The difference is a small but important
one: on the former approach there is no probing involved in valuing features per se, just
syntactic objects which are paired by Merge and as such are free to enter into syntactic
relations or operations, such as Agree. Thus, probing can in effect be removed from the
mechanisms of Agree, and in some sense is reapportioned to the operationMerge. With
it comes the assumption that probing is not triggered by unvalued features and is not a
matter of ‘success’ or ‘failure’: the features of derivational sisters are mutually visible,
and the sisterhood configuration established by Merge allows Agree to apply wherever
required.
Given this revised interpretation of probing as visibility or accessibility of features
of derivational sisters, we can now fully incorporate the Maximise Structural Economy
condition into Merge. Essentially, since probing is not triggered by unvalued features,
upon the merger of an antecedent in the same local domain as a pronoun, the features
of both are visible to one another and Maximise Structural Economy applies, ruling out
the derivation. So, in deriving a sentence like (76a) in which Condition B is violated,
the merger of v with VP creates the syntactic object in (76b):
(76) a. * Maryi hates heri
b. {v, {hates, her[VAR: x]}}
Upon merger of Mary with the constituent in (76b), the features of both are mutually
visible, and if Mary bears the same value for [VAR] as the pronoun, Maximise Struc-
tural Economy will be violated, since the dependency could have been more economi-
cally established by Agree. Since pronouns cannot enter the derivation with unvalued
[VAR] features, the derivation is ungrammatical: creating dependencies effectively in
the numeration based on shared feature values is ruled out.
41This is a slight simplification. Due to the scope of this chapter, we do not examine the important
question of why—if (following Epstein et al. 1998) c-command relations can be reinterpreted derivationally
as sisterhood relations—c-command nevertheless appears to be asymmetrical.
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5.4.3.3 Activity effects
If Agree provides a more economical way of establishing the dependency that results
in a pronoun and another DP bearing the same value for [VAR], we might well wonder
why a pronoun’s local domain is not its minimal LF-phase, rather than its PF-phase. If,
as in (77), a pronoun free in its minimal PF-phase but bound in its minimal LF-phase
were to have its [VAR] unvalued, that feature would make it syntactically active at the
point when the antecedent merges (within the minimal LF-phase, vP).42
(77) Johni [vP <Johni> saw a snake [PP near himi]]
We might imagine that due to the possibility of an alternative derivation involving
Agree, Maximise Structural Economywould be violated in this environment. Of course,
this would give the wrong result, since pronouns free in their minimal PF-phase but
bound in their minimal LF-phase are grammatical, typically in non-complementary
distribution with anaphors, as we have argued in §5.2.4 in particular. However, Max-
imise Structural Economy does not apply in this sort of way, i.e. by comparing the
derivation with alternatives arising from different numerations. Upon merger of the
antecedent, the condition simply observes that syntactically active elements are in a
configuration which replicates the output of Agree, without the operation having taken
place, violating economy. By assumption, only features that remain syntactically active
in the derivation are visible to syntactic operations, and Maximise Structural Economy
is a component of the operation Merge. Upon completion of the minimal PF-phase
containing the pronoun, its [CASE] feature will be transferred to PF and the inactivity
(through valuation) of all the pronoun’s unvalued features has the consequence that the
pronoun’s valued features are also inactive beyond the PF-phase.43
5.4.3.4 Feature values of indexical pronouns
One matter concerning shared [VAR] values on pronouns that we have left unexplained
until now (see §4.2.2.3) is whether 1st and 2nd person pronouns must be reserved a
special indexical value for their [VAR] features, e.g. [VAR: 1st], [VAR: 2nd]. The least
stipulative assumption is presumably that they should not, and this is supported by at
42This is what we have already assumed for anaphors in chapter 4, explaining why an anaphor’s local
domain is its minimal LF-phase.
43These slightly modified assumptions have no effect on the proposed analysis of anaphor binding by
Agree. The valuation of the anaphor’s [CASE] within its minimal PF-phase does not inactive an anaphor’s
[VAR: ] for the purposes of Agree with an antecedent in its minimal LF-phase, since the feature is in any
case active by virtue of being unvalued.
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least two types of empirical evidence.44 The first is that bound and coreferential read-
ings are available for 1st and 2nd person pronouns (as well as 3rd person pronouns),
as discussed recently by Rullmann (2004), Kratzer (2006) and Heim (forthcoming).45 In
§4.2.2.4 we saw that a diagnostic for an analysis of pronouns as either bound or coref-
erential is the availability of both sloppy and strict readings under VP-ellipsis.
(78) I [VP did my homework] and so did you <[VP do my/your homework]>
= you did my homework, or:
= you did your homework
Under the strict reading, the pronoun in the elided VP is interpreted as coreferential
with my in the antecedent VP. However, a sloppy reading is also possible in which the
elided pronoun is interpreted as bound by you, with the pronoun my in the antecedent
VP bound by I, satisfying the Parallelism requirement on ellipsis. Such bound 1st and
2nd person pronouns are often termed ‘fake indexicals’ since their interpretation is not
directly assigned by the context, but by the local binder. This would not be captured
under an analysis whereby all 1st and 2nd person pronouns bear [VAR: 1st], [VAR: 2nd]
for example, i.e. where their interpretation is always determined contextually.
The second empirical argument against specific indexical values for [VAR] on 1st
and 2nd person pronouns brings us back to Condition B. Assuming that the value of
[VAR] on these pronouns is equivalent to that of 3rd person pronounsmakes correct pre-
dictions concerning the availability of coreferential rather than bound readings in cer-
tain configurations where a Condition B violation might be expected. As background
to this, we will first highlight Evans’s (1980) observation that in certain contexts, a Con-
dition B effect can be circumvented. The following example from Safir (2004) illustrates
the point:46
(79) Everybody hates Max. John hates him. Bill hates him... Even Maxi hates himi
(Safir 2004)
The absence of a Condition B effect is due to the pragmatic environment. Each new
sentence introduces an individual who is confirmed to be, in effect, a Max-hater. The
Condition B effect is circumvented since the context ensures that in Even Max hates
him, Max is presented as a member of the group of people that are Max-haters, and
44Unless this were the case, there would clearly be an issue of redundancy between [VAR] and [ϕ], since
in all but 3rd person pronouns the value of [VAR] would simply reflect the ϕ-feature value.
45See these articles for additional evidence that 1st and 2nd person pronouns may be bound.
46My own feeling is that the relevant sentences are still rather awkward, though I also agree with Safir
that replacing the pronoun with a reflexive is not a pragmatically appropriate alternative.
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not, crucially, as an individual who is a self-hater. As Safir notes, it is in fact even
pragmatically infelicitous to use a reflexive in this context (even though it would of
course satisfy the Condition A requirement). The same effect arises with 1st and 2nd
person pronouns:
(80) Of course you hate me. Everybody hates me. I hate me. (Zwart 2006)
While in (79), the context ensures that the pronoun has the same referent as the putative
local antecedent, in (80) the fact that both the object pronoun and the local subject are
1st person singular pronouns ensures that they have the same referent.
We can now show how assuming that the [VAR] value of indexical pronouns re-
ceives no special value (just x, y, z, etc.) allows us to explain ‘Evans contexts’ with 1st
and 2nd person pronouns. Take first the possibility of a derivation for I hate me involv-
ing binding, resulting from I and me both bearing [VAR: x]. As argued in §4.2.2.4, con-
figurations involving a DP c-commanding a pronoun with the same [VAR] value result
in binding at LF, perhaps through the insertion of a λ-operator on the c-commanding
DP (I), binding the variable corresponding to me. This automatically ensures that me
is dependent on I for its interpretation, corresponding to a reading of self-hating for
the sentence, essentially the same LF-representation as for I hate myself. Yet this pos-
sibility is in any case ruled out by Maximise Structural Economy upon the merger of
the antecedent, I, which is consistent with the absence of a self-hating reading of I hate
me. Turning to the possible (‘accidental’) coreference interpretation, we now entertain
the possibility that I and me bear different variables, say [VAR: x] and [VAR: y]. Max-
imise Structural Economy does not rule out the derivation since the [VAR] values of the
two DPs differ, and no binding relation can be established at LF since the variables are
distinct. However, there is still the possibility that upon interpretation the same indi-
vidual is assigned to both variables. Indeed, covaluation of x and y is in this case a
requirement since there is only one individual that can be identified by a 1st person sin-
gular pronoun, namely the speaker. A possible problem is that in §4.2.2.4 we followed
Reinhart (1983a,b); Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993) in assuming that the possibility of
‘accidental’ coreference is typically ruled out, since binding is preferred over corefer-
ence wherever both give rise to the same interpretation (Rule I). However, in Evans
contexts, the bound and coreferential interpretations are not equivalent: the coreferen-
tial reading for I hate me in (80) does not present the subject (I) as a self-hater, but rather
as a member of the group of me-haters.
Allowing 1st or 2nd person pronouns to bear different values for [VAR] from other
1st or 2nd person pronouns (perhaps in the same sentence) is a natural extension of the
system of [VAR] proposed in §4.2.2. If we were to assume that the [VAR] feature borne
by indexical pronouns had a special value, both I and me would bear the same [VAR]
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value in (80), and the obviation of the Condition B effect would not be predicted. The
proposed analysis not only interacts with the Maximise Structural Economy principle
to explain certain obviations of Condition B in Evans contexts, but is also consistent
with the possibility that (fake) indexical pronouns can be bound, just like 3rd person
pronouns.
5.4.4 Remaining issues
Maximise Structural Economy provides an independent motivation for Condition B
effects, with no binding-specific mechanisms required in narrow syntax. Perhaps para-
doxically, this is both the appeal and the drawback of the approach: Condition B re-
duces to independent principles of economy, yet these principles no doubt have wide-
reaching implications for other empirical phenomena. Due to the scope of this thesis,
naturally these implications cannot be fully explored, though some observations are in
order.
5.4.4.1 Anaphors may act as antecedents
The first issue is an empirical one, from binding facts. This is a concern since binding
data is precisely what Maximise Structural Economy is supposed to explain. Perhaps
the biggest problem specific to the approach proposed in §5.4.3.2 is that anaphors act as
antecedents for pronouns and as such are themselves capable of inducing Condition B
effects. Take (81a), with a Condition B effect:
(81) a. * Johni believes himselfi to respect himi
b. Johni believes Mary to respect himi
The grammaticality of (81b) confirms that in (81a) it is the anaphor (the ECM subject)
rather than the matrix subject that induces the Condition B effect. The problem is that
at the stage where the anaphor enters the derivation (SpecvP of the ECM clause), it
does not bear the same feature value for [VAR] as the pronoun (since anaphors enter
the derivation with [VAR: ]). The expectation is therefore that Maximise Structural
Economy does not rule out the derivation at the stage when the anaphor merges, since
the two features are not (at that stage) specified with the same value. Yet this is of
course inconsistent with the Condition B effect in (81a). Further, by the stage where
the antecedent for the reflexive enters the derivation, the pronoun’s minimal PF-phase
(vP in the ECM complement) has completed and the pronoun’s features consequently
inactivated. Thus we can confirm that the merger of the matrix subject cannot induce
the violation of Maximise Structural Economy, as indicated by (81b).
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5.4.4.2 Shared feature values without dependencies
Amore general problem, independent of the binding theory, is thatMaximise Structural
Economy as it stands incorrectly rules out many cases where features simply happen
to enter the derivation with the same value. For example, take a simple case of two
pronouns which have separate values for their [VAR] features but which bear the same
[ϕ] values.
(82) a. Hei respects himj
b. {He[VAR: y], [ϕ: 3, Sing, Masc], {v, {respects, him[VAR: x], [ϕ: 3, Sing, Masc]}}}
When he merges in SpecvP, it contains the features [PERSON: 3], [NUMBER: Sing],
[GENDER: Masc]. Yet an identical set of features is also present on him, containedwithin
the derivational sister of he, as indicated in (82b). If Maximise Structural Economy ap-
plies ‘blindly’ in the manner suggested above, it should rule out the derivation since the
shared feature value of the two pronouns is not the result of a syntactic operation. Other
instances of the same problem could be found in wh-constructions with two wh-phrases
in the same local domain, for example:
(83) Whoi loves whoj?
Presumably, both instances of who are specified with identical [WH] features (or equiv-
alent, such as the [OP] of Adger and Ramchand 2005; see §4.2.2.3). The difference be-
tween (82a)/(83) and Condition B configurations appears to be that in the former there
is no dependency between the two elements: it is simply coincidence that the two DPs
bear the same feature values. However, in §4.2.2.4 we have assumed (following sugges-
tions by Reinhart 1983a,b; Heim 1998; Fox 2000) that if two DPs share values of [VAR]
features, they are interpreted at LF as being in a binding relation, where possible. It re-
mains to be seen what the full extent of this problem facing Maximise Structural Econ-
omy is, and if its mechanisms can be modified (without significant theoretical cost) to
capture the relevance of an intended dependency between the two elements.
The precise scope and articulation of Maximise Structural Economy therefore re-
mains to be fully treated. While there may be problems, it is noteworthy that a desirable
consequence of the principle is that it may lead to a better understanding of the under-
lyingmotivation for features of lexical itemswhich are underspecified (unvalued) in the
numeration. On some level, it is perhaps surprising that the lexicon widely underspec-
ifies features in this way, given that features are required to be valued at the interfaces
and that the unvalued nature of the particular feature will sharply restrict the syntactic
configurations in which the lexical item bearing it may appear. However, Maximise
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Structural Economy (in some form) suggests that keeping feature values within the lex-
icon is in some sense costly, perhaps from the perspective of memory burden. Local
syntactic operations, on the other hand, apparently involve no cost. In effect, Maximise
Structural Economy bans the numeration from replicating the mechanisms of narrow
syntax, thereby ensuring that interpositional dependencies are achieved at minimal ex-
pense.
5.4.5 Summary
While certain issues remain to be treated fully, this analysis of Condition B effects has
some significant advantages over the previous approaches outlined above. At the same
time, it should be clear how this analysis builds on the intuitions underlying its prede-
cessors. Conceptually, it owes the greatest debt to the analyses of Gamon (1996) and
Hornstein (2006). What it shares is the intuition that Condition B is not its own condi-
tion per se, rather that the relevant configuration replicates the output of an indepen-
dent mechanism and that the Condition B configuration loses out on economy grounds.
For Gamon and Hornstein, however, the Condition B configuration replicates anaphor
binding. Hornstein suggests that an alternative derivation involvingmovement is more
economical, resulting in the appearance of a reflexive in the place of the pronoun. Ga-
mon argues that the configuration triggers a chain-formation operation which has no
effect on interpretation and so violates economy. The approach proposed above sug-
gests that the syntactic configuration of identical [VAR] features of a pronoun and a
local antecedent establishes a dependency which is more economically determined by
Agree. The economy principle that rules this out is embedded within the algorithms
involved in Merge (including a reinterpretation of probing previously assumed to be a
component of Agree). This provides an explanation for one of the curious facts about
Condition B, namely that it appears to apply everywhere throughout the derivation
(Lebeaux 1998). If this is true—and assuming that Condition B reduces to syntactic
operations—the only possibility is that Condition B reduces to Merge, since Merge is
(practically by definition) the only operation that applies at every step of the deriva-
tion. Furthermore, it is not necessary to weaken the theory by letting in comparison
of derivations arising from different numerations. Condition B effects arise when the
narrow syntactic computation does not select the optimal manner of supplying PF and
LF with a particular interpretation for each.
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5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have sought an explanation for why Condition B effects hold, given
that the requirement for a pronoun not to be bound by a particular DP does not read-
ily follow from virtual conceptual necessity. We assume, therefore, that Condition B
should not be treated as a primitive principle of the grammar, but rather must be the
result of more general grammatical principles, ideally derivable from economy require-
ments and so independently motivated. We have identified and responded to four
major concerns arising from present approaches to Condition B. First, the local domain
in which pronouns cannot be bound must be appropriately characterised and ideally
reduced to independent grammatical domains. This was successfully achieved through
the observation (although surprising at the time) that pronouns must not be bound by
a c-commanding antecedent in their minimal PF-phase. This captures a quite striking
proportion of the Condition B data and sheds new light on why anaphor/pronoun non-
complementarity systematically obtains in a particular type of structural configuration.
Supported by the evidence that PF-phases are binding domains, we also concluded that
Condition B effects are sensitive to narrow syntactic configurations, and cannot simply
hold at the LF interface. Third, we observed that the status of Condition B is unusual
in being a ‘negative condition’, stating what must not happen in order for a pronoun
to occur grammatically. Finally, we required Condition B not to be an ad hoc binding-
specific constraint, since our Minimalist aim is to eliminate the binding theory from the
grammar.
While these points have been addressed by different analyses of Condition B at
least to some degree, we saw shortcomings of each, and that none could claim success
in achieving all of the above goals. These last three requirements of the Minimalist
binding theory were achieved by subsuming Condition B within an economy condition
on Merge that maximises feature-sharing in narrow syntax. Since we have to propose
this additional principle, the analysis does not quite ‘come for free’ in the way that Con-
dition A appears to. Indeed, this reflects the fact that the motivation for Condition B
effects has long proved elusive. Still, Maximise Structural Economy is by no means un-
reasonable and allows us both to generalise the intuitions of Hornstein (2006) concern-
ing the uneconomical nature of pronouns and to extend the intuitions of Citko (2006)
concerning the optimality of derivations involving maximal structure-sharing. The fact
that we can eliminate Condition B, reducing its effects—including matters concerning
domains, c-command, and reference—to an economy violation is, I believe, a consid-
erable step forward. Moreover, in light of the conclusions of chapter 4 that Condition
A reduces to Agree, it also allows us to dispense with the binding theory altogether.
In the following chapter we will provide further empirical support for the analyses
of Condition A and Condition B effects developed in chapters 4 and 5 by examining
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the behaviour of anaphors and pronouns in other Germanic languages. We will see
that these analyses offer sufficient flexibility to accommodate these crosslinguistic data,
and that they can therefore provide rather greater empirical coverage than the classical
binding theory.
Chapter 6
Extensions to other Germanic
languages
The distribution of anaphors and pronouns in English can be explained without re-
course to a binding theory, per se. In chapter 4, we argued that Condition A effects can
be derived by Agree; in chapter 5, a reduction of Condition B to an independent econ-
omy condition on Merge was proposed. Chomsky’s revisions of the binding theory
within the Principles and Parameters approach have often been criticised for failing to
extend to crosslinguistic patterns in anaphora. In particular, a common pattern among
other Germanic languages is that anaphors divide into simplex (SE anaphors) and com-
plex (SELF anaphors). This chapter argues that a narrow-syntactic approach to binding,
based on the lexical properties of different types of DP, can be articulated with sufficient
flexibility to account for well known yet long problematic crosslinguistic phenomena.
The principal aim is not to propose an account which extends to as many languages
as possible, but to highlight how a Minimalist approach to binding such as the one
presented in this thesis might respond to various empirical challenges. Thus, the struc-
tured variation in crosslinguistic binding patterns can be attributed not to differences in
binding domains in different languages, but simply to the lexical feature specifications
that languages employ.
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters we have seen that the constraints on locality in anaphor bind-
ing and pronoun disjointness can be explained through the interaction of syntax with
bare output conditions, namely the requirement that the interfaces can only interpret
valued features. The conclusion, in keeping with our Minimalist methodology, is that
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the binding theory can be dispensed with as a module of the grammar. However,
anaphors and pronouns in other languages appear to behave in somewhat different
ways. The GB assumption that a set of binding conditions governs the distribution of
anaphors and pronouns leads to only two possibilities for analysing the crosslinguistic
data. Either a binding theory set up to capture the English data is simply incorrect,
or the binding theory which accounts for English is in fact a particular instantiation
of a much more general binding theory whose parameters must be set for particular
languages. The latter approach is articulated by Anderson (1986); Manzini and Wexler
(1987), for example, where the binding domain is parameterised. Yet, as we see below, a
critical problem for such an approach is that it is the particular anaphors and pronouns
themselves which seem to require or ban binding within a particular domain, rather
than all anaphors or pronouns in a given language.
The aim of this chapter is to provide strong indications of how the quite sub-
stantial but structured variation across the Germanic languages can be handled by ex-
tending the approach to binding proposed in the previous chapters. The general prob-
lem with crosslinguistic variation in binding (even in related languages) is in keeping
the theory sufficiently restrictive but with just enough flexibility to accommodate the
observed variation. I show that deriving the constraints on binding through (seman-
tico)syntactic features and narrow-syntactic operations allows just the right sort of flex-
ibility. Variation is then expected to arise either due to different feature specifications
of pronouns and anaphors (including features not directly encoding referential prop-
erties but which influence the narrow syntactic operations which a DP may enter into)
or to independent syntactic characteristics of the languages in question, such as clausal
structure.
I outline below the behaviour of pronoun systems in other Germanic languages,
selecting Dutch, Norwegian, and Icelandic for particular case studies. Notably, partic-
ular focus will be placed on ‘simplex’ monomorphemic anaphors which are known to
pose substantial difficulties for the classical binding theory. In light of the failure of the
classical GB account to explain the distribution of these anaphors, this is an area that
our Minimalist approach to binding can target for improvement over its predecessors
from the perspective of empirical coverage. Moreover, we will see further evidence
throughout the chapter that our assumptions in chapters 4 and 5 concerning local bind-
ing domains and the mechanisms responsible for determining binding relations seem
to be on the right track.
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6.2 Dutch
6.2.1 Anaphors and pronouns in Dutch
Dutch has a distinction between strong and weak pronouns, as shown in the table 6.1
(adapted from Zwart 1997).
Person/Number strong subj. weak subj. strong obj. weak obj.
1st Singular ik ’k mij me
2nd Singular jij je jou je
3rd Singular hij ie hem ’m
3rd Singular zij ze haar ’r
1st Plural wij we ons —
2nd Plural jullie — jullie —
3rd Plural zij ze hen/hun ze
Table 6.1: Dutch personal pronouns
The difference is sometimes taken to be that the weak pronouns are clitics (Berendsen
1986; Zwart 1997). The weak pronouns occur immediately to the right of the finite verb,
cannot be topicalised, nor conjoined with full DPs, though unlike French clitics, for
example, they can occur as objects of prepositions. However, Koster (1986) argues that
there is no reason to assume that the weak pronouns are clitics:
“Unlike the clitics in Romance and other languages, they are not co-analyzed
with the verb to which they are connected. Dutch has two verb movement
rules, Verb Second and Verb Raising, neither of which moves the alleged
clitics along with the verb.”
(Koster 1986: 329)
As is typically the case in Romance and Germanic, the 1st and 2nd person pro-
nouns do not have a reflexive-specific morphological form when used reflexively:1 the
weak form of the pronoun may be locally bound, although the strong form cannot:
(1) a. Iki
Ii
schaam
shame
mei
me.STRi
/*miji
/*me.WKi
‘I am ashamed.’
b. Jiji
youi
schaam
shame
jei
you.STRi
/*joui
/*you.WKi
1For this reason, in the examples in this chapter we will largely use only 3rd person pronouns and
anaphors, where a distinction is made.
6.2. Dutch 219
‘You are ashamed.’ (Zwart 1997)
In the 3rd person, however, a specifically anaphoric weak pronoun is required in such
constructions, zich.2 Reinhart and Reuland (1993); Reuland and Everaert (2001) assume
that zich is deficient for ϕ-features—namely number and gender—since it is restricted
to 3rd person but can refer to masculine and feminine, singular and plural.
In each of the contexts shown above, if a strong pronoun is used, it must be a
specifically reflexive pronoun. The following reflexive paradigm adapted from Everaert
(1986: 35) highlights that the system of weak and strong pronouns is relevant to the
appearance of different types of bound element:
Person/Number weak pronouns strong pronouns
1Pers Singular Ik was me Ik was mezelf
2Pers Singular Jij wast je Jij wast jezelf
3Pers Singular Hij wast zich Hij wast zichzelf
3Pers Singular Zij wast zich Zij wast zichzelf
1Pers Plural Wij wassen ons Wij wassen onszelf
2Pers Plural Jullie wassen je Jullie wassen jezelf
3Pers Plural Zij wassen zich Zij wassen zichzelf
Table 6.2: Dutch weak and strong reflexive pronouns with the verb ‘wash’
In each case, the strong reflexive form is composed of the weak form of the pronoun
plus zelf (‘self’). As we will see in much more detail below, the weak form is used in
‘inherently reflexive’ contexts, while the strong form tends to appear as the reflexive
object of a normal transitive verb.3
Dutch is therefore commonly assumed to exhibit a three-way distinction between
pronouns and anaphors, with the anaphor group dividing into simplex (‘SE’ anaphors,
zich) and complex (‘SELF’ anaphors, zichzelf ). Koster (1985) argues that from the per-
spective of locality, both anaphors are similar in that they generally must be bound in
their full clause. To complete the picture, Dutch also has a reciprocal, elkaar, which we
will not examine in much detail, as it has been well known since Yang (1983: 170) that
the distribution of reciprocals varies remarkably little across languages.
Barbiers and Bennis (2003) highlight a broad range of variation with respect to
the forms used for SE and SELF anaphors in Dutch dialects. Although our aim here is
2Vat (1980); Koster (1985); Everaert (1986) assume that the zich which appears in inherently reflexive
predicates is a clitic. As above, Koster (1986) argues against this approach.
3As discussed below, wassen (‘wash’) is assumed to belong to a class of verbs which are ambiguous
between inherently reflexive (giving rise to the weak paradigm) and not inherently reflexive (giving rise
to the strong paradigm).
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largely to account for the distribution of zich and zichzelf, it appears that there are other
anaphoric elements in Dutch that we may wish to take into account. In particular, the
object reflexive of transitive verbs, typically realised in standardDutch as zichzelf, shows
wide variation, with numerous forms being used depending on the region. The most
common and widely spread is the non-standard anaphor z’n eigen (‘his own’). How-
ever, Barbiers and Bennis conclude that (with one exception), each of the Dutch dialects
retains a morphological distinction between weak SE anaphors and strong anaphors.
The following dialects emerge across the Netherlands, Flanders (a region of Belgium),
and a small Dutch-speaking area in the north of France: zich/zichzelf (East); hem/hemzelf
(Frisian); hem/z’n eigen (East/West Flanders); zich/z’n eigen (Flemish Limburg). Finally,
Antwerp and South-West and Central Dutch dialects use z’n eigen in both strong and
weak environments. With this exception, the requirement for SE or SELF in each syn-
tactic environment appears fairly consistent across dialects. I assume in what follows
that the particular form of SELF or SE anaphor which is used is not of great importance,
and that what is is the environments in which SELF or SE can appear. Accordingly,
we may restrict our attention to the standard forms, though the analysis should extend
quite naturally to the dialectal reflexives.
6.2.2 Analysis of Dutch anaphors and pronouns
6.2.2.1 Morphological composition of Dutch reflexives
Helke (1970); Pica (1987); Postma (1997) highlight that crosslinguistically, reflexives
commonly have possessive structures. Barbiers and Bennis (2003) assume that at least
some Dutch reflexives are inherently possessive, e.g the non-standard Dutch z’n eigen
(‘his own’). In particular, they suggest a distinction between pronouns with possessive
and non-possessive specifiers. They propose that all anaphors share a common struc-
ture, that is, they are DPs with a pronominal phrase (PronP, but essentially a DP) in
their specifiers. Barbiers and Bennis assume that the pronoun in SpecDP must Agree
in features with D (with which it merges). If the pronominal specifier is 3rd person
possessive (ze or zijn (=z’n)), the D it merges with must also be possessive (-ig or eigen).
In SE reflexives, the DP whose specifier the pronoun fills fails to constitute a Condition
B domain since it bears identical features to the pronoun. Where the D head is null, D,
lacking features, will receive the features of its specifier, by agreement. For example,
hem merges with a null D, and in zich, the -ig moves from D to attach to ze. The fea-
tures are then identical, and the DP layer does not serve as a Condition B domain for
the pronoun in its specifier. The problem, of the weak reflexives, is z’n eigen (in areas
where it is a weak reflexive). Barbiers and Bennis assume that like -ig, eigen cliticises to
the pronoun in SpecDP. In the case of SELF reflexives, the DP layer above the pronoun
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does serve to create a local domain in which the pronoun satisfies Condition B; as we
have seen in §5.2.2, being free in the minimal DP is generally sufficient for a pronoun
to satisfy Condition B. In order that it does create a Condition B domain, the features of
the D head and the pronoun in its specifier are not identical; D must therefore be filled.
For example, in z’n eigen, the possessive specifier bears no [PERSON], unlike the D head,
and hence the mismatch creates a Condition B domain for the pronoun in SpecDP. In di-
alects without eigen, zelf must occupy the D head, and bearing a [FOCUS] feature, differs
from the specifier (zich or hem, depending on the dialect), again creating a Condition B
domain for zich or hem.
Barbiers and Bennis propose that there are no lexical anaphors, just pronouns
in the specifiers of DPs which are locally bound. But this fails to explain why these
pronouns have to be bound, unless they are different from other pronouns (essen-
tially, they are anaphors). It seems, however, that while this may well go some way
towards explaining the morphological composition of different anaphors, from a syn-
chronic perspective these forms are most likely now reanalysed as independent lexical
items. Hence, just as for English reflexives, where the morphological components (the
possessive or accusative pronoun plus self ) nevertheless remain visible, I assume that
in Dutch reflexives each component does not enter the derivation separately, giving rise
to a complex internal structure. Zich and zichzelf in fact display rather different sorts of
binding possibilities, which cannot, I believe, be reduced to their syntactic composition.
For the simplex anaphor, I assume that zich is simply a DP without complex structure
(i.e. D), as argued by Reinhart and Reuland (1993).4
6.2.2.2 Feature specification of Dutch reflexives
This approach minimises the internal syntactic differences between zich and zichzelf. In
fact, if there is any structural difference, I assume that it is only that the D head of zichzelf
selects a null NP:
(2) a. [DP [D zichzelf] [N(P) ∅ ]]
b. [D(P) zich ]
Clearly, then, unlike the approach of Barbiers and Bennis (2003), something other than
the internal syntax of the two anaphors will have to account for the differences between
them.
4Reinhart and Reuland (1993: 658) assume that SE anaphors are like pronouns in being headed by a D,
with the nominal element null, yet differ from pronouns in being deficient for ϕ-features. Reinhart and
Reuland (1993: 667-668, fn.16) further suggest that it is the N part of the anaphor which receives stress,
hence explaining why zich cannot be stressed, while the zelf morpheme of zichzelf can.
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We will take zichzelf first, since this appears to be the most like the English reflex-
ives for which we provided an analysis in chapter 4. As an anaphor, let’s assume that,
as argued for English reflexives in §4.2.2.3, upon entering the derivation zichzelf bears
[VAR: ]. (We may also assume the same for the reciprocal, elkaar.) Assuming just as for
English reflexives that zichzelf ’s [VAR: ] is valued by its antecedent, the prediction is
broadly that zichzelf can never be too close to its antecedent, only too far away (since its
antecedent must enter the derivation before the completion of the minimal LF-phase).5
As we will see below, though, the binding of zich cannot work in exactly the same man-
ner. Naturally, although zich must be locally bound, it appears that it can also be too
close to a potential antecedent, distributing with pronouns in some environments. I
suggest that zich must not be bound within its immediate PF-phase, otherwise it would
give rise to Condition B effects in the manner outlined in §5.4.3. The remaining question
of course, is why—if zich is an anaphor—does it also seem to be subject to such disjoint-
ness requirements? Note that under the assumptions adopted in this thesis, in theory
if zich were subject to both Condition A and B effects, it could occur in the sort of posi-
tions where non-complementarity between anaphors and pronouns occurs in English,
i.e. in positions where an antecedent occurs in the ‘gap’ between the boundaries of the
minimal LF- and PF-phase. Yet technically, this is not possible since Condition A effects
are derived by the valuation of an unvalued feature [VAR: ], while Condition B effects
are derived by the same feature being valued upon entering the derivation. As the fea-
ture cannot be both valued and unvalued upon entering the derivation, being subject
to requirements for being both locally bound and locally free would still represent a
contradiction, just as in the classical binding theory of Chomsky (1981).6
While we will see that a ‘contradictory’ account requiring zich to be both bound
in its LF-phase and free in its PF-phase in fact appears to make the correct predictions
for many of the syntactic environments examined below, it would also overlook certain
other differences between zich and zichzelf. To approach the problem from a different
angle, note first that in the broadest possible terms there seem to be two ways that the
semantics of reflexivity can potentially be encoded: either by a pronoun or anaphor
depending directly on another DP for its reference (as in the classical binding theory),
or by some element marking a predicate as reflexive (in the spirit of Reinhart and Reu-
land 1993). I have proposed that English exhibits the former system, but now suppose
that in the case of zich, Dutch also exhibits the latter. Indeed, Zwart (2006), following
Baker (1996), notes that reflexivisation is marked morphologically in various places in
the world’s languages, but commonly on the verb. We will suppose that Dutch zich
affects predicates in a similar way but that the relation is not morphologically realised
5See §4.3.2 for further details concerning the application of Agree between an anaphor and its
antecedent.
6Although this contradiction of being subject to both Conditions A and B in fact was built into the
Chomsky (1981) system in order to derive the PRO theorem; see §2.1.3.3.
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in the same manner. Imagine, then, that zich bears a feature [REFLEXIVE]. This must be
interpreted as reflexivising a predicate in its LF-phase. Note now that it is automatically
true that zich will be locally bound without appealing to valuation of its [VAR] feature:
any predicate which has zich as its object will be reflexivised,7 and zich does not need to
‘look for’ an antecedent as such.
Two welcome consequences immediately fall out from this approach. First, if
the role of zich is to reflexivise a predicate, it follows that zich is subject-oriented. Sec-
ond, as essentially proposed by Reinhart and Reuland (1993), zich may in some respects
share the feature specifications of pronouns, explaining why it is subject to disjoint-
ness requirements. Essentially, we can assume that zich enters the derivation with a
valued [VAR] feature and so must be free in its PF-phase, under the analysis of Condi-
tion B effects as a violation of Maximise Structural Economy in §5.4.3. If zich were to
bear [VAR: ] as well as its reflexivising feature, this would introduce a redundancy of
two separate mechanisms to establish the binding relation, and would also fail to ex-
plain why zich is subject to Condition B. A possible characterisation of the role of zich’s
[REFLEXIVE] feature is that it ensures that zich’s feature value for [VAR] matches that
of the subject of the predicate it reflexivises. Whether this must be stipulated depends,
I believe, on independent assumptions. Without this stipulation, it would be possible
(in principle) that zich and its antecedent could differ in the values of their [VAR] fea-
tures, while [REFLEXIVE] feature ensures that the must be assigned the same referent
upon interpretation (known as covaluation). That is, the Condition B effect would not
be predicted, since the [VAR] values of zich and its antecedent could differ. Yet as we
have seen in §4.2.2.4, it appears that in any case a covaluation strategy may be generally
disfavoured in contexts where a binding relation is possible with the same interpreta-
tion (Reinhart 1983a,b).8 If so, the derivation which obviates the Condition B effect via
covaluation may in any case be ruled out. If the predicate must be interpreted as reflex-
ive, the only possibility will then be the derivation in which zich and its antecedent bear
identical values for [VAR], and the stipulation reduces to independent factors.
We might well wonder whether the two binding mechanisms, effectively estab-
lishing reflexivity in the case of zich and anaphoric dependence in the case of zichzelf,
give rise to different semantic interpretations. Indeed, this appears to be the case,
strongly supporting the proposed distinction between the mechanisms of binding zich
and zichzelf. Lidz (2001) shows that this difference can be brought out in “Mme. Tus-
saud” contexts (Jackendoff 1992). Imagine that in Mme. Tussaud’s, a celebrity (in Jack-
endoff and Lidz’s sentences, Ringo Starr) enters to look at their own waxwork, in a
sense, looking at ‘themselves’. They then perform an action, one on the waxwork, and
7Providing of course that the subject is 3rd person, and so does not mismatch in person features with
zich.
8The reader is referred to §4.2.2.4 for further related discussion.
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one on their own person. Clearly, then, two separate relations are at play, one involving
an individual with a shared identity with the one performing the action, and one which
is genuinely reflexive. The possibilities for explaining these two scenarios with zich and
zichzelf correlate precisely with the binding mechanisms proposed here for each.9
(3) a. Ringoi
Ringoi
scheert
shaves
zichi
SEi
‘Ringo shaves himself.’
b. Ringoi
Ringoi
scheert
shaves
zichzelfi
SELFi
‘Ringo shaves himself.’ (Lidz 2001)
Lidz shows that when zich is employed, as in (3a), the only possible interpretation is
that Ringo is shaving his own beard, rather than shaving the beard of the waxwork.10
This is predicted on the account proposed here, since zich ensures a purely reflexive
interpretation of a predicate. Using zichzelf, on the other hand, as in (3b), introduces
the possibility that Ringo is shaving the waxwork, although the reading where he is
shaving his own beard is also available. Again, we can explain this since the feature
valuation relationship which links zichzelf to its antecedent (Ringo) imposes an identity
relationship between the two; as long as we can assume that an appropriate sort of
identity holds between Ringo and his waxwork, the binding possibility is predicted.11
Furthermore, since we assume that the mechanism for binding zichzelf is the same as
for binding reflexives in English, in is natural that in English Ringo is shaving himself
also permits the same two interpretations.
The contrast is revealed in a slightly different way in an example from Rooryck
and Vanden Wyngaerd (1998a) (attributed to Voskuil and Wehrmann 1990a,b). The
German baronMünchhausen, famous for recounting far-fetched tales of his adventures,
claimed to have escaped from a swamp by pulling himself up by his hair. Pulling
oneself out of something can have two interpretations, in English as in Dutch. In the
most natural interpretation, the agent gets out of his own accord, presumably by using
a branch or other fixed object. On the other interpretation, relevant to theMünchhausen
story, the agent pulls on a part of their own body (which we know is all but impossible
in the real world due to there being nothing to provide leverage).
(4) a. Münchhauseni
Münchhauseni
trok
pulled
zichi
SEi
uit
out of
het
the
moeras
swamp
9See also Rooryck and Vanden Wyngaerd (1998b) for further discussion.
10This is also the case for the English Ringo is shaving, where it is often assumed that a null reflexive is
underlyingly present.
11This is an advantage of the approach developed here over Reinhart and Reuland’s (1993) analysis of
Dutch reflexives, which as Lidz (2001) highlights does not predict these facts.
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‘Münchhausen pulled himself out of the swamp.’
b. Münchhauseni
Münchhauseni
trok
pulled
zichzelfi
SELFi
uit
out of
het
the
moeras
swamp
‘Münchhausen pulled himself out of the swamp.’
(Voskuil and Wehrmann 1990a,b)
Crucially, as originally observed by Voskuil and Wehrmann (1990a,b), (4a) never has
the interpretation required for Münchhausen’s story, while (4b) can.
To summarise, even before examining the distribution of Dutch reflexives, we
have seen evidence that zich is assumed to be a bare D pronoun bearing the valued
features [VAR] and [REFLEXIVE]. Zichzelf is assumed to be a DP with the same feature
specification as the English reflexives, that is, an unvalued feature [VAR: ]. It now
remains to show how these feature specifications explain the rather complex and often
overlapping distribution of zich and zichzelf in Dutch.
6.2.3 Explaining the distribution of SE and SELF anaphors
I now examine a range of syntactic environments, highlighting whether zich, zichzelf, or
a pronoun is acceptable in each case. I aim to show how the binding theory developed
in this thesis, interacting with the proposed feature specification of Dutch reflexives, is
able to explain why in some instances zich patterns with zichzelf, and in others patterns
with pronouns.
6.2.3.1 Object position of transitive verbs
Only zichzelf can appear as the object of a transitive verb bound by the subject:
(5) Maxi
Maxi
haat
hates
zichzelfi
SELFi
/*zichi
/*SEi
/*hemi
/*himi
‘Max hates himself.’ (Reuland and Everaert 2001)
This is exactly what we predict. Zichzelf is bound in its LF-phase (by the copy of Max
in SpecvP), while both the pronoun and zich are bound in their minimal PF-phase (also
vP), hence are ungrammatical.
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6.2.3.2 Object position of inherently reflexive verbs
In Dutch, if a predicate is inherently reflexive (e.g. behave (oneself )), only an SE anaphor
can be used:12
(6) Maxi
Maxi
gedraagt
behaves
zichi
SEi
/*zichzelfi
/*SELFi
/*hemi
/*himi
‘Max behaves (himself).’ (Reuland and Everaert 2001)
Structurally, the locality between the subject and reflexive object is identical to that in
the transitive verb construction, but here, although an anaphor is still required (the pro-
noun still being ungrammatical), zich is possible, while zichzelf is not, i.e. the reverse
scenario to (5). Given the explanation for the ungrammaticality of zich in (5), it is partic-
ularly striking that zich is undeniably in a local binding configuration with the subject,
though this should be ruled out by Condition B on the assumptions outlined so far.
Either we are wrong in thinking that zich is subject to Condition B at all, or something
about this particular construction renders this instance of zich not subject to Condition
B. Adopting the former would leave us without an explanation for the ungrammatical-
ity of zich as the object of a transitive verb, and would also leave other cases examined
below unexplained. Barbiers and Bennis (2003) suggest that inherently reflexive sen-
tences are not structurally equivalent to (5) in that they have a ‘hidden’ small clause
complement of which zich is the subject. This small clause constitutes a binding do-
main in which zich is of course free. This, however, fails to explain why a pronoun in
the same position is ungrammatical in Standard Dutch (Barbiers and Bennis show that
it is grammatical in some dialects), and why zichzelf is impossible.
So we are left seeking an alternative explanation for why zich is not subject to
Condition B in the object position of an inherently reflexive verb. As we saw in §5.3.2.2,
Reinhart and Reuland (1993); Reuland and Reinhart (1995) claim that in order for a
pronoun to be subject to the relevant disjointness requirements, it has to have full ϕ-
features and structural Case.
Condition on A-chains
A maximal A-chain (α1,. . . , αn) contains exactly one link – α1 – which is
fully specified for ϕ-features
(Reuland and Reinhart 1995: 256)
I showed in §5.4.1 that this aspect of the Chain Condition does not need to be stipulated
but—provided that binding reduces to Agree—is subsumed by the Activity Condition
12See Everaert (1986:45-63) for a review of inherently reflexive constructions.
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(Chomsky 2000, 2001). We assume, naturally, that objects of transitive verbs are typi-
cally assigned structural Case. However, inherently reflexive verbs are rather different
in that they do not simply select an object; only elements specified with a reflexive fea-
ture (zich, for 3rd person) are permitted. In some sense which is not entirely agreed
upon, the specification of these predicates as inherently reflexive eliminates or reduces
the θ-role assigned to the object. It is plausible that this elimination of the θ-role as-
signed to the object also has a syntactic reflex, namely the suppression of structural
accusative (objective) Case-assignment. If so, then as Reinhart and Reuland (1993) ar-
gue, zich may receive inherent Case through θ-marking by an inherently reflexive verb
(allowing it to occupy an argument position). This is consistent with the claim by Ev-
eraert (1986: 98-106) that zich may either receive structural or inherent Case, and that
inherently reflexive verbs assign inherent Case to zich. I leave it open for now whether
it is incompatibility with inherent Case or the fact that inherently reflexive predicates
fail to assign a theme θ-role which prevents other DPs, including pronouns and zichzelf,
from occurring as objects of inherently reflexive verbs. That is, either these will require
their structural Case feature to be valued and inherently reflexive verbs cannot do this,
or they are simply incompatible with the θ-grid of an inherently reflexive verb.
In this way, we can relate the behaviour of zich in inherently reflexive contexts
to other cases (in Germanic languages) where Condition B effects are circumvented.
Frisian has 3rd person singular feminine/3rd person plural pronouns which may ap-
pear as a locally bound pronoun har/harren (‘her’/‘them’);13 the other 3rd person pro-
noun se cannot be locally bound:14
(7) a. Hjai
Theyi
skammen
shamed
harreni
themi
/*sei
/*themi
‘They were ashamed of themselves.’ (Frisian; Hoekstra 1994)
b. Mariei
Maryi
wasket
washes
hari
heri
/*sei
/*heri
‘Mary washes (herself).’ (Frisian; Reuland and Everaert 2001)
Hoekstra (1994) adduces a range of convincing evidence in support of the conclusion
that the two types pronoun differ in their Case specification, har(ren) bearing inherent
Case, and se bearing structural Case. This explanation for locally bound pronouns is
developed by van Gelderen (2000) for earlier stages of English, which also permitted
locally bound pronouns, as in (8).
13For the 3rd person plural pronoun, either har or the extended for harrenmay be used (Hoekstra 1994:48,
fn.4). For clarity, I use harren here where this form is being used.
14This data has also been presented §3.2.2.1 to argue against Condition B applying at LF, and in §5.4.1 to
show that the activity of [VAR] features is crucial in determining Condition B effects.
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(8) ac
but
hei
hei
hynei
himi
gewyrpte
recovered
‘but he recovered himself.’ (Old English, Beowulf 1746; van Gelderen 2000)
Middle English also allowed pronominal objects of inherently reflexive verbs (vanGeld-
eren 2000:110). Intriguingly, in support of our view that inherently reflexive verbs do
not assign structural Case, van Gelderen (2000: 110) shows that in the Middle English
period, by which time pronouns were generally not permitted as object of verbs corefer-
ent with a local antecedent, they were still allowed as pronominal objects of inherently
reflexive verbs.
(9) hei
hei
xuld
should
repent
repent
hymi
himi
‘He should regret.’ (Mid. English, The Paston Letters #129; van Gelderen 2000)
Van Gelderen adopts the same conclusion as we have for Dutch, namely that these in-
herently reflexive verbs assign only inherent Case, and this, given the analysis of Con-
dition B effects proposed in §5.4.3, explains why the pronoun can be locally bound.15
The data we have looked at so far from inherently reflexive predicates in Dutch
can be explained by the proposed feature specifications for zich and zichzelf. Further-
more, our analysis is consistent with some related evidence from Old/Middle English
and Frisian. However, before we move on, it should be pointed out that zich/zichzelf
complementarity does not always obtain in the object position of inherently reflexive
verbs.
(10) Maxi
Max
wast
washes
zichi
SEi
/zichzelfi
/SELFi
/*hemi
/*himi
‘Max washes (himself).’ (Reuland and Everaert 2001)
Following Everaert (1986); Reinhart and Reuland (1991, 1993); Reuland and Everaert
(2001) and others, I assume a double entry in the lexicon for such predicates, one for
a non-reflexive transitive verb (which may take zichzelf as its object), and another for
15An alternative analysis (sometimes proposed for the equivalent SE reflexives in Scandinavian, as we
see below) is that there are two varieties of zich, the sort which appears in inherently reflexive contexts, and
the sort which appears as an argument of non-inherently reflexive predicates. It seems possible that the
latter is not a true argument of the inherently reflexive predicate and does not introduce a [VAR] feature,
thereby explaining why it does not induce a Condition B effect. Under this approach it could be argued
that zich is more like a reflexivising morpheme perhaps coanalysed with the inherently reflexive predicate:
indeed, Lidz (2001) reports a suggestion by Pierre Pica that zich in inherently reflexive contexts is a clitic
whereas in other cases it is not.
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an inherently reflexive predicate (which may only take zich as its object).16 This also
correctly predicts that the bound pronoun is ungrammatical in both cases.
6.2.3.3 Object position of selected PPs
Only zichzelf can appear as the object of a selected PP bound by the subject:
(11) Johni
Johni
schoot
shot
op
at
zichzelfi
SELFi
/*zichi
/*SEi
/*hemi
/*himi
‘John shot himself.’ (adapted from Koster 1985)
Essentially, we have the same pattern here as the object position of transitive verbs;
only zichzelf is permitted, suggesting that Condition B rules out both zich and the pro-
noun. Under the assumptions of §5.2.3, these argument PPs cannot be PF-phases, and
so the Condition B effects are expected under the analysis in §5.4.3. Rather strikingly,
this conclusion is supported by the observation of Koster (1985: 147) that a ‘remark-
able’ characteristic of the PPs which constitute local binding domains is that they bear
stress, while that that do not create local binding domains do not. This ties in perfectly
with our assumption that PF-phases are typically stress-bearing constituents; we as-
sume that if the PP cannot bear stress, it is not a PF-phase, and does not count as the
domain in which a pronoun must be free. Hence here there is no PF-phase intervening
between zich/hem and the antecedent, which predicts the observed Condition B effect.
Zichzelf on the other hand can be bound by John, as PP does not constitute an LF-phase
boundary, and so its [VAR: ] can be valued by Agree with John’s matching valued
feature.
16If English also has inherently reflexive predicates which may take a null reflexive object (see also note
10), this double entry in the lexicon must also be true of English, giving rise to both John washed and John
washed Peter/himself. Even if null reflexives can be assumed to be the objects of inherently reflexive verbs
in English, note that overt reflexives must also be able to. For predicates which have only an inherently
reflexive entry in the lexicon (e.g. behave), an overt reflexive may still occupy the object position; a non-
reflexive DP may not, precisely because there is no transitive lexicon entry for the predicate). If both overt
reflexives and null reflexives can occupy the object position of inherently reflexive objects, the data are
explained in the following way:
(i) a. John washed ∅ /himself Lexicon entry for wash as inherently reflexive
b. John washed Peter /himself Lexicon entry for wash as transitive
(ii) a. John behaved ∅ /himself Lexicon entry for behave as inherently reflexive
b. * John behaved Peter /himself No lexicon entry for behave as transitive
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6.2.3.4 Object position of unselected PPs
In the corresponding position inside unselected PPs, either zich or a pronounmay occur,
suggesting that Condition B is satisfied, and hence that PP is a PF-phase.
(12) a. Hansi
Hansi
zag
saw
de
the
hond
dog
naast
next to
?hemi
?himi
/zichi
/SEi
/?*zichzelfi
/?*SELFi
‘Hans saw the dog next to him.’
b. Peteri
Peteri
laat
let
mij
me
voor
for
hemi
himi
/zichi
/SEi
/*zichzelfi
/*SELFi
werken
work
‘Peter has me work for him.’ (adapted from Everaert 1986)
Again, this approach is supported by Koster’s observation that these PPs are stressed,
tying in with my assumption that PF-phases are typically stressable constituents; see
§2.2.3.3 and §5.2.5.2.
Given that PPs are not LF-phases, the question of course is why zichzelf is not
acceptable here. This is notable since English reflexives, which are assumed to bear the
same feature set as zichzelf, can often appear in such environments (although perhaps
more marginally than pronouns for some speakers), as in the famous (13):
(13) Johni saw a snake [PP near himselfi]
We might imagine that these PPs in Dutch are also LF-phases, and as zichzelf finds no
antecedent within PP, its [VAR: ] cannot be valued. Yet this does not resolve the issue,
since we would then expect zich also to be ungrammatical, contrary to fact, as it could
not then reflexivise a predicate in its LF-phase. Also we have assumed in §4.5.2 that LF-
phases are constituents which obligatorily contain a subject, and it is not clear that PPs
such as this should be assumed to have PRO subjects.17 Furthermore, we also saw in
§4.5.2 that the presence of a subject does not necessarily imply that a given constituent
will constitute a phase, since DPs with possessive or agentive subjects, for example, are
not LF-phases.
There are indications, however, that the reason for the degraded status of zichzelf
in the object position of unselected PPs may not be binding-theoretic, or even syntactic.
It is commonly observed that speakers often prefer the unstressed anaphor zich over
the pronoun hem in sentences such as (12a) (hence the judgement reported by Everaert
1986 for (12a)), although they are willing to accept the grammaticality of both. Koster
(1986: 325) notes that when the pronoun is used, the preferred form for most speakers of
17Though see Barbiers (2000) for arguments for subjects of Dutch PPs. See §5.2.3 for cases where Condi-
tion B effects do lead us to assume the presence of a PP-internal PRO.
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standard Dutch in (37b) is an unstressed form of the pronoun, ’m. As zich cannot bear
stress, it appears that in this syntactic environment, an unstressed form is favoured.
More tellingly still, Koster states that zichzelf is impossible here without contrastive stress,
indicating that it is possible when appropriate phonological conditions are met:
“...from the point of view of the binding theory both zich and zichzelf can
occur in adjunct PPs, but that if the preposition can be (uncontrastively)
stressed zich must be selected, while zichzelf must be selected otherwise.”
(Koster 1986: 325)
If this is a plausible explanation, then we might well wonder whether in the object posi-
tion of selected PPs in §6.2.3.3 zich is ruled out due to phonological factors, for example,
that selected Ps must be followed by a stressed element, as suggested by de Vries (1998).
Yet even if such a constraint were to hold, it does not mean that we should modify our
assumptions about the binding-theoretic configuration in these sentences, since even
the unreduced pronoun hem is ungrammatical in the same environment: we would
therefore still need to invoke Condition B for such cases, regardless of other prosodic
factors also ruling out zich. In any case, it is clear that syntactic and not prosodic factors
rule out zich in (11). Koster (1986: 332) provides the following example, where zich is
an acceptable object of the preposition op (‘at’), provided that the antecedent is not too
local:18
(14) Hans
Hans
gelooft
believes
[dat
[that
Jank
Johnk
[Peteri
[Peteri
[op
[at
zich∗i/k
SE∗i/k
schieten]
shoot]
zag]]
saw]]
‘Hans believes that John saw Peter shoot at him (=John).’
(adapted from Koster 1986)
6.2.3.5 DP-internal subject
In the same way that Dutch (at least in theory) exhibits non-complementarity in the
object position of adjunct PPs, it is again like English in exhibiting non-complementarity
in the DP-internal subject position between reciprocals (elkaar) and pronouns (although
genitive reflexives are impossible as in English):
(15) Ziji
Theyi
zagen
saw
[elkaarsi
[each other’si
/huni
/theiri
auto]
car]
‘They saw each other’s/their car.’ (Koster 1985)
18Note also that the possible reading for zich is not in fact predicted under the approach developed thus
far, since zich is apparently not bound in its LF-phase; see §6.2.4.
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Again, we may assume the explanation provided in §4.5.2 for English. DP does not
constitute an LF-phase, allowing the reciprocal’s [VAR: ] to be valued by the matrix
subject. Yet on the other hand, DP does constitute a PF-phase, allowing the pronoun to
be bound by any element outside DP.
6.2.3.6 The ECM subject
A far more problematic case of Dutch non-complementarity arises in the ECM subject
position, this time between zich and zichzelf :
(16) a. Maxi
Maxi
voelde
felt
[zichi
[SEi
/zichzelfi
/SELFi
/*hemi
/*himi
wegglijden]
slide away]
‘Max felt himself slide away.’ (adapted from Reuland and Everaert 2001)
b. Johni
Johni
zag
saw
[zichi
[SEi
/zichzelfi
/SELFi
/*hemi
/*himi
vallen]
fall]
‘John saw himself fall.’ (Koster 1985)
The only other environment where we have seen this pattern is with certain inherently
reflexive verbs, like wassen (‘wash’), as shown in §6.2.3.2. There, the suggested explana-
tion was that such predicates have dual entries in the lexicon, and so that each reflexive
occurs as the object of essentially a different predicate, one inherently reflexive, the
other not. No such explanation is available here; the reflexive is not even an argument
of the matrix predicate. The real problem in both cases is why zich escapes Condition
B here, since the pronoun is ruled out. The solution proposed in §6.2.3.2 was that zich
is compatible with inherent Case, while the other possibilities are not, coupled with the
assumption from §5.4.3.3 that inherently Case-marked DPs do not induce Condition B
effects. Yet this is unlikely to be an appropriate solution this time, since the ECM subject
position is standardly assumed to be assigned structural, rather than inherent, Case. As
yet, then, we do not have a good explanation for this non-complementarity. We might
envisage somehow appealing to the two anaphors occupying different structural posi-
tions, since it is often argued that zich is a clitic (Everaert 1986, cf. Koster 1986). As we
are forced to examine the syntax of Dutch ECM constructions in more detail in light of
more complex data from Dutch, I leave further discussions until the next section.
6.2.4 Problems with zich
We have seen that ECM constructions in Dutch pose a particular problem for our bind-
ing theory, though the syntax of such constructions proves somewhat elusive anyway.
However, more generally, Dutch constructions involving non-finite complementation
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prove difficult for the proposed account for the distribution of zich in particular. I now
look at further examples of anaphors embedded in these constructions, revealing addi-
tional difficulties for the proposals under development.
6.2.4.1 Longer-distance binding of zich
In (17), the fact that only Peter can be the antecedent for zich follows under our current
assumptions:
(17) Jani
Johni
liet
let
[Peterk
[Peterk
zich∗i/k
SE∗i/k
/zichzelf∗i/k
/SELF∗i/k
/hemi/∗k
/himi/∗k
wassen]
wash]
‘John let Peter wash himself.’ (Koster 1986)
The pattern of the object reflexives and pronouns in the ECM complement of laten (‘let’)
is exactly the same as for equivalent cases in the matrix clause, such as (10), repeated
here as (18):
(18) Maxi
Maxi
wast
washes
zichi
SEi
/zichzelfi
/SELFi
/hem∗i
/him∗i
‘Max washes (himself).’ (Reuland and Everaert 2001)
In (17), just as in (18), zich is not subject to Condition B when it is the object of an
inherently reflexive predicate, and so can be bound within its minimal PF-phase (vP).
Zichzelf is bound within its LF-phase, presumably vP in the ECM complement in (17).
The fact that zichzelf cannot be bound by the matrix subject in (17) confirms that the
ECM complement clause either is, or contains, an LF-phase (vP). (19) provides further
evidence of this.
(19) Maryi
Maryi
liet
let
[Peterk
[Peterk
naast
next to
zichzelf∗i/k
SELF∗i/k
zitten]
sit]
‘Mary let Peter sit next to himself.’ (Koster 1985)
The minimal LF-phase containing zichzelf in the vP in the ECM complement, and so
binding by Mary in the matrix clause is impossible. Nothing so far in the laten-con-
struction is contrary to what we predict under the current version of the proposal; the
binding domains are explained in the same way as the equivalent cases above.
However, as noted by Koster (1985, 1986), the picture is not nearly as clear as it
might at first seem. Take the following example of an embedded ECM construction
with zich as the object of the ECM complement:
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(20) dat
that
Janj
Johnj
[Mariei
[Maryi
de
the
slang
snake
[naast
[near
zichi/j]
SEi/j]
knuffelen]
hug]
liet
let
‘that John let Mary hug the snake near him/her.’ (Koster 1986)
Here, either Jan or Marie may bind zich. This is not what we predict. The minimal
PF-phase for the anaphor is the locative PP containing it, so it will satisfy Condition
B whether it reflexivises knuffelen or laten. However, since both predicates can be re-
flexivised by zich, its minimal LF-phase must apparently contain both knuffelen and
laten (and presumably their subjects, Marie and Jan respectively). Unlike (17), then, the
minimal LF-phase in this case appears to extend beyond the ECM complement to the
embedding ECM vP.19 There is no effect on the domain in which zich must be free, since
it can still be too close to the antecedent within the ECM complement, as in (21):
(21) dat
that
Janj
Johnj
[Peteri
[Peteri
op
at
zich∗i/j
SE∗i/j
schieten]
shoot]
liet
let
‘that John let Peter shoot at him.’ (Koster 1986)
While the possibility in (20) of binding zich by Marie is predicted on our assumptions
thus far, binding by Jan is not. Similarly, though binding of zich by Peter is correctly
ruled out in (21), binding by Jan is incorrectly ruled out.
Clearly, we must account for why zich can be bound at longer distance in certain
ECM environments. In light of the examples we have seen, we might imagine that it is
the embedding of the ECM construction that somehow allows for the extension of the
domain. Yet in an equivalent sentence to (21) without embedding the ECM construc-
tion, the binding facts are identical:
(22) Maryj
Maryj
liet
let
[Peteri
[Peteri
op
at
zich∗i/j
SE∗i/j
schieten]
shoot]
‘Mary let Peter shoot at him.’ (adapted from Koster 1985)
Moreover, we find embedded ECM constructions where the binding domain for zich
does not extend. There is no difference either between the binding domains in (23a)
and the embedded version in (23b):
(23) a. * Maryi
Maryi
acht
considers
[Peterk
[Peterk
verliefd
in love
op
with
zichi/k]
SEi/k]
‘Mary considers Peter in love with her.’ (Koster 1985)
19It seems that an ambiguity in the adjunction site of PP cannot be the origin of the two possible bindings
for zich, since it would then be expected to give rise to the same effect for zichzelf, for example. This is not
the case, as shown by (25) below.
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b. * dat
that
Janj
Johnj
[Maryi
[Maryi
verliefd
in love
op
with
zichi/j]
SEi/j]
achtte
considered
‘that John considered Mary in love with him.’ (Koster 1986)
In both sentences, zich is too close to the ECM subject and too far away from the higher
subject.
Despite an apparent difference between the binding possibilities in (22) and (23),
it is nevertheless natural to assume that some property of the ECM construction is re-
sponsible for the the longer distance binding when it does arise. In the spirit of Koster
(1985, 1986), and as noted by Yang (1983: 182), the relevant descriptive generalisation
to be made here is that when the SE anaphor is embedded in an adjunct PP within the
ECM complement, it can (and, in the case of (24a) and (24b), must) be bound outside
the ECM complement.
(24) a. Maryj
Maryj
liet
let
[Peteri
[Peteri
naast
next to
zich∗i/j
SE∗i/j
zitten]
sit]
‘Mary let Peter sit next to her.’ (Koster 1985)
b. Janj
Johnj
liet
let
[Kareli
[Kareli
over
about
zich∗i/j
SE∗i/j
praten]
talk]
‘John let Karel talk about him.’ (Yang 1983)
This correctly captures the ‘extension’ of the binding domain in (20), (21), (22), (24a),
and (24b) and the absence of this extension in (17), (23a), (23b). However, there are
reasons to suppose that a simple ‘extension’ of the minimal LF-phase containing zich is
not the correct approach. Intriguingly, the binding domain does not extend for zichzelf
in the same environment. Compare (20) with (25):
(25) dat
that
Janj
Johnj
[Mariei
[Maryi
de
the
slang
snake
[naast
[near
zichzelfi/∗j]
SELFi/∗j]
knuffelen]
hug]
liet
let
‘that John let Mary hug the snake near him/her.’
If zich can be bound by Jan in (20) because its minimal LF-phase is in fact the vP that
contains Jan (the subject of liet), then we would expect that zichzelf in (25) could also
take Jan as its antecedent.
6.2.4.2 Assumptions about Dutch clause structure
We have seen, then, that there are two crucial factors in extending the domain in which
zichmust be bound. First, it must occur within an adjunct, and second, the adjunct must
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be in an ECM complement clause. In cases where the complement clause is a complete
CP, zich cannot be bound by the matrix subject:
(26) * Peteri
Peter
zei
said
[dat
[that
Mary
Mary
naar
to
zichi
SEi
toe
PRT
kwam]
came]
(Koster 1985)
In accounting for the behaviour of zich in ECM complements, we start by examining the
syntax of an ECM complement. ECM complements in Dutch are often considered to be
VPs, or under the theoretical assumptions I adopt here, vPs. Therefore, a traditional
treatment in an updated framework would assume them to be phases (for both LF and
PF). Indeed, in a recent Minimalist treatment of German ECM complements, Wurm-
brand (2001) argues in favour of this view. Furthermore, she claims that the embedding
ECM verb is a ‘semi-functional’ predicate; these verbs occur in functional positions,
but can also assign a θ-role to a DP in their specifier. Wurmbrand suggests, therefore,
that German ECM verbs occupy the v position, selecting another vP (the ECM com-
plement).20 I assume that this structure extends to Dutch ECM complements, too, as
tentatively suggested by Wurmbrand (2001: 284-285). For a sentence such as (16a) re-
peated here as (27), then, the configuration before the matrix C/T-domain is derived is
therefore along the lines of (28):21
(27) Maxi
Max
voelde
felt
[vP zichi
[vP SEi
/zichzelfi
/SELFi
/*hemi
/*himi
wegglijden]
slide away]
‘Max felt himself slide away.’ (adapted from Reuland and Everaert 2001)
20This approach is also adopted by Lee-Schoenfeld (2004) and related to binding facts in German, with
the phase as the relevant binding domain.
21Here I adopt a classical analysis of Dutch as an OV language, where VPs (and vPs) are head-final
in embedded contexts. The structures in this section largely follow the analysis Lee-Schoenfeld (2004)
assumes for German ECM constructions.
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(28) vP
DP
Max
v′
v
voelde
vP
DP
Xzich
Xzichzelf
*hem
v′
VP
<wegglijden>
v
v wegglijden
Thus zichzelf in SpecvP is sufficiently local to allow binding by an antecedent in the next
phase up (the matrix clause vP), by the Phase Impenetrability Condition. A pronoun in
this edge position will presumably be too close to the higher phase to avoid a Condition
B violation, though why zich is not remains to be explained, as mentioned in §6.2.3.6
above.
6.2.4.3 Zich as a clitic
While the binding possibilities for zich (unlike English anaphors) differ when embed-
ded in a PP adjunct within an ECM complement from when it is embedded in a PP
adjunct within a finite complement, there is no equivalent difference in the binding
domains for pronouns or zichzelf. We are led to conclude that there is some particu-
lar characteristic of zich which is revealed in this syntactic environment. In light of
the unexpected or unexplained behaviour of zich in the ECM subject position noted in
§6.2.3.6, we might well have been forced into such a conclusion independently of the
longer distance cases of zich outlined in §6.2.4.1 above. In the spirit of the sort of analy-
ses proposed by Pica (1987); Reinhart and Reuland (1991) and others, let’s suppose that
the special thing about zich is that it undergoes head-movement to attach to a predicate,
and that this movement is covert (since zich is not overtly coanalysed with the predicate
it reflexivises). Pica (1987: 490-491) proposes that long distance anaphora crosslinguis-
tically is derived by covert movement of an X0 anaphor through successive inflectional
head positions, giving rise to binding by subjects in SpecTP positions. This view has
proved very popular. One piece of evidence for treating zich as some sort of clitic of
the type proposed in long distance binding configurations is that like long distance
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anaphors, zich can be bound only by a subject (unlike zichzelf ).22 We might imagine
that in order for reflexivisation to be achieved, zich must incorporate into the predicate
(within its phase). So, rather than the anaphor moving through the inflectional domain,
as proposed in GB work on long distance reflexivisation, I suggest that the anaphor
may move to attach directly to a predicate, resulting in a reflexive interpretation. This
movement of zich could then be responsible for the extension of its binding domain, in
a way that we describe in detail below.
A problem is that on our assumptions so far we already have an explanation for
why zich is subject-oriented: it bears a reflexivising feature which ensures that a pred-
icate is interpreted as reflexive. It appears, then that movement of zich to incorporate
into a predicate is not required. Moreover, as it stands the analysis of zich extending its
binding domain via covert movement overgenerates. Take (29a) (based on (17)), and
(29b) ((23a) repeated):
(29) a. Jani
Johni
liet
let
[Peterk
[Peterk
zich∗i/k
SE∗i/k
wassen]
wash]
‘John let Peter wash himself.’ (Koster 1986)
b. Maryi
Maryi
acht
considers
[Peterk
[Peterk
verliefd
in love
op
with
zich∗i/∗k]
SE∗i/∗k]
(Koster 1985)
In neither case is zich embedded inside an adjunct, which as we have seen appears to
be critical in the effect of the binding domain ‘extension’. Under a movement analysis
of zich, if it were to undergo covert movement, then just as in sentences such as (24a),
repeated here, we would expect the matrix subject to be a suitable antecedent for zich.
(30) Maryj
Maryj
liet
let
[Peteri
[Peteri
naast
next to
zich∗i/j
SE∗i/j
zitten]
sit]
‘Mary let Peter sit next to her.’ (Koster 1985)
The possibility that I will tentatively propose here is that zich does not typically undergo
movement in order to reflexive a predicate, since it does not need to. Hence in (29a)
(based on (17)) there is no extension of zich’s binding domain, since it does not move
into v in the (LF-) phase-edge. Assume that the reflexivising feature of zich is sufficient
22Koster (1985) argues contra Faltz (1977) that zichzelf can be bound by a non-subject, though Koster
concedes that for reasons which are not clear, this is not always the case:
(i) Johni
John
sprak
talked to
Peterj
Peter
over
about
zichzelfi/∗j
himself
‘John talked to Peter about himself.’ (Koster 1985)
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to ensure that the predicate that selects it is interpreted reflexively. Yet reflexivisation
cannot be achieved in cases where the relevant predicate has no external argument,
or where zich is the external argument, for example. This is precisely the case in (30),
where the preposition assigns a θ-role to zich and in the cases observed abovewhere zich
occupies the ECM subject position. In these cases we will argue that zich must move
to attach to a predicate which can be interpreted reflexively. In (29a) and (29b), on the
other hand, zich is an argument of a predicate which can be interpreted reflexively and
so no movement is required for zich to be able act as a reflexiviser.
A problemwith this analysis is that the requiredmovement of zich is covert. There
are two possibilities: either movement takes place in a post-syntactic covert component
of the grammar, or it takes place in narrow syntax, but the lower copy ends up being
the one that is pronounced. If binding relations are determined by processes of narrow
syntax, as we have argued in this thesis, then movement of zich must take place during
narrow syntax too, unlike LF-movement of anaphors in previous P&P frameworks. Yet
in any case, in a framework without a covert component for covert movement to take
place in, we are perhaps independently led to take the latter option. Assume then that
zich is pronounced in the tail position of the eventual movement chain.23 All we need
now is a reason for why the lowest copy must be pronounced, and this might plausibly
have to do with phonological factors. For example, although we have assumed in §6.2.1
that zich, when introduced as an argument with structural Case, is not syntactically
cliticised to the verb (Koster 1986; Reinhart 1997; Reinhart and Siloni 2004),24 we have
also seen that it is phonologically weak, and so is unable to undergo topicalisation and
be coordinated with full DPs, for example.
To make the proposals more concrete, we now outline the derivation of the fol-
lowing ECM construction in (30). Zich is an argument of the preposition naast. The
preposition cannot be interpreted reflexively, since it has no subject. If our assumptions
above are correct, in order for zich to reflexivise a predicate, it must then undergomove-
ment. Zich will first incorporate into V, although as stated above, the moved copy is not
pronounced:
23See, for example, Zwart (1996), who suggests that auxiliaries in Dutch modal-auxiliary-participle con-
structions may undergo movement in overt syntax, even though the nonterminal copy is overtly realised.
Roberts (1997) also proposes a similar analysis of syntactic movement with the lower copy pronounced for
so called ‘restructuring’ contexts in Romance, where ‘verb raising’ apparently takes place covertly.
24Although it may be in inherently reflexive contexts; see note 15.
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(31) VP
V
zitten <zich>
PP
P
naast
DP
zich
This V complex will then raise to v, as in (32).
(32) vP
DP
Mary
v′
v
liet
vP
DP
Peter
v′
VP
<V> PP
P
naast
DP
zich
v
v V
zitten <zich>
As zich is incorporated into zitten, we might suppose that zich is understood as reflex-
ivising this predicate, in other words, as bound by the subject in the specifier of v. Yet
it seems that if zich is interpreted as reflexivising zitten Condition B is violated, since
the reading appears to be impossible. We assume for now, then, that the PP headed
by naast fails to constitute a PF-phase, and so the minimal PF-phase for zich is vP, con-
taining Peter. Yet this is not the end of the story for the derivation of (30). At stage of
the derivation in (32), note that zich, as part of v, is in the edge of the ECM comple-
ment phase; it can potentially now move out of the ECM complement and reflexivise
the embedding ECM verb, laten.
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It seems to me that there are two ways of achieving this movement. We might
imagine that the movement of the embedded verb zitten (with zich incorporated) is sim-
ply not overt, as Roberts (1997) proposes for Romance (see note 22). Indeed, rightward
movement of the verb in the ECM complement to attach the ECM verb does seem to
be overt when the ECM construction is itself embedded. In (33), the verb wassen in the
ECM complement right-adjoins (on the V2 assumptions indicated above) to the ECM
verb ziet.
(33) dat
that
Jani
Johni
zichzelfi
SELFi
Peterk
Peterk
ziet
sees
wassen
wash
‘That John sees himself wash Peter.’
(adapted from van Noord and Bouma 1997)
Covert movement of the verb in the ECM complement would result in a derivation such
as (34) for (30), where the v complex in the ECM complement covertly head adjoins to
the ECM verb.
(34) vP
DP
Mary
v′
v
<v>
v V
zitten <zich>
liet
vP
DP
Peter
v′
VP
<V> PP
P
naast
DP
zich
v
v V
zitten <zich>
In any case, it is perhaps not actually crucial that zitten (with zich incorporated) moves
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covertly to adjoin to the ECM verb in order to explain (30). An alternative is that from
the phase-edge position zich occupies in (32) as part of v in the ECM complement, it
is free to move (covertly) again, excorporating to the nearest predicate, v of the matrix
clause:
(35) vP
DP
Mary
v′
v
<zich> liet
vP
DP
Peter
v′
VP
<V> PP
P
naast
DP
zich
v
v V
zitten <zich>
Now we assume that this movement derives the reading where zich is bound by the
matrix subject, and the prediction is consistent with our assumptions concerning local-
ity: zich escapes its minimal LF-phase by being pied-piped with the embedded verb to
the immediate phase-edge (v), whereupon it can attach to the matrix v.
We have managed to explain why the ECM construction is crucial, since local-
ity rules out equivalent derivations where the complement clause is a CP, rather than
a vP: in the immediately higher phase there is no predicate head in the phase edge to
which zich could move, so it can never reflexivise a predicate higher than its minimal
CP. Some further mention of the mechanisms responsible for the required semantic in-
terpretation is perhaps in order. We have suggested in §6.2.2.2 that the role of zich is
to ensure that a predicate is interpreted as reflexive, and that this is only successfully
achieved if it bears the same value for its [VAR] feature as the subject of the predicate
it reflexivises. We have not speculated here on the possible motivation for the head-
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movement in narrow syntax, however. While even the most fundamental properties of
head-movement remain fairly controversial, it seems quite problematic to assume that
this variety of head-movement is simply triggered by the requirement for valuation of
an unvalued feature of zich, for two reasons. First, zich appears not to undergo move-
ment when it is an argument of a predicate which can be interpreted reflexively, and
so zich would have to have different feature specifications when it is the argument of
a predicate that also selects a subject and when it is the argument of a predicate that
doesn’t. Second, we might expect that if feature valuation is the motivation for move-
ment, zich would then bear an unvalued feature which would again make its other
features active, and the Condition B effect would be expected in the landing site of the
movement, contrary to fact. In other words, only the pronounced copy of zich in (30)
is active for the purposes of Condition B. This is expected if upon completion of the
minimal PF-/LF-phase in which zich enters the derivation (the ECM complement vP)
all of zich’s unvalued features have been valued. In summary, although the empirical
evidence suggests movement of zich, the mechanisms responsible for it remain to be
clarified. Since this analysis forms only a small part of this rather exploratory chapter,
we leave this as a matter for future resolution.
6.2.4.4 Remaining details
The analysis presented—albeit necessarily tentatively—goes some way towards ex-
plaining some rather curious facts about zich. These include strict subject-orientation,
interpretive differences from SELF reflexives, a requirement for being (in some sense)
both bound and free, and why the domain in which it must be bound appears to extend
in a particular environment. However, certain questions still remain for this approach.
In particular, the analysis of zich as a clitic seems to fail to shed any light on the problem
of why zich and zichzelf are in non-complementary distribution in the ECM subject po-
sition. Importantly, why is zich possible as an ECM subject bound by the matrix subject,
when not a pronoun is not? A second problem concerns other unexpected cases of zich
appearing in locally bound configurations. Reinhart and Reuland provide the follow-
ing evidence for their Reflexivity binding framework. As we expect, when a 3-place
predicate is used, and one object is interpreted as bound by the subject of the predicate,
zich is ungrammatical (due to Condition B):
(36) * Henki
Henki
wees
assigned
mij
me
aan
to
zichi
SEi
toe
‘Henk assigned me to himself.’25 (Reinhart and Reuland 1993)
25The translation is mine, as in the following cases.
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But when both objects are interpreted as bound by the subject, zich is now allowed in
this position, provided that the other object is SELF, marking the predicate as reflexive.
(37) Henki
Henki
wees
assigned
zichzelfi
himselfi
aan
to
zichi
SEi
toe
‘Henk assigned himself to himself.’ (Reinhart and Reuland 1993)
Not only this, but either reflexive can be realised as SELF, provided that the other is
realised as SE.
(38) Henki
Henki
wees
assigned
zichi
SEi
aan
to
zichzelfi
himselfi
toe
‘Henk assigned himself to himself.’ (Reinhart and Reuland 1993)
Reinhart and Reuland highlight that their approach explains this, since the predicate
must only be marked as reflexive (by the presence of a SELF reflexive); the order of the
SE and SELF shouldn’t matter.
A related problem arises with zich as the object of an ECM complement. Though
zich cannot be bound in normal situations by a coargument, when the ECM subject is
zichzelf, it can be bound by it (an observation attributed to Everaert 1991):
(39) Jani
Jani
hoorde
heard
[zichzelfi
[himselfi
zichi
SEi
critiseren]
criticise]
‘Jan heard himself criticise himself.’ (Reinhart and Reuland 1993)
Reinhart and Reuland (1993) show that this is predicted under their approach since
the SELF anaphor reflexive-marks both the matrix and embedded predicates, satisfying
Condition A. Also, their Chain Condition is satisfied, as zichzelf doesn’t head a chain,
but is only a link in it (if it headed an A-chain, it would be ungrammatical). The com-
plete paradigm is as follows:
(40) Jan hoorde...
(41) a. * ...[zich zich critiseren]
b. ...[zich zichzelf critiseren]
c. ...[zichzelf zich critiseren]
d. ?? ...[zichzelf zichzelf critiseren]
e. * ...[zichzelf hem critiseren] (Reinhart and Reuland 1993)
On their approach, (41a) is a Condition B violation, where critiseren is a reflexive pred-
icate without reflexive-marking. Their binding theory allows (41d) but is ruled out
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by economy considerations (a redundant SELF reflexive). (41e) has the same binding-
theoretic status as (41c), so should not violate Condition B, so is just a Chain Condition
violation. Clearly, it remains to be seen exactly what additional assumptions might
be required to predict this paradigm while retaining our feature specification for SE
and SELF reflexives. However, it should be remembered that the admittedly ambitious
approach outlined in this chapter requires no specific binding conditions, with the dis-
tribution of SE and SELF reflexives derived entirely from their featural make-up.
6.2.5 Summary
We have seen that Dutch exhibits two varieties of reflexive. One corresponds to the
English reflexive, which we give a similar analysis involving binding by the Agree
mechanism. The second, zich, appears to be morphologically more like non-reflexive
pronouns, being monomorphemic and morphologically unanalysable (pace Barbiers
and Bennis 2003). Conflicting evidence that zich must be both very locally bound in
some cases and locally free in others is understood by teasing apart instances of zich
in inherently reflexive and non-inherently reflexive contexts. We are then able to show
that zich is subject to Condition B (reinterpreted as a violation of Maximise Structural
Economy as in §5.4.3), which we assume is because it bears a valued [VAR] upon en-
tering the derivation. The requirement that zich be bound must then be achieved by a
mechanism other than Agree: we assume that a [REFLEXIVE] feature is responsible for
ensuring that the value of zich’s [VAR] matches that of the subject of the predicate it
reflexivises. The two separate mechanisms for binding zich and SELF reflexives corre-
late with differences in their syntactic behaviour and semantic interpretation. We see
below that a similar analysis can extend to other Germanic languages, although certain
differences must be accounted for.
6.3 Norwegian
We now turn our attention to the behaviour of anaphors and pronouns in Norwe-
gian, another Germanic language with a fairly rich literature on its binding system.
Norwegian poses an additional challenge to the binding theory developed thus far in
this thesis. While locality constraints naturally differ in some cases from the English
and Dutch patterns we have already seen, Norwegian anaphors and pronouns are also
rather more strictly constrained with respect to which grammatical functions are able to
act as binders for them. To some extent, we have dealt with orientation in Dutch, where
zich is subject-oriented due to its reflexivising feature and incorporation into a verbal
head. However, in Norwegian, non-reflexive pronouns are also subject to orientation
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constraints, requiring at the very least some elaboration or reworking of that analysis.
6.3.1 Anaphors and pronouns in Norwegian
Norwegian is like other the other Scandinavian languages in having two distinct reflex-
ive elements. The first reflexive element is the SE anaphor seg, and is obligatorily 3rd
person but unspecified for number or gender: Norwegian has three cases, nominative,
Person/Number non-reflexive pronouns reflexive pronouns
1Pers Singular meg meg
2Pers Singular deg deg
3Pers Singular ham seg
3Pers Singular hene seg
1Pers Plural oss oss
2Pers Plural dere dere
3Pers Plural dem seg
Table 6.3: Norwegian oblique pronouns
oblique, and genitive. While there is no nominative form of seg, there is a genitive form,
sin (‘his/her own’), which appears to exhibit the same binding constraints as seg (Hellan
1988: 62). Like seg, it is also restricted to 3rd person. Like other possessive pronouns, the
reflexive possessive shows agreement with its head noun (giving rise to three possible
forms sin, sitt, sitte) and is in complementary distribution with full DP possessors.26
The second type of reflexive is selv, cognate with the English ‘self’. Norwegian
forms complex reflexives with either a non-reflexive pronoun or seg followed by selv
‘self’, e.g. ham selv and seg selv. As we see below, the binding behaviour of the two types
of complex reflexive relates closely to the behaviour of the leftmost component. Finally,
Norwegian has a reciprocal, hverandre, which behaves rather more in accordance with
the English anaphors than the other anaphoric elements in Norwegian.
6.3.2 The basic distribution of anaphors and pronouns
The properties of seg appear to be rather similar to those of the Dutch SE anaphor,
zich. Both are ‘subject-oriented’, i.e. they require their antecedent to be a subject, both
appear to need to be locally free (as well as being bound), and the local binding domain
for both seems to be able to extend beyond the closest subject. Suppose that seg receives
an analysis similar to that of zich in Dutch, leaving aside for the moment the question
26Note that possessors may either precede or follow the head noun in Norwegian.
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of whether seg moves covertly as tentatively suggested for zich. We assume at least
that seg is specified with a valued [VAR] feature ensuring that it must be free in its
PF-phase (by Condition B, reduced to Maximise Structural Economy as in §5.4.3), and
with a [REFLEXIVE] feature ensuring that seg is interpreted as reflexivising a predicate.
However, complex anaphors in Norwegian have different properties from both English
reflexives and Dutch zichzelf, and we will need to examine these in more detail before
proposing an analysis.
6.3.2.1 Object position of inherently reflexive verbs
Similarly to the data we have seen in Dutch, the classic environment in which the SE
anaphor seg occurs is in the object position of an inherently reflexive predicate (e.g.
skamme, ‘shame’ and vaske, ‘wash’):
(42) a. Joni
Johni
skammer
shames
segi
SEi
/*hami
/*himi
‘John is ashamed.’ (Hellan 1988)
b. Joni
Johni
vasker
washes
segi
SEi
/*hami
/*himi
‘John washes (himself).’ (Hellan 2005)
(43) a. Jegi
Ii
skammer
shame
megi
mei
‘I am ashamed.’ (Hellan 1988)
b. Dui
Youi
skammer
shame
degi
youi
‘You are ashamed.’ (Hellan 1988)
Here, seg is obligatorily used instead of a pronoun in 3rd person. (43a) and (43b) show
that in 1st and 2nd person contexts the ‘reflexive’ pronoun is indistinguishable from the
normal object pronoun, as noted above.
For Dutch, I suggested that the equivalent SE anaphor zich can be locally bound
(despite bearing the feature specification of a pronoun) due to the absence of a struc-
tural Case feature in this environment. Essentially, I proposed two separate but ho-
mophonous SE anaphors, one with a structural Case feature to be valued during the
derivation, and one without. Hellan (1988) and Hestvik (1990) take a somewhat similar
approach to seg. Hestvik suggests that although seg in inherently reflexive environ-
ments appears in some respects to be like other cases of seg, an anaphor which must be
bound (by a subject), important syntactic differences merit teasing the two apart. He
claims that seg in inherently reflexive contexts is not a true syntactic argument:
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“...when seg occurs in this way [in inherently reflexive constructions], it does
not have the property of a theta-role bearing element, and the verb[s] it is
associated with (as a direct object of) always have the properties of verbs
with one less theta-role”.
(Hestvik 1990: 119)
Hestvik (1990) summarises a range of evidence in favour of this conclusion. For ex-
ample, inherently reflexive Norwegian verbs exhibit syntactic properties of intransitive
verbs, occurring in there-associate constructions. Furthermore, in inherently reflexive
contexts, seg must always be strictly right-adjacent to the reflexive verb, unlike cases
where seg is a true argument, and unlike cases involving other anaphors.27 With slightly
different evidence, Hellan (1988) reaches the same conclusion, arguing that seg in inher-
ently reflexive verbs cannot be replaced by any other lexical item and so cannot affect
the truth conditions of the sentence. Indeed, the nonargument status of items corre-
sponding to seg is commonly (though not uncontroversially) assumed in the literature;
for example, see also Vikner (1985) for Danish sig, and Koster (1985) for Dutch zich.
Supposing that seg is not in fact a pronoun in inherently reflexive constructions
(and hence bears no [VAR]), it is automatically explained why it fails to induce an Con-
dition B effect here. These predicates do not permit SELF reflexives or pronouns in
their object position as there is no θ-role to assign to them. We therefore do not need to
consider inherently reflexives predicates in the binding theory, if Hestvik’s analysis is
correct.28
6.3.2.2 Object position of transitive verbs
As Hestvik (1990) notes, it is not uncontroversial that seg is subject to Condition B,
though I find his arguments that it is (and those presented in Hellan 1988) convincing.29
Further, the parallels between the pairs of sentences with seg and pronouns below ap-
pear to be more than coincidental. When the verb is transitive, as in (44), seg is correctly
excluded by Condition B.
27The reader is referred in particular to Hestvik (1990: 95–120) and the references cited therein for more
detailed evidence.
28It should be noted that an alternative to seg as the object of the inherently reflexive verb vaske (‘wash’)
in (42b) is seg selv. However, as in §6.2.3.2 we may assume that this predicate and others that behave
similarly are listed twice in the lexicon: once as transitive and once as inherently reflexive. When we
employ the inherently reflexive predicate, seg is the only option. When we employ the transitive predicate,
seg and other pronouns are ruled out by Condition B, and seg selv may be used, satisfying Condition A. We
examine complex reflexives in more detail below.
29The reader is referred to Hestvik (1990: 65, fn.13) and the references cited there for other languages in
which certain anaphors must apparently be locally free.
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(44) Joni
Johni
omtaler
talks about
*segi
*SEi
/segi
/SEi
selv
self
‘John talks about himself.’ (adapted from Hellan 2005)
The complex reflexive seg selv, on the other hand, is permitted. Similar patterns are
found with DP-internal binding by a subject within DP:30
(45) Johnsi
John’si
bilde
pictures
av
of
*segi
*SEi
/segi
/SEi
selv
self
‘John pictures of himself.’ (adapted from Hestvik 1990)
Thus the pattern here is very similar to Dutch. We might imagine that seg selv should
therefore receive a treatment similar to zichzelf, particularly since its morphological
composition appears to be equivalent. Yet this is almost certainly jumping the gun,
on two fronts. First, we will see below that seg selv, like seg (and unlike Dutch zichzelf )
appears to be subject-oriented. Second, we have not yet examined the properties of the
complex reflexive formed with a pronoun such as ham selv.31 While we expect that the
pronoun ham induces a Condition B effect in (46), it is less clear on our assumptions so
far why the reflexive ham selv should be ungrammatical.
(46) Joni
Johni
omtaler
talks about
*hami
*himi
/*hami
/*himi
selv
self
(adapted from Hellan 2005)
We will see further evidence below that pronouns are ‘anti-subject oriented’, that is,
they cannot be bound by a local subject. Yet the complex reflexive also appears to obey
this constraint (though unlike pronouns, it must be locally bound by some element).
Such data might lead us to suppose that the complex reflexives are not simply
separate lexical items with alternative feature specifications, but simply instances of the
pronoun or SE anaphor embedded inside a larger constituent. We continue to pursue
this line of analysis in examining binding possibilities in other syntactic environments.
30Hellan (1988: 154) claims that in similar cases the DP-subject must be understood as an agent, rather
than as a possessor. (It seems to me that in any case, on pragmatic grounds this reading is strongly pre-
ferred.) One possible solution, in the spirit of the approach Hellan takes, is that if the role of seg is to
reflexivise a predicate, then possessors do not count as subject arguments of head nouns. Further elabo-
ration would be required if this explanation were to be pursued, given that in §4.5.2.2 the analysis of the
distribution of anaphors in picture-DPs requires that possessors of picture-DPs merge in SpecnP.
31Koster (1985) argues that for Dutch, ’m zelf (the reduced form of hem zelf )—an apparently similar
element to the Norwegian ham selv—has been overlooked as a type of reflexive. It is more likely that this
is a type of logophoric reflexive, however, as suggested in §4.5.2.3; see the references cited there.
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6.3.2.3 Object position of selected PPs
We know from English and Dutch data that for the purposes of binding, selected prepo-
sitions tend to act as if they were not there at all: they do no seem to count for the pur-
poses of c-command, nor do they affect binding domains. We assume that Condition B
effects rule out the following sentences:
(47) a. * Joni
Johni
snakket
talked
om
about
segi
SEi
b. ?* Vi
We
fortalte
told
Joni
Johni
om
about
hami
himi
(Hellan 1988)
The ungrammaticality of each cannot be due to orientation, since seg is bound by a
subject and ham by a non-subject. However, Hellan (1988) notes that typical Condition
B violations such as this can be circumvented in Norwegian by embedding the pronoun
or seg in a constituent with a ‘heavier’ phonetic content. For example, when the object
position occupied by seg or the pronoun is made heavier by conjoining other items, the
Condition B effect disappears:
(48) a. Joni
Johni
snakket
talked
om
about
segi
SEi
og
and
sinei
SEi.POSS-PL
gjerninger
deeds
‘John talked about himself and his deeds.’
b. Vi
We
fortalte
told
Joni
Johni
om
about
hami
himi
og
and
hansi
hisi
kusine
cousin
‘We told John about himself and his cousin.’ (Hellan 1988)
In §5.2.5.2, we took this data to provide independent empirical support for the claim
that PF-phases are typically the relevant domains for Condition B. Suppose that in Nor-
wegian, both pronouns and the anaphor seg are subject to Condition B (Hestvik 1990
and others). Given that we assume that PF-phase boundaries delimit binding domains
for Condition B, then we might well imagine that adding more lexical/syntactic mate-
rial makes it more likely that the object position (occupied by, or containing the anaphor
or pronoun in the above examples) is treated as a PF-phase.
Recall that one important aim is to determine whether complex reflexives consti-
tute separate lexical items with different feature specifications or whether they are just
instances of seg or pronouns embedded inside a larger construction, containing selv. We
can now draw a parallel between the obviation of the Condition B effect when seg or a
pronoun is embedded inside a larger constituent as above, and where selv is employed:
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(49) a. Joni
Johni
snakket
talked
om
about
segi
SEi
selv
self
‘John talked about himself.’
b. Vi
We
fortalte
told
Joni
Johni
om
about
hami
himi
selv
self
‘We told John about himself.’ (Hellan 1988)
Indeed, Hellan (1988) relates the absence of Condition B effect in cases like (48a) and
(48b) to the effect of inserting the anaphoric element selv as in (49a) and (49b):
“Behind the role attributed to selv as an anaphoric, and thereby complemen-
tarity-inducing element, may thus lie a function as [a] ‘heavy’ or ‘rhythm-
producing’ element, which is what is generally needed to make binding
well-formed in such cases.”
(Hellan 1988: 105)
Further data with the possessive reflexive sin support this view. (50a) is also assumed
to be ruled out by Condition B, yet the same structural configuration gives rise to no
Condition B effect when the DP is made heavier with additional lexical material, as in
(50b) and (50c):
(50) a. * Joni
Johni
er
is
sini
SEi.POSS
fiende
enemy REFL selfi
b. Joni
Johni
er
is
sini
SEi.POSS
egen
own
fiende
enemy
‘John is his own enemy.’
c. Joni
Johni
er
is
sini
SEi.POSS
aller
very
verste
worst
fiende
enemy
‘John is his very worst enemy.’ (Hellan 1988)
Recall that the approach to Condition B that we developed in §5.2.5.2 suggests that
categories like DP are not obligatorily specified as PF-phases but their PF-phasehood
may depend on phonological factors. It seems that in (50a), in contrast to (50b) and
(50c), the DP containing sin is not sufficiently phonologically heavy to constitute a PF-
phase. We have seem similar evidence in §5.2.5.2 for this from English pronouns, too.32
32Also, as we saw in §5.2.5.2 for English reflexives, note that the domain in which sin must be bound is
unaffected by the phonological weight of the DP containing in. That is, when a PF-phase is created (on
our assumptions), sin is still able to be bound by a subject outside that domain, as predicted if it must be
bound within its LF-phase.
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It appears that we are able to continue to assume that complex reflexives are
formed syntactically by merging seg or a pronoun inside a constituent containing selv.
We then predict that complex reflexives do not impose their own binding requirements,
but simply interact with the binding requirements of seg or the pronoun contained in-
side them. It follows then that the referential possibilities of complex reflexives are a
function of the elements inside them.
6.3.2.4 Locality in complex reflexives
We now briefly restrict our attention to the behaviour of complex reflexives. It appears
that the local binding domain is the same for both seg selv and ham selv (etc.). The locality
of complex reflexives is more highly constrained than for other anaphoric elements in
Norwegian. Hellan (1988: 80) claims that only coarguments can bind selv, and this is
consistent with the data that we have seen so far. However, our binding theory has
no recourse to θ-grids nor access to a level of representation where argument structure
could be encoded.33
The data we have seen so far with seg selv and ham selv are also consistent with an
alternative treatment whereby complex reflexives must be bound within their minimal
PF-phase. Further data also lead to a similar conclusion. In (51a) and (51b), the minimal
PF-phase is the PP containing seg selv, which does not contain an antecedent and so the
binding does not appear to be sufficiently local.
(51) a. Huni
Shei
kastet
threw
meg
me
fra
from
segi
SEi
/*segi
/*SEi
selv
self
‘She threw me away from her(self).’ (Hellan 1988)
b. Johni
Johni
kikket
looked
bak
behind
segi
SEi
/*segi
/*SEi
selv
self
‘John looked behind him(self).’ (adapted from Hestvik 1990)
On the other hand, if the minimal LF-phase were the relevant domain for seg selv, as
we assume for other anaphors, then vP should be the local domain, and the subject
in each case would be incorrectly predicted to be a possible antecedent. One possible
line of defence might be that the PP in (51a) contains a PRO subject which is controlled
by the object meg, along the lines argued for certain similar English sentences in §5.2.3.
Perhaps the PP would then constitute an LF-phase, explaining why seg selv could not
be bound by the matrix subject. This would leave two remaining empirical problems.
First, (51b) remains to be explained, since there is no object capable of binding any PRO
33Hellan (2005) therefore argues that a framework such as HPSG with multiple levels of representation
is best equipped to handle Norwegian reflexives.
6.3. Norwegian 253
in PP. Second, it also leaves unexplainedwhy seg can be bound by thematrix subject, as-
suming that seg can only reflexivise a predicate in its LF-phase (as we argued for Dutch
zich). More importantly, though, we assumed in §5.2 that PP and DP—even when con-
taining a subject—do not constitute LF-phases. If this assumption is correct, then even
on an approach where the LF-phase is the appropriate binding domain for complex
reflexives, the absence of the possibility of the matrix subject binding the reflexive is
still unexplained in (51a). Finally, in support of the view that it is the PF-phase and
not the LF-phase in which seg selv must find its antecedent, note that unlike English
reflexives (and other anaphoric elements in Norwegian), seg selv cannot be bound by an
antecedent outside the subjectless DP containing it.
(52) ?? Joni
Johni
leste
read
noen
some
omtaler
reports
av
about
segi
SEi
selv
self
(53) * Joni
Johni
traff
met
noen
some
venner
friends
av
of
segi
SEi
selv
self
(Hellan 1988)
As argued in §4.5.2 in particular (and assumed since), subjectless DPs certainly do not
constitute LF-phases, only PF-phases.
From a functional perspective, it is perhaps quite natural that the complex reflex-
ive should be bound within the minimal PF-phase containing it. Recall that we have
assumed that themotivation for the appearance of selv is to create a phonetically heavier
syntactic domain, by assumption a PF-phase, allowing the leftmost element of the com-
plex reflexive to satisfy Condition B. Selv is therefore only required in configurations
which would otherwise induce Condition B violations, i.e. where seg or the pronoun is
bound within its PF-phase. Wherever the complex reflexive is used with an antecedent
outside its minimal PF-phase, there is no motivation for selv in any case, since seg or
a pronoun will be grammatical. However, it is harder to formalise this intuitive ex-
planation for the locality of the antecedent in complex reflexives. We would have to
rely on a semantic approach to economy such as that proposed by Fox (2000), where
derivations involving separate lexical arrays can be compared. Having rejected such an
approach earlier in this thesis, I tentatively offer an alternative explanation. It might,
for example, be plausible to suppose that selv has some morphosyntactic requirement
that it be interpreted as (part of) a reflexive. If so, then it would be expected that this
morphosyntactic requirement must be met before Spell-Out to PF. Another option, in
the spirit of Hornstein (2006), is that selv is not a lexical item with any semantic content
at all, and can therefore be inserted during the derivation, presumably at the PF-phase
level, to somehow rescue the Condition B effect. However, I can only offer a flavour of
possible analyses in this chapter, and this will be one of the matters left open to future
investigation.
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6.3.3 Extended binding domains and orientation
In Norwegian, the SE reflexive seg is obligatorily bound by a subject, while pronouns
must be free from certain subjects, even where they may be bound by a more local
object. This causes two problems for the binding theory developed so far. First, we
must examine how orientation constraints are formalised in our system. Second, we
will see that the sorts of domain in which pronouns must be free, for example, are
no longer always absolute: while in some cases no DP in the pronoun’s local binding
domain may act as its antecedent, in others it must only be free from local subjects, not
objects.
6.3.3.1 Subject orientation of seg (selv)
Both seg (including sin) and seg selv are restricted to binding by a subject:
(54) a. Johni
Johni
fortalte
told
Perj
Peterj
om
about
segi/∗j
SEi/∗j
selv
self
‘John told Peter about himself.’ (Hestvik 1990)
b. * Vi
We
fortalte
told
Joni
Johni
om
about
moren
mother
sini
SEi
‘We told John about his mother.’ (Hellan 1988)
Note that seg selv can be bound by an object provided that this controls a PRO (presum-
ably):
(55) Vi
We
giorde
made
Joni
Johni
glad
fond
i
of
segi
SEi
selv
self
‘We made John fond of himself.’ (Hellan 1988)
As for Dutch zich, the most natural way to explain subject orientation of anaphors is to
assume that seg (selv)’s reflexivising feature must be interpreted on a predicate which
selects a subject. Moreover, as suggested for certain instances of zich, we will adopt
an approach based loosely on Pica (1987), and assume that seg covertly head-moves to
adjoin to the predicate it reflexivises. One possible argument against such an approach
is that the complex reflexive seg selv is also subject-oriented, yet must also be able to
undergo covert head movement. However, we have argued above that seg selv is not
best treated as a lexical item but as an instance of seg merged in a larger constituent
which is syntactically derived. Suppose then, that the complex reflexive has an internal
structure along the lines of (56):
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(56) [DP [D seg ] [NP selv]]
We may continue to suppose that the reflexivising seg (as a head within the complex
reflexive) is ‘affixal’, requiring covert head-movement to a predicate. We will see below
that this goes some way towards explaining the possibility of non-local binding of seg
in certain syntactic environments.
6.3.3.2 Anti-subject orientation of pronouns
Hestvik (1990) assumes that the explanation for orientation of seg and pronouns in Nor-
wegian is not part of the binding theory per se, but derives from an independent prop-
erty of the grammar, namely that (the relevant type of) pronouns undergo movement
at LF, altering their binding domain. Hence, as English anaphors and pronouns for ex-
ample do not exhibit this orientation property, Hestvik is forced to assume that they
are syntactically different from their Norwegian counterparts, namely that they are
phrasal, while Norwegian seg and pronouns are heads. However, we have assumed
in this chapter that the reason certain SE anaphors covertly head-move is not directly
due to their being heads, but due to their requirement to reflexivise a predicate.34 Since
the movement we have proposed is related to the reflexivising function of seg or zich,
we would not wish to assume that pronouns also undergo the same sort of movement,
since it would be unmotivated. One possible argument against a movement account
for the anti-subject orientation of pronouns is, as Hestvik (1990: 180–1) concedes, that
it is then unclear why—if a pronoun always has the option of moving higher than the
DP it illegally corefers with—the Condition B effect cannot be circumvented by this
movement. Yet this argument against the movement of non-reflexive pronouns does
not apply with the theory developed here, since we assume that Condition B effects are
determined by a pronoun in a local binding configuration with an antecedent at any
stage of the derivation. Furthermore, even when seg moves, the Condition B domain is
not affected: there is no resulting extension of the Condition B domain so whatever the
exact explanation for this (presumably related to the covert nature of the movement in-
volved), we may assume that it could equally explain the same absence of the extension
of the Condition B domain for pronouns.
Given that pronouns have no requirement to ensure that a predicate is interpreted
semantically in a particular way, it is far from clear how to deal with their anti-subject
orientation. From an empirical perspective, as we also see below for Icelandic, the real
problem with the anti-subject effect concerns the domain that seems to be relevant: it
appears that the domain extends beyond the standard Condition B domain, as exem-
34Furthermore, Hestvik’s motivation for the movement of pronouns and seg is to do with the require-
ment for government, which is also impossible under Minimalist assumptions.
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plified by (57):
(57) Johni
Johni
fortalte
told
Perj
Peterj
om
about
[hans∗i/j
[his∗i/j
kone]
wife]
‘John told Peter about his wife.’ (Hestvik 1990)
Stranglely, this sentence apparently gives a similar disjointness effect to that found in
cases where there is no PF-phase to ‘protect’ the pronoun from a Condition B violation:
(58) Vi
We
fortalte
told
Joni
Johni
om
about
ham∗i
him∗i
(Hellan 2005)
A possessive subject of a DP as in (57) should satisfy Condition B under our analysis so
far. To confirm this, we see that the possessive reflexive (perhaps a genitive form of seg,
as discussed above) can be bound by the matrix subject without violating Condition B:
(59) Joni
Johni
leser
reads
boken
book
sini
SEi
‘John reads his book.’ (Hellan 2005)
It appears that although Condition B is satisfied in (57), with coreference between the
object Per and hans possible, coreference with the subject is still ruled out. Yet while it
does seem that something beyond Condition B is required to rule out the ungrammat-
ical reading in (57), locality effects nevertheless play a familiar role in other environ-
ments. For example, subjects of both finite clauses and of non-finite clauses block the
anti-subject requirement:
(60) a. Johni
Johni
trodde
thought
at
that
Marit
Mary
likte
liked
hami
himi
‘John thought that Mary liked him.’ (Hestvik 1990)
b. Joni
Johni
ba
asked
meg
me
snakke
talk
om
about
hami
himi
‘John asked me to talk about him.’ (Hellan 2005)
In short, it appears that pronouns must be interpreted as disjoint from the most local
subject.
In order to capture similarly awkward patterns in Icelandic, Anderson (1986) out-
lines a binding theory in which anaphors and pronouns in different languages may
choose between two domains for Conditions A and B. These are: (1) bound or free in a
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pronoun or anaphor’s governing category, and (2) bound or not bound by a superordi-
nate subject in its anaphoric domain. Scandinavian languages are then assumed to opt
for (2) for their anaphors, while English opts for (1). Yet then Norwegian (and Icelandic)
could be assumed to also pick (2) for its pronouns, predicting the observed contrast be-
tween subject and object antecedents of a pronoun. While I agree that two separate
sorts of constraints are at play, I aim to reduce the stipulated constraints of Anderson’s
approach. We have seen that the classical Conditions A and B of Anderson’s option
(1) are derivable. Similarly, subject orientation of certain reflexives can be explained by
their featural content. This leaves only the anti-subject orientation of pronouns as a stip-
ulation. Though this remains to be derived, I therefore propose the following approach
to the interaction of binding and orientation of pronouns in Norwegian:
(61) a. Condition B
Pronounsmust be free in their minimal PF-phase (as derived byMaximise
Structural Economy).
b. Orientation constraint
Pronouns must be free from subjects in their minimal LF-phase.
Let’s see how this explains the Norwegian data, before looking at how we might de-
rive the orientation constraint (61b). In both (60a) and (60b), the minimal LF-phase and
PF-phase containing the pronoun ham is the vP in the embedded clause. The only re-
quirement is therefore that it is not bound by Marit in (60a) and by PRO controlled by
meg in (60b), and hence both are grammatical. In (57), Condition B is satisfied since
the minimal PF-phase containing the pronoun hans is the DP containing it. However,
it does not satisfy the independent orientation constraint, as it is bound by a subject
in its minimal LF-phase: John will enter the derivation in SpecvP in the matrix clause,
and that vP is the pronoun’s minimal LF-phase. Note that we also correctly predict that
binding by Per is possible, since the orientation constraint says nothing about binding
by objects. The same explanation can be carried over to equivalent constructions where
there is no object in the matrix clause and the possessive pronoun cannot be bound by
the subject:
(62) * Johni
Johni
liker
likes
[hansi
[hisi
bilder]
pictures]
‘John likes his pictures.’ (Hestvik 1990)
The next case we come to is that of a pronoun embedded inside a locative PP.
Typically, being free in PP is sufficient to satisfy Condition B, yet observe the following
in Norwegian:
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(63) * Johni
Johni
kikket
looked
[rundt
[around
hami]
himi]
(Hestvik 1990)
This is explained on our assumptions since although Condition B is met, the orientation
constraint is violated, with John the subject of the minimal LF-phase containing the
pronoun (vP). Now take (64):
(64) Peri
Peteri
bad
asked
John
John
kikke
look
[bak
[behind
hami]
himi]
‘Peter asked John to look behind him.’ (Hestvik 1990)
Here, binding by Per is possible since the minimal LF-phase containing the pronoun
will be the embedded clause vP, with PRO (controlled by John) as its subject.
The next case involves binding across a DP boundary:
(65) * Joni
Johni
traff
met
[noen
[some
venner
friends
av
of
hami]
himi]
(Hellan 1988)
Once more, Condition B is met since the minimal PF-phase containing the pronoun is
the DP, which contains no binder for ham. The fact that seg is permitted in this context
when bound by Jon provides support for this:
(66) Joni
Johni
traff
met
[noen
[some
venner
friends
av
of
segi]
SEi]
‘John met some friends of his.’ (Hellan 1988)
The orientation constraint is violated in (65), however, since neither the subjectless DP
nor the nP contained within it constitutes an LF-phase. Therefore the minimal LF-phase
is the vP containing the copy of the subject Jon, violating the orientation constraint.
Hellan (1988) notes that other apparently structurally similar cases appear to allow the
pronoun:
(67) Joni
Johni
fikk
got
høre
hear
om
about
[et
[an
angrep
attack
på
on
?hami]
?himi]
‘John got to hear about an attack on him.’ (Hellan 1988)
Hellan (1988) shows that the difference is the result of the fact that the noun in (67) is
deverbal, but not in (65). Thus, we could assume that the DP contains a PRO, and hence
6.3. Norwegian 259
that nP (whose specifier contains a copy of PRO) is an LF-phase. So, since PRO does
not corefer with ham, the pronoun satisfies both Condition B (in DP) and the orientation
constraint (in nP). Evidence from similar cases with overt subjects appears to point to
this conclusion as well. In these cases, the pronoun is also acceptable, indicating that
they are structurally equivalent to (67):
(68) Joni
Johni
fikk
got
høre
hear
om
about
[vårt
[our
angrep
attack
på
on
(?)hami]
(?)himi]
‘John got to hear about our attack on him.’ (Hellan 1988)
The pattern is the same as other cases involving DP-internal subjects:
(69) Johni
Johni
viste
showed
Olaj
Olaj
[Marits
[Mary’s
bilder
pictures
av
of
hami/j]
himi/j]
‘John showed Ola Mary’s pictures of him.’ (Hestvik 1990)
Here, both the subject and object outside the complex DP are able to corefer with the
pronoun. This is predicted on my assumptions since the minimal PF-phase containing
the pronoun will be the DP containing it (hence only binding by Marit is ruled out by
Condition B), while the minimal LF-phase containing the pronoun will be nP inside the
DP. Both John and Ola are outside the PF- and LF-phases containing the anaphor and so
both are possible antecedents.
Finally, note that pronouns followed by selv are also subject to the same constraint:
(70) Johni
Johni
fortalte
told
Perj
Peterj
om
about
ham∗i/j
him∗i/j
selv
self
‘John told Peter about him(self).’ (Hestvik 1990)
The pronoun ham is subject to Condition B, the orientation constraint, and since it is
part of a complex reflexive, the requirement that—like seg selv—ham selv must be bound
within the minimal PF-phase containing it (even though we do not have an entirely sat-
isfactory explanation for this at present; see §6.3.2.4). First, Condition B is met since ham
is embedded inside a larger DP constituent which protects it from a Condition B viola-
tion (a PF-phase). Next, ham selv must be bound in the minimal PF-phase containing it.
Here, vP is both the minimal LF-phase and PF-phase, and both John and Per are inside
it. Finally, the pronoun ham must obey the orientation constraint by not being bound by
a subject in its minimal LF-phase (vP). Accordingly, our assumptions correctly predict
that ham (selv) can only bound by the object, and not the subject John.
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6.3.3.3 Consequences for explaining non-complementarity between seg and pro-
nouns
While the orientation constraint on pronouns remains to be derived, this approach
makes the orientation of anaphors and pronouns look like independent phenomena.
We will see below further evidence for such an approach from Icelandic, where it ap-
pears that the orientation constraint applies to pronouns whereas the SE reflexive is
not subject oriented. It also makes further predictions for the locality of the antecedent
of seg. In Dutch, we have seen that zich can in some cases find an antecedent higher
than its local domain if it is assumed to head-move. More accurately, it can reflexivise
a predicate outside its minimal LF-phase provided that its minimal LF-phase is headed
by a predicate that it can move through. We assume that if seg moves, then similar sorts
of effects should show up. This appears to be true. For example, while the requirement
on pronouns is (roughly) that they are simply disjoint from the next subject up, seg can
be bound by an indefinitely high subject, provided that it does not need to cross a finite
clause boundary. We examine the data involving longer distance binding of seg and
show how they fit with the analysis outlined so far.
One interesting fact concerning (69) is that in this environment, there is non-com-
plementarity between the pronoun and seg when bound by the matrix subject:
(71) Johni
Johni
viste
showed
Olaj
Olaj
[Marits
[Mary’s
bilder
pictures
av
of
segi/∗j]
SEi/∗j]
‘John showed Ola Mary’s pictures of him.’ (Hestvik 1990)
We have seen above why the pronoun is permitted when bound by John in (69): the
minimal LF-phase containing it is nP with a possessor subject. However, it seems less
clear then why seg in (71) should be able to reflexivise vise (‘show’), a predicate outside
its minimal LF-phase. However, if we assume that seg moves covertly to the phase head
n (just as it moves to v when reflexivising verbs), we expect that it is then accessible for
movement to a predicate in the next LF-phase up (matrix vP), allowing reflexivisation
of viste.
Another environment which gives rise to non-complementarity between seg and
pronouns is the object position of infinitival complements. Unlike English anaphors,
seg is possible in these cases. Ham also is because it is free in its minimal LF-phase, the
embedded clause vP:
(72) Joni
Johni
så
saw
meg
me
sikte
aim
på
at
segi
SEi
/hami
/himi
‘John saw me aim at him.’ (Hellan 1988)
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Yet also when multiple infinitival clauses are embedded, seg in the deepest embedded
clause can still be bound by the matrix subject:
(73) Joni
Johni
bad
asked
oss
us
få
to
deg
get
til
you
å
to
hjelpe
help
segi
SEi
/hami
/himi
‘John asked us to get you to help him.’ (Hellan 1988)
Once again, non-complementarity arises due to seg’s longer distance properties. In fact,
seg can be bound across an indefinite number of non-finite clauses, provided only that
there is no intervening finite clause, as in (75):
(74) Joni
Johni
bad
asked
oss
us
forsøke
try
å
to
få
get
deg
you
til å
to
snakke
talk
pent
nicely
on
about
segi
SEi
‘John asked us to try to get you to talk nicely about him.’
(75) * Joni
Johni
var
was
ikke
not
klar
aware
over
over
at
that
vi hadde
we
snakket
had
om
talked
segi
about SEi
(Hellan 1988)
As argued for the Dutch ECM construction, I suggest that it is a particular syn-
tactic property of infinitival constructions in Norwegian (and in fact, of other Scandina-
vian languages) which means that seg can escape through multiple LF-phases. In fact,
the only assumption required is that infinitival clauses do not constitute complete LF-
phases. In each infinitival clause, seg moves covertly to the phase head v as outlined for
Dutch in §6.2.4.3. From this phase-edge position, the next LF-phase up can be targeted
by seg. When the clause containing seg is finite (a CP phase), there will be no predicate
which seg can attach to before the phase completes. Hence seg can move no further and
there is no possibility for long distance binding. However, when the clause contain-
ing seg is infinitival, we suppose that the minimal LF-phase extends as far as the next
vP, as the infinitival clause boundary is not an LF-phase boundary. Seg can then freely
adjoin to the predicate in the next infinitival clause up, and so on, until a finite clause
boundary blocks further movement.
6.3.4 A note on reciprocals
We see then, that as far as reflexives are concerned, Norwegian does not make use of
the Agree mechanism to establish binding relations, since its reflexives bear the feature
specifications of pronouns plus a reflexivising feature. No reflexives enter the deriva-
tion with their [VAR] unvalued. We have seen that this has several consequences: Seg is
restricted to subject orientation, and the binding domains of seg and seg selv differ from
those we have seen in Dutch and English.
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However, we have not yet dealt with reciprocals in Norwegian. It seems that
reciprocals, as in English and Dutch, should be given a treatment as anaphors bearing
an unvalued [VAR] upon entering the derivation. Notably, reciprocals behave almost
identically to English anaphors.35 Unlike Norwegian reflexives, the reciprocal hverandre
can be bound either by subjects or by objects:
(76) a. Dei
Theyi
fortalte
told
meg
me
om
about
hverandrei
each otheri
‘They told me about each other.’
b. Vii
Wei
fortalte
told
dem
them
om
about
hverandrei
each otheri
‘We told them about each other.’
(77) a. Dei
Theyi
fortalte
told
meg
me
om
about
hverandresi
each other’si
bilder
pictures
‘They told me about each other’s pictures.’
b. Jeg
I
fortalte
told
demi
themi
om
about
hverandresi
each other’si
bilder
pictures
‘I told them about each other’s pictures.’ (Hellan 1988)
Hellan (1988: 69) confirms that the binding domain for the reciprocal is also less con-
strained than for complex selv-reflexives, which we have assumed must be bound in
their minimal PF-phase. For example, like English and Dutch anaphors, hverandre em-
bedded inside a locative PP can be bound from outside PPwhereas Norwegian complex
anaphors cannot:
(78) a. Dei
Theyi
kastet
threw
meg
me
til
to
og
and
fra
from
hverandrei
each otheri
‘They threw me to and from each other.’
b. * Huni
Shei
kastet
threw
meg
me
fra
from
segi
SEi
selv
self
‘She threw me away from her(self).’ (Hellan 1988)
Similar facts are observed with reciprocals embedded inside complex DPs. As in
English, while a subjectless DP does not constitute a binding domain for an anaphor
in a DP-internal object position as in (79a), a DP with a subject does, making (79b)
ungrammatical:
(79) a. Joni
Johni
og
and
Maritj
Maryj
traff
met
noen
some
venner
friends
av
of
hverandrei+j
each otheri+j
35Hellan (1988: 82) concludes that hverandre is the only anaphoric element in Norwegian that behaves in
accordance with the classical Condition A of Chomsky (1981).
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‘John and Mary met some of each other’s friends.’
b. ?* Joni
Johni
og
and
Maritj
Maryj
leste
read
mine
my
boker
books
om
about
hverandrei+j
each otheri+j
(Hellan 1988)
As in English, we assume that in (79a), the nP inside DP does not introduce a subject
and is therefore not an LF-phase, as assumed for vPs. Nor is DP an LF-phase, and so the
minimal LF-phase containing hverandre is the matrix vP. In (79b), though, nP contains
a possessive subject, and so constitutes an LF-phase, ensuring that hverandre must be
bound within nP, which it cannot be.
As predicted, binding of a reciprocal across a finite CP (an LF-phase) is excluded
in Norwegian:
(80) a. ?* Dei
Theyi
håpet
hoped
at
that
hverandresi
each otheri’s
hester
horses
ville
would
vinne
win
b. ** Dei
Theyi
håpet
hoped
at
that
hverandrei
each otheri
ville
would
vinne
win
(Hellan 1988)
As discussed in §4.4.1, this is not the case in English. The English equivalent of (80a)
is typically judged grammatical in the literature. To my ear, the English equivalent of
(80b) is at worst marginal, but structurally similar cases can be found which are nearly,
if not perfect; see chapter 4, note 41. I assumed in §4.4.1 that just as English appears to
have ‘logophoric’ reflexives which can be bound across a clause boundary but cannot be
considered to bear the same feature specification as true locally bound reflexives, so too
must each other be considered as such in these environments. However, a ‘logophoric’
reciprocal is clearly not permitted in Norwegian.
6.3.5 Summary
We see, then, that despite rather complex variation in different types of anaphoric ele-
ment in Norwegian, the Minimalist approach to binding developed in this thesis is able
to explain the vast majority of binding facts still only with reference to two syntactic
domains, the LF-phase and PF-phase, motivated on independent assumptions. On the
assumptions of this thesis, strictly speaking, the only anaphoric element in Norwegian
is the reciprocal, since both SE and SELF reflexives bear a valued [VAR] feature upon
entering the derivation. As expected, then, both are also subject to Condition B, though
in SELF reflexives the addition of selv is introduced purely in order to create a Condition
B domain in environments where Condition B would otherwise be violated: it follows
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then that the ‘head’ of the reflexive (a pronoun or seg) always satisfies Condition B.
Unlike the proposed analysis of English reflexives and Dutch zichzelf, we do not need
to consider pronouns or seg and the corresponding SELF reflexives as separate lexical
items, simply instances of the pronoun or seg merged during the derivation with selv.
This explains why SELF reflexives exhibit certain properties of their ‘head’ element in
Norwegian.
While subject-orientation of seg and seg selv is explained in the same manner as
Dutch zich, along with ‘semi-long distance’ binding in infinitival constructions,36 it is
less clear why 3rd person pronouns may not be bound by subjects within their LF-
phase, even if Condition B is satisfied. While we have left the derivation of this orien-
tation constraint for future discussion, note that in contrast to a uniform LF-movement
approach to both Norwegian pronouns and seg as proposed by Hestvik (1990), we at
least correctly predict that the anti-subject requirement does not hold at long distance,
and thus explain certain instances of non-complementarity between pronouns and seg
in Norwegian.37
6.4 Icelandic
We now turn to another Scandinavian language, Icelandic. Icelandic in some respects
shows similar binding patterns to the other Germanic languages examined here. Most
interesting, for our purposes, is the comparison with Norwegian. It has commonly
been observed that Icelandic differs from Mainland Scandinavian languages both in its
binding system and its richer Case system. If, as argued in §5.4.3.3, binding possibilities
are affected by Case due to the Activity Condition, then it may be plausible to reduce
these two apparently unrelated differences to a single one, in the spirit of proposals by
Taraldsen (1996).
6.4.1 Anaphors and pronouns in Icelandic
Icelandic, like the other Scandinavian languages, has a single reciprocal and two dif-
ferent reflexive elements. The element cognate to the English ‘self’ is sjálf and is not
generally dealt with in the literature. Maling (1986: 61-2, fn.4) suggests that sjálf is less
syntactically constrained than Norwegian selv, which we have examined in some detail
above. Everaert (1990) reports that sjálf may be accompanied by either a reflexive or a
36I borrow the term coined by Thráinsson (1991: 52).
37Also, as we will see below, Hestvik’s approach will not be able to extend to Icelandic, where only
objects, and not SE reflexives, obey orientation constraints.
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pronoun, with a restriction on its position: sjálf must always precede the reflexive, but
follow the pronoun.
(81) a. Haralduri
Haroldi
rakaði
shaved
hannj
himj
sjálfan
self
‘Harold shaved him.’
b. Haralduri
Haroldi
rakaði
shaved
sjálfan
self
sigi
SE
‘Harold shaved himself.’ (Everaert 1990)
Sig is the other reflexive element, an independent reflexive pronoun. Sig has typ-
ically been the focus of attention in the literature on Icelandic reflexives. Icelandic has
four cases: nominative, accusative, genitive, and dative. The reflexive comes in all cases
except nominative: sig (accusative), sér (dative), sín (genitive). Again like the Dutch and
Norwegian SE reflexive, these varieties of sig are all restricted to 3rd person, while the
1st and 2nd person pronouns do not have a reflexive-specific morphological formwhen
used reflexively:
(82) a. Ég
I
meiddi
hurt
mig
me
‘I hurt myself.’
b. Jón
John
meiddi
hurt
mig
me
‘John hurt me.’ (Sigurðsson 1986)
The possessive reflexives in Icelandic38 agree for number, gender, and Case with their
head noun. As for Norwegian, it appears that the possessive reflexives are subject
Person/Case Masculine Feminine Neuter
Singular NOM sinn sín sitt
Singular ACC sinn sína sitt
Singular DAT sínum sinni sínu
Singular GEN síns sinnar síns
Plural NOM sínir sínar sín
Plural ACC sína sínar sín
Plural DAT sínum sínum sínum
Plural GEN sinna sinna sinna
Table 6.4: Icelandic possessive reflexives
38Anderson (1986) terms these ‘possessive adjectives’.
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to more or less the same conditions as the non-possessive SE reflexive (Thráinsson
1979: 326, fn.21).
Finally, Icelandic has a reciprocal, made up of a form of ‘each’, hvor, which agrees
for gender, number, and Case with its antecedent, and a form of ‘other’, annar, which
also agrees in gender with the antecedent but whose Case depends upon the position
of the reciprocal.39
6.4.2 The distribution of sig
As we have argued for Dutch and Norwegian SE anaphors, Taraldsen (1996) proposes
that Icelandic sig is subject to Condition B. The evidence for this is by now familiar, a
self -element apparently being required when a 3rd person object of a transitive verb is
bound by the subject:40
(83) a. * Maríai
Maryi
elskar
loves
sigi
SEi
b. Maríai
Maryi
elskar
loves
sjálfa
self
sigi
SEi
‘Mary loves herself.’ (adapted from Taraldsen 1996)
The exception to this again seems to be constructions involving inherently reflexive
predicates, “inwhich the reflexivemight not seem to represent an argument” (Taraldsen
1995: 327, fn.10).
(84) Jónj
John
rakaði
shaved
sigj
himself
‘John shaved himself.’ (Anderson 1986)
So far, the basic binding facts pattern in the same way as Dutch and Norwegian.
Indeed, we will see below that in many environments, the behaviour of anaphors and
pronouns reflects that of Norwegian, perhaps not surprisingly. However, Icelandic ex-
hibits certain particular characteristics in its binding system which results in us not
being able to simply transpose the analysis proposed for Norwegian.
39See Thráinsson (1979: 326, fn.24) for further interesting details.
40In an earlier paper Taraldsen (1995: 316) judges (83a) as ?? instead.
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6.4.2.1 Orientation of sig
Unlike the subject-oriented Norwegian seg and its equivalents in the other Mainland
Scandinavian languages, the Icelandic reflexive sig (and its possessive form) can for
some speakers be bound either by a subject or an object in the same clause.
(85) a. Jónj
Johnj
sendi
sent
Haraldk
Haroldk
föt
clothes
á
for
sigj/k
SEj/k
‘John sent Harold clothes for him(self).’ (Thráinsson 1979)
b. Jónj
Johnj
rétti
handed
Haraldik
Haroldk
fötin
clothes
á
for
sinj/k
SEj/k
‘John handed Harold his clothes.’ (Maling 1986)
Maling (1986: 61, fn.2) observes a degree of speaker variation with respect to object-
oriented reflexives, which are assumed to be grammatical by Thráinsson (1976, 1979,
1991) and Anderson (1986).41 Rögnvaldsson (1986) suggests that the variation is far
more widespread and far less clear cut than is commonly assumed:
“...the situation is in fact much more complex than any of [Maling 1986; An-
derson 1986; Thráinsson 1976, 1979] would indicate, since judgements differ
somuch: not only do speakers differ, but the same speaker’s judgements can
differ from one day to another.”
(Rögnvaldsson 1986: 89)
As an example, take another class of constructions with object antecedents, where ac-
cording to Maling (1986) the reflexive bound by the object is optional or impossible,
depending on whether the speaker permits reflexives to be object-oriented:42
(86) a. Ég
I
barði
hit
Siggui
Siggai
með
with
dúkkuni
doll
hennari
heri
/*sinnii
/*SEi
‘I hit Sigga with her doll.’
b. Við
we
töluðum
talked
við
to
Jón
Johni
um
about
vandamál
problems
hansi
hisi
/*síni
/*SEi
‘We talked to John about his problems.’ (Maling 1986)
However, Rögnvaldsson (1986) notes that if the object Sigga in (86a) is replaced by the
pronoun hana (‘her’), the reflexive is in fact preferred over the pronoun. If we can as-
sume that in such cases the reflexive is grammatical, while other factors may interfere
41Maling (1986: 62, fn.6) gives a judgement (?) for sig bound by the matrix object, with the pronoun hann
also grammatical in this position: see (109a).
42I have retained the judgements from Maling (1986).
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with the grammaticality for some speakers, the data then fall into line with our assump-
tion that SE reflexives, like pronouns, must be free in their minimal PF-phase.
Interestingly, despite some speakers’ avoidance of object-oriented reflexives, in
the following cases where the reflexive or pronoun is contained in a locative, all speak-
ers appear to allow both the pronoun or the anaphor to corefer with the matrix object.
Moreover, Maling (1986: 57) states that the reflexive is in fact ‘strongly preferred’.
(87) a. Ég
I
tók
took
kanínunai
the rabbit
úr
out of
búrinu
cage
?hennari
?itsi
/sínui
/SEi
‘I took the rabbit out of its cage.’
b. Ég
I
lagði
put
drenginni
the boyi
við
by
hlið
side
systur
[of]sister
hansi
hisi
/sinnari
/SEi
‘I put the boy by the side of his sister.’ (Maling 1986)
We have seen in §5.2.3 that for English verbs whose object is interpreted as undergoing
a movement specified by a locative PP, the PP can (and perhaps must) be assumed
to contain a PRO subject controlled by the object of the verb. This is supported by
crosslinguistic data in this chapter, and appears to hold here, too. The reason why the
reflexive is unanimously acceptable is that it is indeed bound by a subject, PRO in PP.43
Given the reported variation across speakers, it is difficult to know whether an
analysis of sig should be based on that proposed for the Norwegian equivalent, or
whether the reflexive should be considered to operate differently from the one in Nor-
wegian. This question is largely irrelevant, however, since individuals for whom sig
is subject-oriented must in any case have a lexical entry for sig which differs in some
respect from the sig of speakers for whom there is no subject-orientation requirement.
Assuming that subject-oriented sig has the same features and syntax as in Norwegian,
the question is how sig differs for those speakers who allow it to be bound by an object.
As we have seen that the Dutch and Norwegian SE reflexives reflexivise a predicate by
being interpreted as part of v (which may also involve covert movement to v). Thought
of in a formal semantic sense, a predicate is of course a type of syntactic object which
requires (at least) an argument. (Agentive) v heads a predicate which requires an argu-
ment in SpecvP. Typically, sig reflexivises this predicate, resulting in an interpretation of
sig as bound by the subject in SpecvP. Now take a 3-place predicate, like ‘send’. Suppose
that in the derivation of (85a), repeated here as (88a), the derivation of VP proceeds as
in (88b).
43Assuming that the pronoun is not disfavoured to the extent that it is ungrammatical, it remains to
show how the pronoun here satisfies both Condition B and the orientation constraint, however; see the
discussion below concerning its application in Icelandic. It may be necessary to resort to claiming that
the just posited PRO subject of PP in such cases is in fact optional, allowing the pronoun to be free in its
PF-phase (PP), and LF-phase (vP).
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(88) a. Jónj
Johnj
sendi
sent
Haraldk
Haroldk
föt
clothes
á
for
sigj/k
SEj/k
‘John sent Harold clothes for him(self).’ (Thráinsson 1979)
b. [VP Harald [V′ sendi [DP föt á sig]]]
After merging with its complement, V now heads a predicate requiring two arguments.
Therefore, it is in theory possible that sig’s reflexivising feature can be interpreted not
as part of v, but as part of V, resulting in an interpretation of sig as bound by Harald
in SpecVP. I suggest, then, that while SE reflexives typically must be interpreted as
reflexivising a v/n (etc.) predicate, sig may for some speakers be able to reflexivise
other predicates, such as V.
6.4.2.2 Long distance binding across subjunctive clauses
Another much discussed characteristic of Icelandic which distinguishes it from Main-
land Scandinavian is that sig may also take a long distance antecedent (beyond the clos-
est subject) when the clause is subjunctive. Recall that we have seen in §6.3.3.3 that in
Norwegian the reflexive must be bound in the minimal tensed clause: SE reflexives can
be bound across an infinite number of infinitival boundaries, regardless of intervening
subjects. As noted by Thráinsson (1991), this extends to all Scandinavian languages.
We have explained this by non-overt movement of the reflexive through successive v
heads, satisfying the Phase Impenetrability Condition as each infinitival is assumed to
be either vP, or perhaps a non-phasal constituent, like TP. The fact that finite clauses
(albeit only subjunctives) in Icelandic seem to give rise to the same possibility of long
distance binding (as first shown by Thráinsson 1976) is intriguing.
(89) a. Jónj
Johnj
veit
knows
[að
[that
Péturi
Peteri
rakar
shaves-IND
sigi/∗j
SEi/∗j
á hverjum
every
degi]
day]
‘John knows that Peter shaves himself every day.’
b. Jónj
Johnj
skipaði
ordered
Pétrii
Peteri
[að
[to
PROi
PROi
raka
shave-INF
sigi/j
SEi/j
á hverjum
every
degi]
day]
‘John ordered Peter to shave him(self) every day.’
c. Jónj
Johnj
segir
says
[að
[that
Péturi
Peteri
raki
shave-SUBJ
sigi/j
SEi/j
á hverjum
every
degi]
day]
‘John says that Peter shaves him(self) every day.’
The subjunctive verb appears to be crucial: for verbs which take either subjunctive or
indicative complements, only the subjunctive permits a reflexive bound outside that
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clause:44
(90) a. Jóni
Johni
heyrði
heard
[að
[that
ég
I
hefði
had-SUBJ
svikið
betrayed
sigi]
SEi]
‘John heard that I had betrayed him.’
b. * Jóni
Johni
heyrði
heard
[að
[that
ég
I
hafði
had-IND
svikið
betrayed
sigi]
SEi]
(adapted from Thráinsson 1991)
In cases where the binding domain of the reflexive extends into (multiple) subjunctive
clause(s), any intervening indicative clause will prevent the binding domain from ex-
tending further into a higher clause:
(91) Jónj
Johnj
segir
says
að
that
Maríak
Maryk
viti
knows-SUBJ
að
that
Haraldurl
Haroldl
vill
wants-IND
að
that
Billi
Bill
meiði
hurts-SUBJ
sig∗j/∗k/l
SE∗j/∗k/l
‘John says that Mary knows that Harold wants Bill to hurt him.’
(adapted from Anderson 1986)
Thráinsson (1976: 232-234) observes that long distance binding of sig interacts pre-
dictably with the intriguing ‘domino effect’ in subjunctive complements. Where a ma-
trix verb requires a subjunctive complement, the deeper embedded complements may
all be switched to subjunctives, even if infinitivals are standardly selected, resulting in
‘subjunctives all the way down’. Notably, when the matrix clause triggers subjunctives
all the way down as in (92a), a reflexive in the deepest embedded clause can take the
matrix subject as its antecedent; where the option is not triggered as in (92b), binding
by the matrix subject is blocked by the indicative clause.
(92) a. Jóni
Johni
segir
says
að
that
Maríaj
Maryj
viti
knows-SUBJ
að
that
Haraldurk
Haroldk
vilji
wants-SUBJ
að
that
Billi
Bill
heimsæki
visits-SUBJ
sigi/j/k
SEi/j/k
‘John says that Mary knows that Harold wants Bill to visit him/her.’
b. Jóni
Johni
segir
says
að
that
Maríaj
Maryj
viti
knows-SUBJ
að
that
Haraldurk
Haroldk
vill
wants-IND
að
that
Billi
Bill
heimsæki
visits-SUBJ
sig∗i/∗j/k
SE∗i/∗j/k
‘John says that Mary knows that Harold wants Bill to visit him.’
44As shown by Maling (1982); Anderson (1986), it is only the fact that there is no nominative morpho-
logical form of the independent reflexive pronoun which means that the subject of the subjunctive clause
cannot be reflexive.
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(Thráinsson 1976)
The question, of course, is what is it about subjunctives in Icelandic that allows
a reflexive to freely find an antecedent through subjunctive but not indicative clauses.
Pica (1991) shows that for long distance reflexives in general two broad competing ap-
proaches have emerged: either the reflexive is treated as not a true anaphor, and is
argued to have pronominal properties, or it is a true reflexive and the usual binding
conditions do not hold. Reuland and Everaert (2001) note that the same options com-
pete for long distance Icelandic sig in subjunctive environments.45 One argues that
pragmatic rather than structural conditions govern the appearance of long distance sig
in the subjunctive cases; the other seeks a unified explanation for long distance reflexivi-
sation in both infinitives and subjunctives. It should be clear that for the binding theory
developed in this thesis the former will be the easier, placing the problem outside the
scope of our binding theory. Yet this approach is only satisfactory inasmuch as it fits
with empirical evidence, in particular whether long distance reflexivisation with sub-
junctives shows different properties from long distance reflexivisation with infinitival
clauses. Our attention now turns to this evidence.
An approach which treated long distance reflexivisation with subjunctives as par-
allel to reflexivisation with infinitives might well envisage that subjunctive clauses are
somehow incomplete domains, or in our terms, not phasal in the way that indicative
CPs are. Yet there is evidence against treating subjunctive clauses like infinitivals for the
purposes of binding possibilities. We will see in more detail below that in Icelandic in-
finitival clauses as in (93), while sig in the object position of the infinitival can be bound
by the matrix clause subject, a pronoun has to be free in the same domain.
(93) Jóni
Johni
telur
believes
mig
me
hafa
have
svikið
betrayed
*hanni
*himi
/sigi
/SEi
‘John believes me to have betrayed him.’ (Thráinsson 1979)
However, in cases of long distance reflexivisation where the embedded clause is sub-
junctive, there is no problem with a pronoun in the place of sig:46
(94) Jóni
Johni
telur
believes
að
that
María
Mary
elski
loves-SUBJ
hanni
himi
/sigi
/SEi
‘John believes that Mary loves him.’ (Thráinsson 1976)
45See Reuland and Sigurjónsdóttir (1997) and Reuland and Everaert (2001) for further references for each
approach.
46Interestingly, Thráinsson (1976: 236-7) notes that many speakers show a preference for the long dis-
tance reflexive in (94). He reports that it is possible to tease apart subtly different interpretations for the
pronoun and reflexive in some cases where both are permitted.
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Clearly, a subjunctive clause is in some sense ‘large enough’ (presumably, an LF-phase,
like other finite clauses) to satisfy the referential constraints on pronouns (as in Norwe-
gian, Condition B and an additional orientation constraint). It does not appear, then,
that Icelandic subjunctive clauses are different in terms of their phasehood from other
finite clauses, heading off the most natural analysis for a unified approach to infinitival
and subjunctive long distance reflexivisation.
Next we examine how strict the relationship between the subjunctive and long
distance reflexivisation is. Following the initial findings of Thráinsson (1976), Thráins-
son (1991: 56) concludes that “[i]t is not the case... that LDRs [= long distance reflexives]
are mechanically conditioned by the subjunctive”.47 For example, where subjunctives
appear due to the requirement of a particular conjunction, long distance sig is not li-
censed:
(95) a. * Jóni
Johni
væri
would be
glaður
glad
ef
if
María
Mary
kyssti
would-kiss-SUBJ
sigi
SEi
b. * Jóni
Johni
kemur
won’t
ekki
come
nema
unless
María
Mary
kyssi
kisses-SUBJ
sigi
SEi
(Thráinsson 1976)
Thráinsson (1976) argues that syntactic explanations for the correlation between sub-
junctives and long distance sig are untenable, and later research has indeed brought
forward further evidence for this position. Maling (1984) and Reuland and Everaert
(2001) report that the antecedent can sometimes be non-c-commanding (though it still
has to be a subject, this time a subject of a DP), indicating that long distance sig in sub-
junctive clauses is governed by discourse principles rather than syntactic ones.
(96) [Skoðun
[opinion
Jónsi]
John’si]
er
is
að
that
sigi
SEi-ACC
vanti
lacks-SUBJ
hæfileika
talent
‘John’s opinion is that he lacks talent.’ (Maling 1984)
Reuland and Everaert show that in the cases of long distance reflexivisation with infini-
tival clauses, there is no such possibility of non-c-commanding antecedents:
(97) * [Skoðun
[opinion
Jónsi]
John’si]
virþist
seems
vera
be-INF
hættuleg
dangerous
fyrir
for
sigi
SEi-ACC
‘John’s opinion seems to be dangerous for him.’ (Reuland and Everaert 2001)
47Note that this rather contradicts the evidence from ‘subjunctives all the way down’ in (92a) and (92b)
indicating that long distance sig is conditioned by syntactic factors. For the argument that follows, what is
crucial is whether subjunctives all the way down correlate with relevant semantic or pragmatic differences
which are not attested in the contrast in (95a) and (95b). Unfortunately I do not have access to such
judgments at present.
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This contrast between (96) and (97) is very reminiscent of the contrast between ‘lo-
gophoric’ reflexives and locally bound reflexives in English. In §4.4.1 we saw that the
former can similarly be bound by non-c-commanding subjects at long distance for some
speakers and must be exempt from a local binding requirement. Moreover, just as for
certain English logophoric reflexives, Sigurðsson (1990: 317) notes that sig can in fact
appear without any sentence-internal antecedent at all.48
(98) Sigvaldii
Sigvaldii
neitaði
denied
því,
it,
að
that
þetta
this
vœri
was
vilji
will
þjóðarinnar.
the nation’s.
Að minnsta kosti
at least
væri
was
það
it
ekki
not
sinni
SE’si
vilji
will
‘Sigvaldi denied that this was the nation’s will. At least it was not his [refl]
will [he said].’ (Thráinsson 1991)
Thráinsson (1991) concludes:
“...the semantic conditions for these syntactically unbound cases of long dis-
tance reflexives in Icelandic (and Faroese) seem to be the same as for the ones
where a reflexive inside a finite (subjunctive) clause is syntactically bound
by the subject of a higher clause in the same sentence.”
(Thráinsson 1991: 59)
Sig in long distance environments conditioned by the subjunctive also behaves
like a logophoric reflexive in giving rise to both strict and sloppy readings under VP-
ellipsis (Thráinsson 1991; Reuland and Everaert 2001).49
(99) Jóni
Johni
telur
believes
[að
[that
prófessorinn
the professor
muni
will
fella
fail-SUBJ
sigi
SEi
á
on
prófinu]
the test]
og
and
Arik
Arik
telur
believes
þa
so
líka
too
‘John believes that the professor will fail him on the test and Ari does too.’
= Ari believes that the professor will fail Ari on the test
= Ari believes that the professor will fail John on the test
(adapted from Reuland and Everaert 2001)
In this way, long distance sig behaves again like a pronoun. Locally bound sig exhibits
only the sloppy reading, consistent with an analysis as a true anaphor. Reuland and
48See also references in Thráinsson (1991: 58) for earlier but less detailed observations along these lines
(e.g. Maling 1984), and for examples.
49Again, see §4.4.1.
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Everaert (2001) therefore draw the natural conclusion that long distance sig involves
coreference, but local sig involves binding. However, Thráinsson (1991) highlights that
even the long distance reflexive differs from pronominals in that it cannot take a split
antecedent:
(100) Jóni
Johni
sagði
told
Maríuj
Maryj
að
that
þú
you
hefðir
had-SUBJ
svikið
betrayed
þaui+j
themi+j
/*sigi+j
/*SEi+j
‘John told Mary that you had betrayed them.’
(adapted from Thráinsson 1991)
With this slight exception, the evidence we have reviewed so far points to a treat-
ment of sig in long distance subjunctive contexts as governed by pragmatic rather than
syntactic constraints. It seems that only a certain type of subjunctive allows a long dis-
tance reading for sig, as Thráinsson (1976) notes, one related to point of view. To confirm
this, a final piece of evidence is that derived subjects cannot bind long distance sig in
subjunctive contexts.
(101) * Pétrij
Peterj
var
was
sagt
told
(af
(by
Jónii)
Johni)
að
that
ég
I
elskaði
loved-SUBJ
sigi/j
SEi/j
(Reuland and Everaert 2001)
Following Reuland and Everaert’s (2001) assumption that derived subjects do not read-
ily convey perspective or point of view, we can assume that the long distance reflexive
here is not appropriately pragmatically licensed.
In summary, Icelandic is similar to the other Scandinavian languages in that the
infinitival clause does not constitute a local binding domain for an SE reflexive. Where
Icelandic differs is that it has a pragmatically licensed reflexive pronoun homophonous
with the true anaphor, whose appearance is typically conditioned by certain subjunc-
tive constructions where point of view comes into play. We follow the conclusion of
Thráinsson (1976: 237) that “the meaning expressed by the NCBR [non-clause bounded
reflexive] is related to the meaning reflected in the subjunctives that correlate with it.”
That is, the relation between long distance sig and the subjunctive is not the result of
some syntactic property of subjunctives, but due to discourse factors. It should not be a
major concern of a syntactic binding theory to explain the occurrence of such reflexives,
and accordingly there is no reason for us to consider proposing a modified definition of
the local binding domain in order to accommodate them.
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6.4.2.3 Long distance binding across infinitival clauses
While the long distance subjunctive cases should come under a general treatment of
logophoric reflexives, we must still of course deal with the long distance cases in infini-
tival clauses. To this end, we extend the tentative analysis suggested above for Norwe-
gian whereby Scandinavian infinitival clauses have a somewhat reduced architecture,
and are not complete CPs, allowing successive movement through v heads in accor-
dance with the Phase Impenetrability Condition.
In control constructions, things appear at first to work out exactly as for English
with subject-control and object-control predicates.
(102) a. Ég
I
lofaði
promised
Haraldii
Haroldi
að
to
raka
shave
hanni
himi
/*sigi
/*SEi
‘I promised Harold to shave him.’
b. Jóni
Johni
reyndi
tried
að
to
raka
shave
*hanni
*himi
/sigi
/SEi
‘John tried to shave himself.’ (Thráinsson 1979)
(103) Ég
I
skipaði
ordered
Haraldii
Haroldi
að
to
raka
shave
*hanni
*himi
/sigi
/SEi
‘I ordered Harold to shave himself.’ (Thráinsson 1979)
As long as we assume that the infinitival clause contains a vP with PRO in its specifier,
we predict the the data. For example, in (102a), the pronoun can corefer with the object
of the matrix clause since the PRO in its phase is controlled by the subject, hence there is
no Condition B violation; the anaphor will not be bound in vP, and so violates Condition
A. In (103), the pronoun cannot corefer with the object of the matrix clause since the
PRO in its phase is controlled by that object, hence a Condition B violation arises; the
anaphor has an antecedent within its phase, and hence must corefer with the subject.
However, it soon becomes clear that the situation is not so straightforward. The
reason that the matrix clause object in (102a) fails to bind the reflexive in the control
complement is not one of locality, but rather of orientation. As in Norwegian, the SE
reflexive can be bound by a subject outside its minimal vP when embedded in an infini-
tival:50
(104) a. Jóni
Johni
leyfði
allowed
mér
me
að
to
raka
shave
*hanni
*himi
/sigi
/SEi
‘John allowed me to shave him.’
50The pronoun is ruled out as an obviation violation, as we see below in §6.4.3.1.
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b. Jóni
Johni
skipaði
ordered
mér
me
að
to
raka
shave
*hanni
*himi
/sigi
/SEi
‘John ordered me to shave him.’ (Thráinsson 1979)
Since binding of sig by an object is possible for many speakers, the question we must
answer is why binding by an object in (102a) is impossible. We have assumed that long
distance binding in Scandinavian infinitival constructions generally is due to the non-
phasal status of the infinitival clause (permitting successive cyclic covert movement of
sig). Yet in the literature there has been some skepticism of the non-clausal analysis of
infinitives in accounting for long distance binding. One argument against such an ap-
proach that Anderson (1986) provides is that if the infinitival complement simply did
not constitute the relevant local domain in such constructions, wewould expect binding
into the infinitival to exhibit properties of local binding, which it does not.51 For exam-
ple, while non-subjects can bind anaphors in their clause, long distance non-subjects
separated by a clause boundary from sig cannot, as in (102a). But non-subjects do not
bind into infinitivals, either, suggesting that perhaps a slightly different mechanism is
at play. The analysis of the orientation of sig proposed in §6.4.2.1 offers an indication of
why this may be the case. In order for sig to be object-oriented, we have proposed that
it must reflexivise V, rather than v, reflexivisation of which results in subject orientation.
However, in order to escape its minimal LF-phase and trigger long distance binding in
infinitivals, sig must first move to the v head of its phase, and then on to another phase
head. The sig which for some speakers targets V for reflexivisation (resulting in object
orientation) does not occupy the phase edge and so is not available for successive cyclic
edge-to-edge movement.
Similar binding facts are found in ECM constructions, and we assume the same
explanation, that for some reason, the infinitival does not count as the local domain
here. The object of the ECM clause, if coreferential with the matrix subject, is obligato-
rily an anaphor, whereas in English it is obligatorily a pronoun.
(105) a. Jóni
Johni
telur
believes
mig
me
hafa
have
svikið
betrayed
*hanni
*himi
/sigi
/SEi
‘John believes me to have betrayed him.’
b. Jóni
Johni
lét
made
mig
me
raka
shave
*hanni
*himi
/sigi
/SEi
‘John made me shave him.’ (Thráinsson 1979)
As we expect, the ECM subject can also bind the reflexive ECM object (satisfying Con-
dition A) or pronoun (violating Condition B). Just as in English, we assume that the
51Further, Thráinsson (1979) provides evidence that these clauses are fully sentential in that they have a
complementiser, although the status of að as a complementiser here is not always agreed upon.
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ECM subject (Jón) enters the derivation in SpecvP, that is, within the minimal LF-phase
for the pronoun, resulting in a Condition B violation.
(106) a. Ég
I
tel
believe
Jón
Johni
hafa
have
rakað
shaved
*hanni
*himi
/sigi
/SEi
‘I believe John to have shaved himself.’
b. Ég
I
sá
saw
Jón
Johni
raka
shave
*hanni
*himi
/sigi
/SEi
‘I saw John shave himself.’
While these ECM cases fall into line with the rest of our analysis, the problem
with ECM constructions remains, as in Dutch and Norwegian, with SE reflexives as
ECM subjects: if sig is indeed subject to Condition B in the ECM subject position, why
don’t non-reflexive pronouns occur in the same environments?
(107) Maríai
Maryi
taldi
believed
*hanai
*heri
/sigi
/SEi
vera
be
gáfaða
gifted
‘Mary believed herself to be gifted.’ (Taraldsen 1996)
Taraldsen (1996) claims that Condition B is not at play in ruling out the pronoun here
(since it would also rule out sig), but an economy condition (independent of the binding
theory) is, preferring sig since it bears fewer features and is hencemore economical. Tar-
aldsen proposes that sig is underspecified in that it bears no number feature specifica-
tion (and is hence referentially dependent), since there is no morphological distinction
between singular and plural. The absence of nominative sig is then explained by the
assumption that subject agreement involves a full ϕ-set but object agreement involves a
reduced ϕ-set with no number feature (for which Taraldsen provides independent evi-
dence from Icelandic). However, we have already dismissed in §5.3.2.1 an approach to
Condition B effects which relies on an economy comparison of numerations containing
different lexical items, and must therefore seek an alternative explanation.52 The ECM
subject puzzle must thus remain unresolved for the present.
6.4.3 Problems with pronouns
We have seen that sig in many ways behaves in accordance with the equivalent SE
reflexives we have seen in Dutch and Norwegian, and we can put this down to a sim-
ilar feature specification and reflexivisation mechanism. While sig also exhibits char-
52As an example of an approach which accommodates the intuitions of Taraldsen (1996) in the current
framework, see Hornstein (2006), where pronouns are introduced in the derivation ‘grammatically’ and
do not constitute lexical items in the numeration. See §5.3.2.1.
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acteristics which differ slightly from Dutch and Norwegian SE reflexives, Icelandic
non-reflexive pronouns also have rather intriguing empirical properties which set them
apart from the languages we have examined thus far. We see below that in one partic-
ular case, this variation may be attributed to the Icelandic Case and agreement system,
in fact providing important supporting evidence for the narrow-syntactic analysis of
Condition B presented in §5.4.3.
6.4.3.1 Pronoun orientation
We have seen above that many speakers allow the possibility of object-oriented reflex-
ives, though we have highlighted a degree of variation across speakers. Given that
sig does not necessarily obey an orientation constraint similar to that found in Main-
land Scandinavian languages, it is notable that an orientation constraint nevertheless
appears to govern the distribution of pronouns in Icelandic. This can be taken as
an argument against a uniform treatment of subject-orientation of reflexives and anti-
subject orientation of pronouns as in Hestvik (1990), briefly sketched in §6.4.2.1. If, as
in Hestvik’s analysis of Norwegian, all pronouns undergo movement because they are
heads and this results in orientation constraints, why does sig in Icelandic appear not
to be strictly subject-oriented, while pronouns show the equivalent anti-subject orien-
tation? Take the equivalent sentences to (85a) and (85b) (repeated here as (108a) and
(108b)) with the pronoun hann:
(108) a. Jónj
Johnj
sendi
sent
Haraldk
Haroldk
föt
clothes
á
for
sigj/k
SEj/k
‘John sent Harold clothes for him(self).’ (Thráinsson 1979)
b. Jónj
Johnj
rétti
handed
Haraldik
Haroldk
fötin
clothes
á
for
sinj/k
SEj/k
‘John handed Harold his clothes.’ (Maling 1986)
(109) a. Jónj
Johnj
sýndi
showed
Haraldik
Haroldk
föt
clothes
á
for
hann∗j/k
him∗j/k
‘John showed Harold clothes for him.’ (Thráinsson 1979)
b. Jónj
Johnj
rétti
handed
Haraldik
Haroldk
fötin
clothes
á
for
hann∗j/k
him∗j/k
‘John handed Harold his clothes.’ (Maling 1986)
As is typical of the orientation constraint on pronouns, the judgement for a pronoun
in this position differs according to which DP the pronoun corefers with. Unless we
assume that an orientation constraint like (61b) is in operation in the same way as we
have seen for Norwegian, there are two possible conclusions to draw, neither accept-
able. First, the PP in (109a) and DP in (109b) are not local binding domains (PF-phases)
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for the purposes of Condition B.53 What remains to be explained then is why hann satis-
fies Condition B despite being apparently locally bound by the object. Second, we could
continue to assume that the PP and DP are indeed PF-phases. This explains why hann
is acceptable when bound by the object (which is outside its binding domain), but does
not explain why it cannot be bound by the subject (also apparently outside its binding
domain). The orientation constraint (61b) resolves the problem of the latter approach,
ruling out binding of a pronoun by a subject in its minimal LF-phase.
In other cases, where a predicative phrase is controlled by a matrix clause object,
Maling (1986) notes that pronouns appear not to be able to be bound by objects:
(110) a. Ég
I
taldi
considered
Haraldi
Haraldi
[góðan
[good
við
with
börnin
children
*hansi
*hisi
/síni]
/SEi]
‘I considered Harald good with his children.’
b. Mér
Me
finnst
finds
Haralduri
Haroldi
[alltof
[all too
hrifinn
fond
af
of
*honumi
*himi
sjálfumi
self
/sjálfum
/self
séri]
SEi]
‘I find Harald all too fond of himself.’ (from Maling 1986)
Here, the reflexive pronounmust be used (for all speakers) even though the object is the
antecedent, and Maling shows that while object-controlled reflexivisation is optional in
normal cases, it is obligatory in these cases. We may assume that in (110b) sjálfum is
required in order to circumvent a Condition B effect. This does not arise in (110a) since
the SE reflexive is the possessor of a DP which constitutes its minimal PF-phase. Since
Condition B is satisfied in both sentences (allowing the SE reflexive), it is clearly the
orientation constraint which rules the pronoun out in each case. Maling shows that a
(counter-intuitive) small clause analysis with the putative matrix object in fact occupy-
ing a small-clause subject position is untenable on the grounds of constituency tests.
She also argues against a reduced clause analysis, with PRO controlled by the matrix
object, on the grounds that a full clausal source is not always possible. However, this
does not necessarily rule out the derivation in question. Indeed, it is the best analysis
available in a framework that makes use of some version of the Projection Principle;
Maling instead adopts a theoretical framework which allows such relationships to be
stated simply in terms of predication.54 If we assume that PRO, controlled by the matrix
clause object (‘Harold’), is the subject of a small clause in (110a) and (110b), then we ex-
plain the data: in each case the pronoun is free in its minimal PF-phase (DP), but bound
by a subject (PRO) in its minimal LF-phase, in violation of the orientation constraint.
53Indeed, Maling (1986: 62, fn.6) assumes that the PP in (109a) is an argument of a ditransitive verb, and
that PP arguments are not typically binding domains, even for pronouns.
54See, for example, Rögnvaldsson (1986: 93-97) for arguments that predication is not the relevant factor,
and that others are at play. See the discussion of (86a) above.
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Thráinsson (1991: 53) notes that Icelandic differs from the mainland Scandinavian
languages in that the blocking of binding of a pronoun also appears to be somewhat
long distance.
(111) Péturi
Peteri
bað
asked
Jensj
Jensj
[PROj
[PROj
að raka
to shave
hann∗i/∗j]
him∗i/∗j]
‘Peter asked Jens to shave him.’ (Thráinsson 1991)
Compare with the Norwegian, for example, where binding by the matrix subject is
grammatical:
(112) Jóni
Johni
bad
asked
ossj
usj
[PROj
[PROj
hjelpe
to help
hami/∗j]
himi/∗j]
‘John asked us to help him.’ (Norwegian; from Thráinsson 1991)
It is only infinitival clauses that give rise to this long distance effect:
(113) Jóni
Johni
sagði
said
[að
[that
ég
I
hefði
had
svikið
betrayed
hanni]
himi]
‘John said that I had betrayed him.’ (Thráinsson 1991)
Of course, the impossibility of coreference between the PRO subject and the object of the
infinitival in (111) is expected as both a Condition B and an obviation violation. Yet the
impossibility of coreference between the matrix subject and the object of the infinitival
is not. Given that we have seen that the regular Condition B domain (the PF-phase)
holds as in (109a) and (109b) and that subjects outside this domain that cannot bind a
pronoun are constrained by the orientation constraint, then we assume that here we are
also dealing with an orientation effect. The subject control construction (114), where
a pronoun can be bound by an object outside its minimal LF-phase, provides further
evidence that (111) is due to an orientation effect, rather than a Condition B effect.
(114) Égk
Ik
lofaði
promised
Haraldii
Haroldi
[að
[COMP
PROk
PROk
raka
shave
hanni]
himi]
‘I promised Harold to shave him.’ (adapted from Anderson 1986)
It is unclear, then, why the orientation constraint on pronouns should apply differently
in Norwegian and Icelandic, albeit perhaps onlymarginally, although sincemore gener-
ally the exact nature of the constraint remains elusive, we will not speculate any further
here on how to resolve this discrepancy.
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6.4.3.2 Interaction between Case, agreement, and Condition B
This problem of orientation aside, given the analysis presented in this chapter, the data
appear to pattern aswewould expect. Things aremore complicatedwhenwe lookmore
closely at Condition B effects when the pronoun or sig is the ECM subject, though, as
Taraldsen (1995, 1996) reports some curious Condition B obviations in this environment.
As is well documented, Icelandic has nominative objects in certain cases where
the subject receives a lexically selected oblique, so-called ‘quirky’, Case. Here we will
concentrate on nominatives as objects in monoclausal constructions, and as the subject
of ECM infinitivals.55 Take first the ECM construction, or more generally, constructions
where the nominative ‘object’ is in fact the subject of an infinitival or small clause, and
the matrix subject is dative. Two facts are central to our purposes here. First, recall that
in (107), repeated here as (115), an accusative ECM subject bound by the matrix subject
must be realised as sig, rather than a pronoun.
(115) Maríai
Maryi
taldi
believed
sigi
SEi
/*hanai
/*heri
vera
be
gáfaða
gifted
‘Mary believed herself to be gifted.’ (Taraldsen 1996)
In contrast to the structurally similar nominative-accusative ECM pattern in (115), Tar-
aldsen (1995, 1996) shows that when the ECM subject is a nominative ‘object’, sig cannot
occur, perhaps due to a restriction on nominative reflexives:56
(116) Maríui
Maryi-DAT
fannst
thought-3SG
húni
shei-NOM
/*sigi
/*SEi
vera
be
gáfuð
gifted
‘Mary thought herself to be gifted.’ (adapted from Taraldsen 1996)
In precisely these environments, Taraldsen (1996) claims, the bound pronoun is permit-
ted.
The second fact concerns agreement in ECM constructions, and requires some
background on Icelandic syntax. In Icelandic, quirky subjects do not trigger agreement
with the verb, which appears in its default 3SG form.
55The properties of these two constructions differ in certain respects, and the relevant ones are noted
here. See Sigurðsson (2004) for a more detailed summary, and many further references. Note that the term
‘nominative object’ will for our purposes also cover nominative ECM subjects.
56See especially Everaert (1990, 2001) for an account of the general absence of nominative anaphors
in Germanic languages, and for binding-theoretic data in other environments where nominative objects
occur; the general trend in such cases follows that shown here by Taraldsen (1996) for the ECM subject
position. See also note 58 below.
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(117) Strákunum
the boys-PL-DAT
leiddist
bored-3SG
/*leiddust
/*bored-3PL
‘The boys were bored.’ (Sigurðsson 1996)
In such constructions, though, a nominative objectmay control the agreement if present.
However, as first noted by Thráinsson (1979), this agreement with a nominative object
may be optional.57
(118) a. Henni
her-DAT
leiddist
bored-3SG
/leiddust
/bored-3PL
strákarnir
the boys-PL-NOM
‘She found the boys boring.’
b. Mér
me-DAT
virtust
seemed-3PL
/virtist
/seemed-3SG
þeir
they-NOM
vera
be
gáfaþir
intelligent
‘It seemed to me that they were intelligent.’ (Sigurðsson 1996)
Let’s now return to nominative ECM subjects, as in (119). Taraldsen (1995) highlights
that agreement also seems to play a role in whether a nominative ECM subject can
induce a Condition B violation when bound by the matrix subject.
(119) a. Konunumi
women-thei-DAT
fundust
seemed-3PL
þær∗i
they∗i-NOM
vera
be
gáfaþar
gifted-FEM.PL-NOM
‘The women thought they were smart.’
b. Konunumi
women-thei-DAT
fannst
seemed-3SG
þæri
theyi-NOM
vera
be
gáfaþar
gifted-FEM.PL-NOM
‘The women thought they were smart.’ (Taraldsen 1995)
Number agreement on the verb with the nominative ECM subject here is reportedly op-
tional. Intriguingly, as Taraldsen highlights (attributing the observation to Höskuldur
Thráinsson), when agreement takes place, as in (119a), the nominative pronoun exhibits
a Condition B effect if it corefers with the matrix subject. If there is no agreement, there
is no Condition B effect, as in (119b). Taraldsen takes this as evidence that agreement
for number involves covert movement of the agreeing DP into the specifier of a num-
ber agreement head in the matrix clause (AgrN). This movement places the nominative
DP in a position which is too close to its antecedent for the purposes of Condition B.
Yet under the more recent theoretical assumptions adopted in this thesis, where the
operation Agree is capable of licensing agreement at long distance without subsequent
movement, this is not a desirable position to take.
57The degree of optionality of agreement depends on the construction, and the reader is referred to
Sigurðsson (1996) for a comprehensive explanation of this and indeed other agreement phenomena in
Icelandic.
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Suppose that the SE reflexive in (116) is ruled out independently of the binding
theory due to a nominative gap in the morphological paradigm, which seems a reason-
able assumption.58 It appears that the binding configuration of sig is not problematic,
as structurally identical cases as in (115), where the ECM subject is not nominative,
are grammatical. This view is supported by the fact that in Faroese, where the object
bears accusative rather than nominative Case, the reflexive is possible and the pronoun
impossible:
(120) Maríui
Maryi-DAT
tókti
thought-3SG
*hanai
*shei-ACC
/segi
/SEi
vera
be
klóka
wise
‘Mary thought she was wise.’ (Faroese; adapted from Taraldsen 1996)
The key question then is why the pronoun is permitted in environments such as (116)
and (119b).59 One strategy is to examine what properties of ECM constructions are
shared when the ECM subject is an accusative pronoun or an agreement-inducing nom-
inative pronoun, since both cases induce a Condition B effect. It is natural that in both
cases, the Agree operation applies between the ECM subject and an element in the ma-
trix clause. When the ECM subject is accusative, as in (115), it presumably enters into
Agree with v, resulting in accusative Case assignment to the pronoun (and perhaps
object agreement, morphologically unrealised). When the ECM subject is an agreeing
nominative, as in (119a), it enters into Agree withmatrix T, resulting in nominative Case
assignment to the pronoun and agreement on the matrix verb. What is common to (115)
and (119a), then, is that the ECM subject is active for the purposes of Agree, entering
into a syntactic relation with an element in the matrix clause. Recall that in §5.4.3.2 we
proposed that activity of features also plays a role in the principle of Maximise Struc-
tural Economy (a component of Merge) which derives Condition B effects. The fact that
the pronoun is active at the stage where the matrix subject enters the derivation means
that Maximise Structural Economy will apply at that point, ruling out the sentence if
the pronoun bears an identical [VAR] to the matrix subject.
Now take the case of the non-agreeing nominative ECM subject, as in (119b). We
assume that the locality between the ECM subject and the matrix subject is sufficient
to induce a Condition B effect, as is the case with ECM subjects which are accusative
58Although this approach certainly has problems, as Everaert (1990) notes for all standard approaches
to the non-existence of nominative anaphors. See Maling (1984) for a historical perspective on why this
gap might have arisen in Icelandic.
59Following from his account of the usual binding pattern in Icelandic ECM constructions outlined
above, Taraldsen’s (1996) claim is that the nominative pronoun is acceptable in (116) precisely because
the nominative reflexive is ruled out: essentially, a sort of economy condition permits the pronoun where
the reflexive is independently ruled out. However, this is not the sort of economy we have assumed in this
thesis, whereby economy of derivations only holds for a single lexical array. This analysis, as Taraldsen
concedes, envisages a rather different view of economy, holding across lexical arrays.
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pronouns or agreement-inducing nominative pronouns. Yet since the ECM subject in
(119b) fails to trigger verbal agreement, we may suppose that the conditions for Agree
are not met. If the relevant condition which is not met is activity of the pronoun’s
features in the matrix clause, then we may assume that this explains both why there is
no Agree operation with matrix T and why Maximise Structural Economy fails to hold
between the matrix subject and the nominative ECM subject, obviating the Condition
B effect. It remains to explain why the non-agreeing nominative pronoun is inactive in
the matrix clause, of course. Sigurðsson (1996) argues that the optionality of agreement
in these ‘dative and nominative with infinitive’ constructions arises due to a structural
Case assigner in the infinitive which is optionally activated:
“The fact that nonagreement is always possible in D/NcI [dative and nom-
inative with infinitive] suggests that D/NcI infinitives are headed by an
Infl-type element that can be activated as a Case assigner. Conversely, the
optional agreement... suggests that the nominatives can alternatively be as-
signed by the matrix Infl.”
(Sigurðsson 1996: 18)
So when agreement does not take place with the nominative ECM subject, this is due
to nominative Case already having been assigned to it within the infinitival and the
pronoun’s features being inactivated before the matrix clause is derived.60 An objection
might be raised in light of (116), where the nominative ECM subject is 3SG and so does
appear to agree with the 3SG inflection: the obviation of the Condition B effect might
then not be expected. However, if, as Sigurðsson claims, there are two analyses of such
infinitivals, we expect that such sentences are typically ambiguous between a structure
where the ECM infinitival contains an nominative Case assigner and one where it does
not. In both instances the verbal inflection will be 3SG, yet in the former this will be a
default agreement morpheme and in the latter it will be the result of Agree. The bound
reading for a 3SG nominative ECM subject pronoun will only be available in the former,
yet the sentence is nevertheless predicted grammatical.
This account for the interaction between Condition B effects and the Icelandic
Case/agreement system, based on arguments presented on independent grounds by
Sigurðsson (1996), fits quite comfortably with the assumptions we have made in this
thesis. This is not the end of the story, however, since nominative objects may also
appear in monoclausal constructions as in (118a), repeated below.
(121) Henni
her-DAT
leiddist
bored-3SG
/leiddust
/bored-3PL
strákarnir
the boys-PL-NOM
60It remains to be seen what themechanisms for default agreement are andwhy, for example, the deriva-
tion does not instead crash due to T bearing an unvalued ϕ-feature set.
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‘She found the boys boring.’ (Sigurðsson 1996)
Here again we see that agreement of the nominative object with the verb is optional.
There can be no possibility of an optional nominative assigner in such cases, however,
since there is no embedded clause. Sigurðsson (1996) in fact plays down the ‘optional-
ity’ of agreement with nominative objects in monoclausal constructions such as (121),
claiming that by far the preferred strategy is agreement, rather than non-agreement, and
that for most speakers, non-agreement with nominative objects is restricted to a hand-
ful of predicates, including leiðast (‘find boring’). Furthermore, even for these predi-
cates it appears that the non-agreement strategy is generally more marginal than the
agreement strategy. In order to account for the apparent optionality of nominative ob-
ject agreement with these predicates, Sigurðsson (1996) proposes that the nominative is
undergoing reanalysis as an inherent Case in such instances. Under the assumptions
concerning Agree that we adopt here, this would indeed explain why the nominative,
lacking a structural Case feature to make its ϕ-features active, may fail to exhibit agree-
ment.
The prediction, then, is that a pronominal nominative object in these construc-
tions will be able to corefer with the quirky subject. If the nominative Case feature the
pronoun bears is an inherent, rather than a structural Case, the pronoun will be inactive
for the purposes of both Agree and Maximise Structural Economy. This is what we saw
for the Frisian pronouns har and harren in §6.2.3.2. It seems that this prediction is not
borne out, however.
(122) Maríui
Maryi-DAT
leiddist
got-bored-with-3SG
*húni
*shei-NOM
(Taraldsen 1996)
Yet in another paper, Taraldsen (1995: 315) suggests that the judgement for the corefer-
ential pronoun in (122) is ??. Even so, this is still not as clear an obviation of the Condi-
tion B effect as we have seen in the ECM subject position above. We might not expect it
to be, though. As we saw above, when the nominative object is 3SG, the agreement and
non-agreement strategies give rise to the same morphological form of the verb. (122) is
therefore syntactically ambiguous. Recall now that Sigurðsson (1996) highlights that in
monoclausal contexts where non-agreement is (marginally) possible with leiðast (‘find
boring’), agreement is nevertheless the preferred strategy. Therefore, when faced with
an option of a derivation involving agreement or non-agreement, speakers may well
choose agreement. In that case, there will be a corresponding preference for a structural
nominative object rather than an inherent nominative, and the preferred derivation will
give rise to the Condition B effect. In order to permit coreference between the nomina-
tive object and the quirky subject, the disfavoured non-agreement strategy must be
6.4. Icelandic 286
employed, which could explain the ?? judgement reported by Taraldsen. Further sup-
port for this view comes from Taraldsen’s observation that (122) becomes ‘almost fully
acceptable’ when sjálf is added to the pronoun:61
(123) Maríui
Maryi-DAT
leiddist
was-bored-with-3SG
húni
shei-NOM
sjálf
self-FEM.SG-NOM
‘Mary was bored with herself.’ (Taraldsen 1996)
However, with true Condition B violations such as an accusative ECM subject bound
by the matrix subject, there is no such improvement at all. Compare (124a), adapted
from (107)/(115), and (124b):
(124) a. Maríai
Maryi
taldi
believed
*hanai
*heri
vera
be
gáfaða
gifted
‘Mary believed herself to be gifted.’
b. Maríai
Maryi
taldi
believed
*hanai
*shei-ACC
sjálfa
self-FEM.SG-ACC
vera
be
gáfaða
gifted
‘Mary believed herself to be gifted.’ (Taraldsen 1995)
6.4.4 Summary
Just as for Norwegian, we have seen that the binding properties of Icelandic sig must
be accounted for by non-overt head-movement. Given that we have until now aimed
to explain binding by employing the Agree mechanism which eliminates the need for
covert movements to establish syntactic relations, thismight be seen as a backward step.
However, such reflexives clearly exhibit rather different properties from those found in
English, for example, and I have given strong indications of how these properties, as
well as the relevant locality constraints on SE anaphors, can be explained by suchmove-
ment. Crucially, differences between the binding domains for different anaphors and
pronouns are once again reduced to their syntactic properties, and with sig, its analysis
as a head ensures that it can adjoin to predicates, which in some cases permits an ex-
tension of the binding domain. As a final example of how this approach is empirically
motivated, compare the distribution of sig with that of Icelandic reciprocals, which we
61Interestingly, Everaert (2001) notes that the effect seems to be replicated in Italian, where a construction
parallel to (123) is almost fully grammatical:
(i) ? Ad
To
alcunii
some.DAT
piacciono
please
solo
only
loroi
theyi.NOM
stessi
emph-self
‘Some people only please themselves.’ (Italian; Everaert 2001)
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analyse in the same way as their English counterparts, i.e. phrasal items with some
internal structure, bound by Agree with their antecedent.
(125) a. þeiri
theyi
munu
will
hafa
have
sent
sent
gjafirnar
the gifts
hvor
each
öðrum
otheri
‘They will have sent the gifts to each other.’
b. Bílana
the cars
hafa
have
þeiri
theyi
áreiðanlega
certainly
keypt
bought
af
from
hvor
each
öðrumi
otheri
‘They have certainly bought the cars from each other.’ (Thráinsson 1979)
Like sig, the reciprocal cannot be bound across a finite clause boundary, yet this is true
even when the clause is subjunctive:
(126) a. * Mennirniri
The meni
sögðu
said
[að
[that
ég
I
hefði
had
rakað
shaved
hvor
each
annani]
otheri]
(Thráinsson 1979)
b. * þeiri
theyi
sagði
said
[að
[that
María
Maria
elski.SUBJ
love
hvorn
each
annani]
otheri]
(Pica 1991)
This follows naturally from our conclusion that long distance sig in these environments
is used logophorically. However, nor can the Icelandic reciprocal be long distance
bound even when the embedded clause is infinitival. In the equivalent object control
configuration to (104b), where the SE reflexive can be bound by the matrix subject, the
reciprocal in (127) cannot:
(127) * þeiri
theyi
skipuðu
ordered
mér
me
að
to
raka
shave
hvor
each
annani
otheri
(Thráinsson 1979)
Again, though, we are able to comfortably explain this difference. The reason that the
SE reflexive’s domain extends beyond the infinitival clause is not that these clauses
are simply non-phasal and cannot constitute binding domains. Indeed, the data from
reciprocals as in (127) would then be unexplained. The reason is that sig head-moves
to the edge of the phase (vP), from where it can then move to adjoin to the selecting
predicate without violating the Phase Impenetrability Condition.62 Since reciprocals
cannot head-move, they cannot escape the infinitival clause and therefore their binding
behaviour patterns in much the same way as in English. Even though when a subject
control predicate is used, binding by the matrix subject is possible, we assume here that
62This is not possible in finite clauses as these are headed by C, and since C is not a predicate that sig can
reflexivise it cannot be targeted for (successive cyclic) head-movement.
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the binding is sufficiently local due to the presence of a PRO subject in the infinitival
clause controlled by the matrix subject.
(128) þeiri
theyi
reyndu
tried
að
to
raka
shave
hvor
each
annani
otheri
‘They tried to shave each other.’ (Thráinsson 1979)
The data for reciprocals in ECM constructions patterns in the same way, too (i.e. the
same way as in English). The matrix subject can bind a reflexive which is the ECM
clause object, yet it cannot bind a reciprocal.
(129) a. * Mennirniri
the meni
töldu
believed
mig
me
hata
hate
hvor
each
annani
otheri
b. * Mennirniri
the meni
létu
made
mig
me
svíkja
betray
hvor
each
annani
otheri
(Thráinsson 1979)
The head-movement account for SE reflexives is therefore able to account for Thráins-
son’s (1979: 294-7,337-9) observation that the binding domain for reciprocals differs
from that of reflexives particularly in control and ECM constructions. The initially wor-
rying problem that Icelandic reciprocals, reflexives, and pronouns all have different
binding domains can thus be explained under such an approach.
We have also seen that Icelandic differs from Norwegian and other Mainland
Scandinavian languages in a few interesting respects. We have employed several strate-
gies for explaining these differences within the system of binding proposed in this the-
sis. As with the rest of the analyses of crosslinguistic binding patterns explored in this
chapter, this should be taken as an indication of how the system provides just enough
flexibility to cope with such variation. Notably, the problematic long distance reflex-
ive in subjunctive environments cannot be handled by any syntactic binding theory,
and as such need not trouble us too much. More interesting is the interaction between
the binding system and the Case and agreement system in Icelandic which is far richer
than Mainland Scandinavian. If Condition B reduces to Maximise Structural Economy,
which relies on the pronoun being active at the stage when its antecedent enters the
derivation, we are able predict such interactions. An LF approach to binding as ad-
vocated by Chomsky (1993); Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) cannot hope to explain these
facts, however, since neither Case or agreement features can be present in the relevant
LF representations.
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6.5 Conclusion
The proposed binding theory, simply derived from the mechanisms of the computa-
tional system (narrow syntax) and their interaction with feature specifications of lexical
items, makes quite specific predictions about crosslinguistic variation. In particular,
variation should arise due to the interaction of three factors.
First, anaphors and pronouns may have different feature specifications. We have
seen two ways in which reflexivisation may be achieved in the languages examined in
this chapter: either by an anaphor entering into Agree with its antecedent due to an un-
valued feature (a mechanism also instantiated for reciprocal binding), or by an anaphor
bearing a feature which instructs the semantics to interpret a predicate as reflexive.
Though English, I suggest, only instantiates the former,63 which option to choose is
not somehow determined by the binding theories of particular languages. Indeed, a
central claim of this thesis is that languages have no binding theory, per se. Rather,
it is simply a matter of which lexical items bear which sorts of feature. While Dutch
exhibits each type of reflexivisation mechanism for its two different types of reflexive,
Norwegian only exhibits the Agree mechanism in the case of its reciprocals. Therefore,
we see rather striking similarities in the binding domains of English reflexives, Dutch
zichzelf, and reciprocals in all of these languages: in each, the Agree operation must
apply within the anaphor’s minimal LF-phase.
Second, additional syntactic properties of the anaphor or pronoun in question are
expected to play an important role in its binding behaviour. For example, we have seen
that the absence of a structural Case feature on certain pronouns in Frisian explains
why these pronouns are not subject to Condition B (assuming the analysis of Condition
B incorporating the Activity Condition proposed in §5.4.3.3). Similar effects are also
borne out in Icelandic, where nominative objects which do not trigger verbal agreement
(particularly in the ECM subject position) also fail to trigger Condition B effects.
Finally, syntactic characteristics of the language in question should interact with
the properties of its anaphors and pronouns. In particular, we have assumed that Nor-
wegian and Dutch differ from English with respect to the category of certain infinitival
complements (vP). On the assumption that SE anaphors undergo movement to a pred-
icate, this permits SE anaphors in these languages to extend their binding domain in
precisely these constructions.
In this way, we see how the proposed analysis of binding might extend to other
languages, with its major tenets intact. Variation is lexically governed, predicting both
63Although inherently reflexive predicates with a null anaphoric object may be a case of the latter; see
note 16.
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that binding mechanisms may differ across languages and that different binding mech-
anisms may be instantiated within the same language for different lexical items. From
a crosslinguistic perspective, the difficulty with binding in Minimalism is in trying to
account for variation while at the same time keeping the theory sufficiently restrictive.
While the analyses are tentative and questions remain open for further research, this
chapter provides good indications of the manner in which the analysis of binding de-
veloped in this thesis might be able to achieve this goal.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
The approach to binding developed in this thesis puts three important achievements
within reach. First, a theory of binding can be articulated without reference to aban-
doned theoretical concepts, while retaining the classical binding theory’s intuition that
common syntactic factors constrain both movement operations and the relation be-
tween pronouns/anaphors and their antecedents. Second, and more importantly on
Minimalist grounds, the binding theory can be derived from independent syntactic
principles, resulting in the elimination of the binding theory without losing empirical
coverage. Finally, the approach can be extended to accommodate crosslinguistic facts
that the classical binding theory has failed to address, resulting in a significant empiri-
cal gain (particularly if data from languages other than the four examined here can also
be treated in similar fashion). Less, it seems, is more.
7.1 Summary of the thesis
The story of how we got there was roughly as follows. Chapter 2 emphasised that
the classical binding theory is difficult to reconcile with key Minimalist assumptions
concerning levels of representation, local domains, and the abandonment of various
theoretical devices. We also saw, however, that the Derivation by Phase model (Chomsky
2000, 2001, 2004a) introduces theoretical concepts that extend naturally to the binding
theory. With core concepts such as features, operations, and local domains modified
(usually with independent support), we anticipated a reanalysis of the binding theory
in terms compatible with the Minimalist approach.
To achieve this, however, we would require the mechanisms involved in estab-
lishing binding relations to operate in narrow syntax, while Chomsky (1993) (and oth-
291
7.1. Summary of the thesis 292
ers working within Minimalism) have argued that the binding theory can only apply
at LF. We showed in chapter 3 that a binding theory that applies at LF is untenable on
the grounds of empirical evidence, and undesirable on the theoretical grounds that its
conditions must be stipulated with no underlying motivation. Chapter 4 went on to
show that not only was a narrow-syntactic approach to Condition A consistent with the
empirical data, but it in fact permits a complete elimination of the condition from the
grammar, deriving from the Agree operation. The properties of Agree tie in neatly with
those of anaphor binding, particularly with respect to locality, c-command, and the re-
sulting sharing of properties of the antecedent and the anaphor. The semanticosyntactic
feature which triggers Agree between an anaphor and its antecedent was identified as
[VAR], corresponding to the variable that a DP introduces at LF. Reducing binding to
the valuation of an anaphor’s unvalued [VAR: ] also strikingly explains the local bind-
ing domain for anaphors (the LF-phase), and makes accurate predictions concerning
the interaction of movement with anaphor binding.
Chapter 5 showed that the same reductionist methodology also leads to the elim-
ination of Condition B. Although the local domain for pronouns differs in important
respects from that of anaphors, we saw that it can be reduced to the PF-phase, explain-
ing some awkward non-complementarity environments. The relevance of this domain
was explained, since when a pronoun’s Case feature is interpreted by PF (at the PF-
phase) its remaining features are inactivated for the purposes of operations applying at
any later stage of the derivation. It remained to provide a motivation for Condition B,
and this was achieved by an economy condition (Maximise Structural Economy) stat-
ing that syntactic operations must be employed to establish dependencies wherever
possible. Since the application of Agree between the [VAR] features of the pronoun
and of any local c-commanding antecedent would in theory be possible (provided the
pronoun’s features remain active), employing a pronoun with the same value for its
[VAR] feature constitutes a less economical strategy for determining a binding relation.
Since in a derivational framework syntactic constraints only apply to operations, we
suggested that with some small (and not theoretically costly) changes to our assump-
tions concerning Merge and Agree, Maximise Structural Economy could be understood
as a constraint on Merge. We were therefore able to explain why Condition A applies
‘anywhere’ but Condition B applies ‘everywhere’: anaphor binding is determined by
a one-off application of Agree, but the relationship between a pronoun and other c-
commanding DPs must satisfy Maximise Structural Economy at every operation of
Merge.
Chapter 6 provided indications that this approach to binding facts appears to
show sufficient flexibility to capture a variety of crosslinguistic data from related lan-
guages. The narrow-syntactic approach predicts that variation arises due to differences
in the features of DPs responsible for establishing binding relations, differences in other
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features which may affect how the relation is established, and structural differences
across languages. This, it seems, is the minimum required to capture the data. Al-
though we made some specific proposals for extending the analyses in chapters 4 and
5 in order to explain the variation, important questions (necessarily) remain to be an-
swered even for the languages examined in detail here. However, the important con-
clusion is that the narrow-syntactic Minimalist approach has every chance of explaining
quite substantial crosslinguistic variation in binding (including orientation of reflexives
and differences in their local domains), with minimal differences in the featural speci-
fications of anaphors or pronouns interacting with independent syntactic properties of
each language.
7.2 Final thoughts
The binding theory holds a somewhat cherished place in syntactic theory as one of the
early success stories of generative research. However, the theoretical landscape has
changed since the classical period. The answers to key questions concerning how the
binding theory should be articulated and the empirical coverage that it should provide
have become clouded by a great deal of research, whose results have often proved dif-
ficult to interpret. As Burzio (1991: 82) observes, “the very facts it [the binding theory]
helped to uncover have in turn brought to light its limitations — a pattern in a sense
paradoxical, but characteristic of progress.” In a similar spirit, Reuland (2005: 579) notes
that the binding conditions “are too good to be false, and too bad to be true.” Reuland
highlights that a successful theory of binding must therefore account for general trends,
while offering a restricted flexibility capable of accounting for variation in such a way
that the original generalisations retain some content. This is a very, very fine line to
tread. The approach pursued in this thesis accounts for the general trends by reduc-
ing the binding conditions to the core operations of Agree and Merge, with variation
arising due to the interplay of these operations with lexical properties of anaphors and
pronouns, and with independent syntactic factors of particular languages. This seems
to offer a promising avenue for further inquiry from empirical and theoretical perspec-
tives.
Independently of the binding theory, the wider theoretical landscape has also
shifted since the advent of Minimalism, whose implications from biolinguistic and evo-
lutionary perspectives are perhaps only starting to become clear. We have seen good
indications in this thesis that an optimal Minimalist view of the binding theory, namely
that there is in fact no binding theory, looks attainable. Two separate achievements
should be distinguished. On the one hand, the fact that the Derivation by Phase frame-
work provides the theoretical devices responsible for binding with only minimal de-
7.2. Final thoughts 294
parture from core assumptions provides support for the particular implementation of
the Minimalist programme, which has hitherto seemed incompatible with the binding
theory. On the other hand, eliminating the binding theory provides a different sort
of support to Minimalism. Recent work, in particular by Hauser et al. (2002); Culi-
cover and Jackendoff (2005); Chomsky (2005b, 2006), has stressed the requirement for
a characterisation of Universal Grammar that is consistent with evolutionary consid-
erations in the development of the human language faculty. As Chomsky (2005b) and
Jackendoff (forthcoming) highlight, to adequately account for the evolutionary origins
of language, the components of the language faculty that are innate to humans (and
so genetically endowed) must be minimised. This approach is a key departure from
previous versions of Principles and Parameters frameworks, where UG was enriched
in order to explain how children acquire grammar rapidly from finite input data. In
order to show that the evolutionary explanation is potentially within the reach of the
Minimalist programme, it must be shown that all but a bare minimum of principles are
eliminable from UG. In this context, elimination of the binding theory from UG is thus
a small step on the way to the Minimalist goal, but—in light of the importance placed
on the binding theory throughout the history of generative syntax—a significant one.
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